Due Process Flashcards
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)
Of wolf’s holding that the Fourth Amendment but not the exclusionary rule applied to the states, the court had to decide on a case-by case basis whether illegal searches and seizures by state police violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rochin v. Calf (1952)
added behavior that “shocks the conscience” into tests of what violates due process.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
The Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. With the incorporation of the 14th Amendment, the states must enforce the Fourth Amendment’s privacy clause, which enforces the sanction of exclusion implemented on the federal government to the states. The purpose of the exclusionary doctrine is defined to be an essential “ingredient of the Fourth Amendment” that allows the individual a constitutional guarantee of privacy. Further stating that a federal prosecutor may not use illegally seized evidence against Mapp, and must above all secure the individual from “rude invasion of privacy”, which the Constitution affirms. The decision founded then finds that police officers must uphold honest enforcement of the law, and the courts must maintain the judicial integrity for the basis of true administration in our justice system.
United States v. Leon (1984)
Good faith exception was created for the exclusionary rule therefore it allows evidence to be admissible.
Carroll v. U.S. (1925)
Made it where a vehicle is not practicable to secure a warrant. Therefore warrantless searches and seizure of automobiles is permissible, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Compare – Delaware v. Prouse (1978), Michigan v. Sitz (1990), Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000), Illinois v. Caballes(2005) (note Rodriguez v. US, (2015)) and Illinois v. lidster (2004).
Delaware v. Prouse (1978)
Motion to draw a line for police making routine stops of vehicles for the purpose of checking drivers’ licenses and car registrations, holding that police must have probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that a vehicle or its occupants have violated some law.
Michigan v. Sitz (1990)
Ruled that highway sobriety checkpoints were permissible, even though police had no reasonable suspicion to believe that drivers were intoxicated. Checkpoint program matches up with the balance of the state’s interest in preventing DUI.
Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000)
Struck down the use of fixed checkpoints to interdict unlawful drugs on the ground that they lacked individualized suspicion of the driver’s’ criminal activity and aimed only to advance state’s’ “general interest in crime control,” in contrast with sobriety checkpoints.
Illinois v. Caballes (2005)
The courts held that police may use drug-sniffing dogs around a car stopped for a routine traffic violation and prosecutors may introduce evidence of contraband that was found as a result.
Rodriguez v. US (2015)
Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures
Illinois v. Lidster (2004)
The Court upheld “informational checkpoints” –checkpoints at which all cars are stopped in order to inquire whether drivers have information pertaining to a recent crime, such as the location of a missing person or the identity of the perpetrator of a crime.
Border Searches: U.S. v. Brignoni v. Ponce (1975) & U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976)
Except at the border, roving border patrol agents may stop cars only if they have reasonable suspicion and specific and articulable facts indicating that a vehicle contains illegal aliens; Mexican ancestry of occupants alone is not grounds for reasonable suspicion.
Vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of occupants, and vehicles may be directed selectively to a secondary inspection point, even when the basis for doing so is the “apparent Mexican ancestry” of occupants of the vehicle.
Arizona v. Gant (2009)
Holding that police may search only the immediate area in order to protect the safety of officers in a search incident-to-arrest situation; the police must have a warrant to search a car after the driver or passenger is taken into custody and may conduct a warrantless search only for evidence related to the arrest.
US v. Jones (2012)
The court affirmed and held that the GPS tracking device installation without a warrant was an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
Chimel v. Calf. (1969)
An officer may only search the surrounding areas that might endanger the safety of the arresting officer, and may search to remove a hidden weapon or avoid the destruction of evidence. Thus, in the present case the “reasonable” manner of a search was not justifiable. The Fourth Amendment requires the search of an arrestee’s person and area from within he might obtain a weapon for matters of protection, but a search warrant is needed in order to extend the search beyond this area of scope.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
- no probable cause needed
- reasonable suspicion
- minimal invasion/intrusive by govt
Riley v. California (2014)
Finding that only “exigent circumstances” could possibly justify a warrantless search in some particular cases.
-Seek warrant before conducting search of cellphone
-can only examine the outside
-“exigent circumstances
information on cellphone is immune from search
Brown v. Texas (1979)
The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure be “reasonable.
Calf. V. Ciraolo (1986)
The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.
