Epistemology- 3 markers Flashcards
‘Gettier’ case’
An example where (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p, but (4) S does not know that p (i.e. an example that shows the three conditions not to be jointly sufficient).
(false) lemma
A (false) proposition that you rely on as part of your justification of another proposition.
ability knowledge
“knowing X (a place/thing/person) by direct experience of X (it/him/her)
propositional knowledge
knowing that some claim – a proposition – is true (or false) / knowing that p (where p is a proposition)
aquaintance knowledge
“knowing X (a place/thing/person) by direct experience of X (it/him/her)’
tripartite view of knowledge
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p (these being the three necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).
(individually) necessary condition (for being X)
If C is a necessary condition for something being X then something cannot be X without C being the case.
(jointly) sufficient condition/s (for being X)
If C1 and C2 are jointly sufficient conditions for something being X then if something meets these two conditions then it is X.
global scepticism (vs) local scepticism
The former is the view that we can extend doubt without (or at least almost without) limit; that none (or almost none) of our usual forms of justification for our beliefs are adequate. The latter is the view that we can extend doubt to all beliefs of a specific type (e.g. those about the past); none of our usual forms of justification for certain kinds of beliefs are adequate.
philosophical scepticism
The former is the attempt to render doubtful every member of some class of propositions that we think we know such that the reasons for this doubt cannot, in principle, be removed (or at least not by ordinary means).
“impressions” (vs) “ideas” (Hume)
The former are experiences - they are “forceful and vivid”. The latter are caused by impressions and are “copies of impressions” that we can recall later - they are (normally) less forceful and duller than impressions.
Berkeley’s idealism
The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.
direct realism
The view that (a) mind-independent material/physical objects and their properties exist and (b) we perceive them immediatel;y (i.e. without any intermediaries/sense data)
indirect realism
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects
primary quality (Locke)
They are powers of mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which resemble the actual inherent properties of the object. The primary quality of a mind independent object are number, extension, motion, shape, solidity. They are inseparable from the object; the object cannot be conceived of as not having them; they do not vary based on the perceiver; they can be accessed by more than one sense.
secondary quality (Locke)
They are powers in the mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which do not resemble the the actual inherent properties of the object. The secondary quality of a mind independent objects are colour, taste, smell, sound, (felt) texture. The object can be conceived of as not having them; they do vary based on the perceiver; they cannot be accessed by more than one sense.
quality (Locke)
A “power [of an external mind-independent object] to produce an idea in our mind”.
solipsism
The claim/belief that only my mind exists (there are no other minds, nor are there any mind-independent objects or properties)
a priori deduction/argument
An argument in which a conclusion is inferred validly from a priori knowledge (can also be used to refer to the conclusion of such an argument).
a priori intuition
Belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified (you do not infer an intuition FROM something else that you believe; you just believe it immediately without needing to argue for it) and (2) a priori / ‘rational’ (i.e. justified without the need for experience/s)
clear and distinct idea (Descartes)
A belief that can be justified by a priori intuition - it is self-justifying and is grasped by “the natural light” of reason”. It is CLEAR = the truth of the belief is immediately accessible through thought (it is “clear” to me). It is DISTINCT = I can distinguish it from other truths (I won’t confuse it with other things).
empiricism
The view that (a) all of our concepts are ultimately derived from sense experience (so there are no innate concepts) and (b) all of synthetic knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience (i.e. it is a posteriori) (so there is no innate knowledge, and no synthetic a priori knowledge).
Hume’s “fork”
All knowledge is either (a) knowledge of matters of fact (which are a posteriori, contingent and synthetic) or (b) knowledge of relations of ideas (which are a priori, necessary and analytic).
innatism
The claim that (at least some) concepts/truths exist within the mind at the moment that it exists - they are not caused to be there by experience. Minds are not “tabula rasas”/blank slates.
