Epiphenomenalism

Question 1

Epiphenomenalism

1. What category does it belong to?
2. What is the core idea of epiphenomenalism?
3. Arguments for it?

Answer 1

1. Form of naturalistic property dualism.
2. Subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body.
   They themselves have no influence over physical events.
3. Whenever there is a sufficient cause of a physical event, there is a sufficient physical cause of that event.
   If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law.

Question 2

Epiphenomenalism

Achievements

Answer 2

Causal closure
No psychophysical interaction

Multiple realization
Mental properties realized by different physical properties

Mental properties irreducible
Because they are no physical properties

Question 3

Epiphenomenalism

Problems

Answer 3

If mental processes are causally inert, then …

• … why should evolution produce consciousness? Which advantage in the struggle for survival would consciousness provide?
• … acts of will, thoughts, feelings, mental processes would not be among the causes of actions

Absence of a certain mental process

• No impact whatsoever, neither on verbal or nonverbal behavior, nor on memories.
• Absence cannot be determined neither from the first-person perspective nor from the third-person perspective
• Identical memories even if no conscious property
  whatsoever had been present in my entire previous history
• Memories would not guarantee presence of remembered states
• Existence of mental properties is jeopardized

Natural Selection

A property can be selected for only if it has an effect upon organisms’ behavior. Therefore, consciousness (both qualia and intentional states) must have effects in behavior, i.e., epiphenomenalism is false.

Question 4

Epiphenomenalism

Consequences

Answer 4

Dualist interactionism

• “Autonomous mental properties causally efficacious by
  themselves”

Identity theory

• “Mental properties are causally efficacious because they
  are (identical with) neural properties.

Eliminative Materialism

• “Mental properties do not really exist. Only material
  processes are relevant”

Epiphenomenalism

• not an attractive theory
• Can be ruled out a priori