Exercise set knowledge Flashcards

1
Q

How is green growth possible when looking at I = P * A * T. Give a short introduction to the factors

A

I = impact, measured as mas volume of ressource use or waste

P = population

A = Per capita affluence (income)

T = technology, amount of resource use or waste per unit of income

Green growth is possible if I is systematically falling over time at the same time A is increasing. Ideally our wealth would increase and the impact on the environment falls.

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2
Q

Explain the relationship between P and A using a graph. Pleas draw it.

A

Using the thory from the demographic transition we can try to explain the relationship between population (P) and income (A). The theory suggest a negative correlation btween P and A, meaning when income increases over time population growth will decrease.

We can explain this by using figure 1 in Note 1. Here we have devided the graph in for income stages, with declining birth- and deathrates.

Stage 1:

Low income and high population growth, due to birth and death rates.

Stage 2:

Increasing income stregthen nutrition and public healthcare, leading to lower doeath raates and rapid population growth. Here the negative correlation hasn´t appeared yet.

Stage 3:

We start to se a drop in birthrates possible due to

- Increasing costs of having a child 
- Reduced benefits of having a big family
- Increasing opportunity costs of home employment. Women could earn more on the labor market. 
- Improved economic and social status of women

The drop in dirthrates lead to falling popolutation growth rates.

Stage 4

High income economy with equal low birth and death rates therefore a constant populations size.

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3
Q

What is the different perspectives on the relation between A (income) and T (technology, amount of ressource use ressource use or waste per unit of income). How is this referred to the Kuznets curve?

A

In 1992 the World Development Report “Development and Environment” noted that, “The view that greater economic activity inevitably hurts the envrironment us based on static assumptions about technology, tastes and environmental investments”. In simpler terms they argued that you can have economic activity increasing without hurting the climate.

When looking at the relationship between income and technology we will have to adress the arguments for and against the enviromental Kuznets curve.

The enviromantal Kuznets curve shows the hypothesis realtionship between per capita income and per capita pollutant into the enviroment. As figure 1.2.B show, we see a concave relationship, where an increase in per capita income in the begining will lead to an increase in pollution, but only until a given tipping point. Hereafter an increase in the income decreases polution due to many factors.

Some economists argue from the perspective of the Kuznets curve, that increasing income per capita will lead to a decrease in the pollution per capita due to for example an improvement of technology, which develops green alternative to previous options. Other reasons are structural change towards informationintensive industries and services, coupled with increased environmental awareness, enforcement of environmental regulations and higher environmental expenditures, result in levelling off and gradual decline of environmental degradation.

Other economist argue, that the result from the enviromental Kuznets curve do not hold compared to real life data due simplicity and weak assumptions.

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4
Q

Do the math and graphics for the linear relationship and the Kuznets curve. Explain what happens in them both mathematically and intuitive.

A

Math and graphics see note 1

Linear relationship:

The linear positive relationship tells us that an increase in income lead to an emission increase as well. With higher levels of emission the enivoremantal degradation increases. This view therefor criticizes the idea of economic activity having a positive impact on the environment. Instead an increase in economic activity would decrease the environment.

The Kuznets curve:

This view argues that the emission of pollutants per unit of output will decrease as per capita income increases after some time.

If the EKC hypothesis is true, it would mean ecnomic activity is not at threat to environmantal degradation. Instead economic activity is the means to environmental improvements. When a country develop economically they would be moving from lower to higher levels per capita income, leading to the overall level of environmental degradation would fall eventually.

Explenation of the graph in depths

“At low levels of development both the quantity and intensity of
environmental degradation is limited to the impacts of subsistence
economic activity on the resource base and to limited quantities of
biodegradable wastes.

“As economic development accelerates with the intensification of
agriculture and other resource extraction and the takeoff of
industrialisation, the rates of resource depletion begin to exceed the rates of
resource regeneration, and waste generation increases in quantity and
toxicity.

“At higher levels of development, structural change towards information-
intensive industries and services, coupled with increased environmental
awareness, enforcement of environmental regulations, better technology
and higher environmental expenditures, result in levelling off and gradual
decline of environmental degradation.

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5
Q

What is the general understanding from studies testing the EKC hypotehsis (Kuznets Curve)? Outline the possible study questions and the results.

A

There have been many studies econometricaly testing the EKC hypothesis

Two key questions:
1. Are the data generally consistent with the EKC hypothesis?
2. (If the EKC hypothesis holds, does the implication that growth is good for the global environment follow?)

Graphs in note 1

There have been made many econometric papers. Some are supporting the EKC hypthesis for local and regonal impacts, but not for global impacts coming from CO_2. The local and regaonal impacts are from other factors then CO_2, e.g. different chemicals.

In conclusion these papers would argue that the relationship between income and technology in a high income societies would have negative effect on local and regonal enviromental impacts, but not on global scale in the case of CO_2.

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6
Q

We argued that Rawls’s
Difference Principle asserts that it is only just to have an
unequal distribution of wealth if all persons benefit from
that allocation, relative to the situation of an equal
distribution. But we also argued that the total level of utility
attainable might depend on the distribution of wealth, as
utility could be higher in an unequal position if incentive
effects enhance productive efficiency.

Question: Discuss the implications of these comments for a
morally just distribution of resources within and between
countries.

A

Rawl´s notion of justice imply that i can only be just that we have unequal distribution of resources within and between countries if all induviduals is more wealthy (Pareto improvement) then they would be in the case of equal distribution.

On the other hand we also argued that if the “total level of utility” within and between countries are higher in the case of unequal destribution it would be morally just, but notice that this is not the same as in the Rawlsian case. This is a typical utilitarian stance, where the total level of well being matters, but not its distribution. The theory accept that some people get an extremly high utility and others get a low, if the average is better than in the equal case. Still all people could be better off (Paerto improvement) if the society or government introduce a way of redestributing the wealth.

If we look at the world we could argue that is has taken a utilitarian stance within the countries but not between. In general the worlds country become more equal, but within the country we see greater unequality. Utilitarians will argue this is just, where Rawlsians will argue for it is not just.

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7
Q

What argues Rawls´s Difference Principle? Can you think of another principle for dividing utility most equal?

A

Rawls’s Difference Principle asserts that it is only just to have an
unequal distribution of wealth if all persons benefit from
that allocation (Pareto allocation), relative to the situation of an equal
distribution.

Utilitarian theory:
But we also argued that the total level of utility
attainable might depend on the distribution of wealth, as
utility could be higher in an unequal position if incentive
effects enhance productive efficiency.

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8
Q

Prove that, under the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility, the linear indifference curves in utility
space in Figure 3.1 map into indifference curves that are
convex from below in commodity space, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2.

A

We have to consumers A and B

We have shoved that we can go from the linear indifference curve in the utility space to the convex in the commodity space only if we are under the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility.

See the math in Note 1

We end up with

(dX^A / dX^B) / - (U_B / U_A)

This is the slope of the indifference curve in the commodity space, which is negative an equal to their marginal utilities.

Remember both A and B experience diminishing utility returns of consuming more X. There is an initial amount of goods which can be divided. When B then starts to consume more, he will get less marginal utility. His utility gain of consuming one more drops a bit, because he before consumed a bit more. Now A consume less necessarily, which means that her marginal utility increases. The ratio gets smaller and the negative slope of the indifference curve decreases.

Example.
Initial goods = 10 cookies

Marginal utility of eating one extra cookie = What utility you get from eating one extra cookie.

But we have diminishing return to utility = The utility of eating one extra cookie falls from every time you eat one extra. In the beginning you get a lot of utility for eating one extra cookie, but as you eat more and more cookies you start to feel filled up meaning and your utility for eating one extra cookie declines. Meaning your marginal utility declines. At some point you might have get no extra utility of eating one extra cookie.

If we did not had the diminishing return to utility of eating one more, then we would expect the person to be equally happy for every cookie.

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9
Q

Suppose that one believed that each generation should have the same level of well-being as every other one. Demonstrate that we could not ensure the attainment of this merely by the choice of a particular discount rate, zero or otherwise.

A

Our discount factor

d = 1 / 1+p

where p is the utility discount factor.

We make two examples, with intertemporal maximization problems subject to different secondary conditions (bibetingelser)

  1. C_0 + C_1 = X

See math Note 1

In this case it is possible to have equal levels of consumption and utility now and in the future if p = 0 why d = 1. Here we are able to ensure the attainment of this merely by the choice of a particular discount rate.

  1. C_1 = F(C_0), where consumption in period one is a function of consumption in period 0. C_1 is therefore affected by the consumption in the 0 period and the specific form and context of the function F.

See math Note 1

In this case we are not able to ensure the attainment of each generation having the same wellbeing just by the choice of particular discount rate. The best we can do is chasing p = 0, so d = 1 but then we are still dependennt on F_C0, which has be -1 for each generation have the same wellbeing. The implication of p = 0 depend on many things e.g. upon how this play out in real life deepening on how flexible peoples options are for managing their consumption over time.

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10
Q

How does the size of the utility discount rate affect the climate, when we are looking at intertemporal distribution in a utilitarianism view?

A

In intertemporal distribution, discounting future utility helps address questions like how much we should invest in mitigating climate change today to prevent harm in the future or how to balance consumption now against savings for future consumption. It reflects the trade-offs between present and future welfare.

However, the choice of discount rate has ethical implications, especially in long-term policy considerations such as climate change, where the benefits of actions taken now may not be realized for many years or even generations. A high discount rate could justify less investment in future benefits (e.g., less aggressive climate action), as it makes future benefits seem smaller when converted to present value. Conversely, a low discount rate increases the weight of future benefits and costs, advocating for more substantial immediate sacrifices for the sake of future generations.

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11
Q

How do we understand the discount rate of future utility in general?

A

The discount rate of future utility is a concept used in economics and finance to adjust the value of future benefits or costs to their present value. It reflects the idea that, due to various reasons such as risk, opportunity cost of capital, inflation, and individual time preference, people generally value a benefit received today more than the same benefit received in the future. The discount rate quantifies this decrease in value over time.

When applied to future utility, the discount rate is used to calculate the present value of future utility gains or losses. This is especially relevant in long-term decision-making processes, such as planning for retirement, evaluating investments, or assessing the costs and benefits of environmental policies that have effects far into the future. The higher the discount rate, the less future utility is valued compared to present utility.

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12
Q

How is the use of p > 0 morally justified by the descriptive and perspective school?

A

According to the Descriptive school of thought in economics, ρ> 0 is required by the
logic of preference satisfaction which underpins all economics – individuals are observed to prefer current to future consumption, to exhibit positive time preference.

According to the Prescriptive school of thought, there is no ethical basis for policy to reflect individual preferences in this way (cf. Sen on citizens and consumers)– people alive at different dates should have their utilities treated
equally.

This does not imply using ρ = 0. At any point in time there is a small probability that the human species will go extinct. The probability increases with time, implying, given reasonable assumptions, exponentially declining utility weights.
* The Prescriptive approach is taken to mean ρ of the order of 0.001, 0.1%.
* The Descriptive approach is taken to mean ρ of 0.015-0.03, 1.5-3%.

The difference matters a lot– more on this later in the course.

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13
Q

How does ethics have an effect on climate change? Example the Stern Review and the

A

As compared with most previous economic analyses, the Stern Review (2006) recommended stronger and earlier mitigation action. It was explicit that this was largely driven by its ethical position, as reflected in the values used for the utility discount rate ρ and the elasticity of marginal utility η in the iso-elastic utility
function. Stern’s research considers the utility of future generations.

Stern was criticised by a number of economists for using unreasonably low values
for both ρ and η.

Den usikkerhed har skabt skarpe fronter i den økonomiske verden. Mest kendt er modsætningen mellem to af verdens mest profilerede klimaøkonomer, engelske Nicholas Stern fra London School of Economics, og den amerikanske nobelpristager og udvikler af den klimaøkonomiske DICE-model, William Nordhaus fra Yale University.

Hvor Stern ud fra etisk-filosofiske overvejelser og hensynet til fremtidige generationer bruger en lav rentesats på 1,4 procent, har Nordhaus valgt at en mere markedsbaseret rentesats på 4,5 procent. En på overfladen beskeden forskel, men med enorme konsekvenser:

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14
Q

Can one procent when discounting really have any effect?

A

Én procent bliver til mange penge over tid

Modellerne strækker sig over flere generationer, og derfor kan en stigning på en enkelt procent i diskonteringsrenten have stor betydning. Men jo højere rentesatsen er, jo højere afkast kræver vi af de investeringer, vi foretager. Derfor giver en høj rentesats også mindre råderum for klimainvesteringer i dag.

”Bruger du Sterns diskonteringsrente, vil vi i dag være rede til at betale 250 kr. for at få et klimaafkast på 1.000 kr. om 100 år. Bruger man Nordhaus’ rente på 4,5 procent, vil vi kun være villige til at betale 10 kr.”

I USA vil en sænkning af diskonteringsrenten fra 3 til 2 procent i sig selv give en næsten tre gange større beregnet værdi af klimatiltag med et 100-årigt perspektiv.

Og endnu mere opsigtsvækkende: Opdaterer man DICE-modellen med nye klimadata og den nye diskonteringsrente giver det faktisk økonomisk mening at holde sig inden for den temperaturstigning på maks. 1,5 til 2 grader, som verdens lande har forpligtet sig til i Paris-aftalen. Det står i skærende kontrast til William Nordhaus’ kontroversielle synspunkt, at 3,5 graders temperaturstigning er økonomisk optimalt.

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15
Q

While some economists argue for the creation of private property rights to protect the environment, many of those concerned for the environment find this approach abhorrent (= causing or deserving strong dislike or hatred). What are the essential issues in this dispute?

A

Pros:

The establishment of private property rights, where none previously existed, is likely to improve both static and dynamic allocative efficiency of environmental resources.

Owners of the resources can account for the opportunity costs of access, extraction, or harvesting. These costs can be built into the prices paid by resource users. This scenario is more likely to result in a resource use path over time that corresponds to a social optimum than in the absence of property rights.

It may also lead resource allocation closer to a sustainable pattern, although an efficient outcome is not necessarily a sustainable one.

Cons:

However, it is not difficult to find ethical objections to the creation of private property rights.

- In more affluent economies, many individuals argue—largely from ethical premises—that mountain or wilderness areas should be held collectively by a broadly defined community. They believe that future generations have inalienable rights to these resources as well. 

In many parts of the world, there are long-established collective or common rights to water, grazing lands, harvestable species, and the like. It is easy to see potential conflicts between maintaining cultural traditions and the goal of economic efficiency.

Not induvidual based property rights, but groups maybe:

Having said this, there is no reason why private property rights need to be individually based. All that is required is that a well-defined set of persons is endowed with property rights, and that this set is sufficiently small so those rights can be enforced at reasonable cost.

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16
Q

Can you give me an example of a possible dispute if we assigned property rights to protect the environment?

A

Example: Water Rights in Australia

Scenario: Water Allocation in the Murray-Darling Basin
- Before Property Rights: Water use in the Murray-Darling Basin was largely unregulated, leading to over-extraction and severe environmental degradation.
- After Property Rights: The Australian government established water entitlements and trading schemes, allowing water rights to be bought and sold.
- Static and Dynamic Allocative Efficiency: Farmers and industries consider the cost of water in their production decisions, leading to more efficient use and conservation efforts.
- Sustainability: Water trading encourages the transfer of water to higher-value uses and promotes conservation.
Ethical Considerations:
- Opposition: Critics argue that water trading can lead to water being concentrated among wealthier users, disadvantaging small farmers and communities.
Cultural Impact: Indigenous communities may view water as a communal resource with spiritual significance, conflicting with commodification.

17
Q

Consider a good whose production generates pollution damage. In what way will the effects of a tax on the output of the good differ from that of a tax on the pollutant emissions themselves? Which of the two is likely to be economically efficient? (Hint: think about substitution effects on the demand and on the supply side.)

A

When considering a good whose production generates pollution, there are two main ways to address the issue through taxation: taxing the output of the good itself or taxing the pollutant emissions directly. These two approaches have different effects and implications for economic efficiency.

  1. Tax on Output:
    ○ Direct Impact: A tax on the output of the good will increase the cost of producing the good. This generally leads to a reduction in the quantity of the good produced and consumed.
    ○ Incentive: The primary incentive is for firms to reduce their production to avoid the higher costs associated with the tax.
    ○ Limitation: This does not directly encourage firms to reduce their emissions per unit of output. If a firm can only reduce costs by producing less, there might be less innovation or effort to reduce pollution through cleaner technologies or processes.
  2. Tax on Emissions:
    ○ Direct Impact: A tax on emissions directly targets the pollutant, making it more expensive for firms to emit pollutants.
    ○ Incentive: Firms are incentivized to find ways to reduce their emissions per unit of output, such as adopting cleaner technologies, changing their production processes, or switching to cleaner inputs.
    ○ Flexibility and Efficiency: This method allows firms to choose the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions, whether through reducing output or through innovations and improvements in their production process. This can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and greater overall reduction in emissions at a lower economic cost.

Economic Efficiency:
* Fixed Emissions to Output Ratio: If emissions are directly proportional to output (e.g., M=βQ, where MM is emissions, Q is output, and β is a constant ratio), a tax on emissions is equivalent to a tax on output, scaled by β. Both taxes would have the same economic effects. The factory has no flexibility to reduce emissions without reducing output because the emissions per output are fixed.
* Variable Emissions to Output Ratio: If the relationship between emissions and output is not fixed, a tax on emissions is generally more efficient. Firms can respond to the tax by reducing emissions through various means rather than simply cutting output. For example, a firm might switch from coal to natural gas, use more efficient production technologies, or install pollution control equipment.

Illustrative Example:
* Suppose two fuels, coal and natural gas, have the same price per unit of energy, but coal produces 1.8 times more CO2 emissions than natural gas.
* A tax on CO2 emissions would make coal relatively more expensive compared to natural gas.
* Consumers and firms would likely switch from coal to natural gas to minimize their tax burden.
* This substitution reduces overall emissions more effectively than a tax on output would, as the output tax might not differentiate between the cleaner and dirtier fuels.

Conclusion:
If the policy goal is to reduce emissions, taxing emissions directly is generally more cost-effective and economically efficient than taxing output. This approach allows firms to minimize costs by adopting cleaner technologies and methods, leading to greater innovation and a more significant reduction in pollution at a lower economic cost.

18
Q

Krutilla and Fisher presented a model to capture the relative price movements that should be assumed in environmental cost-benefit analysis. How can concerns about the implications of climate change be captured in that model?

A

Capturing Climate Change Concerns in the Model
Krutilla and Fisher’s model looks at the costs and benefits of preserving natural areas versus developing them. To include climate change concerns, we need to consider how climate change affects both the supply and demand for natural areas’ benefits.

Supply Side Effects:

Fixed Supply of Natural Areas: Natural areas provide unique benefits that are limited in supply. Climate change might reduce these benefits by damaging these areas (e.g., through extreme weather or rising temperatures). This makes the remaining natural areas even more valuable because they become scarcer. This illustrates a general point: Scarcity leads the value of
environmental goods to increase with time relative to conventional
goods!

Potential Substitutes: While we might find substitutes for some resources (like using renewable energy instead of fossil fuels), many natural benefits (like biodiversity and natural beauty) have no substitutes. As climate change progresses, these irreplaceable benefits become more precious.

Demand Side Effects:

Rising Demand for Natural Benefits: As people become wealthier, they tend to value natural benefits more (like visiting parks for recreation). This means the demand for preserving natural areas will likely increase over time, especially in developed economies.

Impact of Higher Fossil Fuel Prices: If we account for the environmental damage caused by fossil fuels, their prices will rise. Higher fossil fuel prices might reduce people’s ability to travel to natural areas, slightly lowering demand for recreational visits.

Economic Adjustments:

Internalizing External Costs: By including the environmental costs of fossil fuels in their price, renewable energy sources (like solar, wind, and hydro) become more attractive. This adjustment can make projects that preserve natural areas (instead of developing them for fossil fuel use) more economically viable.

Future Technological Progress: The outcome also depends on how quickly we can develop and reduce the costs of renewable energy technologies. Faster progress in renewables makes them cheaper and more competitive compared to fossil fuels.

Summary
To include climate change concerns in the Krutilla and Fisher model, we need to:
- Recognize that natural areas become more valuable as climate change makes them scarcer and more unique.
- Understand that people’s demand for natural benefits will increase as they get wealthier.
- Account for the true environmental costs of fossil fuels, making renewable energy more attractive and supporting preservation efforts.
- Consider how future advancements in renewable technology can further shift the balance towards preservation over development.

By incorporating these factors, the model can better capture the long-term value and importance of preserving natural areas in the face of climate change.

19
Q

What is Wilderness Amenity Services?

A

Wilderness Amenity Services:

These are the benefits people get from natural environments that are not usually sold in markets. Examples include clean air and water, recreational opportunities, biodiversity and the enjoyment of natural beauty.

20
Q

The table below presents the term structure of the risk-free component of the real discount rate used in cost-benefit analysis in Denmark. Observe that the risk-free discount rate falls with the time horizon. How can this be justified?”

Table:

Se Note 4

A

Simplified Explanation
The question asks why the risk-free discount rate decreases over longer time horizons in the context of Denmark’s cost-benefit analysis. Here’s a simplified explanation based on the provided solution sketch:

Interest-Rate Uncertainty:
- When there’s uncertainty about future interest rates, the correct discount rate to use isn’t just an average of all possible future rates. Instead, we should use a lower rate to account for this uncertainty.
Expected Discount Factor:

  • The expected discount factor (which helps calculate the present value of future benefits) tends to be lower than the simple average of future discount factors. This means that the overall discount rate should be set lower to accurately reflect future values.

Declining Discount Rates:
- As we consider longer time periods, it’s appropriate to use lower discount rates. This is because over the long term, the minimum possible interest rate becomes more relevant. This reflects the idea that future benefits should not be undervalued too heavily, ensuring long-term projects (like environmental preservation) are given fair consideration.

In essence, the decreasing risk-free discount rate over longer periods ensures that long-term benefits and costs are fairly evaluated, taking into account the uncertainties and the tendency of long-term rates to be lower. This approach helps in making more balanced decisions for projects that have long-lasting impacts

21
Q

Give me an intuitive example on hoe the risk free discount rate falls with the time horizon.

A

Imagine a government is deciding whether to preserve a large forest or allow it to be developed for commercial purposes. Here’s how the concept of declining discount rates can be applied in this environmental context:

Short-Term Considerations (0-35 years):
- Development Option: If the forest is developed now, the immediate economic benefits include profits from logging, agriculture, or real estate development. These benefits are relatively high and can be realized quickly.
- Preservation Option: If the forest is preserved, the benefits include clean air, biodiversity, recreation, and carbon sequestration. These benefits are also high but more long-term and less immediately tangible.
Short-Term Discount Rate: To compare these options, the government uses a discount rate that includes both a risk-free component (like a stable return from government bonds) and a risk premium (reflecting the uncertainties and risks associated with future environmental benefits).

For example, the short-term discount rate might be 3.5% (2% risk-free + 1.5% risk premium).

Medium-Term Considerations (36-70 years):
- Over the next few decades, the development profits might still be significant, but they might start to decline as the forest resources are depleted.
- The benefits of preserving the forest, such as continued carbon sequestration and recreation, become more pronounced and stable.
Medium-Term Discount Rate: The risk premium decreases because the benefits of preservation become more predictable and stable as we look further into the future.

For example, the medium-term discount rate might be 2.5% (1.75% risk-free + 0.75% risk premium).

Long-Term Considerations (Beyond 70 years):
- In the long term, the developed land might have limited additional economic benefits due to resource depletion and potential environmental degradation.
- The preserved forest, on the other hand, continues to provide crucial environmental benefits like biodiversity conservation and climate regulation, which become even more valuable as global environmental conditions potentially worsen.
Long-Term Discount Rate: The risk premium is eliminated because the benefits of a preserved forest are now seen as highly reliable and critical for future generations.

For example, the long-term discount rate might be 1.5% (entirely the risk-free rate).

Why This Makes Sense
Long-Term Environmental Stability:
- In the short term, the immediate economic gains from development are tempting, but they come with significant environmental risks and uncertainties. A higher discount rate reflects these uncertainties.
- Over the long term, preserving the forest provides stable and crucial environmental benefits that become more valuable, especially considering potential climate change impacts. Using a lower discount rate acknowledges the increasing importance and reliability of these long-term benefits.

Conclusion
In environmental cost-benefit analysis, using lower discount rates for long-term horizons ensures that the enduring benefits of preserving natural areas are not undervalued. This approach helps in making decisions that appropriately weigh the immediate economic benefits of development against the long-term environmental benefits of preservation, leading to more sustainable and forward-thinking outcomes.

22
Q

Why does the benefits of preservation become more predictable and stable as we look further into the future? explain this with the forest example. Why is not already well understod on the short lane.

A

Example to Illustrate
Imagine a preserved forest providing clean water, carbon sequestration, and recreational opportunities:

Short-Term (0-35 years): In the short term, there might be fluctuations due to external factors like economic changes, policy shifts, or immediate environmental impacts. These make the benefits seem less predictable.

Medium-Term (36-70 years): As we move to the medium term, the forest continues to grow and mature, providing consistent benefits. The value of carbon sequestration becomes more apparent as climate change progresses, and the stable supply of clean water and biodiversity becomes more recognized.

Long-Term (>70 years): In the long term, the forest’s role in climate regulation, water management, and biodiversity conservation becomes critical. The benefits are seen as essential for sustaining human life and mitigating climate change impacts. These roles are highly predictable because the fundamental processes driving them (like photosynthesis, water cycles, and ecological interactions) are stable and well understood.

Still I think there is a discussion inside this. It depends on how long into the future you look, how much value you give preservation over short economic gains. We care more about ourselves now than future generations, so we do not lay enough benefit into the environmental values.

23
Q

What is important to think of when choosing a pollution control instrument under uncertainty?

A

Dependability: To what extent can the instrument be relied upon to achieve the target?

Flexibility: Is the instrument capable of being adapted quickly and cheaply as new information arises, as conditions change, or as target are altered?

Cost of use under uncertainty: How large are the efficiency losses when the instruments used with incorrect information. In figure 7.2 see note 4 the shaded area represents the total net social benefit that would be
generated at a level of emissions. If we do not get all of the maximized shaded area when M* and t*, then we will get efficiency losses.

Information requirements: How much information does the instrument require that the control authority possesses, and what are the costs of acquiring it.? Whit perfect information there is no efficiency losses and net benefits are maxims, see figure 7.2. note 4. Efficiency losses from uncertainty are
those in which emissions are at any
level other than M*, and so attained
net benefits fall short of their
maximum level.

24
Q

Uncertainty about abatement costs– costs overestimated

A

In text: Figure 7.3 illustrates the efficiency losses occurring when the EPA overestimates
the costs of abatement.

The true marginal abatement cost curve is MAC (true), so the optimal level of pollution is
M* where the marginal damage cost of pollution (MD) equals the marginal abatement
cost. The optimal emission level can be attained via the emission tax t* or via an emission
permit system with a total permit supply equal to M*.

However, the EPA believes that the marginal abatement cost curve is MAC (assumed), so
the EPA’s estimate of the optimal emission level is LH
.
Under an emission permit scheme the EPA would therefore issue a total amount of
emission permits equal to LH . The efficiency loss due to the EPA’s overestimation of
abatement costs would then be equal to the area of the red triangle in Figure 7.3, since this
area measures the difference between the additional total damage cost (the area under the
MD curve) and the total saving of abatement cost (the area under the MAC (true) curve)
as emissions increase from the optimal level M* to the level LH
.
By contrast, under a tax scheme the EPA would choose the emission tax rate tH which
would imply an emission level Mt and an efficiency loss equal to the area of the green
triangle in Figure 7.3.

25
Q

Uncertainty about abatement costs– costs underestimated?

A

See figures in Note 4

In text: Figure 7.4 illustrates the efficiency losses occurring when the EPA underestimates
the costs of abatement, believing that marginal abatement costs follow the curve MC(assumed) whereas the actual abatement cost curve is MC (true).

Under an emission permit scheme the EPAwill now issue a total supply of permits equal to
LL which will generate an efficiency loss equal to the area of the small red triangle.

Under a tax scheme the EPAwill choose the emission tax rate tL which would imply an
emission level Mt and an efficiency loss equal to the area of the large green triangle in Figure 7.4.

=> According to figures 7.3 and 7.4 a tax scheme will therefore generate a larger efficiency loss than a permit scheme regardless of whether the EPA overestimates or
underestimates abatement costs.

26
Q

Is there a general result to be found, when over and under estimating during uncertainty about abatement costs?

A

We have thus established the following general result, originally
discovered by Martin Weitzman:
1. When the (absolute value of the) slope of the MAC curve is less than
the slope of the MD curve, licences (quantity controls) are preferred to
taxes (as they lead to smaller efficiency losses).
2. When the (absolute value of the) slope of the MAC curve is greater
than the slope of the MD curve, taxes are preferred to licences (as they
lead to smaller efficiency losses).

27
Q

What If the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal damage cost curve? What is the conclusion?

A

=> If the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal damage cost curve, we
get the opposite conclusion: A tax scheme will now imply a smaller efficiency loss than a
permit scheme, as illustrated in figures 7.5 and 7.6.

28
Q

Problem 2: Policy instruments and uncertainty (weight 33%)

Consider an economy where profit maximizing producers of a private good emit a uniformly mixing
flow pollutant, which damages the environment.

Let 𝑀 = ∑𝑚𝑘 be aggregate emissions, where 𝑚𝑘 is firm 𝑘’s emissions.

Let the social benefits of pollution, 𝐵(𝑀), be given by the maximal private good production that is
possible for an aggregate emission level 𝑀, and let the social damage of pollution 𝐷(𝑀) be
determined by consumers’ valuation of the environmental quality, measured in units of the private
good.

An environmental regulator wants to maximize the net social benefits of pollution. To achieve this,
the regulator will cchoose one of two alternative policy instruments: a uniform emission tax or a
tradable permit.

a) Assume that the regulator knows the marginal social damages of pollution 𝐷′(𝑀). Due to
uncertainty on the abatement costs, the regulator only knows the slope of the marginal
social benefits of emissions:

𝐷′(𝑀) = 2𝑀 − 1
𝐵′(𝑀) = 𝑋 − 3𝑀

Discuss the differences in welfare loss due to the choice of a price instrument over a
quantity instrument and vice versa.

You can also use figures.

Can you recommend to the regulator an instrument choice (emission taxes or tradable
permits)?

Provide reasons for your answer.
How would your answer change if, instead, 𝐵′(𝑀) was given by 𝐵′(𝑀) = 𝑋 − 0.5𝑀?

A

This can be done in a figure with the 𝐷′(𝑀) and 𝐵′(𝑀) curves, where welfare losses are
illustrated by parallel shifts to the 𝐵′(𝑀) curve.

The key result is derived by comparing the (absolute value of the) slope of the 𝐵′(𝑀) curve is greater than the slope of the 𝐷′(𝑀) curve.
For the marginal damages, the slope is given by 𝐷′′(𝑀) = 2. For the case 𝐵′(𝑀) = 𝑋 − 3𝑀, we obtain 𝐵′′(𝑀) = −3. Because |𝐵′′(𝑀)| > 𝐷′′(𝑀), taxes are preferred to permits as
they lead to smaller efficiency losses.

For the case 𝐵′(𝑀) = 𝑋 − 0.5𝑀, we obtain 𝐵′′(𝑀) = −0.5. Because now instead|𝐵′′(𝑀)| < 𝐷′′(𝑀), permits are preferred to taxes as they lead to smaller efficiency losses.