Democracy

Question 1

argues that valid causal inference is exceedingly rare in research on democracy due to three major issues with the ways in which statistics-based research is generally conducted. These are (1) the assumption that causes of democracy are [as-if] randomly assigned, (2) a lack of documentation regarding methodological changes made when building on past work, and (3) ever-evolving standards for credible statistical research, which erode the credibility of existing findings. To Seawright, democracy research is particularly susceptible to these issues because of the difficulty of using experimental approaches to the study of democracy and democratization. Seawright suggests that research on democracy can be improved by clearer replication standards, alternative approaches to causal inference (such as forward path analysis), and a wider use of up-to-date statistical tools.

Answer 1

*Seawright, Jason. 2019. “Statistical analysis of democratization: a constructive critique.” Democratization 26.1: 21-39. Betty

Question 2

Research on democratization is dominated by case studies and small-N comparisons, but there is no standard vocabulary for types of case studies on democratization. review of qualitative studies that examine “crucial cases” reveals that most articles use methods implicitly and are disconnected from the literature on case-based methodology. In order to evaluate the contributions of the various approaches to our knowledge of democratization, researchers should be explicit about the logic of comparison and case selection, supporting their choices with reference to the relevant literature in political science methodology.

Answer 2

*Bogaards, Matthijs. 2019. “Case-based research on democratization.” Democratization 26.1: 61-77. Matt

Question 3

• Evaluating comparative historical/small-n research in democratization
○ Thinner than case studies, but more theoretically integrated
○ Intermediate level of generality
○ Benefits:
§ Good for intensive testing: identifying and testing possible causes of specific events in specific cases (though not as rigorously as case studies).
§ Less myopic than case studies; more likely to call attention to structural macro-causes
○ Weaknesses:
§ Concepts are slippery and inconsistently applied
□ Moving up the ladder of abstraction (e.g. nitrate miners of Chile –> working class) is tricky; prone to conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970)
§ No adequate integration of theories developed for small domains into single theory for larger domain
□ Questionable external validity, similarly to case studies.
□ Skocpol addresses case selection (Why France, Russia, and China?) but doesn’t address external validity.
□ Downing 1992 explains why his cases may differ from other ones.
§ More variables than cases, leaving testing indeterminate
§ Always amend theory as they go along and never test amended theory with different evidence.

Answer 3

Coppedge, Michael. Democratization and Research Methods. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Question 4

expand on Alvarez’s (1996) regime binary classification, in an effort to create a new dichotomous measure of democracy and dataset: the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) index. The DD index offers a theoretically consistent measure of political regimes to distinguish between democracies and dictatorships, operationalized for research and reproducibility. The authors advance a minimalist definition of democracy, emphasizing the institutions which can remove government from power. They are strict in their classification of regimes as democracies, defaulting to the dictatorship classification (e.g. Botswana). The authors do identify potentially ambiguous cases with a Type II (potential false negative) variable, though.

Answer 4

*Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and dictatorship revisited.” Public Choice 143.1-2: 67-101. Betty

Question 5

They assess nine large-n data sets on democracy (ACLP: Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, Arat, Bollen, Coppedge & Reinicke Polyarchy, Freedom House, Gasiorowski Political Regime Change, Hadenius, Polity IV, and Vanhanen). They show that no index offers a satisfactory response to all three challenges of conceptualization (i.e identification of attributes and the conflation and redundancy of them), measurement (i.e selection of indicators, measurement level, and its replicability), and aggregation (i.e selection of level of aggregation, aggregation rule and its replicability). The correlation among them is not surprising because it has relied on same sources and pre-coded data.The correlation only shows reliability but not validity of the data. Finally, these correlations have been performed with highly aggregate data.

Answer 5

*Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices.” Comparative Political Studies 35 (1): 5-34. Jonatan

Question 6

Minimal definition of democracy: free, fair, and competitive elections (a matter of degree and aggregation). Key attributes: responsiveness to citizen preferences, freedom of expression and association, right to vote, right to information, free, fair, and competitive elections. Basically, contestation and participation.

Answer 6

Dahl, Robert A. 1971.Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Question 7

This paper argues that close kin networks (as proxied by rates of cousin marriage) are negative for democratic participation because they encourage closed and familial social relationships, rather than the broader and inclusive relationships necessary for democratic development. argues that exposure to the medieval Church at a time when it declared a prohibition on cousin marriage, led to weaker kin networks and the development of communes, an early kind of participatory institution. These regions with historical weaker kin networks are also associated with higher electoral turnout today. Finally, he examines the children of immigrants in Europe, and argues that citizens with parents from countries with higher rates of cousin marriage are less likely to vote.
• Uses electoral participation as a proxy for “civicness”
• It’s hard to be certain about very distal causes because many confounding factors are introduced

Answer 7

*Schulz, Jonathan F. 2019. Kin Networks and Institutional Development. SSRN Working Paper. Daisy

Question 8

argue that a tradition of local-level democracy is associated with more democratic institutions. Therefore, past experience with local-level democracy is associated with more supportive beliefs of democracy today. This suggests the possibility that a tradition of village-level democracy may affect people’s attitudes about the appropriateness of democratic institutions, which in turn affect the stability of such institutions at the nationallevel. also show that countries with a past experience of local democracyalso have a stronger rule of law, less corruption, and higher GDPPC today.Historical village-level democracy influences future and national levels of democracies.They use language data to construct ancestry and ethnography data

Answer 8

Giuliano, Paola, Nathan Nunn. 2013. “The Transmission of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation-State.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 103(3), 86-92.

Question 9

Examines effect of Western colonialism on contemporary democracy levels. Divides colonialism into two eras: mercantilist wave and later imperialist wave. Strong positive effect of colonial duration on democracy, driven primarily by former British colonies and by countries colonized during imperialist era. Onset and establishment of colonial rule and independence from it are critical junctures that determine modern-day democracy. Potential mechanism linking western colonial rule to democracy: “Western penetration after 1850 during an enlightened (yet imperialist) age created an openness to Western ideas and ideals that facilitated the transition to democracy and modernization.”

Answer 9

*Olsson, Ola. 2009. “On the Democratic Legacy of Colonialism.” Journal of Comparative Economics 37:4, 534-51. Sam Selsky

Question 10

his argument that religious factors—rather than secular—have played a major role in shaping the developments we associate with modernity and democracy. He argues that conversionary Protestants (CPs), especially, have helped democracy spread and flourish through the lasting effects of their conversionary efforts, and uses a qualitative evaluation of historical evidence and OLS regressions to argue that the past presence of Protestant missions strongly predicts democracy. The four religious factors he suggests as most influential on democratization are:

Answer 10

*Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy.” American Political Science Review 106, 2 (May): 224-274. Betty

Question 11

In contrast to arguments that colonialism (Olsson, 2009) and religion (Woodberry, 2012), argue that Europe spread representative democracy through a process of demographic diffusion—when Europeans transported themselves, they also brought along their norms and practices of self-governance. Where Europeans were scarce, they occupied a race-based hierarchy on top of the native majority, which is why they were hesitant to extend political power to natives. When Europeans dominated, extending rights did not threaten European hegemony.

Answer 11

*Gerring, John, Brendan Apfeld, Tore Wig, Andreas Foro Tollefsen. 2022. The Deep Roots of Modern Democracy: Geography and the Diffusion of Political Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming. [Chapters 8-11, 13] Matt

Question 12

International system is important influence on democratization. Levels of democracy are contagious among neighboring countries. Over time, cumulative effect is substantial, creating strongly democratic regions.

Answer 12

*Coppedge, Michael, Benjamin Denison, Paul Friesen, and Lucía Tiscornia. 2021. “International Factors.” In Michael Coppedge, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Amanda B. Edgell (eds), Why Democracies Develop and Decline (in process). Oguzhan

Question 13

There is an endogenous relationship between development and democracy. The effect of development on democratic transition is stronger as income grows, but is weak or nonexistent above a given income threshold. But his main contribution is that the relationship between the two factors is conditioned on exogenous variables, mainly the structure of the international system. In an unconstrained world (i.e with only one hegemon), the type of regime of the hegemon influences the rest of countries (e.g the costs of a democratic collapse are low: There is no alternative great power that can coopt a revolutionary government). However, in a constrained world (i.e with competing powers), the political stakes at play in a small country (and the incentives for great powers to intervene) are higher because any regime change may lead to foreign policy realignment. In those cases, the democratic hegemon will have stronger preference for authoritarianism.

Answer 13

*Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development and the International System.” American Political Science Review 105, 4 (Nov.): 809-828. Jonatan

Question 14

This paper examines past theories on globalization and democracy. Here, they test whether democratization foster higher levels of trade and capital account openness and whether do trade and capital account openness increase the likelihood of democratization? They also test the reverse causal mechanism: effect of economic openness on democracy. They find that evidence for the claim that democracy fosters trade and capital account liberalization is robust but that empirical support for the predicted positive effect of economic openness on democracy among developing countries is weak (China).

Answer 14

*Milner, Helen V., Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. “Democratization and economic globalization.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 163-181. Rachel

Question 15

Foreign aid has positive effects on human rights and democracy, though effects are short-lived after aid dissipates. Aid conditionality serves as channel linking aid and democracy: Recipients make changes in order to receive the aid, but due to modest and temporary nature of the change in aid revert back after a short period. Uses rotating presidency of Council of the European Union as source of exogenous variation - Occurs randomly, and then former colonies receive much more aid. Therefore, CEU presidency is exogenous shock.

Answer 15

Carnegie, Allison, Nikolay Marinov. 2017. “Foreign aid, human rights, and democracy promotion: Evidence from a natural experiment.” American Journal of Political Science 61.3: 671-683. Sam Selsky

Question 16

This paper studies whether democracies emerge as a result of economic development. They define two types of democratization processes:
• Endogenous democratization: Democracies are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically. The basic assumption of the theory is that democratization is the final stage of the modernization process.
• Exogenous democratization: Democracies emerge independent of development but are more likely to be sustained in developed countries. Even if democracies emerge at random development levels, democracies that emerge in more economically developed countries are more likely to survive than in their poorer counterparts.
Notes:
• The authors are against endogenous democratization, for exogenous democratization.
• Development does appear to support democratic stability- democratic survival chances increase with per capita income (with the exception of Argentina).

Answer 16

*Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics, 49 (January), pp. 155-183. Rachel

Question 17

He argues for a conditional modernization theory of democratization. In this view, economic development drives democratization but only when activated by short-term, triggering events. This conditional modernization theory has some strengths. First, it is better to explain the temporal clustering of regimes. For example, although there is some evidence that diffusion explains waves of democratization, he finds that relationship between income and democracy is in turn, associated with the ups and downs in leadership turnover. Second, conditional modernization theory can connect structural accounts with agency-based explanations. For example, at middle levels of development, actors can choose between both democracy and authoritarianism depending on a set of factors such as culture, oil revenue, control of media and costs of repression. At higher levels, only democracy is possible, and at lowest levels of development, only autocracy is possible.

Answer 17

*Treisman, Daniel. 2020. “Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers.” Annual Review of Political Science 23, 241–57. Jonatan

Question 18

A substantial literature argues that states with oil are more likely to be autocratic, have weak bureaucratic institutions, experience domestic conflict, and poor economic outcomes. But Smith and Waldner write that this “resource curse” finding is primarily driven by just a few countries, what they call survivorship bias - if these Arab countries had not survived because of outside intervention, we would potentially not see a resource curse in the data, and instead a “resource blessing,” where oil wealth drives regime stability and greater state capacity. Overall, cross national causal inference on the resource curse is difficult, and we need to take causal heterogeneity seriously, which is best done using multimethod research.
• Emphasize conceptual disagreement about the resource curse
○ Can mean resource revenues make regime less democratic
○ Could mean autocratic stability (regimes who were already autocratic before oil remain autocratic for longer)
§ Could mean stability in general for regimes experiencing oil revenues
• Argue that many studies use inappropriate counterfactuals
○ Oil rich countries should be compared to poor countries without oil, not other rich countries without oil
• Limitations: Their analysis focuses only on oil wealth, which is not the only kind of “resource” curse. They also argue that a few monarchies drive survivorship bias (without British intervention, these now-independent countries would have been part of one Saudi observation), but British protection is not independent of the presence of oil.

Answer 18

*Smith, Benjamin, David Waldner. 2021. Rethinking the Resource Curse. Cambridge University Press. [Cambridge Elements; electronic copy available chapter by chapter through UT library system] Daisy

Question 19

• Contra Przeworski et al, development in poor and middle-income countries increases the probability of democracy because it increases probability that existing democracy will sustain itself (same as Przeworksi) but also because it increases probability of transition to democracy (contra Przeworksi)

Answer 19

Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. 2003. “Endogenous Democratization.” World Politics 55 (July): 517-549.

Question 20

• The original piece on modernization theory.

Answer 20

Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(1): 69-105.

Question 21

Using country-fixed effects and instrumental variables, find no causal relationship between changes in income and changes in democracy. Instead, they find that economic and political development are interlinked. There is a correlation between democracy and income cross-nationally. But no variation within country (fixed effects models). It could be some deep structural, economic changes that shapes modern democracy and growth. Growth and democracy are both caused by political and economic changes or critical junctures.

Answer 21

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. “Income and Democracy.” American Economic Review98, 808-42.

Question 22

argue that development helps the electoral aspects of democracy (free and fair elections) by increasing the relative power of citizens vis-`a-vis elites. However, they find little evidence for development having an impact on other components of democracy. Elections give citizens a focal point to solve collective action dilemmas. Development affects electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election violence, and vote buying. Elections provide a platform for citizens to focus their efforts on organizing.

Answer 22

Knutsen, Carl Henrik, John Gerring, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Matthew Maguire, Michael Coppedge, and Staffan Lindberg. 2019. “Economic Development and Democracy: An Electoral Connection.” European Journal of Political Research58(1): 292-314.

Question 23

The author studies the relationship between inequality and democratization using as baseline Boix and Acemoglu & Robinson, finding that inequality does not harm but rather, weakly promotes democratization, though not significantly. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of Acemoglu and Robinson, the relationship between inequality and democratization is not inverted U-shaped but weakly U-shaped. Also, the authors find that egalitarian democracies are much more likely to survive (democracies with inequality are nearly immune from breakdowns). Finally, inequality increases the probability of transition away from democracy.

Answer 23

*Houle, Christian. 2009. “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation But Does Not Affect Democratization.” World Politics 61 (4): 589-622. Dani

Question 24

In their “contractarian” approach, rising economic groups (e.g., growing middle class) demand credible commitments from the state to protect their income and assets against expropriation by the autocratic elite, which is the driving force behind democratization. In contrast with redistributivist theories that argue elites democratize when the threat of redistribution of their assets by the poor is low (high equality), inequality generates pressures to liberalize. Though, they differentiate between land inequality, which reduces the incentives for and chances of successful bourgeois rebellion, and income inequality, ​which increases those same chances as rising classes demand impartial protections against violations of contracts and property rights.

Answer 24

*Ansell, Ben, and David Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (12): 1543-1574. Matt

Question 25

Are inequality and distributive conflicts between elites and masses over distribution of wealth and income a driving force in democratic transition? In a case study of the third wave of democratic transitions (1980 - 2000), the authors find support for theory refinement: distributive conflict theories are underspecified with respect to scope conditions and only operate under certain conditions. Furthermore, they find that the causal relationship and core mechanism between inequality and transitions to / reversions from democratic rule are unclear.

Answer 25

*Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2012. “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule.” American Political Science Review 106, 3 (August): 495-516. Rachel

Question 26

They challenge two perspectives in the democratization literature. First, democratization from above, the view that elites determine the process, and democratization from below, the view that working class is the main protagonist. They argue for an integration of these two views. Their framework includes three arenas: class (middle and upper vs working), prior inclusion (whether working class was in or out) and arena of deliberation of action (protests vs deliberation and negotiation). By qualitatively examining 39 episodes of democratization, they find that the role of the working class has generally been overstated and misspecified for the historical cases (elites and upper sectors were as important in cases between 1848 and 1931) and underemphasized in the contemporary cases (where the role of the working class has been downplayed in cases between 1974 and 1990).

Answer 26

*Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Ch. 1, pp. 1-32]Jonatan

Question 27

Does the composition of social groups that lead the opposition to the incumbent regime matter for democratization? A group’s potential for achieving democratization depends on two factors: first, protesters must be motivated to confront the incumbent regime and push for democracy, and second, they must have access to resources that provide strategic leverage over the regime and that enable sustained large-scale collective action. In short, you need both motivation and capacity to achieve democratization.

Answer 27

*Dahlum, Sirianne, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig (Forthcoming). “Who Revolts? Empirically Revisiting the Social Origins of Democracy.” Journal of Politics: 1494-1499. Oguzhan

Question 28

the working class was a far more consistent friend of democracy than the middle class, except in South America.

Answer 28

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1993. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Ch. 1, pp. 1-11]

Question 29

Democracy arises from partisan struggle driven by political aims. Main actors are elite parties (or party factions) that pursue their own interests, which aren’t derived from interests of specific economic classes. Democratization is especially likely to emerge from partisan struggle when it involves a transition from an electoral authoritarian regime. Under electoral authoritarianism (“electoral oligarchy”), elections are not free or fair, but they incentivize political outsiders to shape the system to their favor rather than vying for violent overthrow. They advocate democratic electoral reforms as a means of gaining power.

Answer 29

*Madrid, Raúl L. 2019. “The Partisan Path to Democracy: Argentina in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies. 52, 10: 1535-1569. Sam Selsky

Question 30

Democratization almost never happens without a country first experiencing a major violent shock (such as a coup or civil war) or having a ruling party capable of winning power in democracy (electoral continuity). During the two steps from disruption to democratization, regime leaders do not sacrifice significant power (a combination of leader security and regime strength) by accepting democratization. He presents his explanation as a mediation model—a way to understand when structural factors (e.g., mass cultural support for democracy) are most likely to have the biggest impact on the shift toward democracy.

Answer 30

*Miller, Michael K. 2021. Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chs. 1-2, pp. 1-63, Matt

Question 31

Democratizing from a dictatorship reduces the power of an individual, and promotes broader power-sharing. A dictator wouldn’t want to willingly let go of his power, so how does a country democratize? argues that a lot of democratic transitions happen because of mistakes made by autocratic leaders. The paper uses congruence analysis to test historical cases of transitions and see which ones were caused by mistakes of autocrats.

Answer 31

*Treisman, Daniel. 2020. “Democracy by mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government” American Political Science Review 114, 3 (August): 792-810. Nivy

Question 32

This paper looks at regime change or origins of dictatorships caused by elites. Specifically, elites who expect that a dictatorship will improve economic benefits for elites and their corporations. Elites that believe so, will be more inclined to install a dictator, and the prices of the goods they sell rise. This paper specifically looks at Haiti’s transition, and accounts for the network centrality of elites in the social network, and finds that elites that were more central, and supported installation of a dictatorship, reaped economic benefits after the dictatorship was in place.

Answer 32

*Naidu, Suresh, James A. Robinson, and Lauren E. Young. 2021. “Social Origins of Dictatorships: Elite Networks and Political Transitions in Haiti.” American Political Science Review 1153: 900-916. Nivy

Question 33

Elections can strengthen an authoritarian regime in the long term but weaken it on the long term.

Answer 33

Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Havard Mokleiv Nygard, and Tore Wig. 2017. ”Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?” World Politics69(1):98-143.

Question 34

In divided societies (specifically those with ethnics or other deep divisions, and not fully democratic), the government needs to have power-sharing and group autonomy.
Power sharing: Representation across existing divisions in the government decision making processes
Group autonomy: authority to run their own internal affairs, esp. with regards to education and culture
Criticisms of power sharing do exist, but no better alternatives

Answer 34

*Lijphart, Arend. 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 15, 2 (April): 96-109. Nivy

Question 35

Power sharing needs to be disaggregated into three types: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. Which type of power sharing enables democratic survival? Authors find evidence that constraining factors aid democratic survival, in stable as well as post-conflict settings. Inclusive power sharing aids democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. Dispersive power sharing hinders democratic survival regardless of the circumstance.

Answer 35

*Graham, Benjamin AT, Michael K. Miller, Kaare W. Strøm. 2017. “Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival.” American Political Science Review 111.4: 686-704. Nivy

Question 36

Although parliamentarism does outperform presidentialism when it comes to democratic survival, we do not understand the causes of this difference. They examine the performance of parliamentarism vis-a-vis presidentialism in three areas: formation of legislative majorities, incentives for cooperation, and the centralization of the decision-making process. First, there is evidence of minority governments taking place in presidentialism, and parliamentarism does necessarily not produce majority governments. Second, it is not clear whether presidentialism necessarily leads to low levels of party cohesion in the legislatures; the degree of party discipline is not only determined by parliamentarism or presidentialism, but also by electoral rules (open list vs party list, etc). Furthermore, coalitions take place as much in presidential and parliamentary regimes. Finally, policy formation in parliamentarism is not necessarily centralized, thus the government does not always have their policy proposals approved, on the other hand, policy formation is not necessarily decentralized in presidentialism.

Answer 36

*Cheibub, José Antonio, and Fernando Limongi. 2002. “Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered.” Annual Review of Political Science 5.1 (2002): 151-179. Jonatan

Question 37

Big picture: Institutions are endogenous. How do we separate the effect of institutions, from the conditions that give rise to the institutions in the first place? We need to apply counterfactual inference, to understand the outcomes for background conditions and institutions. Such inference is prone to several biases. Solution might be to try different assumptions, and see if effects and outcomes differ.

Answer 37

*Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition 39(4): 527–40. Nivy

Question 38

argues that “parchment institutions” - i.e. rules of political contestation that are written somewhere as laws/regulations/constitutions/etc. - can contribute to the generalization of shared mutual expectations among political actors, which are essential to the effectiveness of institutions. This article distinguishes between research that emphasizes the role of institutions in aggregating preferences into political decisions and research that relies on coordination models to identify conditions favoring certain equilibrium outcomes when multiple equilibria are possible

Answer 38

Carey, John M. 2000. “Parchment, equilibria, and institutions.” Comparative Political Studies 33.6-7: 735-761.

Question 39

invert the culturalist explanation that self-expression values enhance and/or stabilize democracy, arguing instead that democracy perhaps gradually enhances self-expression values. They work from Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) theoretical framework on self-expression values, through which Inglehart and Welzel argued that citizens under autocratic regimes increasingly perceive autocratic regimes as illegitimate as they take on self-expression values, and citizens under democratic regimes have a greater interest in protecting those democratic regimes as their self-expression values increase further. use panel data taken from the World Values Survey (WVS) (like Inglehart and Welzel) and an imputation model for years which did not have a WVS survey wave, using the same additive index Inglehart and Welzel use based on indicators of self-expression (e.g. tolerance, trust). Their results do not show that self-expression values enhance democracy levels, though the results do confirm democratic institutions foster self-expression values.

Answer 39

*Dahlum, Sirianne and Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2017. “Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type.” British Journal of Political Science 47(2): 437-61. Betty

Question 40

builds on existing arguments that between-ethnic-group-inequality (BGI), or horizontal inequality, has a destabilizing effect on democratic regimes, by demonstrating that this effect is strongest when within-ethnic-group-inequality (WGI) is low, because the political salience of ethnicity is increased. He constructs his measures of inequality between and within ethnic groups using survey data from multiple major surveys (e.g. Afrobarometer). Using his new indicators, looks at their effects using both group-level and country-level probit analyses, finding support for his hypothesis at both levels.

Answer 40

*Houle, Christian. 2015. “Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: A Global Analysis.” World Politics 67, 3 (July): 469-505. Betty

Question 41

Do social forces (civil society) play a central role in the emergence of democracy and its consolidation? Operationalizing social capital and civil society organization capacity as a stock variable, they analyze its effect on the procedural means of democracy. Based on results of a cross-national large-N analysis, they find that civil society organizational capacity and nonviolent protest have positive effects on democracy and across democracy indicators. However, they also find that some civil society organizations (right-wing, anti-system movements) also pose a threat to democracy.
• In democratic polities, anti-system movements are associated with autocratization.
• In authoritarian regimes, anti-system movements are associated with democratization.

Answer 41

*Bernhard, Michael, Amanda B. Edgell. 2022. “Democracy and Social Forces.” In V-Dem Vol II. Rachel

Question 42

Uses crucial case of PNG to show that ethnic fragmentation might not make democracy impossible - Good article to cite to show utility of case study research in democratization.

Answer 42

Reilly, Benjamin. 2000. Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the “Crucial Case” of Papua New Guinea

Question 43

Different forms of diversity have different effects on democracy. Ethnolinguistic diversity can increase prospects for democracy, while religious diversity decreases the prospects for democracy. Why would religion have this effect? “Religious strictures often seem to demand national-level uniformity, and as such are often enshrined in constitutional law or national statute. This is true for religiously sanctioned holidays, dietary laws, special rituals and religious education… When a party or leader representing a religious group comes to power in a religiously diverse society, laws pertaining to education, dress, comportment, dietary practices, the use of inebriants, holidays, inheritance, property rights, family law, the rights and status of women, religious worship and the management of sites deemed to be of special spiritual significance may change in fundamental ways, with deleterious consequences for members of religious out-groups.

Answer 43

Gerring, John, Michael Hoffman, Dominic Zarecki. 2018. “The Diverse Effects of Diversity on Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 48.2, 283-314.”

Question 44

The authors analyze 600 articles in which democracy is the independent variable. Most of the reported results indicate that democracy’s effects on a variety of normatively-desired outcomes are either positive or null. However, there are a few reasons that complicate this rather uniform scholarly picture: (a) there is threshold bias, in which some results are barely above arbitrary significance cut-offs; (b) easily-attained outcomes exhibit stronger democratic returns than outcomes outside of the government’s easy control; (c) subjectively-outcomes exhibit a stronger relationship with democracy than more objectively-measured outcomes; and (d) researchers might have a prodemocracy bias, clouding their analytical decisions.

Answer 44

• Gerring, John, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jonas Berge. 2022. “Democracy’s Effects.” Annual Review of Political Science 25 (forthcoming). Andres

Question 45

The authors explore the factors that triggered the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and its institutional outcomes, emphasizing the challenges of making credible commitments. The pre-revolutionary situation was characterized by a rent-seeking crown and an uncooperative parliament, which led to a situation of insecurity and little incentive to invest in the market. The post-revolutionary situation, on the contrary, managed to limit the power of the crown and increase the role of parliament, generating a balance of power that led to credible commitments, thus protecting economic rights and political freedoms. Importantly, political institutions are considered endogenous.

Answer 45

*North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England.” Journal of Economic History 44(4):803–832. Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122739 Dani

Question 46

Can elections result in better governance (less corruption) even without re-election incentives? In a low-information and educationally disadvantaged environment, are democratic elections an efficient way of selecting public decision makers? They find that citizens (even with low-information) are able to elect ‘benevolent’ candidates/leaders. They are also willing to punish leaders who embezzle.
• Democratic elections can reduce the embezzlement of public resources, even if they do not increase citizens’ ability to hold decision makers accountable. While elections increase citizens’ willingness to sanction embezzlement, a lack of transparency can undermine this effect, because citizens are less suspicious towards elected decision makers than towards non-elected decision makers.

Answer 46

*Lierl, Malte M. 2016. “Elections and Embezzlement: Experimental Evidence from Burkina Faso.” SSRN

Question 47

provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on per capita GDP. They find that democratization increases GDP by about 20% in the long-run. Instrumental Variable: Regional waves of democratization

Answer 47

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, James A. Robinson. 2019.“Democracy Does Cause Growth.” Journal of Political Economy.127(1): 47-100.

Question 48

Reviews lit on democracy and conflict. democracies are less prone to engage in interstate warfare with each other (democratic peace theory) and engage in internal conflict/repression (“domestic democratic peace,” per Davenport). Democratic peace theory has strong empirical support but causal mechanism is still not well understood.*

Answer 48

Hegre, Håvard. 2014. “Democracy and armed conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 51:2, 159 – 172. Sam Selsky

Question 49

focus on the impact of regimes on industrialization. This is the first piece of its kind. They argue that autocratic leaders are more likely to adopt an economic model of development centered on heavy industry because of three factors that distinguish democratic and autocratic regimes: different social bases, different security concerns, and different policy tools. They find that autocracies have stronger incentives and better capabilities to pursue rapid, comprehensive industrialization as compared to democracies.

Answer 49

Gerring, John, Haakon Gjerløw, Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2022. “Regimes and Industrialization.” World Development (forthcoming).

Question 50

Naïve democratic theorists think that people rule in democracies (populism); slightly less naïve democratic theorists think that at least people hold their leaders accountable via elections (retrospective voting). But Achen and Bartels are not naïve: they show empirical evidence that people are incoherent, myopic, uninformed, and busy, and thus are not good at holding their leaders accountable. Thus, as realists we should adopt a group theory of democracy, in which citizens’ social groups and identities determine their political/voting behavior.
• In “the real world,” accountability and retrospective voting are undermined by both citizens and leaders acting in non-ideal ways:
○ Citizens have trouble attributing good and bad things to politicians. For instance, they would punish the president after a series of shark attacks, or focus on their personal disposable income instead of macroeconomic factors.
○ Leaders most likely follow a political business cycle in their policies. For instance, recognizing that citizens are myopic, they can artificially inflate the economy right before elections.

Answer 50

*Achen, Christopher H., Larry M. Bartels. 2017. Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce responsive government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (chs 1, 6, 11 – skim the rest) Andres

Question 51

argues that concerns about populism’s threat to democracy may be somewhat overblown because of the conditions necessary for a populist leader to cause a true shift to authoritarianism: institutional weakness and exogenous conjecture. Institutional weaknesses are necessary for populist leaders to push past the constraints democratic institutions impose, and an exogenous conjecture, or the opportunity resulting from a crisis or windfall, is needed to secure mass support. Weyland provides three types of both conditions: institutional weaknesses can be further defined as (1) high instability, (2) susceptibility to paralegal change, and (3) comparatively easy changeability. Exogenous conjecture can be further defined as (1) hydrocarbon windfalls, (2) economic crisis, and (3) security crisis. With data from Latin American and European cases, Weyland uses a QCA analysis to demonstrate that the countries which have undergone a transition to authoritarianism (which he calls “Suffocation of Democracy”) have met at least one condition subcategory for both conditions.

Answer 51

*Weyland, Kurt. 2020. “Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States.” Perspectives on Politics. 18, 2: 389-406. Betty

Question 52

Democracy leads to progressive income taxation in premodern states because as franchise expands, average income of voters declines, leading median voter to favor more progressive taxation. however, relationship between democracy and tax revenue in contemporary states is less clear.

Answer 52

*Kiser, Edgar, Steven M. Karceski. 2017. “Political economy of taxation.” Annual review of political science 20: 75-92. Daisy

Question 53

distinguishes early democracy, where rulers must share decision-making power with a group, from early autocracy, where they can make decisions alone, and from modern democracy, where most of the population only participates at elections. While early democracy is prevalent among small populations with weak states and limited technology, he argues that democracy as we now understand it developed in Europe because rulers were weak and had to make agreements with councils to collect taxes. It remained strong in places like North America, with abundant land and scarce labor, giving the population a stronger claim to participation.
• Speaks against the idea that inequality is bad for democracy - many modern democracies were established and have been maintained under high inequality
• Democratic countries with weak initial states are more likely to survive
○ Speaks to institutional strength literature: Stasavage argues that when institutions are weak, rulers must negotiate with councils/population -> democracy, while when institutions are strong, no negotiation is necessary, so bureaucracy -> autocracy
• What caused states to develop early democracy or early autocracy?
○ Democracy more likely when rulers uncertain about production (low information) and exit is easy
○ Agricultural suitability predicts whether a state develops but not what kind
• China as an example of the “bureaucratic alternative”
○ China has had a bureaucracy for a long time, which has led to its autocracy instead of democracy.
○ Productive agriculture meant people stayed still and state had good information about predictable revenue
○ Inheriting an existing bureaucracy is bad for democracy (as happened in much of the Middle East)
• Limitations: This book covers a lot of history at once and speaks in broad generalizations - not much data provided and what data is used isn’t very decisive. Also, he argues that differences in state strength lead to democracy or autocracy, but other research argues that democracy/autocracy leads to differences in institutional quality

Answer 53

*Stasavage, David. 2020. The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Chapters 1-7] Daisy