Exam II 17th 18th cent. PHIL Flashcards

1
Q
  1. Q: How does Locke argue against the possibility of innate ideas?

How does Leibniz respond to Locke’s empiricist rejection of innate ideas?

A

A: Locke argues that there are no universal principles known by all people, including children and “idiots,” which would be necessary if ideas were innate. He believes all knowledge comes from experience—either sensation or reflection.

A: Leibniz argues that innate ideas exist as dispositions or tendencies, not fully formed ideas. He compares them to the veins in marble—already present, just waiting to be revealed.

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2
Q
  1. Q: Who has the better argument—Locke or Leibniz—on innate ideas? Why?
A

Locke’s claim that everyone would have to have innate ideas for them to be true is confusing, And both rely on God to enforce these innate ideas. Humans can have ideas not based on experience; math, moral and logistical.

while you can defend innate ideas from leibniz via principle of the best,
you can’t do that with locke; ideas like morality math and logic would have to be based on a substratum because they are of experience. Leibniz’s calims are better because they follow his empiricism and explain these concepts.

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3
Q
  1. Q: What is the difference between primary and secondary qualities for Locke?
A

A: Primary qualities (e.g., shape, size, motion) exist in the object itself. Secondary qualities (e.g., color, taste, sound) depend on the perceiver’s senses and are not truly in the object.

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4
Q
  1. Q: How does Locke’s empiricism lead to skepticism? What are we skeptical of?
A

A: Since knowledge comes only through ideas, and we don’t perceive objects directly, Locke admits we cannot be certain of the real nature of external objects—just their effects on us. We’re skeptical of the “substratum,” the supposed substance underlying qualities.

veil of perception skepticism

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5
Q
  1. Q: Do you find the primary/secondary quality distinction helpful? Why or why not?
A

not helpful; if traits all have substratum there is no difference between sensing an objects color and its shape. There is no meaningful distinction as they are derived from the same “thing” that we’ll never experience that is outside of the bounds of his empiricism.

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6
Q
  1. Q: What is an idea, for Locke?

How does this relate to Locke’s naïve realism and the “veil of perception” skepticism?

A

A: An idea is anything that can be the object of the mind—produced either by sensation or reflection.

Naive realism; things are as we perceive them. Locke advocated for realism but only to an extent

skepticism: if we only perceive representations, how can we know reality?

ideas are caused by objects and are representative of them

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7
Q
  1. Q: Evaluate Locke’s position on perception and skepticism.
A

A: I don’t think Locke’s skepticism goes far enough. He claims that the reality that we perceive is representations, and the most accurate of which are the ones in front of us at any given moment. I think that its impossible to say how accurate our representations are when our senses are not on reality and also are based on a substratum we know nothing about.

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8
Q
  1. Q: What is the “Molyneux Man” problem and how does Locke address it?
A

A: The problem asks: if a blind man who knows shapes by touch gains sight, could he visually distinguish shapes? Locke says no—he must learn visual-spatial associations through experience.

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9
Q
  1. Q: Do you agree with Locke on the Molyneux Man? Why?
A

My position goes with biology, I think innate ideas like shapes are not true. If you showed someone a baby chicken and a centipede and they know nothing about either, it is not decisive.

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10
Q
  1. Q: What is the philosophical problem of identity through time?
A

A: It asks how something can remain the same over time despite change.

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11
Q
  1. Q: How does Locke solve the problem of identity?
A

A: Locke says identity depends on the kind of thing. For persons, it’s continuity of consciousness (not body or soul). For objects, it’s continued existence of the same matter or organization.

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12
Q
  1. Q: Evaluate Locke’s view on persistence and identity.
A

A: Many praise his psychological account of personal identity, especially for moral responsibility. Critics question whether memory can be the sole basis for identity (e.g., memory gaps).

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13
Q
  1. Q: What is Berkeley’s thesis of subjective idealism? What does “esse est percipi” mean?
A

A: Berkeley argues that to exist is to be perceived (“esse est percipi”). Only minds and ideas exist—material substance doesn’t. Objects exist only as they are perceived or in the mind of God.

we perceive senses as ideas - objects are ideas in our minds

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14
Q
  1. Q: Evaluate Berkeley’s subjective idealism.
A

A: It avoids skepticism about perception but raises questions about object permanence and other minds. Critics say it makes the world too dependent on perception, but it’s logically consistent within his framework.

relies too much on god– who is outside of his empiricist claims

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15
Q
  1. Q: How does Berkeley object to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
A

A: Berkeley argues all qualities—size, shape, motion (primary) and color, taste (secondary)—depend on perception. He uses examples like the relativity of size and motion to show even “primary” qualities aren’t mind-independent.

objects contain traits within their ideas

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16
Q
  1. Q: Is Berkeley reducing primary to secondary qualities, or vice versa?
A

both into secondary- as all of the ideas are dependent on sensation

17
Q
  1. Q: What is the “Likeness Principle” according to Berkeley?
A

A: It’s the idea that an idea can only be like another idea, not like a material object. Therefore, we can’t say our ideas resemble mind-independent matter—we have no access to it.

18
Q
  1. Q: How does the Likeness Principle support Berkeley’s immaterialism?
A

A: It undermines Locke and Descartes’ realism. If we can’t know whether ideas resemble material things, we should reject matter altogether and affirm that only ideas exist.

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Q
  1. Q: What is Berkeley’s “Master Argument”?
A

A: He argues we cannot conceive of an unperceived object—because the moment we try, we are perceiving it. So the idea of mind-independent matter is incoherent.

20
Q
  1. Q: How might a materialist respond to the Master Argument?
A

A: They might say conceiving is different from existing. Just because we always perceive what we imagine doesn’t mean objects need to be perceived to exist.

21
Q
  1. Q: Why is God essential to Berkeley’s immaterialism?
A

A: God is the ultimate perceiver who constantly perceives all things, ensuring their continued existence when finite minds are not perceiving them.

(continuity of the world)

22
Q
  1. Q: Is Berkeley’s use of God objectionable? Why or why not?
A

A: YES. doesn’t follow the empiricism; you can’t perceive god therefore he isn’t real if you follow what Hume says

23
Q
  1. Q: What is the difference between an impression and an idea, according to Hume?
A

A: Impressions are vivid, immediate experiences (e.g., seeing red); ideas are faint copies of impressions (e.g., remembering red). The distinction lies in intensity and origin.

24
Q
  1. Q: How could someone object to Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas?
A

Hume says ideas are less lively than impressions, but doesn’t draw a line; someone can have very vivid memories or feelings when another idea is brought up. If our reactions to memories can be more vivid than impressions, what is actually making the distinction?

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3. Q: What are “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas” in Hume’s Fork?
A: Relations of ideas are a priori and necessarily true (e.g., math). Matters of fact are a posteriori, contingent, and based on experience (e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow).
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4. Q: Why is Hume’s Fork important?
A: It limits what we can know with certainty. It implies we cannot know causation, God, or the self with logical necessity—they are matters of belief, not demonstrable knowledge. --while allowing for math and logical relations of ideas knowledge
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5. Q: How does Hume’s Fork affect our understanding of causation?
A: Causation is not known a priori. We only infer it through habit—seeing one event follow another repeatedly. we can't trust habit or custom as true knowledge
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6. Q: What is the Universal Causal Principle (aka PSR) and Hume’s view on it?
A: The principle says everything has a cause. Hume doubts this—he argues we only assume causation due to habit and have no rational proof that everything must have a cause. we only assume everything has a cause because we observe cause and effect. Its based on custom or habit to assume there's a reason for everything
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7. Q: Which is more defensible, Hume’s skepticism or the PSR? Why?
PSR requires God and causation to function; everything has a cause because that's what we observe in nature, and nature is perfect due to god and principle of the best Hume's skepticism needs neither, doubting causation as a source of knowledge and God Yu need to suspend more belief for PSR
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8. Q: What are Hume’s two definitions of causation?
Hume's Regularity Account of causation states that causation is simply the regular succession of cause and effect events. A counterfactual account, in contrast, analyzes causation in terms of what would have happened if the cause had not occurred, focusing on the "would have" aspect of the causal relationship
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9. Q: What’s problematic about Hume’s two definitions of causation?
A: They reduce causation to psychological habit and correlation, not explanation—undermining science and metaphysics. there is no explanation as to why we see consistency in the world then. post hoc - we assume cause and effect overdeterminism - an infinite amount of causes - you can't pick just one
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10. Q: How does the teleological argument work?
A: It argues from apparent design in nature to the existence of a designer (God), like how a watch implies a watchmaker.
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11. Q: What is Hume’s critique of the teleological argument?
A: He says it’s a weak analogy—complex things don’t necessarily imply a perfect designer. Also, the argument doesn’t prove a single, all-good, all-powerful deity. it results in a more human deity that most theists wouldn't accept (or a plurality of weaker beings)
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12. Q: Is Hume’s objection to the design argument fair? Why or why not?
A: Many find it persuasive—it highlights assumptions in natural theology. Others argue the analogy still supports some kind of intelligent cause.