Duties of Aid Flashcards

1
Q

How many people live in extreme poverty in 2019?

A

648 million

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2
Q

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, what was the projection of people living extreme poverty in 2022?

A

685 million

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3
Q

How many people live without basic drinking water in 2019?

A

690 million

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4
Q

How many pregnant women and newborns die each year, mostly due to preventable causes?

A

2.8 million

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5
Q

What does the global situation of extreme poverty combined with extreme inequality mean?

A

That those in affluent countries have the potential to make a significant difference.

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6
Q

Apart from duties of aid mean apart from a duty to assist those in positions of extreme detriment?

A
  1. Duties not to exploit people;
  2. Duties not to benefit from exploitation;
    3.Duties to petition our governments or to demonstrate in support of political movements; and,
  3. Duties to compensate for historical injustices
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7
Q

What is Singer’s argument in ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’?

A

That our moral obligation to provide aid in response to extreme suffering is much greater than has been generally assumed.

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8
Q

What is Singer’s starting point for this argument?
(Quote)

A

That ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad’.

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9
Q

What is the quote from which Singer propagates the pond thought experiment?

A

‘If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of a child would presumably be a very bad thing.’

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10
Q

What is Singer’s moral principle suggested by the pond example? (Quote)

A

‘If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it

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11
Q

What is the standard version of Singer’s argument?

A

P1: If we can prevent something bad from happening wihtout thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, then we ought to do it.
P2: Suffering and death are bad.

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12
Q

What is the less demanding version of Singer’s argument?

A

P1: If we can prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, then we ought to do it.
P2: Suffering and death are bad.
Conc: Therefore, we ought to prevent suffering and death whenever we can do so without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant

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13
Q

What is Singer’s main argument, then

A

Just as we are morally required to save the child in the pond, so too are we morally required to help those suffering from extreme poverty (whenever we can do so without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance)

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14
Q

What is helping not merely?

A

‘charitable’, or ‘generous’.

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15
Q

What is helping?

A

Morally required

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16
Q

If we accept Singer’s argument and acted upon it…

A

‘Our lives our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed.’

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17
Q

What is the first initial reply?

A

The case of world poverty is not similar to the Pond case because of the distance involved

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18
Q

What is the problem with the first initial reply?

A

Distance is not morally relevant. For modern technology means that this is no longer likely to be true.

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19
Q

What is the second initial reply?

A

One can not be certain that their charitable efforts will be effective. There is uncertainty in donating to combat global poverty

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20
Q

What is the problem with the second initial reply?

A

Information on both need and the effects of aid are widely and easily accessible

21
Q

What is the third initial reply?

A

Through private donation, we allow governments and large organisations to avoid their responsibility

22
Q

What is the problem with the third initial reply?

A

Private donations may in fact encourage government aid.
We can also say that we should be spending time protesting and campaigning for greater action at a societal level.

23
Q

What is the fourth initial reply?

A

That the conclusions Singer makes don’t seem right. There must be something wrong with Singer’s argument.

24
Q

What is the problem with the fourth initial reply.
(Quote)

A

‘Human beings are to some degree altruistic, but they are also to a great degree selfish, and their attitudes on matters of conduct are largely determined by what is in their own interests, and what is in the interests of the few others they care about.’

25
Q

Suppose we agree that we have some obligation to give aid, but we want to avoid Singer’s extreme conclusions. What is a way of dealing with this?

A

A plausible fairness principle

26
Q

What is a plausible fairness principle?

A

In response to situations where collective action could avoid some harm, no one agent is obliged to do more than their fair share.

27
Q

What does Miller consider?

A

Cases where collective action is needed and the burdens could be distributed fairly, but some people fail to do their fair share.

28
Q

What is a quote from miller that displays that, in cases where collective action is needed and the burdens could be distributed fairly, people should do their fair share

A

‘In the situations I am considering, agents face a choice between three broad possibilities: (1) they can discharge their original fair share of responsibility despite others’ non-compliance; (2) they can do more than they were originally required to do in order to compensate for the non-compliance; or (3) they can do less than they were originally required to do, so that they fall more closely into line with the defaulters.’

29
Q

Concerning option 3 (grouching – they can do less than they were originally required to do’) what cases does this seems fine?

A

i) This seems okay in cases like the ‘leaving present’ example
ii) It also seems fine if my attempts will be ineffectual without the compliance of others.

30
Q

The case of global poverty is not like this. Why?

A

Donations can have a significant impact, even if others are not giving. If we think we have a responsibility, then we should not do less than our fair share

31
Q

Concerning option 2 (taking up the slack), what is this like?

A

i) This is like Singer’s position. Regardless of what others are doing, individuals are obliged to keep on giving (until they would be sacrificing something of comparable significance).
ii) Non-compliance is a fact of life and we need to recalculate our own obligations

32
Q

What does Miller think about taking up the slack?

A

That this cannot be demanded of people

33
Q

Concerning option 1 (doing your fair share), what can be said?

A

‘By doing my fair share, I have discharged my obligation and the injustice that remains, because of the partial compliance, is the responsibility of the non-compliers, and only theirs. As a general matter, we are not required as a matter of injustice to correct the injustices that others perpetrate.’

34
Q

What is the modified pond problem?

A

You are walking past a shallow pond and see 5 children drowning in it. There are four other bystanders who could help but they refuse to do so.
Having rescued one of the children, are you obliged to go back and help the others? Would it be morally permissible to let the others drown?

35
Q

Concerning the modified pond example, what does Miller’s ‘fair share’ principle imply?

A

That you do not have a strict moral obligation to help the additional children in modified pond.

36
Q

In terms of moral obligations, what does Singer’s argument not distinguish between?

A

Killing and letting die

37
Q

What can be said about killing and letting die?

A

Perhaps (all things being equal) an act of killing is morally worse than an act of letting die/

38
Q

If letting die is less serious than killing, then…

A

perhaps Singer is wrong to think that we have such strict moral obligations stemming from global poverty.

39
Q

What are the three reasons to think killing is worse than letting die?

A
  1. Appeal to examples;
  2. The dischargeability’ claim
  3. The ‘optionality’ claim
40
Q

What is the first argument to be made for the killing vs letting die response?

A

That violating an obligation not to kill is a serious moral wrong, whereas violating an obligation not to let die is less serious.

41
Q

What is the first way one can deny that violating an obligation not to kill is a serious moral wrong, whereas violating an obligation not to let die is less serious?
(Quote)

A

‘Suppose there were a starving child in the room where you are now – hollow eyed, belly bloated, and so on – and you have a sandwich at your elbow that you don’t need. Of course you would be horrified; you would stop reading and give her the sandwich, or better, take her to a hospital

42
Q

Suppose someone didn’t help the child, and simply let them die, what is there?

A

Ample reason for judging her very harshly

43
Q

If the example of someone letting a child die makes them a monster, then what does this show?

A

That letting die is just as serious a moral wrong as a case of killing

44
Q

What does Onora O’Neill provide to argue that those in affluent countries are not killing, but merely letting die?

A

The lifeboat example

45
Q

What is the lifeboat example from O’Neill?

A

‘On a well-equipped lifeboat with six persons, B, C, D, E, and F decide to withhold food from A, who consequently dies. In this case, they cannot appeal to self-defence – for all could have survived. Nor can they claim that they are merely A die – ‘We didn’t do anything’ – for A would not otherwise have died. This was not a case of violating the problematic right not to be allowed to die, but of violating the right not to be killed.

46
Q

What is the second version of the lifeboat example?

A

Suppose three of the six people on a well-equipped lifeboat secure extra food, leaving only enough for one of the remaining three people to survive. None of the three who secure the food knows exactly who will die, they do not act alone, and they may not even act with malicious intent (they just want extra for themselves). Still, the subsequent deaths should be considered killings’

47
Q

What is O’Neill’s ultimate point?

A

That perhaps many of the deaths caused by lack of food, shelter and medical care should also be described as killings

48
Q

What other examples does O’Neill discuss?

A

Examples where external powers (businesses, financial institutions, or foreign governments) are the cause of suffering in poorer nations

49
Q

If suffering and death is being caused by those in affluent countries, then…

A

Those involved cannot claim to be merely letting people die – these cases should be viewed as killings