DIRECTORS & OFFICERS: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, LIABILITY, AND INDEMNIFICATION Flashcards

1
Q

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO THE
CORPORATION
6.1.1 The Standard

A
  • Director must perform duties in good faith & w/ reasonable belief that her actions are in the best interest of corp.
  • She must also use care a person in similar position would reasonably believe appropriate under
    the circumstances.
  • The 1st sentence of this standard is duty of loyalty.
  • The 2nd sentence of this standard is duty of care.
  • Every time you see a director arguably in breach of either duty, state the entire standard.
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2
Q

Duty of Care

A

The standard (stated above) includes the duty of care. A
director owes this duty to the corporation.

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3
Q

Burden on Challenger/Plaintiff

A
  • Person challenging directors’ action on basis of a BOD of care has burden of proving that statutory standard above was not met.
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4
Q

Two Common Scenarios

A
  • On exam, you’ll typically see the duty of care come up in two ways: (1) nonfeasance or (2) misfeasance
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5
Q

Nonfeasance

A

Nonfeasance : director basically does nothing.

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6
Q

Misfeasance

A
  • Misfeasance: board makes a decision that hurts the business.
  • Here, in contrast to cases of nonfeasance, causation is clear.
  • This means that directors who meet the standard will not be liable for corporate decisions that turn out to be poor/erroneous.
  • We expect a person in a like position to do appropriate homework.
  • If she did, she is not liable for bad results.
  • Think of the business judgment rule as a presumption that when the board took an act, it did
    appropriate homework.
  • That’s why burden is on P to show that board either did not do appropriate homework/did something galactically stupid.
  • The ct will not second-guess a business decision if it
    was made in good faith, was informed, & had a rational basis.
  • A director is not a guarantor of success.
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7
Q

Director May Rely on Reports or Other Information

A
  • In performing her duties, director is entitled to rely on info, opinions, reports, or statements (including
    financial statements), if prepared or presented by:
    (1) corporate officers/employees whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable & competent;
    (2) legal counsel, accountants, or other persons as to matters the director reasonably believes are within such person’s professional competence; or
    (3) a committee of the board of which director is not a member, if director reasonably believes committee merits confidence
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8
Q

Duty of Loyalty

A

The standard (see 6.1.1) includes the duty of loyalty. A director
owes this duty to the corporation.

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9
Q

Burden on Defendant

A
  • Duty of loyalty cases are about conflicts of interest
  • The business judgment rule does not apply in duty of loyalty cases.
  • Why? Because it can never apply when the fiduciary
    has a conflict of interest.
  • So the burden in these cases is on D
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10
Q

Common Scenarios
z Conflicting Transactions (“Self-Dealing”)
— What Constitutes a Conflicting Transaction?

A
  • This is any transaction between corp (on one
    side) & (1) one of its directors, or (2) that director’s close relative, or (3) another business of director’s (on other side).
  • A classic example: XYZ Corp. enters into K w/ LMN Corp., which is owned (wholly/in part) or run by one of XYZ Corp.’s directors. We worry that the director has divided loyalties. The same is true if LMN Corp. is owned by director’s spouse/child/other relative close enough to affect one’s judgment.
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11
Q

Standards for Upholding Conflicting Interest
Transactions

A
  • A conflicting interest transaction will not be enjoined, set aside, or give rise to an award of damages b/c of director’s interest if:
    (1) It was approved by a majority (but at least two)
    of disinterested directors (those w/o a conflicting interest).
  • All material facts must be known to board when board approved transaction. OR
    (2) It was approved by a majority of votes to be case by disinterested shareholders (those w/o
    a conflicting interest)—again, after disclosure/facts were known.
  • Notice of shareholders’ meeting must describe the transaction. OR
    (3) Judged by the circumstances at time corp entered into transaction, it was fair to corp.
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12
Q

Interested Director’s Presence at Meeting Irrelevant

A
  • Presence of interested director(s) at meeting at which directors/shareholders voted to approve conflicting interest transaction does not affect the action
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13
Q

Special Quorum Requirements

A
  • For purposes of the vote on a conflicting interest transaction, at a directors’ meeting, a quorum is a majority (at least two) of disinterested directors.
  • Note that at a shareholders’ meeting, a quorum consists of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast, not including shares owned/controlled directly/beneficially by director w/ the conflicting interest.
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14
Q

Factors to Be Considered in Determining Fairness

A
  • Despite statute’s absolute terms, a transaction approved by board/shareholders might still be set aside if party challenging transaction can prove that it constitutes a waste of corporate assets.
  • So, even if deal is approved, remember on exam to say:
  • “Some cts also require transaction to be fair. For fairness, cts look at adequacy of consideration, corporate need to enter into transaction, financial position of corp, & available alternatives”
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15
Q

Remedies

A
  • Possible remedies for an improper conflicting interest transaction include enjoining transaction, setting transaction aside, damages, & similar remedies
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16
Q

Directors May Set Own Compensation

A
  • Despite apparent conflict of interest, unless articles /bylaws provide otherwise, board can set director compensation.
  • Must be reasonable & in good faith.
  • If it’s excessive, board is wasting corporate assets & breaching duty of loyalty
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17
Q

Competing Ventures

A
  • Directors may engage in unrelated businesses, but
    engaging in a directly competing business raises serious duty of loyalty problems.
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18
Q

Corporate Opportunity Doctrine

A
  • Directors’ fiduciary duties prohibit them from usurping a corporate opportunity from their corporation w/o first giving their corp an opportunity to act.
  • This is known as “usurpation of a corporate opportunity.”
19
Q

Corporation Must Have Interest or Expectancy

A
  • So what is a corporate opportunity?
  • Some say it’s something in corp’s business line.
  • Other tests include whether it’s something the company has an interest/expectancy in/something D found on company time/ w/ company resources.
  • Remember, then, that a usurpation problem
    arises only if a director takes advantage of a business
    opportunity in which corp would have an interest/ expectancy.
  • A corp’s interest does not extend to every conceivable business opportunity, but neither are opportunities limited to those necessary to corp’s current business.
  • The closer the opportunity is to corp’s line of business, the more likely a ct will find it to be a corporate opportunity.
20
Q

Lack of Financial Ability Not a Defense

A
  • Corp’s lack of financial ability to take advantage
    of the opportunity probably is not a defense.
  • Director should still present opportunity to corp & allow it to decide whether it can take advantage of the opportunity.
21
Q

Board Generally Decides

A
  • Board must decide whether to accept/reject an opportunity
22
Q

Remedies

A
  • If director usurps a corporate opportunity, corp can sue to recover under a constructive trust theory.
  • If director still owns the property, she can be compelled to transfer it to corp at price she paid.
  • If she has sold property at a profit, corp may recover that profit.
23
Q

Tip

A

Usurpation of a corporate opportunity is a very
common Corporations exam issue. Whenever the
facts of a question mention that a director learns
of a business opportunity, be sure to consider whether her corp would be interested. If so, she must present opportunity to her corporation, disclosing all material facts, & can take advantage of opportunity personally only if corp decides not to pursue it.

24
Q

Common Law Insider Trading—Special
Circumstances Rule

A
  • Director has no CL duty to disclose all facts relevant to a securities transaction between director & other party to transaction.
  • However, cts have found a duty to disclose where a director knows of special circumstances (ex. an upcoming extraordinary dividend/planned merger).
25
Q

Duty to Disclose

A
  • Directors also have a duty to disclose material corporate info to other board members
26
Q

Loans

A
  • Corp can make a loan to a director if it is reasonably
    expected to benefit corp
27
Q

Personal Liability of Directors May Be Limited

A
  • Articles may limit/eliminate directors’ personal liability for money damages to corp/shareholders for actions taken/not taken.
  • However, articles may not limit/eliminate liability for financial benefits received by director to which she is not entitled, an intentionally inflicted harm on the corp/shareholders, unlawful corporate distributions, or an intentional violation of criminal law.
28
Q

WHICH DIRECTORS MAY BE LIABLE?
6.2.1 Determining Director Liability

A
  • Directors may be liable to corp for improper distributions, improper loans, “ultra vires” acts (making company do things it has no power to do), & for breaches of fiduciary duties.
  • But how do we know exactly which directors are liable for these actions?
  • A director is presumed to concur w/ board action unless her dissent/abstention is noted in writing in corporate records.
  • In writing means (1) in the minutes, (2) delivered in writing to presiding officer at the meeting, or (3) written dissent to corp immediately after meeting.
  • So an oral dissent, by itself, is not effective.
  • Note also that a director cannot dissent if she voted for the resolution at the meeting.
29
Q

Exception

A
  • Director is not liable under the rule above if she was absent from the board meeting (she was sick that day).
30
Q

OFFICERS
6.3.1 Powers and Status

A
  • Officers are agents of corp.
  • Agency law determines authority & powers of officers.
  • Corp: principal & officer: agent.
  • Whether officer can bind corp is determined by whether she has agency authority to do so (actual/ apparent authority).
  • Unauthorized actions may become binding on the corp b/c of ratification, adoption, or estoppel.
  • Corp is liable for actions by its officers w/in scope of
    their authority, even if particular act was not specifically authorized.
31
Q

Roles

A
  • Traditionally, corps were required to have a president, secretary, & treasurer.
  • Now, corp need not have any particular officers.
  • It may have those specified/permitted by its bylaw
  • One officer may appoint assistant officers if permitted by bylaws.
  • May one person can simultaneously serve in more than one office
32
Q

Duties

A
  • Officers’ general duties are determined by the bylaws or, to the extent consistent w/ bylaws, by the board/officer so authorized by the board.
  • Officers owe the same duties of care & loyalty to corp as directors
33
Q

Selection and Removal of Officers

A
  • Officers are selected & removed by the board, which also sets officer compensation.
  • Despite any contractual term to the contrary, an officer has power to resign at any time by delivering notice to corp, & corp has power to remove an officer at any time, with/without cause.
  • If resignation/removal is a breach of K, nonbreaching party may have a right to damages, but
    note that mere appointment to office itself does not create any contractual right to remain in office.
  • Remember that shareholders hire & fire directors.
  • Shareholders do not hire & fire officers.
34
Q

INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES
6.4.1 Categories of Indemnification

A
  • Someone has been sued by (or on behalf of) the corp in her capacity as an officer/director.
  • Director has incurred costs, attorneys’ fees, maybe even fines, & a judgment/settlement in that litigation.
  • Now, she seeks indemnification (reimbursement) from the corp.
  • There are 3 categories of indemnification.
35
Q

Category 1: No Indemnification

A
  • Corp cannot indemnify a director who is
    (1) held liable to corp or
    (2) held to have received an improper benefit.
36
Q

Category 2: Mandatory Indemnification

A
  • Unless limited by articles, a corp must indemnify
    a director/officer who was successful in defending a
    proceeding on the merits/otherwise against officer/ director for reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred in connection w/ the proceeding.
  • In some states, director/officer must win entire case; in others, they are entitled to indemnification “to the extent” that they win the case.
37
Q

Category 3: Permissive Indemnification

A
  • Corp may indemnify a director for reasonable
    litigation expenses incurred in unsuccessfully defending a suit brought against director on account of director’s position if director:
    (1) acted in good faith; and
    (2) believed that her conduct was in the best interests of corp (when conduct at issue was within director’s official capacity).
  • This standard sounds familiar. Why? It’s the duty of loyalty part of the standard from earlier.
38
Q

Who Makes Determination

A
  • Generally, determination whether to indemnify is
    to be made by a disinterested majority of the board,
    or if there is not a disinterested quorum, by a majority of a disinterested committee or by independent legal counsel.
  • The shareholders may also make determination
    (shares of director seeking indemnification are not counted).
39
Q

Officers

A

Officers generally may be indemnified to the same
extent as a director

40
Q

Court-Ordered Indemnification

A
  • Notwithstanding the above rules, a ct in which a director/officer was sued may order indemnification if it is justified in view of all circumstances.
  • If director/officer was held liable to corp, reimbursement is limited to costs & attorneys’ fees (it cannot include the judgment).
41
Q

Limitations of Liability

A
  • Articles can eliminate director (&, in some states,
    officer) liability to corp for damages, but not for
    intentional misconduct, usurping corporate opportunities, unlawful distributions, or improper personal benefit.
  • So, these provisions can eliminate liability only for duty of care cases.
42
Q

Advances

A
  • Corp may advance expenses to a director defending
    an action if director givess corp a statement that director believes he met the appropriate standard of conduct & that he will repay the advance if he is later found to have not met the appropriate standard.
43
Q

Liability Insurance

A
  • Corp may purchase liability insurance to indemnify
    directors/officers for actions against them even if directors/officers would not have been entitled to indemnification under the above standards.
44
Q

Agents and Employees

A
  • MBCA does not limit a corp’s power to indemnify,
    advance expenses to, or maintain insurance on agents & employees.