Exam 2 Review Flashcards
1
Q
What happened in the Peloponnesian war?
A
consult notes
2
Q
Reasons for Peloponnesian war?
A
Arguments:
BoP, Bipolarity, Regime Type, Free-riding, and National Culture
3
Q
BOP explanation for P war
A
States were worried about power shifts, so they entered the war.
4
Q
Bipolarity explanation for P war
A
2 big states are more prone to war.
(Athens and Sparta)
5
Q
Regime Type explanation for P war
A
Non democracy vs Democracy
(Limited bc Athens wasn’t a true democracy considering only rich men could vote)
6
Q
Free-riding explanation for P war
A
Athens did not believe that Sparta allies would help so they were just going to free ride (they were wrong)
7
Q
National Culture starting p war
A
Sparta seen as warrior society who goes to war, so obviously they would go to war, Weak because they were reluctant and last state to join.
8
Q
Why is it important to apply theories?
A
Because when you apply and deep dive many of them break down.
9
Q
Which theories tend to hold up better?
A
Power theories
10
Q
Feudal system
A
Power and sovereignty were divided, overlapping, and shared sovereignty b/w pope, prince, and holy roman emperor.
11
Q
Pope
A
sovereign over religious matters
12
Q
Prince
A
local leader and in charge of domestic or civil affairs
13
Q
Holy Roman Emperor
A
in charge of foreign affairs and foreign policy
14
Q
Treaty of Westphalia (1648)
A
established sovereignty, international binding treaty, state legal equality, and non-intervention.
-ended thirty years war
-marked decline of feudal system and increase of modern system.
-Power shifted to pope, rise of strong states and mass armies.
15
Q
How did the rise of strong states and mass armies happen after treaty of Westphalia?
A
International trade and taxation allowed economic increase and money to fund the army which led to a bureaucracy structure and big armies which led to massive power.
16
Q
Dominant states during modern system
A
Austria-Hungary (roman empire), Russia, Sweden, Spain
17
Q
19th century main themes
A
- Change in BOP
- Rapid Rise of Germany and Japan
- Territorial expansion/ Imperialism
- Peace and Stability
18
Q
19th century change in bop theme
A
1815 France and Napolean fall, British power begins to rise. England dominates world as hedgominc. Industrialization allowed for military and political power and strong navy increased trade.
19
Q
19th century rapid rise of Germany and Japan theme
A
Industrialization at a rapid pace and Japan defeated Russia which helped them gain legitimacy
20
Q
19th century theme of territorial expansion (imperialism)
A
-before 1870’s imperialism was always economic and forcing other states to do business.
-after 1870’s imperialism was actually conquering land.
late forming states conquered colonies in Africa to make up for lost time and become powerful.
21
Q
Why do states use imperialism?
A
- Power (realist pov) to gain resources/territory for power.
- Superiority (constructivism pov) belief that they tried to spread their superior culture to help inferior culture
- Colonial conquest. wanted mote territory
- Conquer new lands to keep capital system (Marxist Pov) bringing in new materials to keep state growing
22
Q
19th Century Peace and Stability theme
A
after 1815 there were no international wars. Rise of Marxist left so leaders of the world feared revolution in non-democratic states so states in international system avided war and cooperated.
23
Q
Congress system in peace and stability era
A
after 1815. Major powers came together in congress meetings to avoid conflict. Constant summit meetings of leaders using diplomacy to work through issues.
24
Q
Arms race (dyadic level argument)
A
2 states continually engaging in rapid and uncommon increases to military spending
25
Themes of arm races:
1. Rapid growth
if you generally spend 2-3% it would jump to 8% military spending
2. Action-reaction
must have ar process. I increase my weapon spending which causes you to increase yours. You have to be acting to your opponent directly.
3. Duration
Must last for long period of time (8-10years)
26
Idea that arms races lead to war
"pressure builds during arms races" you view them as bad and aggressive for increasing but view yourself as safe for doing so and vice versa which leads to a fight.
27
Do they actually lead to war?
No. only 20% of arms races were followed by war. On its own it does not cause war but can play a role. Neither necessary or sufficient
28
World war one causes
Bipolarity, nationalism, military doctrine, democracy vs authoritarian states, individuals.
29
Proximate cause of WW1
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand (example of nationalism, serbain nationalist wanting to form their own state)
30
Bipolarity cause of WW1
2 "chain gang alliances"
Triple Entente; Great Britain, France, and Russia.
Triple alliance; Germany, Austria, and Turkey
BUT they weren't really chain gangs because they all had really loose ties and no strong commitments.
31
Nationalism cause of WW1
Widespread nationalism.
Germany was trying to gather and bring Germans together
France was trying to gain border territory back from Germany because half French and half German citizens.
Russia and Austria competing for Slavic territory
32
Military Doctrine cause of ww1
(many blame this)
The cult of offensive and military bureaucracy
33
Cult of Offensive
the idea that you have to be a strong and good military leader you have to support the attack. You have to have massive first-strike capability to win war quickly.
34
Military Bureaucracy
Developed massive military bureaucracies to carry out attacks and built elaborate plans that time down to the minute how it all would go down. Once the plan started there was no going back and left no breathing room for diplomacy.
35
Democracy vs Authoritarian states as ww1 cause
England + France vs Germany + Austria
(But, Russia is on the side with the democracies even though it is not once itself. Russia is on the wrong side for this thought process)
36
Individuals as WW1 cause
Mostly focused on the German Kaiser and Moltke.
-Kaiser caused war by not being worried about it. Treated it as no big deal.
-Moltke caused war because he lived in the shadow of his uncle who had defeated France. When he became head of German military he was driven to fight for glory.
37
Treaty of Versailles 1919
1. Punitive by BoP standards.
(changed the way we treated losers and how peace treaties worked)
2. France seeked punishment
Desired to get compensated for war and make it where Germany could not rise again.
3. Germany:
-lost all colonies, paid reparations, had limited military.
4. Keynes economic consequences of peace predicted that too much of a burden was put on Germany and their only solution was to fight.
38
Causes of ww2
Versailles treaty (put too much on Germany), phoenix phenomenon, depression, US/UK/ France foreign policy
39
Phoenix Phenomenon
states that lose wars rebuild and gain power faster than states that won them. "rise from ashes"
40
Hitler as cause?
No. He used traditional German policy, no unique ideology, no evidence of being mentally ill, and may have been scapegoat for German elite.
41
Necessary Conditions
must have it for event to take place
42
sufficient conditions
it will cause the event but not needed
43
Define war
war is politics, Warfare + fighting is a political act. You have goals + things you wany to achieve, so you can use diplomacy or economy, or you can use war. War is politics by other means.
44
Reasons you fight a war are
politically defined.
45
Victory or defeated in war is determined by
whether or not you win your political objectives
46
Types of conflicts
war, militarized interstate disputes, extra systemic war, or civil wars.
47
Wars
Military conflicts between two states with atleast 1,000 battle deaths
48
MIDS
militarized interstate disputes
Lower-level military conflict b/w 2 or more states that falls short of 1,000 deaths.
49
Extra systemic wars
war b/w a state and non state actor outside territory of state
50
Civil wars
wars b/w a state and non-state actor inside territory of the state
51
Security dilemma
the means by which one state seeks to increase its security decreases the security of the states around it.
52
example of security dilemma
military wants to provide security so you expand your military, but this can be used to attack others so their security decreases.
53
Question of security dilemma: why do states who genuinely want peace usually end up fighting?
54
Effects of security dilemma
1. Spending more on defense than needed
2. Reduced ability
3. Increased fear and less security
55
Weakness of secuirty dilemma?
We don't worry about everyone gaining weapons the same way. We don't care about England gaining weapons, but we do care about Iran.
56
Prisoners dilemma or game theory
Explanation:
All about taking into account what the other person is going to do and find your best option based on what options others can take. If both sides are rational/smart they will confess, but they still get a worse outcome than they would have if they worked together.
57
What is the most logical thing to do in prisoners dilemma?
Confess or defect
58
War weariness (systemic level)
generations that experienced war/its traumas never want to experience it again so while they are in power, they do not allow war. When a new generation that has not experienced war comes into power then warfare will return.
59
Dyadic level arguments
BoP and PT
60
Bop dyadic level argument
When two states have approximately equal distribution of power across systems of nations, they tend to produce a peaceful equilibrium and will not fight. this is because war is too risky for both if neither state has the clear advantage.
61
Power transition dyadic level argument
nationals all develop at different rates and grow in their economy or military at different rates. Some will be unhappy with the way things are operating and this is dangerous because states have growing power and are dissatisfied which will result in conflict. The weaker state will initiate war just before it passes the dominat state in equality.
62
The theory that brings PT and BoP together since they both have strong empirical evidence?
Kelly Kadrea power conflict theory.
Zone of equality, decisive advantage, or overwhelming / preponderance.
63
International rivalry
rivalries consist of the same pair of states competing with one another, and the expectation of a future conflict relationship with the same specific opponent.
64
Themes of rivalries
-must be a state
-dyadic with ONE other state no groups
-duration (very long-lasting and tries to bring history into conflict)
-militarized competition, must at least be the threat to use military force against an opponent
65
Rivalries only make up 10% of dyads but
account for 53% of conflict in the world
66
Resource wars
one state uses military force against another for the primary purpose of gaining access to key economic and strategic resources. (War over capturing vital resources, traditionally oil)
67
Potential resource conflicts
non-renewable resources are more dangerous/ conflict prone
oil, rivers, fishing/whaling, diamonds
68
Repeated play
can allow you to receive cooperation in the security dilemma under certain circumstances.
Shadow of future and infinite time horizon
69
Infinite time horizon
You cannot know when the game will end, why? if you know you will when the last round is and defect. The other player will know you are going to defect before that and cooperation will be lost before end.
70
Shadow of future
Worried about future benefits you'll have to forge. Repeated cooperation can add up to more benefits than just defects once. Future benefits accumulate and make it more rational to cooperate. Only works with infinite time horizon.
71
tit for tat strategy
You cooperate as long as your opponent cooperates. When they stop cooperating and defect, then you defect back. "be nice as long as they are"
72
Democratic Peace
Belief that spreading democracy will lead to global peace
73
Facts about democracies
1. Democracies are just as likely to go to war as everyone else
2. They often fight imperial wars and attack weaker opponents.
3. More likely to initiate wars against non-democracies
4. Democracies are nearly immune from war with each other
74
Democracies will go to war no problem but
they are not likely to go to war with each other
75
What is a democracy
1. Free and fair elections
2. Freedom of speech
3. Freedom of press
4. Peaceful transition of leaders
76
Why are democracies more peaceful? four main explanations
Kant 1795, Structures, Norms, and Trasnparency
77
Kant 1795
Citizens in a democracy do not want to pay the costs of war. Leaders in non democracies do not pay the costs, so are more willing to fight. Something huge really has to happen or be there for democracies to fight. Authoritarian leaders don’t care to go to war.
78
Structures explanation of dp
institutions determine peace
1. Vote out leaders (we vote out leaders who engage in costly or bad wars. So leaders don’t start bad costly wars, and peace because the president is rational.)
2. Separation of powers (Power is divided by different branches of the government. So no branch can fight and start the war alone. Congress declares, executive fights, congress funds. Harder to get everyone to agree because everyone must agree it is necessary. More people involved results in less wars being fought.)
-War powers act:
79
Norms explanation for dp
-Standard methods of behavior (acceptable modes of behavior)
Idea: democracies operate under a different set of norms than others
-Freedom of expression, try to solve issues through compromise, handling disputes peacefully, bargaining and negotiations
So when democracies go into the international world we use bargaining and negotiate but only with states they believe will follow those same norms. So we bargain and negotiate with other democratic states because of the same norms but not with authoritarian states because their norms are different. So this is why we do not engage in war with democratic states but do with authoritarian states.
80
Transparency explanation of dp
(negative that has been spun to be a positive because it allows states to avoid conflict because it allows other states to know if they are serious or not and no accidental wars.)
Very easy to see what is going on inside of democratic state. Why?
-Free Press
When states enter into conflict they both bluff and say they will go to war over this topic BUT in democratic states it’s harder to bluff because everyone can see what is going on domestically and the true intentions.
-Transparency makes it hard to bluff
-Transparency allows you to know whether your opponent is serious about fighting. Democratic states you can see what's happening, but authoritarian states you cannot so sometimes bluffing leads to accidental war.
81
Ecological fallacy
using data from one level of analysis to make conclusions about another level of analysis. (not good)
82
Ex: People believe that because the dyadic level says democratic states don’t go to war with each other, then spreading democracy will lead to less war systemically.
This is wrong because: More democracies creates more democracy non democracy dyads and mixed dyads increases, which is the most war prone dyad.
-Systematically, at first more democracies would be more prone to war, but over time it would decrease in the long run.
Conclusion: adding more democracies in the short run will not increase global peace. Once you get over the hump and majority is democracies, then war chances will decrease and peace may be achieveable
83
Deterrence
Prevents others from doing something that they would otherwise do. (Ray and Kaarbo)
-Art of distilling fear in an adversary so that they are afraid to attack, (Dr. Strangelove)
84
Si vis pacem apara bellum:
If you wish for peace, prepare for war.
85
Types of deterrence:
Immediate and Extended
86
Immediate deterrence
telling someone to not attack you. “If you attack my country I will…”
87
Extended deterrence
trying to put your protective bubble around another country + not attack someone else
88
What kind of deterrence is more successful?
immediate
89
Compellence-
forces others to do something that they would not otherwise do
Compellence is more difficult to succeed at than deterrence.
90
Deterrence is different from compellence. Deterrence is trying to keep you from doing something.
Compellence is telling you to do something
91
For deterrence to work-
1. Defender must decide what is worth defending (what is important to you? What are you willing to fight over? Looks at entire globe)
2. Defender must adequately communicate their intentions (telling your opponent what you will fight over.)
3.Defender must be credible (history must show you are credible and fight when you say you will) (sometimes it's better to take a bad outcome to avoid hurting your credibility)
4.Defender must have second strike capability (if your opponent attacks you, you must maintain the ability to absorb attack and shoot back at your opponent
(If any of these fail deterrence fails)
92
Does deterrence work?
-The problem with dogs that don’t bark.
(When a dog doesn’t bark, nothing happens)
Nonevent- implies that those who wanted to do something didn’t
If deterrence is successful nothing happens, which makes it hard to tell.
93
Testing deterrence-
Central Deterrence Theory Logic:
Main hypothesis: deterrence leads to peace
Logically equivalent hypothesis: war implies deterrence broke down (~p > ~d)
94
The anarchy game
Everyone allowed to be as bloodthirsty as they want to because no common sovereignty,
Anarchy didn’t make us fight, but it didn’t stop us from fighting.
95
Anarchy is a
Permissive condition- a condition that doesn't force you or make you fight but it allows you to do what you please.
96
Bargaining/ Negotiation:
“solve or resolve a problem without having any militarized conflict”
97
3 main bargaining scenarios
(Re) distribution of a fixed amount, Possible mutual gains or losses, and diving a fixed quantity
98
(Re) distribution of a fixed amount
“Constant sum game”
There is a certain amount (fixed amt) of something/ a good and that amount CANNOT change.
(indivisiblity problem in ps210)
“The more you get, the less I can get”
High conflict (little chance of cooperation)
Ex: Dividing territory. Two states want to divide territory, you can’t make more land.
Same exact thing as “Zero sum competition”
99
Possible mutual gains or losses
“Variable sum games”
Depending on how we behave (cooperate or fight) we can make a deal where we are both better off or we can both lose.
Work together = get more work against other = get less
100
Variable sum game examples
Prisoners dilemma (aka security dilemma)
Dominant strategy: do not cooperate
Results: both sides worse off
Unless played many times over and over (infinite time horizon and shadow of future can get cooperation)
Chicken Game
You win if your opponent backs off (you are better off and gain more if you can get your opponent to back down)
Both lose if no one backs off (if neither back down you end worse off)
-if we keep going and don’t strike a deal with both crash (war), unless one side says ok I’ll give you what you want (cooperate and their the chicken)
Reputation greatly matters. If the other side has a reputation for never swerving your only option is to swerve and be the chicken.
101
Key to being good at bargaining:
know the situation and apply the right strategy. If you use incorrect strategy you may make things worse.
102
Dividing a fixed quantity
(b tactics)
-get as much as you can w/o destroying the deal
Reserve position
103
Reserve position
point at which someone will walk away and not make a deal
“I will spend up to x amount of dollars”
Ex: interested in a car and your set price is 15,000. The reserved position is 15,000, but if the price goes above it you will walk away.
104
If the reserved positions do not overlap,
you cannot make a deal.
105
Strategies for a better deal:
Resolve, Invent options for mutual gain, Long term strategy
106
Resolve:
-Demonstrate your willingness to walk away without making a deal.
The more willing someone thinks you are to walk away, the better deal they will give you.
(still negotiating by getting up and walking out)
Ex: strikes. Dividing a fixed amount and proving you will walk away.
107
Construct enforcement mechanisms:
Outside group/ 3rd party to enforce a deal to MAKE you cooperate. Third party will punish you or the other side if you do not live up to agreement.
-Gangs and organized crime use this to get around the prisoner's dilemma. Will kill you if you defect, so they enforce the deal.
-IO’s watch to see if people will break their deal, and states may sanction them.
Strategies in game:
108
Contingent cooperation
(Tit for tat strategy)
Under this scenario you just do what they did last time. If they cooperate last time, you cooperate. If they defect, then you defect to punish them. You play nice as long as they do.
-it lets you get back to cooperation. If you defect and I defect, then when you cooperate I will cooperate. I only punish you for as long as I need to for you to be punished.
Downsides: limits punishment. Punishment is less and you are more likely to break a deal.
Ex: SALT treaties (limited nuclear weapons).
As long as Soviet Unions lived up to caps, you lived up to caps. If they went over caps, so did we.
109
Severe retaliation
(GRIM REAPER)
Says if the other side breaks deals and crosses the line, then you hit them HARD. If you break a deal, then I will never cooperate with you again. Cross me, it’s a death sentence. Other side knows in advance (deterrence).
Ex: Traditionally, Israel's policy towards Palestinians for 20 years. Now we see it playing out from October 7th.
110
Chicken
-Cooperate if you think the other side will not.
Ex: Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet union's moves missiles in Cuba, US finds out. Kennedy quarantined Cuba and the Navy circles Cuba. The Russian ship headed towards Cuba, the US Navy headed toward the ship. If the US entered the ship, it would have been an act of war but we refused to let that ship through. The soviets linked and cooperated because they were convinced that the US would board the ship and they did not want to deal with war.
-This is where your long-term reputation is vital.
You have to be willing to “crash your car”. Must build a rep for being willing to crash so that the opposition will swerve. (have to endure reputation costs)
Ex: Israel never negotiates with terrorists. They would always storm the plane and let hostages die (reputation costs). They were willing to endure those costs to build their reputation. At some point, people stopped using hostages as leverage.
111
Credible commitments
You have to make a credible commitment that you will swerve. You have to take an action that you will swerve. Steps that show you cannot back down.
Commitments= threat or promise
Credibility= believable and effective
112
How to be believable and credible?
-cost to carry out the threat by the sender must be less than the cost to not carry it out.
-cost to comply for the target must be less than not complying
Ex: how nuclear policy broke down in the 60s. That would end the world so it lost its credibility
113
Tactics of credible commitments:
Irrational, Constrain your ability to, Deter over compel, Linkage, and Vague or specific commitments
114
Irrational
Someone who will take steps against their own interest or taking a step a sane person would ever do.
Ex: Eisenhower would go out and play this and say things like “Oh yeah nuclear war would be fun” to scare Russians and win concessions and negotiations.
-Tactic may depreciate over time. At some point people will call your bluff and it wont work.
-Consequences must be bad for the other party. Whatever you are gonna do that may be irrational must also harm the other side or else it won’t work.
-Only works in chicken. You want to convince them you will crash your car and not swerve. We want the other side to back down. If you use it in the wrong scenario it will not work.
Ex: North Korea. They present themselves as having an irrational leader who will do things that leaders do not usually do.
115
Constrain your ability to
Design a way that will make it where you have to take an action, which builds credibility. Changes based on your scenario.
-In chicken you want to constrain your ability to cooperate
-In prisoners dilemma you want to constrain your ability to not cooperate
116
Deter over compel
A deterrent threat is always more credible than a compellent threat.
117
Linkage
Issues where you are weak with one you are strong
Ex: president Nixon
Because you are strong in one area where you can actually take action, it builds credibility when you link.
Ex: how we link human rights and trade.
118
Vague or specific commitments
Specific more believable but vague leaves room for less commitment
119
Vague commitment
(not precise in what you will do) tell them you will take action and leave out details or not tell them why action you will take
Why? Benefits-
-allows flexibility in how you respond. Don’t have to lock in.
-makes opponents cautious: uncertainty causes them to think of worst case scenario
Relies on how your opponent will approach it.
-problems: they don’t think of worst case scenario
-being vague can make your opponent worry more, but it can also harm your believability.
-salami tactics: “don't invade or we will do this” so your opponent just does little attacks that will eventually get them all.
120
Specific commitment
-More believable
-Less vulnerable to gradual encroachment and salami tactics
Problems:
-makes it clear what you will do, so it tells them what you will not do.
Ex: anyone in this circle killed will be met with retaliation, so the outside of the circle is fair game to them.
-Makes clear what the other side can do.
-It locks you in. You have committed yourself. Must do it or you're weak and not credible.
121
How to avoid war:
-Alliances
2 issues
-reliability: when states sign alliance do they live up to it
-effect on war and peace
If states don’t honor their alliances then they can’t have an effect on war and peace
122
Three key parts to an alliance:
-must be formal written document
-between states
-cooperating during conflict :promising to make some form of action during war
123
Are alliances reliable?
-pacta sunt servanda
Israelites in old testament carried their alliances with their word if God
Translates to : pacts must be respected
-rebus sic stantibus
US-france alliance
Translates to: while things remain the same
You only have to follow an alliance if things have remained the same since you signed it. If not, you are not obligated to follow it. Only follow it if still in your self interest
124
Did states in allainces fight on the same side of war?
Only honored about 25% at a time
125
Types of treaties:
-defensive pact (alliance); plurality but not majority
-offensive pact; 2 states sign agreement to attack a 3rd party
-neutrality; if you go to war I will stay out of it
-nonaggression; agree to not attack each other
-consultation; if _ happens we will get together and talk
126
Most likely treaty to cause war?
Neutrality
Defensive
-28 percent chance of war
Offensive
+47 chance of war
Neutrality
+57 increase chance of war even more than offense
127
Unit Veto System-
if everyone has nuclear weapons, then everyone would be too scared to attack and there would be peace.
Flaws-
Can’t guarantee all leaders will be rational
Accidental launches? Cost alot to maintain
128
Necessary and sufficent
Is needed to cause war and will cause it
129
Necessary but not sufficient
you need it but also need other things.
130
Sufficient but not necessary
You can have it with that but removing it does not mean you will not get war.
131
Not necessary or sufficent
says you can possibly have a war with it but you need other factors, and you get to war without it completely.
132
Constant sum game
game of total conflict or pure competition, the sum of payoffs to every player are the same every game
"zero-sum competition"
133
Variable sum game
the sum of all player's payoffs are different in every game depending on strategizes that they utilize
134
Arms races in 19th century
Germany rose powerful and increased navy spending. Great Britan who relied on their navy then increased theres as well. Then France, The united states, Italy, and Japan all followed.
