Essay plans Flashcards
- Does Rousseau’s normative argument in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality depend on the accuracy of his history of humanity? 2019
Two parts to the q R is answering in DOI: the source of inequality among men, and whether it was founded in the NL. The first part relates to his history of humanity roughly, the second to the normative question of whether inequality is justified.
But we only get his full account of the sense in which it’s (un)justified in SC. R doesn’t spend much time on this q in DOI.
1. R isn’t making any attempt at an accurate history of humanity.
‘Set aside the facts, for they do not affect the q’.
Suggests in the preface that we are investigating not any historical state that actually existed, but rather using the history he presents to separate essential from inessential aspect of man’s nature.
Lect: His is a conjectural/philosophical history, not of what actually happened, but what would have to have happened if our current state is to make any sense.
Similarly to L, he seems to subvert the notion of a SN as an original state, but instead of making it an actual relational condition that people might be in, he makes it an account of what is essential to us.
But there may be a further sense in which R’s history should be interpreted as historical: the capacities we have from birth, vs those we acquire later. He suggests in Emile that amour propre arises during puberty, and that conscience arises later.
2. What is R’s normative argument?
See epistle dedicatory: addressed to those who couldn’t live in an ideal state, with rulers who acted in accordance with the GW, citizens united by friendship, no war, etc.. He suggests that if he couldn’t live in such a state he would attempt to develop bonds of affection and friendship for his fellow citizens
This suggests an implicit normative critique of the forms of hierarchy created by amour propre, and an appeal to conscience as the remedy to chains of dependence and subordination.
Similarly, we see in the main body that he sees human perfectibility (our ability to find better means of supporting ourselves) as able to lead us either into dependence or into rationality and morality. He suggests that when we enter societies characterized by material inequality, amour propre commits everyone into slavery- people are bonded as a slave or a master, such that the slaves must look to the masters for respect, while the masters get that respect from slaves but it is always tainted because it is the respect of the loser.
Thus normative argument: social inequality is harmful, and ought to be remedied through making people similar in goals and nature (Taylor), and inculcating in them conscience. Or, at least, if he is to be read in a less political manner, we ought to do this work ourselves- in a psychological sense, to give ourselves conscience.
Though as in Emile this psychological task may require withdrawing from society, if our society isn’t homogeneous and small enough for this to work.
3. In what sense does the normative argument depend on the accuracy of R’s history?
Doesn’t depend on people actually being in a historical state where there wasn’t amour propre? His description of the initial state is laughably implausible, and he doesn’t think we could go back to small, settled communities with at most minimal forms of amour propre anyway.
So he isn’t advocating for this. He is advocating, as we saw in the preface, for people to be made similar to one another, and to will according to the GW.
Depends on amour propre being modifiable, perhaps so that a society similar to the SC can be characterised by mutual respect. Bertram: whether AP is wholly negative- R seems to have a different stance in different books.
Den and Neuhouser
In what sense is the SC a response to the DOI?
DOI answers only the first part of the q: ‘what are the origins of inequality among men, and whether this is justified by the NL’. R doesn’t think that political authority (which presumably extends to inequality in esteem) can be justified on the basis of natural law- we see at the start of the SC that conventions remain as the sole basis for legitimate political authority. So the SC is pushing back to say that natural law can’t make inequality legitimate, only conventions (and through conventions, the mitigation of social inequality)
The SC suggests the manner in which people are made to have conscience,
From lecture- it isn’t an ideal solution- R would prefer that we could go back to small, rural communities that have some self-sufficiency but not the damaging forms of amour propre. But this is impossible, so our best hope is the SC.
Once we reflect on the fact that another person (our mother) exists and has a will, but we can’t master her as we inevitably try to, we are in chains and cannot escape them.
‘I intend to attack error, rather than establish new truths’ (Rousseau). Discuss. (Me)
Whose error is he attacking? H’s? M’s?
DAS- attacking those who praise the arts and sciences.
It leads to inauthenticity in our external behaviour, it causes people to dumb themselves down to the level of their day, and most importantly it smiles disdainfully at notions of fatherland, faith, and virtue, leads to idleness, and teaches people everything but their duties.
R’s solution: in praise of S. Saw S as speaking in praise of ignorance.
Contra those who seek knowledge for reasons of greed and vanity.
Attacking Mont’s and Hume’s exhortation of commerce as inimical to our moral nature?
This might suggest some sense in which ‘he had nothing new’- he wanted to criticise Mont’s argument that it wouldn’t be appropriate to bring back ancient virtue in a modern context.
Mont: in some states (especially monarchical states), we need vice. We can mobilise people’s self-interest by giving them a share in the state, as well as making use of their love of honour (which generally masks the vice of ambition) so that they serve the state. Finally, luxury as the force behind le doux commerce, which cures destructive prejudices, spreads knowledge, softens mores, and leads to peace.
H taking this one step further: avarice isn’t just the means to political progress, but moral progress as well. Reason is a slave to the passions, and the interplay of our selfishness and sympathy turns us into sites of mroal agency.
Saw commerce as a cause of the most damaging forms of social inequality- thus we should redress these kinds of inequality, though not all material inequalities.
Saw la doux commerce as a malign effeminacy- the conveniences of life enervate true courage, and the equation of such with virtue is a loss of taste. R as the barbarian.
Nevertheless, positive thesis as seen in constitution of Poland, and epistle dedicatory to DOI- we ought to create a republic in our hearts, that bond us with our compatriots, as preparatory to a future situation in which we are more united in purpose and therefore more free.
Even here, it may be that R saw himself as the painter of nature and defender of the human heart, not a philosopher.
But then again, he is wanting to change the human heart- to make it moral, where it was naturally amoral. He pushes back against OS, to replace it with the idea of pride, but nevertheless suggested that goodness and badness are not natural but the result of social conventions.
Perhaps even here R was a Utopian, in the sense in which he was envisaging an unrealistic ideal society for the sake of critique- critiquing his own society.
Was Rousseau a democrat? Me
Lect: If we are so lucky to live in such a state, this doesn’t necessarily mean its a democracy. If one can complete the imaginative leap of imagining one as participating in the creation of law, this doesn’t mean one actually so participates.
This is Bejan’s reading, still controversial- so feel free to disagree
R thought the SC was compatible with many types of govt- many deliberative democrats miss the sovereign-govt distinction.
R thought democratic govts, rather than dem sovereigns, generally fare badly.
The chapters on the Roman govt are crucial to R’s view of govt- though many skip them
The role of the universal assembly is ritualistic and ceremonial- the sovereign doesn’t do very much nor does it assemble very often.
The crucial thing is that the governors themselves see themselves as acting in the GW. this requires that they be just. Sounds like L here- the law of nature is the key, not actual ongoing consent.
This departs from the view we got in prelims- that’s ok. R responding to SCs of L and H that never actually happened, with his own SC that never actually happened.
Instead the SC is a yardstick, not a programme. People sign up to the SC because it gives up a sense of freedom that we lost, but only our end of the contract is under our control.
[mathematical question]
R isn’t counselling us to revolution but to withdrawal.
Should we consider Rousseau to be a political thinker? Me
Yes.
What is a ‘political thinker’?
Someone who wants to characterise our political situation
Someone who wants to make concrete political prescriptions
Foil: Why it might be an ethical body of work: DOI epistle dedicatory- suggesting that we do the work ourselves, inculcating in ourselves an affection for our fellow citizens
Emile: France could not be a viable republic under the SC, so the best option would be to withdraw.
SC doesn’t seem to be a concrete recommendation- lawgiver, constitution of Poland.
CA: he still was occupied with describing our political situation to some extent? Or was this just our social situation?
CA: SC: to find a dependable and legitimate form of political authority, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. Thus concerned with a q that is mathematical in nature: how to frame political institutions in such a way that each person could act in the interests of all, and even be coerced into doing so, and yet always remain as free as before.
‘Aristotle was no democrat, but he had democratic tendencies’. Discuss. (2014)
See VII.viii-ix- a polis is composed most essentially of its citizens only, and not the other people who are not citizens and cannot attain virtue. Thus the end of the polis is to make its citizens’ lives go well, not all the people living under its rule.
Democratic tendencies: wisdom in a crowd idea, such that power is safer when it’s dispersed and when virtuous tendencies within a group are allowed to be magnified. Suspicion of arbitrary power and belief in the importance of the happiness (however full it can be) and interests of all denizens (CA: he only cares about citizens’ happiness CCA: but he sees the interests of the poor as being closer to the common good than those of the rich).
On the last point, he suggests that equality is a better criterion than wealth for distributing at least some offices. Is this really a democratic tendency?
‘c. Aristotle acknowledges that Socrates talked much of education, but complains that this meant only the education of the elite guardians. By ignoring broader “habits, philosophy, and laws,” Socrates left out the vast majority of the city as a diverse multiplicity. A better regime would spend more time arranging the legal and intellectual shaping of all of its parts, not just one part. Only then will the whole benefit.’
Importance of giving explicit preference to those not included in the constitution.
Non-democratic aspects: inegalitarianism in who the state ought to care about, disenfranchisement of those who are not sufficiently wealthy or virtuous, emphasis on virtue rule, not rule by people by virtue of membership or being affected by the decisions made, nothing about consent, views on non-eudaimonic people being property. He rejects the distribution of resources according to free birth.
- Can we best understand Aristotle’s normative aim in the Politics as a call for moderation?
Why does A think that stasis is the biggest threat to political order? Is he right?
See paper copy
Describe and evaluate Aristotle’s ‘defence’ of democracy. RL
What was A’s defence?
III.11 passage- the many banded together
“For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence [arete] and practical wisdom [phronesis], and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character [ta ethe] and thought [dianoia]. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry, for some understand one part, and some another, and among them, they understand the whole”
This is about virtue, not knowledge- Cammack.
It isn’t about variety- CAs to potluck dinner analogy (these didn’t exist, dishes were prepared by dependents and A wouldn’t like this analogy
It is about virtue more than knowledge- he considers the possibility of the argument being applied to animals.
Value of role models, conditions for there to be incentives for people to be virtuous (e.g. shame)
‘The [amplifying] effect could be gained in multiple ways: through moral support, emulation, rivalry or competition, the desire to impress an audience, or the fear of shame’
But to an extent wisdom would be involved- phronesis.
Was this really a defence of democracy?
It’s not necessarily about democracy, but perhaps other kind of public process e.g. the selection of officials. A was more likely espousing polity in the passage.
He is still talking about something fairly analogous to the democratic process, though.
That said, it would still be different from our own conception- it’s not a value in diversity of opinions or perspectives. It’s a way for virtue itself, understood as the same for everyone, can best shine through
But a minimal level of D. would be required for this virtue in a crowd idea to work.
Clear from III.12-13 that A saw virtue as the condition for citizenship, not freedom. Democracy didn’t come with ideas of equal respect here?
Is Aristotle correct?
Intuitive support: people can be braver in groups than alone, and often the moral support of others can help with moderation (Cammack: as anyone who has dieted will know)
CA: mob justice?
CA from Plato: it is unreasonable to expect the many to have overall virtue; at best they will have virtue suited to their station. In a way A agrees with this- the citizenry (whom Aristotle thinks are what most fundamentally constitute the polis) doesn’t extend to vulgar craftsmen, for example. Neither thinker believes in a universal type of democracy, but P would still push back and say that it is only those who have reason (the PKs) who should rule, and that three individuals are sufficient to know virtue.
CCA: it is unreasonable to expect three individuals to have a comprehensive idea of the good (relies on P’s arguments about the forms)- enlarging the circle is a sign of epistemic humility.
CCA2: it would be too risky to concentrate power in the hands of such a small number
There may still be room for ideas about the value of the diversity of ideas a crowd has to offer, which A rejects.
Experiments in living idea- not everyone is likely to have a complete perspective on the good (A would agree), and crucially the good is somewhat different for different people.
So bringing diverse perspectives may be essential to making good political judgements
We have a situation in which large states are necessary- in this contexts there is real diversity of interests, and here diversity can be an important contributor in itself.
Respect engendered by a democratic process is also important- did A consider this? See youtube lecture beginning
Lovett- The republicans were divided over whether to concentrate power in the hands of a fewer number of Aristocrats and the wider public- now it is generally agreed that democracy is the best way to engender civic allegiance
“A citizen is distinguished from all others by his participation in giving judgement and holding office” (Politics, Book III, Chapter I). But Aristotle thinks certain ways of living preclude some from participating. Why? (2018)
What is required for citizenship?
A citizen is one who participates in giving judgement and holding office, but this isn’t necessarily to say that they will hold office. They are rather of a sort to be able to rule and be ruled in turn, and still give judgement insofar as they are part of the group that holds power in the constitution (e.g. by being a part of the electorate)
Just as women are permanently related to their husbands as being ruled, even though the relationship is analogous to ruler and citizen.
Not full practical reason- A thinks rulers ought to have this, but for a citizen it is sufficient to get by on ‘true opinion’. Nevertheless, they ought to have the leisure time to be able to participate in politics, and be as free from faction as possible.
- Slaves
Those who lack deliberative reason, and so are naturally suited to be in service to a master for the sake of both of their survival
Unclear how A makes the distinction between a slave’s reason and a non-slave’s- after all, slaves will be entrusted with aspects of household management, and A admits that they can ‘recognise’ reason (their master’s capacity for reason)
CA: Frank: ‘Aristotle may take slavery to be necessary to politics, but all this suggests that there is nothing immutable that singles out any particular person as a slave. Instead, slave identity, like citizen identity, is determined by activity’.
CCA: A does say the slave’s deliberative capacity is ‘completely lacking’, and though he plausibly thinks that slavish activity can make one slavish, he doesn’t seem to suggest that those who lack deliberative capacity can go on to develop it.
Frank’s two sources: 1. A allegedly maintains that is is appropriate to hold out to slaves the promise of their freedom. But though this passage promises an argument as to why freedom ought to be offered ‘as a reward’, it doesn’t clearly presume there’s a capacity to cease being a slave (lacking reason), and A doesn’t seem to go on to even give this argument - A suggests that friendship isn’t possible with a slave as a slave, but is with a slave as a person. But this passage seems to be about slaves by law, not natural slaves, and A also says that a tyrant can’t be friends with hsi subjects (which is a form of master-slave rule), since justice is needed for friendship and there couldn’t be justice there. [pushback on second point- the tyranny example is over people who aren’t justly slaves]
CCA2: “some things are distinguished right from birth, some suited to rule and others to being ruled” 1.4
CCCA: slaves might lack deliberative reason in a second order sense (insofar as they ahven’t actualised their first order capacity for it), but have it in the sense that they can gain it through use.
But if A thought this then why wouldn’t he want to give slaves a chance to gain it? - Vulgar craftsmen
These don’t lack deliberative reason as the slaves do, but they have roles that are incompatible with the demands of citizenship
Explicit reason: They lack the free time to properly participate, e.g. by being informed. Given the demands of citizenship (following from A’s ideal of active participation), it seems that it would be necessary in a well run society that some people must support those who so participate, without participating themselves. [still relevant to a modern society?]
Another likely motivation behind A’s exclusion of both slaves and vulgar craftsmen: they are part of the masses. A thinks that the poor’s interests are closer to the common good than the rich’s, but also that if the poor as a whole are given power then stasis will ensue
Third reason: Those with money are more likely to be just, both because they have ‘good birth’ and because they already have money and so are less likely to feel the need to be unjust to get money. This is why A said that there would be more public rejoicing in the killing of an unjust ruler than a thief. - Women and foreigners
What is Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s idea of politics? Is it valid? (RL)
Three critiques:
1. Politics is about diversity, not unity.
The more of a unity a CS becomes, the less it is a CS
Diversity is needed for self-sufficiency
So politics should be about taking diversity and managing it as effectively as possible, not trying to make everyone into a unity.
2. Property should mainly be private, because each cares for his own and his favourite most of all
3. Socrates focused too much on the education of the guardians, while neglecting the rest of the city- thus the guardians were unhappy and everyone else was neglected.
Is it valid?
3.- A seems to end up coming to quite similar conclusions to P.
The polis is most strictly its citizens- this is a broader class than P’s guardians, but nevertheless much more restricted than whom we would want to call citizens.
A sees the goal of the polis as the happiness of each of its parts, and so might be thought to neglect non-citizens. Vulgar craftsmen and slaves only have virtue relative to their master (i.e. their master’s actions), which seems to be an insufficient condition for their own happiness.
At the same time, A shares P’s conclusion that the citizens in the best polity will be sacrificing the most happy life possible for them in order to do politics- contemplation.
This isn’t to say that they must be dragged kicking and screaming to it, though (they will still take pleasure in it), so in this sense A’s account may be superior.
1. Politics as being about diversity.
In what sense is this true for A?
Different people will perform different tasks, for A
A doesn’t seem to attempt to make everyone exactly the same- he has an educational programme that is the same for all (citizens), but not the same for every person.
But P doesn’t try to do this either- different people are different there too, and have different tasks.
Perhaps a better reading: each person is defined with reference to their own virtue, for A, not that of the polis as a whole.
For P the question of the extent to which the auxiliary and working classes are just in their individual souls seems to be neglected.
Similarly, for P the archetype for the polis as a whole has to come from a singular form- justice. By contrast, for A there may be multiple best poleis that might be good to aim for in different situations.
Lecture: polis as a combination of less perfect partnerships?
Also-
Is it a valid critique?
The idea of living with diversity and not trying to eliminate it seems to be a very valid one. As does the idea that each person has their own conditions for happiness, that can nevertheless be roughly harmonious with the function of the polis as a whole.
How persuasive is Aristotle’s case in support of the mixed constitution? (2015)
A’s argument:
The rich contain a tendency towards arrogance, which leads to a kind of domination, while the poor contain a tendency towards malice, which leads to a kind of slavery. In each case, faction would result as the ruling class presses its interests too strongly, and those excluded attempt to take control of the constitution.
Solution: to give the most weight in the constitution to the middle classes. This mixes the constitutions of democracy (which gives the poor preference in deciding about justice) and of oligarchy (which gives the rich preference)- hence, ‘mixed constitution’.
More specifically, both polity and aristocracy are mixed constitutions, with the former tending towards D. and the latter towards aristocracy, but A exhorts the former in most circumstances because the poor’s interests more closely align with the good of the polis than the rich’s.
His way of doing this: a moderate property req for the assemblies, paying the poor for jury duty and fining the rich for not showing up, no property req for offices.
CAs:
Caution is needed, at least, in pursuing this approach: Might the roots of faction exist within the middle classes as well? There are also multiple types of cleavage (though remember A’s small societies).
A thinks that poverty can lead to injustice as people need to seek more than they have, while wealth can lead to arrogance.
Seems to prioritise the happiness of citizens primarily, and that of others only insofar as their unhappiness would be detrimental to order. In some sense, he might therefore suffer an analogous problem to P, insofar as focusing on the virtue of the guardians for P neglects everyone else.
7.12-15: the necessary and useful people and property must be used for the sake of the noble people, just as in the soul what is inferior is used for the sake of what is superior.
Similarly, by imposing a property req he fails to give people political power on the basis of their being affected by that power- we would dislike this. A would push back and suggest that we ought to maximise the virtue of those ruling; but the former may be the better trade-off here.
- ‘The only argument in Locke’s political philosophy that is still interesting as a starting point for contemporary political theory is that in the Letters on Toleration.’ Do you agree? Why or why not? 2019
Foil: the letters are the only plausible starting point bc L’s other works start from religious premises that are no longer relevant.
The premises of the treatises are deeply Christian in nature-
Natural equality of men
There is a law of nature, and we can appeal to God when agreements as to matters of right break down
There is a city of men and city of God, so the civil authority should focus only on preserving life, liberty and estates and not on saving souls
Men have dominion over animals.
Dunn: even consent in the treatises isn’t the ground of PO or legitimate authority- our obligations and rights come from God alone. We are not sovereign.
But the letters on toleration seem to be religiously neutral? Arguments in favour of toleration:
Souls could not be saved through coerced belief, only true belief that is the result of the inward persuasion of the mind
There is so much disagreement about these issues that we shouldn’t trust a state to have all the right answers
If we allow coercion in favour of the religion we think is right, then there are no safeguards against that true religion being coerced in turn
CA: the above premises forget the first argument for toleration that L mentions: that the care of souls isn’t the task of the magistrate, because God hasn’t given men any natural authority to do that for other men (through coercive/dominating relationships), nor has he given us the power to consent to do so.
This relies on the Augustinian idea that there is a city of men and a city of God, but the city of men ought not to try to save souls but only ensure the preservation of life. Part of this depends on the idea that people will actually have scripture as a guide to living well.
Perhaps the starting point for both works is the same: politics should not be about saving souls, but rather about focusing on what’s minimally agreeable so as to form a legitimate state.
Many people take the treatises in a secular direction: the combination of NL and consent can underpin the minimal consensus required for a political system that exists to preserve life and liberty. Perhaps, despite the religious ideas underpinning it, this is plausible as a starting point for contemporary political theory
CA: the distinction between the preservation of life, liberty and estates and saving souls is religiously rooted, and in a secular age we should be focused on the things that promote living well in general (at least insofar as these are relatively non-controversial).
Locke relies on the argument that the most important thing for living well is to avoid bodily ailments, and that being a good person/having a good soul is not relevant to politics.
Aristotle: it would be very unwise not to focus on the political sphere as a place to make men’s lives go well. People will not be swayed towards the good life through persuasion alone- they need proper education and habituation.
Religious ideas about the afterlife can no longer justify neglecting this task in the social realm.
CCA: but we’re in a very different political situation compared with A- polities are much bigger, we cannot know everyone, and as a result force is much more important to underpin the workings of the state. With this increased relevance of coercion we need extra safeguards.
This is a v plausible starting point for a political theory that focuses on the uses of state coercion: insofar as we are using force, it’s a good idea to focus on what people agree is conducive to a good life.
But it’s somewhat unclear that life, liberty, and estates are the only things people can agree on (wb education?).
At the same time, L’s idea of the political is a very different one to A’s- the use of coercive power, not the polis more generally. Perhaps coercive power ought to be governed under Lockean principles but A’s arguments are still highly relevant to what sort of society, political culture and educational system we should have
Problem: how do we solve the issues of making men’s lives go well without using coercion?
Q. How important is consent to Locke’s political theory, actually? RL
PF: the consent of the people determine when the govt is legitimate, who is in the govt, when individuals are obligated to the govt, and when the govt has lost its authority.
CA1: L doesn’t deal with trying to prove that govts have actually been consented to (‘govt is everywhere antecedent to record’), nor does he even mention the q of how individuals consent to govt today. So it doesn’t seem to be about how officials or the form of govt are selected
Dunn: it’s a damaging lacuna in L’s account that he doesn’t specify what sort of performance an ‘express’ consent is.
He is similarly vague about how consent might give rise to money as an enduring possession which violates the spoilage principle, or how consent is supposed to govern the allocation of land within a country.
CA2: People are very limited in what they can consent to, and the form the govt would have to take in order to be legitimate is quite strictly specified in advance: an institution for the regulation and preserving of property and the defence of the commonwealth.
One can’t seem to transfer one’s right to life, liberty, and estates (for how could one transfer a right to life when one had no right to take away one’s own?)
This is seen in L’s defn of political power (a right of making laws, penalty of death, for the regulating and preserving of property, the defence from foreign injury, for the public good).
CA3: many of our obligations to govt we have whether or not we have expressly consented.
We have an obligation towards the government to obey the law, on the basis of tacit consent- and so long as we have only tacitly consented we are free to sell our possessions and found/join another commonwealth elsewhere.
Dunn: ‘Anyone who voluntarily derives benefits from an existing political society incurs political obligations towards it’
Tacit consent isn’t real consent- our obligations are coming from God here.
So the only rights and obligations that really seem to be transferred by consent is that of judging and punishing violations of the NL. The only obligation we seem to incur would be that we alienate our property and couldn’t move elsewhere, unless the govt were dissolved.
What, if not consent?
Our moral code, the limits of political power, and the general forms on which we might associate are determined by reason, not consent. It is also reason to recognise the law we must live by that enables us to be free:
The “liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by”
Our obligations are therefore naturally owed to God, not incurred on the basis of consent
That the people are the best judge of whether the CM is illegitimate doesn’t necessarily imply that God isn’t the ultimate judge.
What relevance remains for consent?
It would still seem that a given individual would be free to join another commonwealth or not on the basis of consent, and they would only have the right to resist a govt if they had consented.
What about the people who are born in a society but don’t consent?
MacPherson: this creates two classes in society- the propertyless subjects and those who expressly consent and are landowners/citizens. This would mirror England at the time of L. L would seem to overlook them, insofar as they didn’t have any reason to enter into society if they didn’t have property to protect.
Thus consent only applies to one qualified version of ‘the people’.
CA: Dunn: it would be inconceivable that L would see himself, or his patron, or a rich landowner who hadn’t held office, but not a rebel who had agreed to take an oath of allegiance, as excluded from membership.
D: It is the disposition to identify as a member that matters.
This doesn’t seem to be a hugely strong argument of Dunn’s. McP’s argument is backed up by the distribution of express consent in L’s own day. No evidence that L would exclude anyone from consenting, but he may have overlooked those who didn’t consent.
He may have focused on a limited notion of ‘the people’ because he was focussed on the right of a parliament to remove a monarch.
A disposition to identify as a member (D: ‘voluntarily accepts membership’) may not be strong enough to remove the right to emigrate.
Dunn: consent doesn’t determine that we acquire POs, nor that our society becomes legitimate, nor how govt ought to be organised.
CA: L is concerned with the question: how can we trust each other and our government? He answers: so long as we can agree together on a legitimate form of political power that can secure what is minimally agreeable: the preservation of life, liberty, and estates. 2.8: “And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society”
This is compatible with a range of religious beliefs, but not atheists and Catholics, who couldn’t be trusted at all to keep by their compacts.
It was probably intended to result in a justification for the right of parliament to remove a recalcitrant monarch.
But it remains the case that our rights and our duties come from God alone.
