Epistemology- 3 markers

Question 1

‘Gettier’ case’

Answer 1

An example where (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p, but (4) S does not know that p (i.e. an example that shows the three conditions not to be jointly sufficient).

Question 2

(false) lemma

Answer 2

A (false) proposition that you rely on as part of your justification of another proposition.

Question 3

ability knowledge

Answer 3

“knowing X (a place/thing/person) by direct experience of X (it/him/her)

Question 4

propositional knowledge

Answer 4

knowing that some claim – a proposition – is true (or false) / knowing that p (where p is a proposition)

Question 5

aquaintance knowledge

Answer 5

“knowing X (a place/thing/person) by direct experience of X (it/him/her)’

Question 6

tripartite view of knowledge

Answer 6

The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p (these being the three necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).

Question 7

(individually) necessary condition (for being X)

Answer 7

If C is a necessary condition for something being X then something cannot be X without C being the case.

Question 8

(jointly) sufficient condition/s (for being X)

Answer 8

If C1 and C2 are jointly sufficient conditions for something being X then if something meets these two conditions then it is X.

Question 9

global scepticism (vs) local scepticism

Answer 9

The former is the view that we can extend doubt without (or at least almost without) limit; that none (or almost none) of our usual forms of justification for our beliefs are adequate. The latter is the view that we can extend doubt to all beliefs of a specific type (e.g. those about the past); none of our usual forms of justification for certain kinds of beliefs are adequate.

Question 10

philosophical scepticism

Answer 10

The former is the attempt to render doubtful every member of some class of propositions that we think we know such that the reasons for this doubt cannot, in principle, be removed (or at least not by ordinary means).

Question 11

“impressions” (vs) “ideas” (Hume)

Answer 11

The former are experiences - they are “forceful and vivid”. The latter are caused by impressions and are “copies of impressions” that we can recall later - they are (normally) less forceful and duller than impressions.

Question 12

Berkeley’s idealism

Answer 12

The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.

Question 13

direct realism

Answer 13

The view that (a) mind-independent material/physical objects and their properties exist and (b) we perceive them immediatel;y (i.e. without any intermediaries/sense data)

Question 14

indirect realism

Answer 14

The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects

Question 15

primary quality (Locke)

Answer 15

They are powers of mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which resemble the actual inherent properties of the object. The primary quality of a mind independent object are number, extension, motion, shape, solidity. They are inseparable from the object; the object cannot be conceived of as not having them; they do not vary based on the perceiver; they can be accessed by more than one sense.

Question 16

secondary quality (Locke)

Answer 16

They are powers in the mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which do not resemble the the actual inherent properties of the object. The secondary quality of a mind independent objects are colour, taste, smell, sound, (felt) texture. The object can be conceived of as not having them; they do vary based on the perceiver; they cannot be accessed by more than one sense.

Question 17

quality (Locke)

Answer 17

A “power [of an external mind-independent object] to produce an idea in our mind”.

Question 18

solipsism

Answer 18

The claim/belief that only my mind exists (there are no other minds, nor are there any mind-independent objects or properties)

Question 19

a priori deduction/argument

Answer 19

An argument in which a conclusion is inferred validly from a priori knowledge (can also be used to refer to the conclusion of such an argument).

Question 20

a priori intuition

Answer 20

Belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified (you do not infer an intuition FROM something else that you believe; you just believe it immediately without needing to argue for it) and (2) a priori / ‘rational’ (i.e. justified without the need for experience/s)

Question 21

clear and distinct idea (Descartes)

Answer 21

A belief that can be justified by a priori intuition - it is self-justifying and is grasped by “the natural light” of reason”. It is CLEAR = the truth of the belief is immediately accessible through thought (it is “clear” to me). It is DISTINCT = I can distinguish it from other truths (I won’t confuse it with other things).

Question 22

empiricism

Answer 22

The view that (a) all of our concepts are ultimately derived from sense experience (so there are no innate concepts) and (b) all of synthetic knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience (i.e. it is a posteriori) (so there is no innate knowledge, and no synthetic a priori knowledge).

Question 23

Hume’s “fork”

Answer 23

All knowledge is either (a) knowledge of matters of fact (which are a posteriori, contingent and synthetic) or (b) knowledge of relations of ideas (which are a priori, necessary and analytic).

Question 24

innatism

Answer 24

The claim that (at least some) concepts/truths exist within the mind at the moment that it exists - they are not caused to be there by experience. Minds are not “tabula rasas”/blank slates.

Question 25

intuition and deduction thesis

Answer 25

All knowledge is either: (a) justified non-inferentially by a priori intuition or (b) justified inferentially through a priori deduction from these a priori intuitions using sound arguments

Question 26

innate knowledge thesis

Answer 26

We have knowledge of at least some truths as part of our rational nature which (a) are “discovered”/”uncovered”/”recollected”, (b) are not “intuited”/”deduced” and (c) are not, and could not be, justified by experience and so are a priori (though experience might ‘trigger’ our discovery of them)

Question 27

innate concept thesis

Answer 27

We have at least some concepts as part of our rational nature which (a) are “discovered”/”uncovered”/”recollected” and (b) are not, and could not be, based (directly or indirectly) on experience and so are a priori (though experience might ‘trigger’ our discovery of them)

Question 28

scepticism about subject area S

Answer 28

We do not / cannot actually have the concepts within S that are being proposed; We do not / cannot actually have the knowledge within S that is being proposed.

Question 29

cogito (Descartes)

Answer 29

“I exist” - an indubitable, non-inferentialy justified a priori intuition which (according to Descartes) is the foundation of one’s other knowledge and survives sceptical doubt.

Question 30

epistemology

Answer 30

The area of philosophy that examines the source, the limits and the nature of our concepts/knowledge

Question 31

external world

Answer 31

The sum total of all mind-independent objects and their properties.