essay plan

Question 1

How many?

Answer 1

8 (+intro & concl)

Question 2

outline

Answer 2

1 discussions not the same, type vs token
2 ontological reduction, Frege’s stars
3 nomological danglers, Occam’s razor, causal closure, overdetermination
4 Leibniz’s Law, not a property, phenomenological fallacy
5 spatial location, counterexamples, Putnam mirror analogy
6 philosophical zombies, conceivability not possibility, Kripke rigid designators
7 multiple realizability, chauvinism, token identity
8 functionalism

Question 3

How many in intro?

Answer 3

3

Question 4

How many in 1?

Answer 4

5

Question 5

How many in 2?

Answer 5

4

Question 6

How many in 3?

Answer 6

6

Question 7

How many in 4?

Answer 7

5

Question 8

How many in 5?

Answer 8

3

Question 9

How many in 6?

Answer 9

7

Question 10

How many in 7?

Answer 10

5

Question 11

How many in 8?

Answer 11

3

Question 12

How many in concl?

Answer 12

2

Question 13

intro

Answer 13

• Mind-brain identity theory (MBIT), poses multiple appeals- pivotally it functions in perfect agreement with scientific consensus and research, it allows for the language of folk psychology, it avoids the critical shortfalls of dualism, and the threat posed by Leibniz’s law, and that of ‘philosophical zombies’.
• However, the issue of ‘multiple realizability’ renders MBIT either absurdly exclusive or alternately makes scientific research totally infeasible.
• Alternatively, functionalism, whilst still boasting the appeals of MBIT, integrates the critical issue of multiple realizability into its conception of mental states.

Question 14

1

Answer 14

• One of the most common objections to MBIT is the criticism that our discussion of brain states is simply not the same as our discussion of mental states.
• Indeed, J. J. C. Smart underscores this issue by pointing out that “any illiterate peasant can talk perfectly well” about mental states, despite knowing “nothing whatever about neurophysiology”, which strongly suggests the independence of mental states from brain states.
• On another end of the spectrum, philosophers such as Steven Schnieder argue that type identity theory necessitates a radical exclusion of mental language (the language of ‘folk psychology’) from our vocabulary as it “not only implies that mental states have physical features … [but also] that some physical events … have non-physical features”.
• It should also be noted that type identity theory is the more common branch of MBIT (and the one addressed for the most part of this essay) which argues that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state (e.g. pain is identical with C-fibres firing).
• Type identity is in contrast to token identity, which argues that each particular mental state is identical with a particular mental state (e.g. the pain I felt at 8 o’clock this morning is identical with my C-fibres firing at 8 o’clock this morning).

Question 15

2

Answer 15

• Smart, however, argues that MBIT does not make the claim that there is a necessary identity of meanings and so an analytic reduction, but rather it is an empirical correlation and so an ontological reduction that is contingent.
• This distinction is illustrated by Frege’s example of the Morning and Evening Star. The ancient Greeks noticed that very bright star rose in the morning, and another rose in the evening, and so named them the Morning and Evening Star respectively, despite both stars in fact being the planet Venus (a fact which was discovered later on).
• Accordingly, just as Morning and Evening Star are two different senses, but refer to the same reference or referent, Venus, mental states and brain states are two different senses, but refer to the same referent, neurological activity.
• In this way, identity theorists seem to be able to use mental-state language both justifiably and in harmony with common use of language, and yet also to concur with contemporary neurological consensus and its empirical evidence.

Question 16

3

Answer 16

• As a further result of this ontological reduction, MBIT does not, unlike dualism, entail what Herbert Feigl refers to as “nomological danglers”.
• Feigl argues that the universe displays a ‘vertical order’ of laws, all of which are ultimately dependant on the laws of physical (e.g. the laws of chemistry or biology). However, if mind states are not identical to brain states then it will have to be argues how and there are mental laws that ‘dangle’ outside the laws of physics and how and why they came about.
• This also means that Occam’s razor (also known as the law of parsimony), the principle that the simplest explanation is probably the correct one, arbitrates in MBIT’s favour, as Feigl points out that ontological reduction simplifies our conception of the world considerably- “Instead of conceiving of two realms, we have only one reality which is represented in two different conceptual systems.”.
• Furthermore, MBIT does not contravene the empirically-evidenced causal closure of the physical (the claim that for every physical event there is a sufficient and necessary physical cause).
• This in turn avoids the issue of over-determination as no more explanation is provided for an event than the physical, which has already been asserted to be sufficient by itself.
• In this manner MBIT avoids the multiple complications incurred by dualism and seems to pose the simplest solution to the mind-body problem.

Question 17

4

Answer 17

• Issue is raised, nonetheless, by the Identity of Indiscernibles (commonly known as Leibniz’s Law) the principle that as no two objects have exactly the same properties.
• The primary issue on this count is the issue of the irreducibility of subjectivity- that mental phenomena (e.g. pain) are private, whereas the corresponding physical phenomena (e.g. C-fibres firing) are publicly observable, and so they seem to have a differentiating property.
• The response can be made, however, that the way in which something is accessed is simply not a property of the thing itself.
• Furthermore, such a criticism can be accused of submitting to “phenomenological fallacy”, a notion formulated by U. T. Place, which is that the mistake is made to think that just because something may seem to be the case, does not mean that it is the case.
• And so just as clouds seem to me to be dry, fluffy, and solid, when in fact they are liquid droplets, mental states may seem to me to be unlike brain states from introspection, but this does not mean that they are not the same thing.

Question 18

5

Answer 18

• A further issue for MBIT posed by Leibniz’s law is that spatial location seems to be a differentiating property, as brain states are located in space whereas mental states immaterial entirely.
• An identity theorist may reply, however, that our own inability to give mental states physical locations does not mean that they are not physical. Indeed, there are many things that we readily admit to be physical, yet do not admit of locational descriptions, such as wetness or running.
• Furthermore, Putnam’s analogy in response to this issue also seems to deal with cases where mental phenomena seem to be located elsewhere in the body to the brain, for example when I have a pain in my arm yet I know that my C-fibres are firing in my brain, as he illustrates that a mirror can be reduced to the object causing the reflection even if they do not occupy the same location, just as mental and brain states can be reduced to each other despite not occupying the same space.

Question 19

6

Answer 19

• One consequence, nonetheless, of the earlier solution that the identity of the brain and mental states is a contingent, empirical fact, rather than a necessary, analytic fact, makes MBIT vulnerable to the notion of ‘philosophical zombies’.
• ‘Philosophical zombies’ are creatures that are physically identical to humans but lack consciousness, which seem coherent as a possibility according to an identity theorist, as mental states, and so consciousness, are not necessarily identical but rather contingently so, and as ever it is impossible to observe the mental states of others.
• Many identity theorists respond with the argument that it is shown to be the case a posteriori that conceivability does not entail possibility; for example it is conceivable that water is not H2O, yet it is not possible for water to not be H20, and likewise with the example of the mental state of pain and the brain state of C-fibres firing.
• This is further attested by Kripke’s concept of ‘rigid designators’, which pick out the same thing in all possible worlds because they are essentially the same (e.g. H2O and water).
• As a result, just because the identity of two things has been discovered a posteriori and so is synthetic, does not mean that it is metaphysically contingent.
• Indeed, a claim being synthetic relates to its epistemology, whereas necessity relates to metaphysics; they occupy different philosophical domains and so it seems possible for a synthetic claim found to be true a posteriori to be metaphysically necessary.
• In such a way, MBIT seems to be able to secure itself metaphysically.

Question 20

7

Answer 20

• The issue that MBIT does not seem to be able to secure itself against, however, is that of ‘multiple realizability’.
• This issue is that if a certain mental state is identical with a certain brain state, then it is impossible for creatures with differently structured brains (e.g. a squid’s oesophagus runs through its brain, or more extremely, any non-human creature), or people whose brain damage has caused their brain to restructure due to the ‘plasticity’ of the brain, to have the same mental states as humans with prototypical brains.
• Yet most feel quite strongly that other creates also feel the same or at least similar mental states as us (e.g. pain, happiness) and furthermore people who have had their brains restructure after brain trauma do experience the same mental states as before with different brain states, and as a result some philosophers, notably Ned Block, have named identity theory ‘chauvinistic’.
• Seemingly the only response to this is to adopt token identity in lieu of type identity in order to include the mental states of humans with atypical brains and non-human creatures.
• To adopt token identity, however, annuls any practicability of MBIT in regard to scientific research, which was the very reason MBIT was favoured in the first place.

Question 21

8

Answer 21

• As a result of this, functionalism, the view that mental states are constituted solely by their functional role in the system of which they are a part, seems to be the ideal alternative to MBIT.
• Functionalism does have to its credit all the aforementioned appeals of MBIT; it permits the common vocabulary of mental states whilst adhering to scientific consensus; it entails no ‘nomological danglers’; accordingly, it falls on the right side of Occam’s razor; it does not contravene the generally established claim that the universe is a closed physical system; and so lastly it faces no issues of overdetermination.
• Crucially, however, functionalism incorporates multiple realizability into its basic apprehension of mental states, and so does not fall into absurdities when faced with atypical human brains or chauvinistic speciesism as type identity does but rather demonstrates valuable flexibility, nor does it preclude useful neuroscientific research as token identity does.

Question 22

concl

Answer 22

• Overall then, MBIT, does have multiple appeals in its harmony with scientific consensus and common parlance in regard to mental state, and its metaphysical robustness.
• It simply cannot, however, provide a response to the unacceptable consequences of multiple realizability without sacrificing its fundamental practicability at the expense of its overall appeal, whereas functionalism is able to adapt to the potential issue of multiple realizability into the advantage of versatility whilst retaining all the attractions of MBIT.