15 MARKER 2 Flashcards
What is the question?
(b) Evaluate Searle’s claim that mental states are biological phenomena. [15]
How many paragraphs?
5 (+ intro and concl)
Outline?
intro 1 - appeals 2 - the problem of causality 3 - being realised in 4 - property dualism in disguise 5 - Chalmers as an alternative- brain conscious concl
How many in 1?
3
How many in 2?
5
How many in 3?
5
How many in 4?
5
How many in 5?
4
1
all three premises seem to be sound; mental phenomena seem inarguably to be caused by brain processes- causal closure of the physical accounted for and contemporary science does not need to be dismissed; mental phenomena do seem to be features of the brain in that we do not have mental phenomena without a brain (e.g. brain injury); most people feel intuitively that mental phenomena are not reducible to the physical- there is a subjective, intentional, conscious experience attached that cannot be denied due to incorrigibility of sense-data
- as a biological process, doesn’t seem to make any metaphysical claims and so circumvents all the issues of dualism
- by using the scientific model of causation ie explanation rather than the Humean model of causation where one state of affairs gives rise to another state of affairs, Searle seems to resolve the issue of whether p1 and p2 can coexist
2
- Jaegwon Kim holds to the Humean model of two discrete events with a time-gap between them, so that the effect can be stopped
- Searle’s rejection of the Humean model means that there isn’t two phenomena but one phenomenon viewed from two different perspectives
- Kim argues that one level of description cannot cause another level of description – this is simply not what causation is- anything can be used to explain an event, but that does not mean it is the cause of the event
- Searle would argue that this criticism presupposes a mental that is a distinct state of affairs from the physical, and so a Humean model is required to provide a link between these two states of affairs
- however this reply to a criticism of his BN relies on the validity of BN, and so is circular in its reasoning, or at least only as strong as BN itself
3
- Searle mental phenomena are “realised in the system that is made up of the micro-elements” as well as being caused by them
- However it is extremely unclear what Searle means by “realised in”- indeed he seems to fall into the same problem of which he accuses Descartes- he uses his own vocabulary to assert his position without really justifying it
- There seem to be three options of what “realised in” means; consciousness is the aggregate state of molecules, in which case Searle’s BN is essentially just MBIT; consciousness is the process that takes place through the neurons, in which case Searle’s BN is essentially just functionalism; consciousness emerges from neurological states, in which case Searle’s BN is essentially just PD with different slogans as even if Searle explicitly denies that it is anything “over and above” the physical, he still asserts it to be irreducible AND emergent
- Searle may reply that “realised in” is just the neurons’ BEHAVIOUR as an aggregate of the physical level
- However, this doesn’t seem to marry with his claim that mental states are irreducible and so would seem to commit him to there being two different properties of mental states
4
- Many argue that Searle’s BN is simply a rebranded PD as it commits to the intrinsic and distinctive tenets of PD- that there is only one substance, the physical, that mental states are properties of the brain (systemic properties as Searle calls them), and that mental states are subjective and so irreducible to the physical- and so would seemingly have to come to the same conclusion of PD
- if so then all the attendant issues of PD come- how does a physical substance cause irreducibly mental properties and explanatory weakness of what is the nature of mental properties
- However Searle insists, unlike a PD such as Chalmers who maintains that irreducibility implies that mental states are “distinct from” and “over and above” neurobiological states, that there are no metaphysical consequences of saying that mental properties are subjective and irreducible as it is rather an epistemological claim
- Searle further argues in “Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness” (2008) that we make reductions in order to explain and so understand surface appearances in terms of their underlying “reality” and the reduction of consciousness to the physical is not possible simply because consciousness “falls outside the pattern of reduction that we have chosen to use for pragmatic reasons”
- however it seems to me to be more than just a “pragmatic .. pattern of reduction” as it applies to everything else that has been encountered in the world- suggesting that consciousness is not merely something that is inexplicable simply because it was expedient for scientists to leave it as so but rather because it is something else altogether
5
- Searle admits that there is presently a biological mystery posing an empirical challenge of how the brain can be conscious, but denies that there is any metaphysical issue relating to this
- Searle further argues that this is because science has repeatedly shown that macro properties (eg liquidity) can be radically different to the underlying reality of their micro properties (eg molecules that happen to be touching but not that closely packed or in a regular pattern- moreover no particular molecule is wet)
- however, all of these previous macro properties are distinct from consciousness in that they are publicly observable, whereas consciousness is the only thing encountered that is only able to be observed from a 1st person perspective
- Indeed Chalmers provides a polar extreme view- the subjectivity of consciousness has deep metaphysical consequences to the extent that our view of the universe needs to be reconsidered entirely in order to accommodate it properly (I’ll watch the TED talk)
intro
Searle’s claim that mental states are biological phenomena appeals when viewing each premise individually, however the inconsistency of his descriptions of mental phenomena, redefinition of causation, and the insufficient consideration of subjectivity means that Searle’s biological naturalism is untenable.
concl
Searle’s biological naturalism is convincing only so far as each premise stands alone, however the contradiction of mental phenomena being both “realised in” and “caused by” micro-elements, the need to redefine causation entirely in order to make his argument coherent, and the inability to properly address the unique issue of subjectivity renders Searle’s claim insupportable.
