Dangerousness & Threat Assessment Flashcards
Tarasoff v. the Regents of the University of California (1976)
**Duty to warn and protect
The court held that this exception extended Dr. Moore’s duty to warn into a duty to protect Tatiana - the therapist owes a legal duty not only to his patient but also to his patient’s potential victims.
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck (1980)
**Duty to protect unidentified victims
court rejected the Tarasoff limitation to an identified victim, imposing not only a duty on therapists to predict violence, but also a duty to protect unidentified victims in the general public
Brady v. Hopper (1983)
John Hinkley’s therapist was deemed immune from any duty to warn because of a lack of specific threat
Jablonski v. United States (1983)
The victim’s estate sued for negligence on several grounds. The court ruled that the therapists were negligent:
(1) they did not forecast the homicide based on the “psychological profile” of the patient,
(2) did not request some prior records, and
(3) the warning was vague and inadequate.
Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County (1983)
failure to warn constituted extended to personal injury cases
Coble v. Texas (2010)
Coble, a Texas death row inmate was resentenced at a new sentencing hearing, which was awarded in part due to the testimony in his first trial of Dr. Coons, forensic psychiatrist; Dr. Coons testimony was found to be in inadmissible by TX court of appeals because: it was not scientifically valid (he had not met with Coble in 18 years and there was no validated approach to his assessment); harmless error standard used, did not have substantial and injurious effect on jury
Barefoot v. Estelle (1983)
SCOTUS ruled that there are no constitutional barriers for experts to testify in capital cases about long-term dangerousness
Kansas v. Crane (2002)
SCOTUS ruled that Kansas SVP act was constitutional
required serious difficulty in controlling behavior, not absolute lack - further ruled that SVPS must be distinguished from the dangerous but typical sex offender - thus the presence of mental diagnosis and dangerousness are not enough
Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)
SCOTUS ruled that the Kansas SVP Act was constitutional
mental abnormality was fine, and it was civil, not criminal commitment - commitment not punishment so it was not double jeopardy
Schenck v. United States (1919)
1st Amendment does not protect speech that approaches a clear and present danger
Watts v. United States (1969)
Watt’s threat on the president was “political hyperbole”
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
SCOTUS used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts:
(1) speech can be prohibited if it is “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and
(2) it is “likely to incite or produce such action”