Emerging international issues

Question 1

Nuclear proliferation history and motivations

Answer 1

• 1945: first nuclear weapon deployed by US – Hiroshima then Nagasaki
• spread of technology of nuclear weapons
  
  • uranium enrichment: U235 enrichment to 90%
  • plutonium route: reactor processes, to be reprocessed to create weapon-grade material
• acquisition of nuclear weapons – motivations:
  
  • military pre-eminence: realist perspective, need to maintain balance of power – some take this to mean having greater power than others esp. enemies, power of nuclear weapons as deterrence due to scale of destruction caused
  • regional dynamics: nuclear capability/intention of developing nuclear capability of near-by states influence a state’s motivation to acquire nuclear weapons
    
    • e.g. Sino-Chinese border war ended China-India friendship, China’s testing of nuclear weapons led Indian government to focus on their own development of nuclear weapons, then led Pakistan to expand nuclear capacity
  • political-domestic: can encourage countries to move from near-nuclear to a nuclear state
  • institutional imbalances and preferences
  • personalities: individual preferences significants
    
    • e.g. India – Indra Ghandi pushed expansion of nuclear capacity

Question 2

Impact of nuclear proliferation

Answer 2

• human cost:
  
  • human deaths and also inter-generational problems
  • counter-force capabilities: limits casualties as weapons more sophisticated and targeted
  • expensive technology, especially in developing countries – expanding nuclear programmes often means money for water, sanitation, improving employment is diverted
  • radiation effects may also impact neighbouring states to target
• instability v stability: centres around horizontal and vertical proliferation
  
  • nuclear weapons more destructive than conventional weapons whose effects are known
  • great human cost concern, more is not better, horizontal proliferation needs to be contained
  • fear of nuclear weapons gives them power
  • nuclear proliferation increases irrationality of states

Question 3

Types of proliferation

Answer 3

• vertical: expanding spread of weapons and delivery vehicles within the same state
• horizontal: across countries, in response to other countries expanding nuclear capabilities – more than one country has chosen to expand nuclear capacity

Question 4

Nuclear non-proliferation regime

Answer 4

• International Institute of Atomic Energy (IAEA): responsible for ensuring countries use nuclear energy for specific purposes
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968, 1970): non-nuclear states willing give up their right to nuclear states (5 countries), this requires protection from nuclear states and shares technology with them
  
  • criticised for creating inequality
• success of the non-proliferation regime:
  
  • proliferation has not been stopped
  • equitable treatment of non-nuclear states not occurred

Question 5

Evolution of non-proliferation efforts

Answer 5

• 1972: the US and the Soviet Union signed a treaty (SALT I – Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) limiting the number of missiles and ballistic missile defences
• 1974: Nuclear Suppliers Group
  
  • group of nuclear suppliers: follow guidelines so that countries do not use their exports for weapons, attempt to prevent misuse of nuclear technology and control of information
  • countries that seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. The NSG first met in November 1975 in London, and is thus popularly referred to as the “London Club” (“Club de Londres”)
• 1979: ratification of an evolved treaty (SALT II) was suspended when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, but was nevertheless tacitly honoured by both parties
• 1990s: two strategic arms reduction treaties (STARTs) signed, reduced stockpiles
• counter-proliferation attempts include:
  
  • 2004: UN Security Council resolution aims to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMDs
  • 2004: proliferation Security Initiative aimed to improve international cooperation to interdict trafficking and transfer of WMD materials and delivery systems
  • Nuclear Security Summit (first occasion 2010) aims to increase cooperation to prevent nuclear smuggling
  • Global Zero movement: wants to rid the world of all such weapons

Question 6

Case study: nuclear programmes in North Korea and Iran

Answer 6

• North Korea and Iran present different challenges to the non-proliferation regime

North Korea

• 1994: Agreed Framework was signed by North Korea, agreeing to shut down its plutonium reactor in return for other concessions
• 1998: North Korea again announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, which it did five years later
• 2005: new talks led to a Joint Statement affirming the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula
• October 2006: country tested a nuclear weapon in and is now thought to have access to half a dozen nuclear weapons, there have been several attempts to reignite negotiations, but so far without visible success
• small state using nuclear weapons to establish prestige in international system

Iran

• nuclear program:
  
  • leadership aspirations
  • medical research
  • weapons research
  • halted by the Islamic Republic
  • 1980s: reinitiated by the Islamic Republic
• Ayotullah Khomeini (1902-1989): decided Iran didn’t want nuclear war, when Iran and Iraq entered into conflict decided needed weapons again in 1980s
• remains a member of the NPT
• 2002: concerns raised Iran’s nuclear capacity and intentions
  
  • enrichment route
  • signatory to the NPT but did not declare all its sites
• 2003: the IAEA reported that the country had failed to declare enrichment activities as required
  
  • UN Security Council then demanded that Iran stop these activities
  • negotiations produced no firm resolution, as Iran argued that it needs enrichment to achieve energy security, while the IAEA states that she is researching potential nuclear weapons
• Dec 2006: sanctions via the UN Security Council
• 2008: negotiations failed
• Jun 2013: change of government to Rouhani, new round of discussions where Iran was willing to negotiate with US and other states, due to sanctions on oil caused great negative impact on economy
• 2015: agreed upon JCPOA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – key parameters

• parties: Iran, Germany, America, EU and UN Security Council
• number of installed centrifuges in Iran will be reduced by about two-thirds and only 5,060 would be permitted to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium over 3.67% for 15 years
• Iran will not enrich uranium with any of its more advanced centrifuges for at least 10 years, and will conduct “limited” researched and development.
• Iran’s current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) will be reduced to 300 kg for 15 years
• the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have enhanced access through agreed procedures, including to clarify past and present issues.

Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors
• new UN Security Council Resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time.
• transparency measures implemented and “an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.”
• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps, all past UN Security Council resolutions will be lifted simultaneously with Iran’s completion of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns