Due Course of Law & Due Process Flashcards

1
Q

(a) Vague Offences

King v Attorney General [1981]

A
  • S.4 Vagrancy Act 1824 created an offence of loitering with intent in public place.
  • K charged with loitering w intent to steal so challenged the act’s constitutionality under Art 38.1
  • Held unconstitutional: the ingredients of the offence and method of proof were vague and arbitrary.
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2
Q

(a) Vague Offences

McNamee v DPP [2017] Case Note HC

A
  • Rule 3 Prisoners Temp Release Rules: On TR prisoners are subject to condition that they keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
  • S.6 CJ Act 1960 states a person on TR is deemed unlawfully at large if they breach a condition to TR.
  • M granted TR subject to such condition & acknowledged the conditions in writing. But 6 months after release he was charged with trespass and under s.6 CJ Act 1960 for being unlawfully at large.
  • Sought leave for JR to challenge ‘unlawfully at large’ as so vague it’s incapable of trial in due course
  • HC refused: App premature, M failed to swear the grounding affidavit and no evidence he was not on notice of the requirement not to commit the offences in question on TR.
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3
Q

(a) Vague Offences

McNamee v DPP [2017] Case Note CA

A
  • CA held person charged is entitled to know w a reasonable degree of precision with what he is charged
  • Applicant charged that “you broke a condition of your release by failing to be of good behaviour by attempting to commit offence of trespassing. Tried arguing “Fail 2 be of good behaviour” too vague
  • CA Decision: satisfied M could have no doubt as to what constituted the activity which was said to have fallen foul of the requirement: Offence ingredients were not arbitrary, vague, related to rumour.
  • Held a condition of good behaviour involved a requirement not to breach the criminal law.
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4
Q

(b) Strict Liability / Absolute Liability

CC v Ireland [2006]:

A

SC held s.1(1) CL Am Act 1935 inconsistent as it provided for crime of absolute liability. Offence: Statutory rape of girl under 15. Guilty regardless of your belief about her age (if over
17/not). SC held unconstitutional by reason of absolute elimination of any defence of honest mistake.

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5
Q

(c) Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Onus Presumptions

Hardy v Ireland [1994]

A
  • Reverse onus presumption at issue in s.4(1) Explosive Substances Act 1883 which said person shall be guilty of possession unless he can show he made it/had in possession/under control for lawful object.
  • He argued this reversal offended the presumption of innocence, but the SC rejected this.
  • SC held DPP still had to prove (a) possession (b) knowing possession (c) possession/control was in circs to give rise to reasonable suspicion possession not for a lawful object beyond reasonable doubt
  • H argued to escape liability, he had to negate (c). But SC said (1) nothing in constitution to prevent reversal/offend due process and (2) onus is only in an excusatory context like not guilty by insanity
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6
Q

(c) Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Onus Presumptions

O’Leary v AG [1995] Upheld by HC

A
  • S.24 Offs Ag State Act 1939: if person found in possession of certain incriminating docs such would be evidence, until the contrary was shown, that one was a member of an unlawful organisation.
  • S.3(2) Offs Ag State (Am) Act 1972: Statement of garda that he believes the accused was a member of an unlawful organisation shall be evidence that he was such a member.
  • Argued these provisions offended against the presumption of innocence.
  • HC again rejected this was an unconstitutional reversal of the onus: Held the s.3(2) statement is evidence and like all evidence has to be weighted and considered and the section can’t be construed as meaning the court of trial must convict in absence of exculpatory evidence.
  • NB: It seems a reverse onus presumption only unconstitutional where it requires court to convict on basis of the presumption. If there’s a possibility of acquittal despite the presumption, no difficulty.
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7
Q

(c) Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Onus Presumptions

Rock v Ireland [1997]

A
  • Challenge to s.18-19 CJ Act 1984 on basis they infringed the right to silence.
  • S.18 allowed inferences to be drawn at trial for failure to explain matters on arrest such as presence of object/mark on clothing/him which Garda reasonably believed may be attributable to participation.
  • S.19 said adverse inferences can be drawn from failure to explain presence at place. But also (i) failure can only be used in corroboration of any evidence (2) only such infs ‘as appear proper’ taken into acc
  • Thus purely a matter for court/jury to evaluate infs and give weight only if they considered it proper to
  • Held court must have regard to principles of constitutional justice and D’s right to a fair trial in
    deciding so court is under a constitutional obligation to ensure no improper/unfair infs were drawn.
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8
Q

(d) Aspects of Trial Procedure: Right to Cross-Examine Evidence

Re Haughey [1971]

A

A person has a right to cross-examine evidence.

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9
Q

(d) Aspects of Trial Procedure: Right to Cross-Examine Evidence

Donnelly v Ireland [1998]

A
  • No right to have face to face confrontation with a witness. SC held the key aspects of the right are:
    (1) The ability of the jury to assess the credibility and demeanour of the witness and
    (2) Allowing the accused an opportunity to rigorously cross-examine evidence
  • It held that video-link evidence satisfies these requirements.
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10
Q

(d) Aspects of Trial Procedure: Right to Cross-Examine Evidence

JF v DPP [2005]

A
  • Issue: whether a V in child sex abuse case should be made to do medical exam at the accused’s behest.
  • Held it deprives him of the opportunity “effectively” to present his case through an expert and right to
    give rebutting evidence. Refusing access to V also thwarts ability to conduct effective cross-exam.
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11
Q

(e) Undue Delay-Cases Other than Child Sex Abuse Cases

State (O’Connell) v Fawsitt [1986]

A
  • Held a person charged w criminal offence has a trial with reasonable expedition. Held in deciding to prohibit a criminal trial for delay, had to strike balance bw rights of accuse and rights of community:
    (1) Length of delay
    (2) Reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay
    (3) The responsibility of the accused for asserting his rights and
    (4) The prejudice to the accused
  • F charged in 1981 but not tried until 1985 (4-year delay). As there was no good reason for the inordinate delay, SC held the trial couldn’t proceed.
  • As important defence witness had died, the accused couldn’t be guaranteed a fair trial.
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12
Q

(e) Undue Delay-Cases Other than Child Sex Abuse Cases

McFarlane v DPP [2008]

A
  • 5 Jan 1998 charged w abduction, but due to M bringing JR proceedings, actual trial not til 2006.
  • HC held no evidence anything had occurred since 1999 that prejudiced his capacity to defend himself.
  • Held it was the decision of M to bring JR proceedings that caused the extensive delay. While delay in
    delivery of JR proceedings, insufficient to prove there was actual prejudice of rights under Art.38.1
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13
Q

Summary Trials

Nash v DPP [2012]

A
  • HC engaged in balancing exercise & refused injunction to restrain murder trial on grounds that delays and adverse publicity didn’t preclude a fair trial and were outweighed by public interest in having the issues of guilt or innocence in a brutal double murder case determined in a due course of trial.
  • Upheld by SC: guilt/innocence should be determined by a full trial on the merits.
  • To be prohibited, the culpability of prosecution in delay must be so serious that the effect is to disturb
    the important const value that guilt / innocence of accused should be determined in a full trial
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14
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

B v DPP [1997]

A
  • TEST: Whether, by reason of delay, there’s a real risk an accused would not obtain a fair trial.
  • Man accused of sexually abusing his 3 daughters from 1963-1973. Complained in 1992.
  • Denham J listed special considerations applying to delay in child sex-abuse cases:
    (1) Was the relationship between the parties one of trust?
    (2) Did the accused exercise dominion over the V effectively preventing him from complaining?
    (3) Did the State contribute to the delay?
    (4) Has the passage of time nullified the accused’s ability to raise alibi evidence?
  • Held delay was due to dominance of F over them and State no contribution. Trial started in 1994.
    Issues: (i) Too lenient on C (ii) Case just focuses on reason for delay and assumes allegations are true
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15
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

JOC v DPP [2000]

A
  • Rejected that prejudice could result from the death of his wife who could’ve given evidence as to number of visits by complainant and possibility the offence could’ve taken place.
  • But court was willing to give more weight to testimony of wife and expressed concerns re law in the area and the presumption that events alleged actually occurred and focus on reasons for delay only.
  • Where there’s physical evidence, it allows an assertion to be tested. If none, case turns on circs.
  • Big time lapse (20 years) not only has an effect on memories makes it almost impossible to clarify the surrounding circumstances.
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16
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

JL v DPP [2000]

A
  • Court undertook more rigorous analysis of issue of prejudice. Identified 3 key points re delay:
  • (1) due to the passage of time, more likely alibi evidence would be unavailable (2) there may be a risk that the V misperceived the sexual act and lack of medical evidence could be prejudicial and (3) it was alleged incidents took place in a caravan but doubt re whether acc still owned one at time of act.
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17
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

DD v DPP [2004]

A
  • Geoghegan J said above cases don’t excuse delay merely bc V had food reason not to complain earlier
  • Need to show an inhibition preventing complaining arising directly from the offence.
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18
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

H v DPP [2006]

A
  • Inquiry not what were reasons for delay in bringing claim, but simply will accused receive a fair trial?
  • Explanation: Court focuses on the the consequences of the delay in terms of identifiable prejudice to the accused from the circumstances and the resulting real or serious risk of an unfair trial.
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19
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

JK v DPP [2006]

A
  • 84 y/o man accused of sexual offences against niece, nephew and grand-niece.
  • SC referred to H stating the core inquiry was whether the accused will receive a trial – reasons for delay no longer the determining factor! Focus on specific prejudice not general prejudice (stress, etc.)
  • SC rejected argument that specific prejudice put forward was well-founded: evidence of alibi at a Christening when one of acts was alleged: witness that was talking to J at time of act now dead.
  • SC said the family was a close-knit circle so unlikely other witnesses wouldn’t be available to testify
  • SC rejected the idea of general prejudice put forward also.
20
Q

(f) Undue Delay: Child Sex Abuse

G v DPP [2014]:

A

Sexual offences trial prohibited due to delay in prosecuting young offender on basis the
prosecutorial delay amounted to a breach of the special duty on the prosecution to expedite matters.

21
Q

2. Autrefois Acquit (Double-Jeopardy) and the Prosecution Appeal

People (DPP) v O’Shea [1982]

A
  • Held it’s possible for the DPP to appeal an acquittal by the HC (CCC) to the SC under Art 34.4.3 (right to appeal any HC decision to the SC and an acquittal was a “decision”). DJ rule?
22
Q

2. Autrefois Acquit (Double-Jeopardy) and the Prosecution Appeal

People v Quilligan [1989]:

A

If properly acquitted before a competent court cannot be retried.

23
Q

2. Autrefois Acquit (Double-Jeopardy) and the Prosecution Appeal

Registrar of Companies v Judge David Anderson [2004] Summary of current position

A
  • DC judge struck out 2 summonses for failing to file annual returns under CA 1963 on basis the returns had been filed and late fees paid but CA still permitted prosecution for failing to do so in first place.
  • J held paying the fine was essentially answering a charge that was then levied again via prosecution
  • SC held no double-jeopardy arose as there was no twofold prosecution for the same offence i.e. the fine was administrative in nature (civil) and v different from the prosecution (criminal)
  • Noted 3 protections under DJ rule: (1) Protection from being retried for an acquittal (2) protection from retrial after a conviction and (3) protection from being punished multiple times for same offence
24
Q

3. Right of Access to Legal Advisors

People v Healy [1990]

A
  • All persons in custody have a right to reasonable access to legal advice.
  • It’s to ensure fully-informed decision re what to say/not and bc of imbalance of power bw police and d
  • SC held H’s constitutional right was infringed as the Gardaí had refused his solicitor admission to him until the statement had been completed.
  • This includes a right to be informed as soon as your solicitor arrives.
25
Q

3. Right of Access to Legal Advisors

People v AD [2012]

A
  • Clarke said it was clear from the custody record and the tape that the interview was not stopped as it should’ve been when solicitor arrived. Decision was made to proceed with Garda Egan present.
  • A Member in Charge of a Garda Station has a duty to protect and vindicate the rights of the accused
26
Q

The right is one of Reasonable Access

People v Buck [2002]

A
  • Gardaí had difficulties getting solicitor for B. Didn’t arrive until 5 hours later. After he arrived, he spoke to B and after this B made an inculpatory statement.
  • SC held where D asks to see a solicitor and Gardaí make bona fide attempts to comply, the admissibility of any incriminating statement made before the arrival should be decided by the judge as in his discretion in light of the common law principles of fairness to the accused and public policy.
  • Here, upheld trial judge finding of no conscious/deliberate violation of B’s right to access to a solicitor
  • Held denial of access renders a subsequent period of detention unlawful and any admissions obtained in such period inadmissible. Must establish causative link bw breach of right and making of admission
  • Not the Gardaí’s fault if you start talking while you’re waiting for your solicitor to arrive.
27
Q

The right is one of Reasonable Access

People v O’Brien [2005]

A
  • Detained in Pearse St and requested solicitor. Gardaí recommended Mr Gaffney (Tallaght based)
  • Due to distance + busy, arrived 7 hours later. Issue: admissibility of statements after talking w Mr G
  • Held what made O’s detention unlawful was the deliberate & conscious decision of Gardaí to contact Mr G rather than a more convenient one. They knew/ought to have known there’d be a big delay.
  • The detention remained unlawful so long as the breach of the constitutional rights continued
  • Thus, once you have access to legal advice the unconstitutionality is cured. But if the inculpatory statement is made during the unlawful detention, then there is a causative link.
  • Finnegan J drew distinction bw the colourable manoeuvres employed here to thwart O’s access to a sol and the behaviour of Gardaí in Gormley. O’Brien was deliberate and conscious denial/frustration
28
Q

The right is one of Reasonable Access

Gormley v DPP [2010]

A
  • Solicitor nominated by G was sought immediately by Gardaí. He indicated he’d not be available for an hour after called, but turns out not to have been available under almost 2 hours after.
  • Court refused leave to appeal holding when right of access is thwarted by deliberate refusal or colourable manoeuvres to ensure the right is undermined, the detention is unlawful.
  • However, held Gardaí don’t have to wait an indeterminate time after D seeks sol to allow him arrive
29
Q

The right is one of Reasonable Access

DPP v Gormley & White [2014]

A
  • G arrested 1.47pm. Gave name of solicitor and Gardaí made reasonable efforts to contact sol, attending his parents home and then his own after 2.15 pm
  • 3.06pm he contacted gardaí to say he be there as soon as possible after 4pm (roughly an hour).
  • But G was interviewed at 3.10 and made inculpatory statements before sol’s arrive at 4.48pm
  • W arrested at 7.45am and taken to station. Made request for named solicitor at 7.58. Call made to her, a recorded message gave her emergency number, G rang such number, and she responded at 8.15
  • She arrived at 9.42, but at 8am permission was granted to take various samples from W.
  • Clarke J: Summarised existing law: While a constitutional right to legal advice is recognised, it’s not yet been held evidence gathering must be suspended until legal advice available
  • SC held due process involves a right to have legal advice before custodial questioning.
  • Thus in G’s case, as a consequence of his clear request, he was entitled to advice before questioning
  • SC gave indication right to LA in future may extend to right to have lawyer present during questioning
  • In W’s case, held as he had, in law, no option but to give the samples there was no obligation to wait
    for his lawyers before taking them: wouldn’t make a difference – mandatory samples! No advice on it
30
Q

Right not extend to to have legal advisor present during interviews

Lavery v Member in Charge, C Garda Station [1999]

A
  • SC held right of reasonable access does not entitle accused to have solicitor present during questioning
31
Q

Right not extend to to have legal advisor present during interviews

DPP v Gormley & White [2014]:

A

SC said “in future” may be right to have LA present in questioning

32
Q

Right not extend to to have legal advisor present during interviews

Doyle v DPP [2017] Case Note

A
  • D convicted by jury in Central CC. Main evidence was a confession made by D while in custody after his arrest. Claimed inadmissible bc made it as a result of an inducement: arrest of his ex / baby mum
  • SC had to determine whether he was entitled to consult with a solicitor and have one present prior to and during the 15th interview with the Gardaí during which the admission was made.
  • SC Denham: not part of a right to trial in due course of law that a sol be present for questioning in G custody. Said any comments in Gormley & White were obiter: the right is a right of access to a lawyer.
  • Comforted by the fact that since G&W a Practice Code on Access to Solicitor in Garda Custody permits the presence of a solicitor in interview if necessary. Interviews are video taped also.
  • Charleton pointed out D had access to his lawyer just before the 15th interview and also, at the solicitor’s request, the interview was interrupted to enable access by him to D.
  • Charleton J: Comforted by the current safeguards we have & by fact that all the interviews (20 hours)
    were recorded and the lower court judges inspected them all for coercion, inducement, etc.
33
Q

4. Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence

People (AG) v O’Brien [1965]

A
  • Held where evidence is obtained as a result of a deliberate or conscious breach of a constitutional right it must be excluded save in extraordinary excusing circumstances.
  • Principal evidence against O was stolen property found by gardaí when their home at 118 Captain’s Road Crumlin was searched. This was carried out under warrant for “118 Cashel Road, Crumlin”
  • As the warrant was invalid the G’s entry was not in accordance with the law and constituted a breach of his Art 40.5 right to inviolability of dwelling. Was the evidence admissible?
  • Where there is a deliberate conscious breach, inadmissible. But here, it was through an error that the wrong address appeared on the search warrant and the searchers were unaware. No deliberate violation
34
Q

4. Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence

People v Madden [1977]

A
  • M detained in excess of that permitted by statute because he was making a statement at expiration
  • When put to him M was in unlawful detention, garda said “that’s not for me”.
  • Held even though no mala fides, satisfied Garda must have been aware of the lawful period and thus he had deliberately and consciously determined the taking of the statement was more important.
35
Q

4. Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence

DPP v Kenny [1990] Reversed O’Brien

A
  • Involved the previous practice of rubber stamping warrant. Issue: no evidence the peace commissioner made enquiries (as required) before issuing a warrant, thus it was unlawful & entry unconstitutional
  • SC said deciding whether a violation of const rights was carried out consciously & deliberately, test was whether the act in question (not the violation of the constitution) was conscious and deliberate
36
Q

4. Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence

DPP v JC [2015] Reversed Kenny: CURRENT LAW

A
  • Held an inadvertent breach of const rights in obtaining evidence will not lead to exclusion of it at trial but knowing, reckless or grossly negligent breaches will lead to exclusion except in exceptional circs.
  • It requires an analysis of the conduct or state of mind (mens rea) of person who gathered the evidence.
  • JC’s dwelling was searched under issue of warrant under s.29 Off Ag State Act.
  • S.29 then found unconstitutional in Damache so CC found gardaí had no authority to enter his dwelling and as a result he was in unlawful custody at the time he made the inculpatory statement
  • Statements inadm per Kenny but now valid as although warrant invalid now, was valid at time of entry
37
Q

4. Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence

DPP v Cullen [2014]

A
  • Driving prosecution dismissed as driver was handcuffed w/o reasonable cause: this deemed to be a breach of his const rights. Q: can gardaí put handcuffs on person showing no sign of resisting arrest?
  • Held a garda arresting was entitled to handcuff if they genuinely believed it was necessary based on their own individual assessment. No assessment here: he applied handcuffs to all suspects.
  • Thus deliberate breach of rights and made the detention unlawful and evidence of drink inadmissible
38
Q

Extraordinary Excusing Circumstances: Still Admissible

DPP v Shaw [1982]:

A

Kept D longer than allowed due to chance of finding missing victim. Held justified.

39
Q

5. Duty to Seek Out and Preserve Evidence

Braddish v DPP [2001] CCTV

A
  • CCTV of robbery prompted gardaí to arrest B who later confessed to it. B then requested the footage and stills but they were no longer available as G had given it back to owners after B confessed
  • SC held trial was prohibited. Argued the evidence was irrelevant as he confessed, however Hardiman pointed out the evidentiary value of CCTV and this confession is hotly contested.
40
Q

5. Duty to Seek Out and Preserve Evidence

Dunne v DPP [2002]

A
  • Cameras covering area of petrol station where robbery made. Owner of premises couldn’t remember if he gave the police the footage, but said it was his practice to do so. Argued G had it. Gardaí denied it.
  • Court restated Braddish, but in Braddish, the gardaí definitely had the tapes. Here it was in issue.
  • Held there is not only a duty to preserve evidence but also to seek out evidence
41
Q

5. Duty to Seek Out and Preserve Evidence

McKeown v DPP [2003]

A
  • Car stolen. M requested forensic tests be carried out on the car. Gardaí said no tests were done and car returned to its owner: believed they’d enough evidence. Held not for police to dispose on such grounds
  • When accused of stealing a car, the car is relevant. But there must be a balance bw right of accused and right to car-owner of return. Indicated notice should be given to accused telling him of intention to return. Indicated delay mitigates against any unfairness as less likely evidence would be obtained
42
Q

5. Duty to Seek Out and Preserve Evidence

Wall v DPP [2013]

A
  • Passenger pulled steering wheel causing fatal accident. G failed to examine wheel for fingerprints.
  • Held despite this, there was sufficient evidence in the case to avoid a fair trial: fingerprints could’ve been there anyways and back seat passenger was available to give evidence.
  • Held test is not that the difficulty stems from any intrinsic unfairness in the trial but the unfairness of a person being tried in the absence of evidence which ought to be available
43
Q

5. Duty to Seek Out and Preserve Evidence

Stirling v Collins [2014]

A
  • App charged with criminal damage and public order offences. No eyewitness so CCTV v important
  • Garda testimony and the recorded material was the case, but the G lost the footage.
  • Solicitor acted promptly and requested the footage more than once.
  • Noted in Wall they said JR to prohibit trial should only be granted in exceptional cases where prejudice is clear: here it was v clear. Was there a real and unavoidable risk of unfair trial?
  • Held there was clarity of the prejudice caused by the absence of what is vital evidence. Allowed JR.
44
Q

6. Pre-Trial Publicity

D v DPP [1994]

A
  • D stood trial twice on charge of indecent assault on boat in Donegal. Both occasions jury had been discharged and retrials ordered. First trial found not guilty.
  • After the discharge of the jury in the second trial on the grounds of prejudicial newspaper reporting, an interview w complainant published on front of national newspaper: “Rape began when I was 11”
  • No names given, but one scenario she described bore similarity to remaining charge against D
  • “Trial of the 7th man halted this week after prejudicial media coverage” + “originally face 10 charges”
  • Retrial prohibited? Test: App must show there was a real risk of an unfair trial
  • Held what risk there was was not unavoidable and downplayed relevance of article: said new jurors unlikely to link it to the trial. Also noted jury are given direction by judge to put it out of their minds
  • Egan dissented: Said the only way the trial could proceed would be where a sufficient amount of time had passed to allow the “fade factor” to occur: so the story may not be fresh in mind of potential juror
45
Q

6. Pre-Trial Publicity

Z v DPP [1995]

A
  • Alleged victim of rape in X case. In both HC and SC it was made clear she’d been raped.
  • Z didn’t succeed in stopping trial: SC noted these cases involve a balancing of the right to a fair trial against the community’s right to prosecute w the “key” being demonstration of real risk of unfair trial.
  • Held trial only unfair where rulings and directions by the trial judge can’t obviate potential unfairness.
  • Did note the dilemma of telling them to put out of mind draws attention to it, but held anyways.
46
Q

6. Pre-Trial Publicity

DPP v Haugh [2001]

A
  • Challenge to a stay on the trial of Charles Haughey. It was stayed on basis of arguments of unfair publicity orbed chance of fair trial.
  • They said a rally with banner “jail corrupt politicians” had been advertised with over 40k leaflets distributed containing prejudicial comments re Haughey.
  • Carroll was critical of the possibility of pre-trial publicity argument would actually work as the fade factor would now be in operation and only 300 people showed up for the rally.
47
Q

6. Pre-Trial Publicity

O’Brien v DPP [2013]

A
  • O charged w theft and deception: alleged he operated a pyramid scheme. Sought to prohibit a future criminal trial on basis he couldn’t get a fair trial due to substantial ongoing publicity.
  • Kelly J in the Commercial Court in civil proceedings described the activities of O as “an unsophisticated yet successful confidence trick” and “repulsive”
  • Court directed a stay for 12 months on the trial to allow for the fade factor as the broadcasts and
    newspaper articles were likely to constitute a real risk of an unfair trial.