Ethical Issues Related to Human Embryo Research Flashcards
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
Allows research under strict conditions
A licence must be provided by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
Embryos must not have developed beyond 14 days after conception (not counting the time during which the embryo is stored in cryopreservation)
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001
Extends human embryo research
Includes cloning for research purposes (sometimes called ‘therapeutic cloning’)
First cloning licence in UK: to the Newcastle Fertility Centre (in 2004)
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
Amends the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
Allows the creation and research use of ‘human admixed’ embryos,
= an embryo created by combining material from human and nonhuman animals (as defined by section 4A 6)
Subject to a licence being provided by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015
Allow the use of donated mitochondrial DNA if an embryo ‘may have mitochondrial abnormalities caused by mitochondrial DNA’; and ‘there is a significant risk that a person with those abnormalities will have or develop serious mitochondrial disease’. [regulation 8a]
Specifies the process as involving the insertion of all nuclear DNA of an egg/embryo that is not polar body nuclear DNA into another egg/embryo
What is the status of the human embryo?
The ‘low status’ position
Isn’t equal to a an adult human being
The ‘high status’ position
Used here to refer to the position that attributes a status to an embryo that is equal to that of an adult human being
Common arguments produced by supporters of the ‘low status’ position
Arguments for:
- Probability
- Sentience (capacity to feel pain)
- Potentiality
- Ensoulment
‘Low position’ status of embryos
The argument for probability
Premise 1: A human being with a high probability of surviving beyond a certain stage is more valuable than a human being with a low probability of surviving beyond a certain stage, e.g. the stage of implantation.
Premise 2:The probability that a young embryo may not survive beyond implantation is high.
Conclusion: Young embryos should not be granted a high status.
Problem: Premise 2 is flawed as some young embryos may have a high probability
Premise 1 is questionable as a higher probability of surviving doesn’t mean more worth
‘Low position’ status of embryos
The argument for sentience
Premise 1: a necessary condition for high status possession is possession of the capacity to feel pain.
Premise 2: young embryos lack the capacity to feel pain.
Conclusion: young embryos should not be granted a high status
Both premises are questionable
Even if premise 2 would be accepted, premise 1 might still be rejected.
Could high status be attributed in spite of a rejection of premise 1?
‘Low position’ status of embryos
The argument for potentiality
Version 1: embryos are like gametes
Premise 1: It is absurd to claim that gametes have the same moral status as that possessed by adult human beings.
Premise 2: Gametes have the same potential to develop into human beings as embryos.
Conclusion: It is absurd to claim that embryos have the same moral status as that possessed by adult human beings.
Premise 1 could be agreed
Premise 2 is questionable as it rests on a confusion of 2 different meanings of potentiality
Gametes have passive potentialities
Embryos have active potentialities
Conclusion: since embryos are not like gametes, the argument fails to establish that they lack high status
‘Low position’ status of embryos
The argument for potentiality
Version 2: embryos are like acorns
Premise 1: Young organisms with the potential to be more mature have less moral value than those who are more mature already.
Premise 2a: Acorns have the potential to become oak trees, but are not oak trees yet.
Conclusion 1: Acorns lack the value possessed by oak trees.
By analogy:
Premise 1: Young organisms with the potential to be more mature have less moral value than those who are more mature already.
Premise 2b: Embryos have the potential to become adults, but are not adults yet.
Conclusion 2: Embryos lack the status possessed by adults
Problem with Premise 1: Should young organisms really be valued less?
in the case of acorns-oak trees: why?
Is the intrinsic value of oak trees greater?
Is the instrumental or aesthetic value of oak trees greater?
‘Low position’ status of embryos
The argument for ensoulment
Premise 1: As long as something can still divide into more than one ensouled being, it cannot possess a soul.
Premise 2: Young embryos can still divide into more than one organism.
Conclusion: Young embryos are not ensouled.
Premise 2 may be correct
Premise 1 - Why should we hold on to the view that two ensouled organisms cannot sprout from one ensouled organism?
+ the view that young embryos are not ensouled is implausible on scientific grounds (as it would deny that they are living individuals).
Conclusion: As the view that young embryos are not ensouled is highly implausible, the argument cannot be used to support the view that young embryos should only be granted a low status.
What is the human soul?
Aristotelian notion of the human soul: the organising principle of all physical aspects of a human being
or, put simply: that which makes a human being a living individual in its own right, rather than part of another individual
What is Thomson’s violinist?
Judith Thomson imagines that a famous violinist is ill suffering from kidney failure and that the only way in which he could be saved is by being plugged into the body of someone else. That person would need to remain connected to the violinist for a whole nine months and then both would walk out of the hospital fit and well.
How can Thomson’s violinist be applied to abortion
You have been kidnapped by the Society of Music Lovers to save the violinist. You were sedated when they intruded your home and you find yourself waking up in a hospital and being connected to a famous violinist. You need to decide if you want to remain connected (and save the life of the violinist) or disconnect yourself and walk out of the hospital.
Do you think that you should be allowed to disconnect yourself?
Thomson argues that you should be free to walk out of the hospital even if it means death for the violinist.
Could this analogy be used to justify why it might be morally appropriate for women to have an abortion in some situations, for example when they become pregnant after rape?
If it is acceptable to disconnect yourself from the violinist (even if this will result in his death), it might be argued that it is also acceptable for the fetus to be killed in some situations, even if both the violinist and the fetus might be granted equal/high status.
How can Thomson’s violinist be applied to human embryo research
Could the analogy also be used to support human embryo destruction for research?
if so, the destruction of human embryos would be the lesser evil compared to the evil of forgoing some greater good, where this greater good could not be achieved without this destruction, and where no alternative options that pose fewer moral problems would be available to obtain this greater good.
put more simply:
would not allowing embryo destruction for research be tantamount to forcing at least some people to remain connected to a famous violinist for 9 months?; or
is allowing the destruction of human embryos for research analogous to allowing the kidnapped person to disconnect themselves from the violinist?
