Aristotle (Politics) Flashcards
Pol 1.1
Definition of the community- common enterprise, friendship, justice.
The polis is the most authoritative community- it encompasses all others, and aims at the highest and most authoritative good.
Different types of rule- statesman, king, household manager, master. These differ in kind.
Pol 1.2 (Natural birth of the polis)
Two natural human relationships: male and female (from not deliberate choice but the urge to leave something behind), natural ruler and slave (bonded for survival)
Women are not the same as natural slaves- nature made them for different tasks
Household- constituted to satisfy everyday needs. Village- collection of households for needs other than everyday ones.
A complete community, constituted by several villages which are self-sufficient: a polis. ‘it comes to be for the sake of living, but it remains in existence for the sake of living well’.
Thus poleis exist by nature and ‘anyone who is without a city-state, not by luck but by nature, is either a poor specimen or else superhuman.’
‘It is also clear why a human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any other gregarious animal. Nature makes nothing pointlessly, as we say, and no animal has speech except a human being.’ We deliberate together not just to express pleasure/pain, but to make clear what is beneficial/harmful, and so just.
The polis is thus prior to a human being
‘Hence, though an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone, whoever first established one was responsible for the greatest of goods.’
Pol 1.3 (Analysing the polis)
Four basic relations of rule, with their own kind of knowledge: master over slave, husband over wife, father over children, and rule as ‘wealth management’.
What is at stake: is the rule of a polis like any of these kinds of rule?
Pol 1.4-6 (Slavery)
A slave, in Aristotle’s view, is a piece of “animate property” used by a master in order to accomplish the actions that make up the master’s life. (I.4)
‘For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary, they are also beneficial, and some things are distinguished right from birth, some suited to rule and others to being ruled.’
‘‘At any rate, it is, as I say, in an animal that we can first observe both rule of a master and rule of a statesman. For the soul rules the body with the rule of a master, whereas understanding rules desire with the rule of a statesman or with the rule of a king.’ (I.5)
“For he who can belong to someone else… and he who shares in reason to the extent of understanding it, but does not have it himself, is a natural slave.”
Natural slaves vs slaves in fact (1.6)
As a whole, the ‘community’ of master and slave forms a kind of mutual “friendship” that even borders one oneness of person
Pol 1.7-11 (economy and wealth acquisition)
“rule by a household manager is a monarchy, since every household has one ruler; rule of a statesman is rule over people who are free and equal.” (1.7)
Oikonomia consists in the dispensation, allotment, or simply the use of resources. (I.8)
Bartering and the production of resources are natural forms of wealth acquisition
Commerce is unnatural. it involves symbolic or monetary exchange, rather than barter’s direct exchange. This allows unlimited profits and stores of wealth. (1.9)
Two potential motivations for the drive to accumulation: 1. Those who are “preoccupied with living, not with living well” (over focused on their survival). 2. Those who think that living well means pursuing physical gratification.
Such commercial excesses are “justly disparaged” (I.x)
Pol 1.12 (Husband and wife, father and child)
“For a man rules his wife and children both as free people, but not in the same way: instead, he rules his wife the way a statesman does, and his children the way a king does. For a male, unless he is somehow constituted contrary to nature, is naturally more fitted to lead than a female”
the statesman, though equal and ‘differ[ing] in nothing’ to his subjects, at any one point in time distinguishes himself in ‘demeanor, title, or rank from the ruled’, and male is permanently related to female in this way
Pol 1.13 (Ruling and being ruled, the virtue of slaves/women/children/vulgar craftsmen)
“ruling and being ruled differ in kind.” (I.xiii, 1259b.35-37) Confusion between these two could lie at the heart of political disorder
Puzzle: ‘Whichever answer one gives, there are problems. If slaves have temperance and the rest, in what respect will they differ from the free? If they do not, absurdity seems to result, since slaves are human and have a share in reason. Roughly the same problem arises about women and children.’
“It is evident, therefore, that both [ruler and ruled] must share in virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue.”
The “deliberative” part of the soul, which rules by way of reason, is “entirely missing” from a natural slave. Women, meanwhile, have deliberative reason but it “lacks authority.” Children, finally, also have deliberative reason, but it’s incomplete
Slaves only have virtue relative to their masters, not as humans in themselves. Wrt vulgar craftsmen: ‘a slave shares his master’s life, whereas a vulgar craftsman is at a greater remove, and virtue pertains to him to just the extent that slavery does; for a vulgar craftsman has a kind of delimited slavery.’
The virtue of each part (man, woman, father, child) must be re-examined once we have considered the constitution as a whole
Pol 2.1-2 (Unity and difference)
Aristotle decides that it would be more effective to consider a variety of the most highly regarded constitutions in his time and compare them with one another. But then A turns not to an existing constitution but to the Kallipolis.
The first Socratic recommendation that Aristotle tackles is the policy of communal families. The purpose of such is to create unity: no familial or tribal conflicts, so that the polis can become a community of pleasure and pain.
CA: A city, he argues, is not simply one thing, but a multiplicity of many things that function together. “I am talking about the assumption that it is best for a city-state to be as far as possible all one unit; for that is the assumption Socrates adopts. And yet it is evident that the more of a unity a city-state becomes, the less of a city-state it will be. For a city-state naturally consists of a certain multitude” (II.i, 1261a.15-18). The point, it seems, is not to overcome this multitude of difference but rather to manage it effectively.
Multiplicity is necessary for self-sufficiency: ‘For a household is more self-sufficient than a single person, and a city-state than a household’. “So, since what is more self-sufficient is more choiceworthy, what is less a unity is more choiceworthy than what is more so.” (II.ii).
Pol 2.3-4 (Against Socratic communism)
“what is held in common by the largest number of people receives the least care.” (II.iii, 1261b.33-34). “For there are two things in particular that cause human beings to love and cherish something: their own and their favourite. And neither can exist” in Socrates’ city
Other practical concerns Aristotle has include the inadequate defences of Socrates’ plan against incest, patricide, and other ethical taboos. If no one knows who’s related to whom, how can we be expected to preserve our moral standards?
With a more moderate approach, we could arrive at some kind of mixed system of property: “‘For while property should be in some way communal, in general it should be private. For when care for property is divided up, it leads not to those mutual accusations, but rather to greater care being given, as each will be attending to what is his own. But where use is concerned, virtue will ensure that it is governed by the proverb “friends share everything in common.”.” (II.v)
“Selfishness is rightly criticized. But it is not just loving oneself, it is loving oneself more than one should […]. Moreover, it is very pleasant to help one’s friends, guests, or companions, and do them favors, as one can if one has property of one’s own”
Pol 2.5-6 (Against Socratic Elitism)
The city is not one note, but a harmony of many notes: “It is as if one were to reduce a harmony to a unison, or a rhythm to a single beat. But a city-state consists of a multitude, as we said before, and should be unified and made into a community by means of education.”
Socrates spoke of education, but only wrt the guardians- he ignored broader “habits, philosophy, and laws”.
The result of the Socratic regime of guardians is that the guardians live unhappy lives, while the rest of the city is ignored
In the end, he classifies the Socratic city in this way: “The overall organization tends to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy but midway between them; it is called a polity, since it is made up of those with hoplite weapons.” (1265b.25-30). Socrates is right in advocating such a regime.
Pol 2.7 (Phaleas and practical wealth distribution)
2.7- Phaleas had recommended that wealth could be evened out through small, practical measures, such as limiting childbirths or using dowries to balance things out
The mistake that Socrates made, but that Phaleas didn’t, is to emphasize property over laws when it comes to questions of equality and levelling. To Aristotle, it is the laws which must shape habits and desires so that vicious inequality is avoided. There’s no need to end the system of ownership as such.
“For one should level desires more than property, and that cannot happen unless people have been adequately educated by the laws.”
Three kinds of human motivations, all of which can motivate injustice (and their remedies): 1. For Necessities- moderate income & property 2. For Pleasures That End in Pain- temperance 3. For Pleasure In Itself- philosophy & contemplation
‘The greatest injustices, in any case, are committed because of excess and not because of the necessities. For example, no one becomes a tyrant to escape the cold”
Pol 3.1-2 (the agency of a city, citizenhood, the identity of a city)
“the question of a city’s agency should cause us to look more closely at the individual agents that constitute that city as a whole. In other words, we have to examine that city’s citizens”
A is discussing ‘unqualified citizens’ (as opposed to honorary citizens, resident aliens, or immigrants with other legal statuses)
“The unqualified citizen is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judgment and office.” A ‘citizen’ can be defined in many different ways, depending on which form of constitution is in place.
The unqualified citizen sounds most like a citizen in a democracy, as Aristotle admits- democracies would therefore have the best understanding of what it means to be a citizen.
A addresses “the problem of when we ought to say that a city-state is the same, or not the same but a different one.”
The integrity of the polis, it turns out, has little to do with geographical or spatial concerns. The identity of the city lies instead in the integrity of its constitution
Pol 3.4-5 (Human virtue and citizen virtue)
Distinction between PV and CV. The virtue of a citizen is defined by the constitution in which they live. If they serve and preserve that constitution, they are showing the virtues of citizenship and being good citizens. But certain constitutions may ask them to do things that make them bad people
“the citizens… have the safety of the community as their task. But the community is the constitution. Hence the virtue of a citizen must be suited to his constitution. Consequently, if indeed there are several kinds of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be a single virtue that is the virtue—the complete virtue— of a good citizen. But the good man, we say, does express a single virtue: the complete one. Evidently, then, it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without having acquired the virtue expressed by a good man.”
the city will only function if the vast majority of its inhabitants act like good citizens in at least a basic sense.
Since political rule is different from mastery, a ruler must learn political rule by also being ruled. “a good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen, to know the rule of free people from both sides […] But, when serving as a ruler, the citizen should be capable of practical wisdom (phronēsis). When being ruled, meanwhile, it is enough to get by on “true opinion””
3.5: “the truth is that not everyone without whom there would not be a city-state is to be regarded as a citizen.” Slaves and vulgar craftsmen lack the ‘free time’ to pursue deliberation and judgement. They are thus akin to a “resident alien”.
“The goal of finding the best constitution, we now see, has to do with uncovering a form of political organization that makes being a good citizen most equivalent to being a good person”
Pol 3.6-7 (Taxonomy of constitutions)
“A constitution is an organization of a city state’s various offices but, particularly, of the one that has authority over everything. For the governing class has authority in every city-state, and the governing class is the constitution.” 3.6
The best constitution promotes living well: Like a captain on a ship, the statesman is ruling not only for his own benefit, but so that the whole ship and its crew can prosper.
Taxonomy of regimes
‘Few’ and ‘many’ here often mean ‘rich’ and ‘poor’- a community with a majority of wealthy rulers would still be an oligarchy, and one with a minority of poor rulers would still be a democracy
Pol 3.8-11 (Political virtue and shares in the polis, ‘Defence’ of democracy)
“justice seems to be equality, and it is, but not for everyone, only for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality, since indeed it is, but not for everyone, only for unequals.” 3.9
“So political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of noble actions, and not for the sake of living together. Hence those who contribute the most to this sort of community have a larger share in the city-state” 3.9
The primary value for aristocracy is not equality (as human beings) or shared freedom or wealth, but political virtue
Different constitutions grant different kinds of people the right to decide about justice, but Aristotle also thinks that people in general should be subject to just laws (rather than deciding on everything by decree in the moment).
‘Defence’ of democracy: ‘the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually but collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person’s expense. For being many, each of them can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom, and when they come together, the multitude is just like a single human being, with many feet, hands, and senses, and so too for their character traits and wisdom. That is why the many are better judges of works of music and of the poets. For one of them judges one part, another another, and all of them the whole thing.’
