Family & Education Flashcards

1
Q

1. The Family Based on Marriage

Based on Art 41.

A

duty on the State to safeguard the institution of Marriage on which the family is founded), the term ‘family’ has been considered to be the marital family:

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2
Q

1. The Family Based on Marriage

State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966]

A
  • SC held a natural, unmarried father wasn’t entitled to rely on Art 41/be heard before adoption
  • Rejected the concept that an unmarried unit constituted a family within Art 41.
  • Held there is no such thing as a ‘de facto’ family – constitution only protects martial families.
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3
Q

1. The Family Based on Marriage

Murphy v AG [1982]

A
  • Defined marriage as “a permanent indissoluble union of man and woman”.
  • With the referendum, it’s no longer man and woman but still have a special institution of marriage
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4
Q

2. Power of Oireachtas to Recognise Non-Marital Families

Murphy v AG [1982]

A
  • Held the Income Tax Act that taxed married couples more heavily than unmarried couples was in breach of the obligation on the State to guard the institution of marriage.
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5
Q

2. Power of Oireachtas to Recognise Non-Marital Families

Muckley v Ireland [1985]

A
  • Ps overpaid tax on basis of Murphy finding and sought to offset the overpayment against a later underpayment. But s.21 Finance Act 1980 prevented this.
  • State argued Art 41.3 only prohibited inducements not to marry.
  • SC rejected this interpretation on basis 41.3 prohibited the penalisation of marriage by imposing a greater burden on married couples than on cohabiting couples.
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6
Q

2. Power of Oireachtas to Recognise Non-Marital Families

MhicMathuna v Ireland [1989]

A
  • Challenge to constitutionality of social welfare Act providing for unmarried mother’s allowance
  • Carroll J rejected this: but did this rejection re-introduce the inducements concept in M and Muck?
    (i) Inducements Argument: Act is inducement not to marry
  • Carroll held she didn’t believe people would rather remain unmarried and receive this payment bc if they married and were cohabiting, ran risk of criminal sanctions if it was found to be true.
  • Due to greater burden of raising kid alone, the support was centred and not an inducement.
    (ii) Penalisation Argument: C said unmarried co-habiting couples were worse off in terms of allowances than married and both unmarried and married couples living apart were treated the same re
    allowances. Thus there was no penalty in being married. SC approved the decision.
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7
Q

3. Position of Non-Marital Families - Unmarried Mothers

State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966]

A
  • Held the rights of an unmarried mother don’t come under Arts 41-42.
  • Her rights to care and custody of the child are protected by Art 40.3 (personal rights).
  • Didn’t pronounce the extent of other natural person rights other than care and custody.
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8
Q

3. Position of Non-Marital Families - Unmarried Mothers

G v An Bord Uchtála [1980]:

A

Natural right of unmarried M and right to surrender her rights re her child.

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9
Q

3. Position of Non-Marital Families - Unmarried Fathers

State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála [1966]

A
  • Unmarried F who had no legal right to be involved in the placing of his child for adoption challenged the exclusion on the basis of Art 41.
  • SC rejected that the unit of unmarried parents & child constituted a family for purposes of Art 41
  • NB: Unmarried father’s have no automatic constitutional rights to child
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10
Q

3. Position of Non-Marital Families - Unmarried Fathers

JK v VW [1990]

A
  • Court was willing to extend the position of the non-marital child by acknowledging rights of ‘interest and concern’ for the unmarried father. Here, unmarried F applied to be a guardian
  • SC held although there’s rights of interest and concern arising from the blood link, no constitutional right to guardianship in the unmarried father exists.
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11
Q

3. Position of Non-Marital Families - Unmarried Fathers

GT v KAO [2007] Failed to review position

A
  • HC: McKechnie J held the ECHR required him to decide that the natural F may have rights.
  • Here, we had a de facto family living together for 3 years then then M took the twins to UK.
  • G didn’t consent or know of this. He instituted 3 sets of proceedings under the Guardianship of Infants Act in the DC in Ireland and under The Hague Convention and Brussels II in UK court
  • Brussels II: Removal of a C is wrongful if in breach of ‘custody rights’ a person has under the law of the state the C was resident in. HC had to decide whether he had custody rights
  • McK starts decision noting the dissent of McCarthy J in JK v VW: ‘I find it hard to accept a loving F, who with the M wanted to have a child, has no natural right to the society of the child’
  • Then noted the dissent of Barrington J in W. O’R v EH.
  • However, he held his is bound by the above SC decisions and must follow them (only HC judge)
  • So, as the constitution gave little protection, he considered ECHR case law on Art 8
  • He held the broader concept of family in cases like Keegan v Ireland meant G had rights.
  • Held the M and F were at all times a de facto family within the meaning of Art 8 and thus were entitled to respect for their family life under Art 8. Concluded the removal was wrongful.
  • Appealed to SC: Appeal was limited bc the judgment was only concerned w the declaration that the retention of the children was wrongful. SC upheld + refused to examine the position of unmarried Fs.
    Thus the position is still that in Nicolaou.
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12
Q

Children: MArital and Non-marital

G v An Bord Uchtála [1980]:

A

Incl. right to be fed, live, reared, educated, opportunity of working and realising his full personality and dignity as a human being.

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13
Q

4. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Health Care Decisions

Northwestern Health Board v HW [2001] NB: Heel Prick Test

A
  • Parents refused to allow the PKU (heel prick) test be taken on 4th child. 3 others had it: negative
  • HB applied for an order empowering it to carry out the test without parental consent.
  • Both HC and SC refused the order: SC was 4:1 with Keane CJ dissenting.
    (i) Murphy J - Held failure of parental duty must be exceptional i.e. such a degree of neglect as to constitute abandonment of the child.
    (ii) Murray J - Noted the risk of a liberal approach would involve the State and courts in a sort of micro-management of the family. Noted some parental decisions made be a source of distress to a rational bystander, but again said should only intervene in exceptional circumstances.
    (iii) Hardiman J - Critical of lack of legislation in the area.
    (iv) Keane CJ (Dissent) - Noted the conscientious weighting by a properly informed parent of the dangers of not having the test versus the minimally invasive nature of the procedure meant this was a failure
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14
Q

4. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Health Care Decisions

Re A Ward of Court (Baby Janice) [2004]

A
  • Parents were Jehovah’s Ws. Baby born w heart defect. She needed to undergo surgery to remedy this. Initially consented, then withdrew due to possibility she’d have to have a blood transfusion
  • Hospital applied to HC: HC made the baby a ward of court and authorised the treatment
  • More treatment required later, and matter came before Abbott J again.
  • Based on HW ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, the argument was made that this operation was needed to save her life and the only risk was in 8 in 100 operations but it was a risk any parent would take on behalf of a critically ill child.
  • Balancing religious freedoms and the child’s right to health, held the child’s right takes precedence over their religion and held there was a pressing need for surgery. Allowed order.
  • Note: Immediate risk here. No immediate risk in HW case.
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15
Q

4. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Health Care Decisions

HSE v B [2016] NB Case Note

A
  • HSE sought application for order to force B (pregnant woman) to have a C-section against her will in order to vindicate the right to life of B’s unborn child.
  • H claimed on basis of medical evidence that B, who’d had 3 C-sections already, couldn’t naturally deliver as there’d be a risk of rupturing her uterus putting her and the child’s life at risk
  • B resisted this and stated she wished to deliver naturally. After the case, she in fact gave birth by C-section and took medical advice and delivered a healthy child.
  • Hearing in HC was in camera but B sought an order to lift it. HSE argued in best interests of child.
  • C-Section - Refused to order a C-section despite the danger to health of B and child. Said court can’t see why she’d want to take a risk, but issue is not whether they agree with her buy whether she can be forced to have a surgery in the interest of her and her child.
  • HSE questioned her capacity: Held as an adult patient she must be presumed to have capacity to refuse
  • Unborn Child - Held the right of the courts to intervene in a parent’s decision re an unborn child isn’t any greater than their right to intervene re born children. Thus held NWH v HW was just as applicable
  • Applying NWH, held the intervention could only be justified in extreme and exceptional circs.
  • Held the increased risk B was taking was not such to justify the court to force a C-section
  • HC Decision on Lifting of In-Camera Order - Held it’s B’s choice to make a decision on this and not HSE’s: she’s entitled to seek the lifting even if not in daughter’s best interests. It’s for her to decide.
    NB: Ultimately this confirms that NWH v HW is still binding precedent.
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16
Q

4. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Health Care Decisions

Eastern Health Board v MK [1999]:

A

But said he doubts if the distinction is of any real importance in the
circumstances and certainly the rights of the children are the same whether they arise under 40.3 or 42

17
Q

5. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Adoption Decisions

Adoption

A

is a 2-stage process: (1) Consent to placement is made (2) Consent to final adoption is made

18
Q

5. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Adoption Decisions

OC v Sacred Heart Adoption [1996]:

A

Consent to placement does not extinguish M’s rights.

19
Q

5. Parental Authority (Autonomy) in Adoption Decisions

DG v An Bord Uchtála [1996]

A
  • For consent to be valid, the mother must be aware of:
    (i) The nature of her rights re the child (w/o their categorisation as constitutional/legal rights)
    (ii) The two-stage nature of the adoption process
    (iii) The effect of the making of an adoption order on her rights
    (iv) Effect of legislative provisions that may allow a court to overturn failure to give final consent
20
Q

(b) Custody and Adoption

Re JH [1985] Primacy of Marital Family

A
  • C placed for adoption and before it was finalised, M withdrew consent and married father of C.
  • Dispute arose between adoptive parents and natural parents as to the custody of the child: child had been with adoptive parents for 3 years and evidence from psych showed c would suffer harm
  • SC: The constitutional presumption is that the welfare of the child… is to be found in the family
  • This holds unless the court’s satisfied there’s compelling reasons why this can’t be achieved or exceptional case where parents failed to provide. Ordered child be returned to her natural parents.
21
Q

(b) Custody and Adoption

N v HSE (Baby Ann) [2006]

A
  • Baby born in 04 when parents weren’t married and placed for adoption in late 04. Adoption not finalised when parents got married in Jan 06 and sought the baby’s return (w adopters for 4 yrs)
  • HC ordered adoptive parents retain custody, but SC reversed this decision: ordered return
  • This was again in the face of psychological evidence the c would suffer harm if returned.
  • Hardiman J endorsed Re JH constitutional presumption that the c’s welfare is best found in the fam: can only be interfered w if compelling reasons why welfare can’t be secured w parents
  • Held the Constitution prefers parents to third parties as the enablers and guardians of c’s rights
  • Fennelly also referred to presumption that the c’s rights are best secured in the marital family
  • He referred extensively to Northwestern Health Board as to application of Art 42.5
  • Held must be a clearly demonstrated failure of duty before State exercises its power: none here
22
Q

6. Family Rights, Non-Citizens and Residency Right

Fajujonu v Minister for Justice [1990]

A
  • Parents (illegal immigrants) who feared deportation argued that a child born in Ireland couldn’t be deported as he was entitled to the care of his parents within the State of his birth.
  • Accepted the right could be limited, but argued such limitation applied in exceptional circs only
  • This was part of an argument that the Minister hadn’t considered their specific case and instead made the decision to deport as part of a wider, policy-based decision.
  • Held deportation is permissible but only where the Minister had considered the specific case and determined it was justified in the interests of the common good and to protect the State.
23
Q

6. Family Rights, Non-Citizens and Residency Right

Osayande v Minister for Justice [2003]

A
  • SC noted in Fajujonu the majority of the family (3 kids) were Irish citizens and drew attention to the “length of time” argument. Here, family was only here a few months but W gave birth during.
    Note: Amended the Art 9 Constitution after this case: No automatic right to citizenship on birth here.
24
Q

6. Family Rights, Non-Citizens and Residency Right

EA v Minister for Justice [2012]

A
  • HC granted interlocutory injunction restraining deportation of Nigerian national bc of his son’s right to the care and comfort of his parent’s despite father lying in asylum process re nationality.
  • Deported but then returned but not in a position to support son financially. Couple separated but claimed they were still living together as a family unit.
  • Court gives primacy to constitutional right of care and company of parents under Art 42.1
  • No possibility of claiming Zambrano rights (EU citizenship conferred if child born in EU).
  • But under art 41 the F played an active role in the rearing of his son and noted if he was deported the
    son unlikely see him again until 18 depriving him of his const right to care and company.
25
Q

(a) Parental Authority (Autonomy) in the Context of Education

Re Art 26 and the School Attendance Bill 1942 [1943]

A
  • S.4 of the Bill let Minister issue certs to parents of home schooled children certifying that they were receiving suitable education. Held repugnant for two main reasons:
    (i) Up to Minister to dictate the standard of education deemed suitable which could vary between children. Minister could exercise it to require a level greater than objectively viewed minimum. Not what was envisaged by Art 42.3.2
    (ii) It allowed M to certify the manner in which the education is received. This was not within Art 42: As long as parents supply a general standard, the manner it’s given is up to the parents.
26
Q

(a) Parental Authority (Autonomy) in the Context of Education

DPP v Best [2000]

A
  • B prosecuted under school attendance legislation for not sending her kids to school.
  • B argued she was providing suitable elementary education at home. Difficulty for the DC judge was that ‘suitable elementary education’ wasn’t defined by statute. Referred to SC:
    (i) Denham J: Held a child’s right to receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and social is a priority and the standard is a question of fact to be decided on the physical and intellectual capacity of the child. Not necessarily equal to the primary school curriculum.
    (ii) Keane J: Onus is on the State to ensure that those providing education ensure that it’s designed to meet the needs of, and develop to the fullest extend the capacities of the children concerned.
    (iii) Murphy J: Held the underlying objective of Art 42.3.2 is to provide children with basic education so that they can communicate orally and in writing in society and record, organise and deal with ordinary social and business matters. Assessing suitable education can be done in two ways: judge assessing the proficiency of the child or parents giving evidence supported by experts.
    (iv) Barron J: Court must consider the actual educ being provided, the quality of the teaching and the response of the child to that teaching. No need to be equated with national exams as not all kids are at this standard. Involves provision of core subjects in a school curriculum level of tuition suiting the child and at same time not depriving the child of future opportunities.
  • While they differ, they agree that the as const allows for home tuition the minimum standard can’t
    include something that can’t be taught at home and parental choice and involvement is essential.
27
Q

(b) Provision of Primary Education

Art 42.4

A

The State shall provide free primary education… with due regard for the rights of parents. So what is the extent of parental choice in the provision of primary education?

28
Q

(b) Provision of Primary Education

O’Donoghue v Minister for Health [1996]

A
  • Meaning of basic primary education (Art 42.4) not limited to scholastic education but incl. such advice, instruction & teaching to enable him to make best use of his inherent and potential capacities, physical mental and moral, however limited the capacities may be.
  • Noted parents, even w the best will in the world can’t provide it as effectively as trained teachers
29
Q

(b) Provision of Primary Education

Sinnott v Minister for Education [2001]

A
  • 23 y/o severely autistic man who only received 2 years of primary education sought damages for for failure to provide him with education orders to provide for his ongoing education.
  • SC didn’t challenge the services requested, but his argument that they be provided indefinitely
  • Held the obligation to provide free primary education related to children only (i.e. under 18)
  • Denham J: ‘Clear from Art 42 that educ is grounded in the family sphere. The primary educator is the fam, which is protected’. Held while fam is PE, the State shall require a certain standard.
30
Q

(b) Provision of Primary Education

O’Sheil v Minister for Education [1999]

A
  • P wanted to educate kids on basis of the Steiner principles and wanted State to fund such a school
  • Held under Art 42.3.2 this form of education met the requirements of a certain minimum standard and the parents were free to educate their children this way at their own expense. State funding?
  • Laffoy J referred to philosophy underpinning Art 42: would be contrary to the Constitution’s intent to interpret the obligation as merely being to fund a ‘single system of primary education’
  • Rejected the State could argue it discharged its constitutional obligations through the provision of 15 denominational schools in the area as it would render parental freedom of choice meaningless
  • Noted the Minister hadn’t adopted this approach: Gaelscoils and non-denom schools showed this
  • Re role of parents, the State must have regard to and accommodate the expression of parental choice & lawful preference, but this wasn’t without limits.
  • It doesn’t mean the State must accede to an app for financial aid from any group of parents united in their choice of primary education. The disbursement of public money must be rational.
  • Ultimately it failed as Irish not taught under Steiner principles and Laffoy didn’t think it appropriate in Ireland that the State be obliged to fund school’s where Irish wouldn’t be taught
    Summary: State can’t dictate one system of education; must have parental choice, but there’s limits.
31
Q

8. The Changing Face of the Family in the Irish Constitution

(a) Child’s Views Art 42A.4.2

A

This puts the child’s view on a constitutional footing. In proceedings, a child’s views shall be given weight having regard to their age and maturity.

32
Q

8. The Changing Face of the Family in the Irish Constitution

(b) Different Standard for Intervention

A

 Previous Art 42.5 provided in exceptional cases where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State could intervene.
 New wording: State is now permitted to intervene where the failure of the duty is such that the safety or welfare of any of their children is likely to be prejudicially affected.
 NB: HSE v B in 2016 reaffirmed Northwestern Health Board standard of intervention in parental decision making as ‘exceptional circumstances’ only. So has the standard changed?

33
Q

8. The Changing Face of the Family in the Irish Constitution

McD v L [2009] Sperm Donor granted Access

A
  • M donated sperm to lesbian civil partners. They’d a written agreement between them that he’d play a “favourite uncle” role, but access would be at the couple’s discretion.
  • Since the birth the couple claimed he wanted much more involvement than agreed.
  • M applied to HC for guardianship and access. HC held the child lives in a loving de facto family unit under Art 8 ECHR and denied his application for both guardianship and access.
  • SC overturned: NO recognition of de facto families in Ireland: couple not a family under Const.
  • Held HC didn’t give sufficient weight to fact he was biological F and had rights as such.
  • Influenced by best interests of child: in best interest to know and have access to their father.
34
Q

8. The Changing Face of the Family in the Irish Constitution

Roche v Roche [2009]

A
  • SC refused a woman the right to obtain an order against a fertility clinic to release frozen embryos to her for implantation. She argued they were protected under Art 40.3.3 (right to life of unborn)
  • SC held unborn only applies after implantation in the womb and not frozen embryos
  • Unborn envisages the potential to be born – only occurs after implantation. Not protected.
  • SC noted the choice of how life before birth should be protected is policy decision for Oireachtas
35
Q

8. The Changing Face of the Family in the Irish Constitution

MR and DR v An tArd Chlaraitheoir [2014]

A
  • SC quashed HC decision allowing genetic mother of twins via surrogacy be registered as birth M
  • Genetic father was allowed be registered but not the genetic mother (also argued inequality).
  • Held surrogate mother should be registered: Denham J held the current legal lacuna surrounding
    surrogacy gave her no other choice but to come to this conclusion. Up to legislature to act!!
36
Q

9. Rights of the Child

BB v ZS [2018]

A
  • B sought return of child to Hungary under Hague Convention and Brussels II bis.
  • Hungarian nationals separated in 2013. Z remarried and moved to Ireland in 2016.
  • Child visited him in July 2017. Before return date, he told B child was not returning to Hungary
  • Z refused to return her and gave B wrong address in Ireland. Then refused to comply w Request for Return issued by Central Authority in Hungary. Agreed her habitual residence was Hungary
  • HC granted an order returning the child to Hungary and held Art 13 Hague Convention provided the court with a discretionary power to refuse return of child on the basis of child’s objections:
     Child’s views alone are sufficient basis for refusing to return.
     Child’s understanding of English was limited so needed interpreter.
     B had always been the primary carer and bore financial responsibility
     No plausible explanation for the child’s refusal to return: risk not child’s views
     Retention resulted in considerable parental alienation: against Hague’s policy
     Not bound to return if there was a grave risk it would expose her to psychological or physical harm or otherwise put her in an intolerable situation. None here.
37
Q

Child and Family Relationship Act 2015

A

(a) Parent’s spouse, civil partner or cohabitant of minimum 3 years can apply for custody where they have shared parenting for 2 years (this includes unmarried fathers).
(b) Child’s best interest will be the paramount consideration for the court in proceedings.
(c) Child co-parented by civil partners has the same protections as child in marital family.
(d) Unmarried father who cohabit with for 12 months’ with the child’s mother, including 3 months’ after the child’s birth, will automatically become the child’s guardian. Only applies after January 2016.