Commerce Clause Cases Flashcards
US v. Morrison (2000)
Facts:
* Sexual assault case. Brzonkala alleges that Morrison assaulted her.
* TLDR: Morrison gets away on probation from his charges and Brzonkala sues, stating that this violated the Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA)
Issue
* Is the Violence Against Women’s Act a regulation of interstate commerce? [No]
Reasoning
* From* Lopez*, there are 3 categories when judging IC : (1) channels of IC (2) instrumentalities of IC, and (3) things that substantially effect IC. VAWA is in category 3.
* Congress made the argument that gender-based violence harms interstate travel and reduces economic productivity.
* This argument was rejected because Congress cannot regulate an non-economic activity based on its supposed impact on IC. This would open to much power to Congress.
* This type of intrastate, noneconomic, violent activity is left up to the states
Other Opinions
* J1: Congress can regulate anything that they think will substantially effect interstate commerce. It doesn’t matter if they are right, what matters is that there was a reason to even make a connection.
Gonzales v. Raich (2005)
Facts:
* California passes Proposition 216 (state law).
* Prop 216 allows the use of medical marijuana and doctors and patients will not face criminal prosecution for growing or possessing weed.
* Raich is personally growing some weed which eventually gets raided by the DEA. The DEA says that the weed is legal only under CA law, but it is illegal under federal law (Controlled Substances Act)
* Raich challenges the CSA, stating that weed is purely local and is a non-commercial activity.
Issue
* Is the Controlled Substance Act a regulation of interstate commerce? [yes]
Reasoning
* This case is similar to Wickard v. Filburn
* Wickard stated that Congress can regulate local and non-commercial activity if it substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate
* This logic was applied to weed. If there is a state that makes an exception to weed possession, then the market will shift towards the CA market, affecting the federal interstate commerce of controlling drugs.
* Also, the gov’t cannot distinguish between local or federal weed. Under a broad regulation such as the CSA, smaller, individual uses that aren’t entirely problematic are likely to be bounded/ensnared by the law (Raich’s usage). But, that doesn’t doesn’t make that activity automatically exempted/excised from the regulation.
Other Opinions
* J1 (concur): the power to regulate activities that substantially effect IC is in the NP clause. But, the states still should have some say in this.
* J2 (dissent): There is no such thing as private or purely local activity anymore. Now any activity can potentially be regulated.
* J3: What the fuck is this decision.
NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)
Facts:
* The Affordable Care Act was passed with an individual mandate provision. The provision required Americans to purchase a minimum insurance coverage, or else they will be penalized by a fee from the IRS.
* This provision was challenged under lots of grounds, but IC was one of them.
* Challengers argued that the provisions forces commercial activity.
Issue
* Is the ACA provision a regulation of interstate commerce? What about under the Necessary and Proper Clause [No]
Reasoning
* From the 3 categories from Wickard, the ACA falls under Category 3 (substantial effects)
* The gov’t’s argument on the provision was that “not having health insurace has a substantial effect on IC because everybody will need health insurace or will partake in the market eventually. Also, there may be huge “cost-shifting” problem since healthcare is a huge market.
* However, Court rejected this argument because Congress is essentially trying to regulate inactivity. The mandate creates activity to be regulated, not regulating a current, pre-existing activity.
* Furthermore, allowing Congress to regulate inactivity will open the door to overpower Congress since there are many things that people don’t take apart in.
* For the NP Clause: The mandate isn’t necessary to further an enumerated power. For example, the mandate isn’t needed for health insurace reforms. Thus, the provision fails under NP Clause.
Other Opinions
* J1 (dissent): Healthcare is a growing market that everyone will particpate in eventually. It is a fact that having large amounts of uninsured people will (negatively) impact the health care market, affecting IC. For example, uninsured individuals can cross state borders at any time and receive healthcare at any point. There is obviously a rational connection btwn the individual mandate and IC
* J2 (dissent): Don’t forget about the 10A. The states should be able to have some power to regulate healthcare and have a say.
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
this case is about the commerce clause. this is the steam boat monopoly between ogden and the gibbons (federal gov’t)
This case provides all the basics to the commerce clause:
* Commerce = intercorse –> includes buying and selling AND navigation
* “Among the State” covers commerce that starts in one state and ends in another (not just crossing borders) –> eg. ports are regulated under interstate commerce
* Foreign commerce can is regulated by Congress and will be always prempt state law via Supremacy Clause
* Interstate Commerce can only be limited by other constitutional provisions
* Purely intrastate commerce = Congress has no role
US v. EC Knight (1895)
this case is about regulating interstate commerce, specifically if manufacturing and production are included in the commerce clause. This is the sugar monopoly case where sugar companies were being acquired to form one big one.
There must be a balance between the Congress’s commerce clause and the state’s police powers.
Indirect effects on interstate commerce cannot be regulated by the commerce clause, only direct effects. There must be a direct connection btwn the regulation of goods and interstate commerce.
Manufacturing and production are an “indirect” effect because the products haven’t entered the commerce stream just yet. there is a difference between “eventually being apart of commerce” vs “actually/actively being in the stream of commerce” [while monopoles may create an effect on IC, the formation of monopolies aren’t included in IC since they aren’t actively particpating in IC just yet]
there is a dissent
Stafford v. Wallace (1922)
this case is about interstate commerce and the stream of commerce approach. This case involved stockyards and meat packers who (deceptively) packaged meats to consumers.
If a product is still going along the process of commerce, and has not ended up at its final destination, then Congress can still regulate it. Stockyards are not the final stop, they are just the stop along the overall scheme of Congress, as they help distribute the product to the final destination. Clearly what happens in stockyards are a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce clause.
Champion v. Ames (1905)
this case is about the commerce clause and the transportation of lottery tickets. Is the transportation of lottery tickets interstate commerce
Transportation of lottery tickets fall under interstate commerce because the tickets are clearly crossing one state to another. Clearly interstate commerce.
This case also mentions that congressional authority over interstate commerce is plenary (almost absolute), and the only limitations are other constitutional provisions. Otherwise, it is up to Congress to decide whats best on how to regulate commerce. Nothing in the consitution specifcially excludes lottery tickets, so congressional regulation is ok.
there is a dissent
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
this case is about interstate commerce. it provides an example of Congress trying to regulate child labor thru passing labor regulations.
Congress can regulate interstate commerce, but can’t use interstate commerce to regulate the health, safety, and wellbeing of ppl (those are police powers). Clear that Congress passed the regulation to protect the wellbeing of kids, but that is a police power and is left up to the states. Several states have already moved to regulate child labor by themselves, and we should let the states continue to decide.
Also, Child labor is a purely local activity, and it involves the manufacturing process of commerce, which is something left up to the states.
there is a dissent on this case.
Schechter Poultry v. US (1935)
this case is about interstate commerce and is about when commerce stops in the “stream of commerce.” This case is about National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the chicken slaughtering business.
Processing and sales are not included in interstate commerce because the product has arrived at its final destination. Once the chicken arrives in NY and at Schecheter’s business, the product is no longer in the flow of IC
Case also mentioned the president’s role in the NIRA. Court ruled that president’s involvement is unconstitutional because they were bascially delegated legislative powers to make laws.
concurring opinion
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937)
This case is about interstate commerce and replacing the “stream of commerce” standard with the “substantially effects” test.
Is the Wagner Act (creates the NLRB board which does a lot of labor regulations) a regulation of interstate commerce? [yes]
As long as there as the law or regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, then Congress can regulate. The opposition argued that the Wagner Act tried to regulate manufacturing which was originally off-limits on IC, but the Maj Opinion rejected this argument since the “Stream of Commerce” standard is done.
There is a dissenting opinion.
US v. Darby Lumber (1941)
this case is about the substantial effects test and how intrastate commerce falls in it. This case has to do with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and manufacturing/producing lumber for other states
While the manufacturing of lumber itself is purely local, the shipment of it to other states is obviously interstate commerce. Congress has authority to regulate IC however they see fit, which includes prohibiting the shipmet of goods that don’t follow specific standards (minumum wage and hrs)
In regards to wage regulations, the opposing side argued that wages are a intrastate matter. But, here, the Court ruled that if Congress deems that an intrastate matter will affect interstate commerce, then Congress can regulate. Here, Congress found that uneven labor standards (more hrs, less pay) will heavily affect IC, so they are allowed to regulate.
Wickard v. Filburn (1942)
this case is a cooperative federalist case and it expands upon when Congress can regulate purely intrastate commerce. Involves the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) with grain production and farmers producing extra grain for themselves
Congress can regulate purely local, non-economic activity if affects interstate commerce in the aggregate.
Court has never really said that production can never be regulated under IC – its up to the legislature to decide.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US (1964)
this case is about Congress’s ability to regulate intrastate commerce.
Congress can regulate local commerce if it has a connection to interstate commerce. there just needs to be a rational connection
Congress did some fact-checking and found that racial discrimination is a burden on IC. It places whole classes of people under travel restrictions, and its not just in the South. Also, the movement of people is commerce, and ppl travelling from 1 state to another state is clearly interstate commerce.
US v. Lopez (1995)
this case is about protecting state gov’ts over federal power in interstate commerce. This case has to do the with Gun Free School Zone Act and if its a regulation of interstate commerce
Congress upheld the standard that an activity can be regulated under intrastate commerce if it is substantially effects IC and it is commercial. Here, it was found that guns aren’t a commercial activity, and that guns aren’t connected to a broader economic scheme (so no aggregate effect like in Wickard)
This case also provides 3 cateogories to find out if a regulation of interstate commerce is okay: (1) channels of IC, (2) instruments of IC, and (3) things that substantially affects IC.
