Eliminative Materialism Flashcards
Eliminative Materialism
The theory that claims that at least some of our common-sense (folk-psychology) mental states, like consciousness or intentionality, are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they don’t refer to anything that exists.
Which Philosophers support EM?
Paul and Patricia Churchland
Folk Psychology
Folk psychology refers to the everyday psychological concepts and explanations of behaviour we use.
Examples of folk psychology
- He ran away because he was scared
- She got a drink because she was thirsty
- They ran out of the building because there was a panic
- He studied for the test because he wanted to get a good grade
Eliminative Materialism (intro)
Eliminative materialism argues that terms like ‘belief’ and ‘pain’ don’t correspond to anything specific. They might be a useful and practical way of talking about mental states but when we actually look at what they really are, they can’t be reduced to anything in particular.
Eliminative materialists think that a proper analysis of mental states will look more like neuroscience, with specific descriptions of the mechanics of the brain.
Folk psychology as a scientific theory
Folk psychology is something we just assume. But Churchland sees it as a scientific theory like any other. And the nature of scientific progress requires bad theories to be replaced by better ones.
Problems with folk psychology
- Folk psychology can’t explain mental illness, sleep or learning.
- While pretty much every other scientific theory has advanced over time (e.g. Aristotle’s physics was replaced by Newton’s and then Einstein’s), folk psychology is still the same as it was thousands of years ago.
Intentionality as a Problem of folk psychology
The intentionality in folk psychology doesn’t fit well with most other areas of science. We talk of having a thought about something, for example “I am thinking about an elephant”, but it’s not clear how a physical thing can be about anything in this way. A table or a chair doesn’t have intentionality in this way – it isn’t about anything. Nor do most other theories in science have intentionality – we don’t say gravity or temperature are about anything
Augments FOR EM- what Churchland argues
Folk psychology is an inadequate account of human nature. It is unable to explain why we sleep, dream or how we learn. Our neuroscientific understanding of human mentality is developing apace and to provide further and a fuller explanation of such phenoma and so will supersede folk psychology.
ISSUES with EM
- Our certainty about the existence of our mental states
- Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power
- Eliminative materialism is self-refuting
- Our certainty about the existence of our mental states
P1. When you look into your own mind you appear to be directly aware of your own mental states, such as your beliefs, sensations and desires.
P2. It is absurd to deny the existence of what one is directly aware of.
C. So, eliminative materialism is wrong to deny the existence of mental states picked out by the concepts of folk psychology.
- Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power
- Actually quite effective in predicting human behaviours in a range of situations.
- If it is raining, and desire to go to work but remain dry. Then you can predict that I will go out with an umbrella to achieve this.
- The science of psychology continues to employ many of the basic concepts of folk psychology, suggesting that the theory is continuing rather than stagnating.
- Since neuroscience doesn’t yet have any alternative account for human nature which comes close to the explanatory and predictive power of folk psychology, folk psychology is still the best hypothesis.
- Eliminative materialism is self-refuting
P1. Eliminativism claims that mental states, such as beliefs do not exist.
P2. But if beliefs do not exist then it is not possible to believe that eliminative materialism is true. And if the language used to articulate the theory doesn’t express genuine propositions or beliefs then it is meaningless.
C1. Therefore, according to emliminativist’s own view, it is not possible to believe and coherently articulate eliminitivism.
C2. And so the theory is self-refuting
Paul Churchland’s response
This argument presupposes the truth about folk psychology, which is precisely what eliminitivism is denying.
Churchland’s reply to EM being self-refuting can be objected as a weak analogy to save EM. Why?
For eliminativism is denying the very category of belief in which the theory is articulated and with notions of truth and falsehood, evidence and reasoning. If beliefs and so forth genuinely don’t exist, then EM and the arguments cannot be coherently articulated. And if we can only make sense of the eliminitivist’s arguments is by presupposing the truth of folk psychology.
