Dictatorships Flashcards
Explain the different types of authoritarian regimes
Monarchies - king/queen is the supreme ruler, and succession is determined by royal line (usually male line)
Military Dictatorships - Gov is composed of a committee or junta, of senior figures in the armed forces, whilst elected or representative institutions are often ‘suspended’
Civilian Dictatorships - non-democratic regime, usually with some form of non competitive (single party systems) or semi competitive (in hegemonic party systems) elections.
Explain the role of elections in authoritarian regimes?
1 - may help govs commit to power-sharing arrangements & patronage with opposition groups through co-opting elites - fewer incentives to seek regime transition
2 - pressure to hold them from international institutions, but they create little incentive for real political competition - gives them credibility
3 - high voter turn-out helps govs signal where their popularity is - knowledge of where co-ordinated resistance may be
Explain the dictators credibility dilema
The dictator dilema is that he relies on repression to stay in power, but this repression creates incentives forr everuone to falisify their prefences so the dictator is unaware of their true level of support
Explain how Parties and Elections help Co-Opt Elites
Provide popular or powerful elites with a secure source of patronage
independent of the gov.
Give elites a stake in the outcome of an election and therefore fewer
incentives to seek regime turnover
Divide opposition groups forces them to compete over local isses, therefore the gov can reduce the likelihood of successful
mobilisation against the regime.
Ensure everyone “follows the rules” making governing bargains
more stable.
Explain Bueno de Mesquita (et al) selectorate theory?
1993
2 types of supporting groups for leaders
The ‘selectorates’ are the people who have a say in selecting a leader (democracy over 18, monarch members of the royal family)
The ‘winning coalition’ are the sub-set of the selectorate who’s support is essential for the leader to remain in power (democracy the proportion of voters needed to elect a new gov, a military junta a group of military leaders/generals)
All leaders prefer to buy off the winning coalition with private goods.
But, when the winning coalition increases in size public goods will increase as it is more inexpensive for the leader as private goods become small
What is the difference between a strong loyalty norm and a weak one?
Strong loyalty norm - Members of the WC will be unlikely to be part of the new regime; as it is smaller, leaders will only have to distribute minimal resources to keep the WC happy
Weak loyalty norm - Members of winning coalition will be
likely to be part of the new regime; as leaders cant afford to distribute significant resources to keep the winning coalition happy or invest in public goods to satisfy all which is not enough for the WC
Explain the loyalty norm
The dictators survival problem is to keep the “winning coalition” loyal.
The strategy varies by the ratio of W to S.
When W/S is small there is a strong loyalty norm and members of the winnning coalition are unlikley to be a part of the new regime so leaders will only have to distribute minimal resources to keep the W happy.
When the W/S is large there is a weak loyalty norm. Members of the W are likley to be a part of the new regime so leaders will have to distribute significant resources to keep their W happy.
Explain how the size of the winning coalition impacts public policy
The manner in which leaders distribute public goods (eg schools)
& private goods (eg corruption) depends on the size of the W
All leaders prefer to “buy off” the W with private goods
(as this is cheaper), but this is not always possible.
The larger the W, the more expensive it is to buy off.
As the W increases in size, the share of private goods might
become so small that members of the winning coalition would get more value
from the dictator providing public goods.
Case study- 2013 Azerbaijan Election
Ilham Aliyev long-term dictator. Semi-competitive but manipulates. 2013 created an app that he sent to everyone which would announce who the winner was. Morning of the day of polling they pull up their app to see how the vote count is going (said it’s over). He had decided to not
even count the ballots. Announce what he wanted they to be- slightly better than the last year
Case study- loyalty norm North Korea
Sang Koo, 2017
- Kim Jong-un North Korea, a personalistic dictatorship has been able to survive without uprising due to it having one of the smallest winning coalitions to selectorate ratios in the world
- This is due to the winning coalition being small and thus more replaceable within a new regime and therefore increases his winning coalitions loyalty norm resulting in them being less likely to go against him4
Case studies - types of dictatorship examples
Monarchy - Saudi Arabia
Military - Myanmar
Civilian - hegemonic Singapore
Single party Russia
