euthyphro

Question 1

scene setting

Answer 1

2. grave context ;
   - situation : socrates is on his way to see accuser meletus
   > accusing him of impiety and corrupting the youth
   - socratic irony: socrates sarcastically praises meletus for supposed knowledge and wisdom despite his you
3. euthyphro’s boast;
   - prophetic powers: euthyphro claims to have prophetic abilities. socrates treats this claim with irony similar to his treatment of meletus
4. complexity of euthyphro’s situation;
   - accusation of impiety: euthyrphro accused of being impious for prosecuting his father for murder. he argues that justice is the only thing that matters

Question 2

philosophical inquiry begins + definition 1

Answer 2

5c. question;
- what is piety? socractes insists that piety must have one consistent form, the same in every action
5d - e euthyphros def 1 : The pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, whether it is about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious

comparison to zeus : euthyphro compares himself to zeus, who castrated his father

Question 3

elenchus

Answer 3

• socrates uses the elenchus to test euthyphro’s definitions by questioning and refuting them.
• this method aims to uncover inconsistencies and stimulate deeper understanding.

Question 4

analysis of definition 1

Answer 4

• confusion: this def confuses an instance of piety with general conception of piety
• explanation: it fails to explain why prosecuting wrongdoers is pious. definitions must be explanatory not exemplary; provide the one ‘form’ / ‘ model’ that makes all pious acts pious
• extension vs intention: def 1 confuses extension [specifically instances of piety] with [the inherent qualities defining piety]
• socratic requirement : socrates argues that proper def must explain core of all pious actions which makes them pious, not just examples of piety

Question 5

definition 2

Answer 5

7a. def 2 by euthyphro;
- dear to the gods; what is dear to [ loved by] the gods is pious, what is not is impious

Question 6

analysis of definition 2

Answer 6

7e. socratic challenge;
- gods’ disagreement : socrates reminds euthyphro that the gods differ in what they love and hate, at least in moral and aesthetic matters. This implies that, according to euthyphro’s definition, an action could be both pious and impious
8a. contradiction
- socrates points out that euthyphros 2nd def generates a contradiction - same things would be loved and hated by the gods; pious and impious??? definition must be false
9c-d socrates concession;
- hypothetical agreement of the gods ; for the sake of the arg socrates allows the idea that the gods agree on what they love
- socrates is not theologically fussy and believes he can refute euthyphro anyway

Question 7

definition 3

Answer 7

• euthyphro; the pious is what all the goods love and the opposite, what all of them hate, is the impious

Question 8

analysis of def 3

Answer 8

• euthyphro dilemma: socrates asks is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods
• if pious is synonymous to ‘loved-by-all-the-gods” then euthyphro’s definition (ed) means one of the following:

> opt. 1 : the gods love actions abc because abc are pious = the gods love abc because they are love-by-all-the-gods. absurd
opt 2 : action abc have property of being love-by-all-the-gods because all the gods love abc = abc are pious bc all the gods love abc. absurd

Question 9

euthyphro: three areas of philosophical progress

Answer 9

• metaphysical
• logical
• theological

Question 10

euthyphro: three areas of philosophical progress - metaphysical

Answer 10

• the central definition is the third definition [9e; The pious is what all the gods love, and
  the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious]
• its refuted as a definition of piety as its possible implications are absurd
• insight : despite refutation, eurythphro’s def suggests whatever piety is, its at least plausible that the gods love it ; for any instance of piety we can infer it is god-loved
• necessary property: lets say that piety is always (and non-contingently) god-loved. being god loved is then a necessary property of piety
• essence vs property: however this doesn’t explain the nature of piety. piety is necessarily god-loved, but this does not provide its essence (it does not explain piety). nature = what it is. [following plato philosophers call nature essence]
• metaphysical terms: ‘ necessary property’ and ‘essence’ are metaphysical terms (what Socrates calls ‘affect/quality’ and ‘nature’). they correspond to necessary truth and definition (in linguistic terms). true definition conveys necessary truth, but true definitions are only a small subset of necessary truths. For example, “Humans are smaller than planets” is necessarily true but fails to define (and hence explain) ‘human’.

Question 11

euthyphro: three areas of philosophical progress - logical

Answer 11

• phil of explanation:
  > socrates relies greatly on term ‘because’
  > because indicates relation between two propositions for examle p because q. q explains p
  *asymetrical relation : [e.g] a is the mother of b; a is shorter than b. ‘because’ indicates asymentrical relation so ‘p because p’ isnt explanatory
  
  • example from dialogue : socrates’ example: x is a carried thing because someone carries it (10b). not: someone carries x because x is [already] a carried thing. so, by analogy: x has the property of being a god-loved thing because the gods love it. not: the gods love x because it is a god-loved thing.
  • euthyphro’s inversion : euthyphro defines the pious as the ‘god-loved’. so ‘the gods love the pious because it is pious’ reads, for him: ‘the gods love the [god-loved] because it is [god-loved]’. this inverts the previous, sensible proposition: ‘x has the property of being a god-loved thing because the gods love it’. in other words, euthyphro is treating ‘because’ as a symmetrical relation.

Question 12

euthyphro: three areas of philosophical progress - theological

Answer 12

• philosophical theology :
  > why cant the gods simply command what the pious is?
  >or make the pious what it is in virtue of taking an attitude towards it?
  
  • moral character: things have the moral character they do independently of what anyone commands or their attitudes towards them. Their commands and attitudes are a response to already existing value – they do not create that value.
  • monotheistic view: in a traditional, monotheistic view, god creates the world. it is ontologically dependent on him. But this is not the same as metaphysical dependence. god’s creation is metaphysically independent of him, in the sense that he grounds his commands in reasons that are independent of him. this socratic view became the orthodox view in judaism, christianity, and (arguably) islam