Democratic peace and individual-level factors Flashcards
Immanuel Kant (1795)
“democratic peace” > war is the consequence of the ambition and vanity of absolute monarchs, who acquire its benefits but do not pay its costs.
(Ndzendze, 2021)
Regime type > good predictor of foreign policy and trade alignment decisions.
Russett and Oneal (2001)
Descriptive relationships
Regime-type dyads most likely at peace > composed of two democracies.
Although democracies sometimes intervene in each other’s internal affairs, as the USA has done in Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, and Iran > democracies very rarely go to war with each other.
Why do Russett and Oneal (2001) think leaders in democracies go to war less often?
democratic leaders > more easily punished for policy failures, including war.
Free movement of information, opposition groups, accountability of national leaders > domestic political costs associated with war is higher than non-democracies
Weeks (2012)
Civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent overall than democracies
Military regimes > more belligerent as their core constituency is composed of military officers > less conflict-averse than other domestic audiences;
Personalist regimes > no effective domestic audience > no predictable mechanism exists for restraining or removing belligerent leaders > leaders may be selected for personal characteristics > more likely to use military force.
Chiozza and Goemans (2011)
Regime distinction based on exit options for leaders > not democracy or non-democracy
Leaders > count on peaceful removal from office > make credible political concessions to the opposition > less likely to initiate international conflict.
Leaders > worry of forcible removal from office > cannot credibly commit to concessions > making war more likely.
Fearon (1995)
Information problems > parties have incentive to lie about military power > use of force.
Easier for opponents of democracies to access reliable information > solve the information problem > public opinion, the legislature, general knowledge about military status.
War > response to information problems in non-democracies
Bell and Quek (2018)
Citizens of democracies and non-democracies (specifically China) > more reluctant to use force against democracies > in comparison with other regime types
Lowers likelihood of war against democracies > wars + the initiator is a democracy > democracies feature a clear mechanism for translating public preferences into policy.
How can the government system in democracies affect the likelihood of war?
Democracies > more conducive to peaceful compromise + political culture is centred around nonviolent power transfers and conflict resolution > externalise their domestic norms to their relations with other countries
Making war less likely
Rosato (2003)
Elected leaders are not accountable to peace-loving publics or interest groups
Open political competition doesn’t guarantee a democracy reveal private information about its level of resolve
Democracies do not reliably externalise their domestic norms of conflict resolution + do not trust or respect one another when their interests clash.
McDonald (2015)
“Great power peace” view
The relationship between democracy and peace is an artefact of historically specific great power settlements > shape subsequent aggregate patterns of military conflict by 1) creating new states, 2) altering hierarchical orders 3) influencing regime type in states.
“Capitalist peace” argument
(Gartzke, 2007)
Interconnection, globalisation, and the potential losses from trade disruption in case of war are the actual causes of the phenomenon mistakenly identified as a relationship between regime type and war.
How can regime type be thought of as an intervening variable in a larger causal chain?
Argument = war outcomes based on public opinion > regime type > explains mechanisms linking public opinion to policy outcomes.
Bratton and Van de Walle (1994
In personalist regimes > Hand-picked regime insiders must thus remain loyal to the leader
i.e > North Korea under the Kims and Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
(Arquilla and Rasmussen 2001).
In a non-personalist style system > government insiders can punish the leader.
i.e > the Argentinian junta ousted Galtieri for policy failures during the Falkland war
(Singer and Small 1994)
Liberal democracies in the international system were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Correlates of War (COW)
Of these 66 wars, 33 were “imperial,” fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were “colonial,” against existing colonies:
- Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) to create a buffer state against Russia
- France invaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation (Rosato, 2003)
Oren (1995)
Democratic peace theorists can respond that in instances of conflict, it is perceptions of democracy that are important, not whether they actually are.
‘Perceptions’ act as an excuse for the weak explanatory power of the liberal’s causal mechanism when democracies do engage in conflict.
American opinion leaders stopped defining Germany as a democracy as the two countries’ strategic relationship deteriorated.
Why is the argument that public constraint acts as a constraining factor for governments is empirically weak?
(Reynié, 2004)
Between January 3 and April 12, 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against the Iraq war, yet the war still went ahead
(Rourke, 1993)
Out of the 200 times the United States has taken military action abroad, only five of these actions were wars declared by Congress, and most were authorised unilaterally by the president
What was the conclusion of Weeks (2012) argument?
Machine-style autocratic governments can be more peaceful than democracies.
Explained it though personalist and non-personalist regimes, and the form each takes.
