Dormant Clause Cases Flashcards
Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1952)
Facts
* In 1789, Congress passes a law that regulates ports and harbors. Congress states that until the law is passed, the regulation of these ports and harbors are left up to the states.
* PA passes a state law requring that all ships needed to be driven by a local pilot.
* Cooley has a ship but he doesn’t use a local pilot. He gets fined.
* Cooley sues, saying that the PA law is invalid and that only Congress can regulate the ports and harbors.
Issue
* Is the Penn law unconstitutional? [Yes]
* Can states regulate interstate commerce? [Sometimes]
Reasoning
* Ports and harbors fall under naviagation, so Congress can obviously regulate if they wanted to.
* But, states should have some say. There is no need to completely remove them from the IC conversation. Both state and federal levels can co-exist.
* This case introduces the idea of selective exclusiveness
* Selective Exclusiveness: If (1) not national in scope, (2) no need for uniformity, and (3) not regulated by Congress, then states can use their police powers to regulate.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
Background
* This case is an example where selective exclusiveness isn’t clear.
* Arizona passes the Train Limit Law, where it limits trains from having more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars.
* Southern Pacific gets charged for violating the Train Law Limit Act –> sues and says this is an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce
Issue
* Does the AZ law violate interstate commerce? [yes]
Reasoning
* Absence of federal legislation means that states have some amount of limited authority in IC – aka. has to be (1) local in character and effect and (2) can’t have a major impact on IC.
* But states can’t impede the flow of interstate commerce – we have to ask how much a state regulation burdens IC
* 90% of AZ trains are interstate, and the AZ laws forbids trains that are allowed everywhere else. These trains cross interstate lines all the time, so the law is clearly blocking interstate commerce.
* This is all known as the dormant commerce clause
* Dormant Commerce Clause: states cannot impose burdens on interstate commerce or discriminate against interstate commerce
Other Opinions
* J1 (dissent): Congress hasn’t explicitly said anything on this matter, so the states can do what they want.
* J2 (dissent): What is the point of this decision. If, at the end of the day, Congress can make a decision, then that is the end of the discussion.
What is Selective Exclusiveness?
Selective Exclusiveness is the principle that allows states to rule on interstate commerce matters IF: (1) not national in scope (2) no need for a uniform decision, and (3) not regulated by Congress.
If these conditions are met, then states can use their police powers to regulate.
What is the Dormant Commerce Clause?
Dormant commerce clause is the idea that states cannot impose burdens on interstate commerce, or discriminate against interstate commerce.
Hunt v. Washington St. Apple Ad Commission (1977)
Background
* North Carolina requires specific label requirements on their apples (either USDA label or no label at all)
* Washington, who owns 30% of the apple market, has its own system which clashes with the NC’s system
* Washington argues and says NC’s system was a burden on interstate commerce because it discriminates against out-of-state products, takes away their market advntage, and requires packaging for just one state
Issue
* Whether or not the NC law violates the interstate commerce clause [yes]
Reasoning
* This is a clear burden on interstate commerce. So instead, the court has to look if there is a valid reason behind this burden (aka. are there any local benefits)
* North Carolina argues that there are local benefits as the law is meant to prevent label confusion for local consumers
* Opinion rejects above argument since the law is not only a burden on WA, but also discrimination. The law takes away WA’s marketing advantage by raising their costs, and the law’s benefits aren’t actually for consumers, it is for the NC apple producers.
* Opinion also states that other non-disciminraotry options were available – NC could require both state and USDA grades.
* Overall, if a state wants to justify a burden placed on IC, then they have to show high benefits and that no other non-discriminatory methods were available.
Maine v. Taylor (1986)
Background
* Maine bans the live importation of baitfish into the state to protect their fish ecology. Taylor imports a bunch of baitfish and gets fined.
* Taylor challenges Maine’s law saying the ban of shipment was a violation of the commerce clause.
Issue
* Is Maine’s law a violation of the commerce clause? [No]
Reasoning
* Although it is true that Maine is banning some form of interstate commerce, it doesn’t necessarily mean that Maine’s burden is automatically unconstitutional. The Majority Opinion states that they need to see if the burden is justifable and if there is a genuine local concern.
* Maine does have a substantial and genuine interest, which is to protect their fish’s ecology and promote their environment’s welfare. This is clearly not an attempt to (unfairly) protect ME businesses from out of state busineses]
* Sampling was also not feasible here, as there is a lack of reliable methods to inspect and test imported baitfish to see if they had any harm, so a complete ban was reasonable. ME had a right to be careful about possible risks to protect their envrionment]
* Overall, even though the commerce clause does have heavy rules on the burdens a state can place on interstate commerce, it is not absolute. As long as the state isn’t needlessly obstructing commerce, and there is a legitimate need, such as for the health and welfare of their state, then a broad burden might be okay.
Other Opinions
* J1 (dissent): Maine is the only state that bans the importation of bait fish, and bait fish is a huge industry. For one, how are there no other alternatives? And also, the state should prove that sampling wouldn’t work without automaticaly ruling it out.
Granholm v. Heald (2005)
Background
* Michigan and New York have a classification system for wine distribution. In-state businesses can directly ship their products to customers, while out-of-state businesses are not allowed.
* Several wine producers challenged this system, stating this was a discrimination against out-of-state products and was a burden on IC
* However, there were a few complications: (1) 21A repealed the prohibition 18A, and just a few years earlier, Congress had passed a law that allowed states to ban the importation of alcohol if it violated their state laws.
Issue
* Can a state allow in-state wineries to sell and ship to in-state residents, but not allow out-of-state wineries to directly ship to residents? [No]
Reasoning
* This is clearly product discrimination. Generally, treating in-state products vs. out-of state products are almost always bad, especially when access to markets are limited.
* Yes, while the 21A gives states the power to regulate alcohol, it doesn’t mean that states can violate other parts of the Constitution (Commerce Clause)
* The state tries to argue that there is a benefit to this classification system (preventing minors from buying alcohol)
* Court rejects above argument since there is no actual evidence that the discrimination against out-of-state products would result in decreased-levels of underage drinking.
* Overall, a state can totally allow or completely ban alcohol. They just can’t allow one type (in-state) over an other (out of state)
Other Opinions
* J1 (dissent): Congress has authorized MI and NY to do this. There is 21A and that law Congress had passed earlier. Under these laws, the states are protected from dormant clause claims.
