criminal workshop Flashcards
To punish a gambler who owed him money,
a bookie purchased from a demolitions expert
a small explosive device that he planned to
place under the driver’s seat of the gambler’s
automobile. The demolitions expert assured
the bookie that the explosive would be strong
enough to cause severe damage to the legs and
ankles of anyone sitting in the front seat of the
car, but would under no circumstances be strong
enough to kill. The device would go off when
the ignition was turned on. On Sunday night,
the bookie planted the device in the gambler’s
car. On Monday, the gambler was sick and did
not go to work. That afternoon, the gambler’s
15-year-old son came home from school and
saw his father’s car in the driveway. The son
took an extra set of keys from the house to take
the car for a joyride, even though the gambler
had forbidden his son to drive the car without
permission. When the 15-year-old turned on the
ignition, the explosive device went off and the
boy died instantly.
If the bookie is charged with the murder of the
gambler’s son, what is the jury’s verdict likely to
be?
(A) Guilty, because the bookie’s act caused the
son’s death.
(B) Guilty, because he intended to cause serious
bodily harm to the gambler.
(C) Not guilty, because he did not intend to
cause the death of any person.
(D) Not guilty, because it was not foreseeable
that the son would attempt to drive the car.
The bookie is guilty because his act, which caused the death of the gambler’s son, was committed
with an intent to cause serious bodily harm.
At common law, murder was the killing of a human being with malice aforethought. The mental state of malice aforethought could be established with any one of the following states of mind: (i) intent to kill; (ii) intent to cause serious bodily harm; (iii) reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life (“depraved heart”); or
(iv) the intent to commit a dangerous felony (“felony murder”). In this question, the bookie clearly
intended to cause serious bodily harm to the gambler.
Under the doctrine of transferred intent, if the actor intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to one person and caused the death of another person, malice aforethought as to the unintended victim was established. Thus, under the doctrine, the bookie’s intent to harm the gambler will be transferred to the gambler’s son, and the bookie will be guilty of the murder of the gambler’s son.
(A) is not as good an answer as (B). It is
true that the bookie’s act caused the gambler’s son’s death and that cause must be established to
hold the bookie responsible for murder. However, it will take more than “cause” to hold the bookie
criminally liable; there must also be malice aforethought. Therefore, (A) is too broad a statement.
A father who was paralyzed in an accident
and unable to work refused to accept financial support from relatives or the government
to help him care for his family. When one of
his children became seriously ill and needed
medical attention, the father refused to allow the
child to receive medical care at the local public
health clinic because of his feelings regarding
the acceptance of charity. The father thought
that the child was starting to get better, but then
she took a turn for the worse and died from her
illness.
What crime has the father most likely committed? (A) Murder. (B) Voluntary manslaughter. (C) Involuntary manslaughter. (D) No crime.
The father has committed involuntary manslaughter. A father has a duty to provide the necessities for his child. His failure to do so has caused the child’s death. Such an omission is criminal,
so (D) is incorrect. Criminal negligence, a form of involuntary manslaughter, is an unintended killing caused by the negligence of another. Criminal negligence requires a greater deviation from the reasonable person standard than is required for civil liability, but less negligence than the reckless disregard for human life required for malice. Certainly a parent’s failure to provide medical treatment for a critically ill child is criminal negligence. Note that intent is not an element
of involuntary manslaughter.
(A) is incorrect because murder requires a showing of malice aforethought, which includes a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life (i.e., an abandoned and malignant heart). Here the facts do not appear to rise to the level of culpability
required to establish malice.
A man asked a coworker who was a wine
collector to lend him a bottle of expensive wine
to put in his liquor cabinet, because he was
inviting his mother over for dinner and wanted
to impress her. The coworker permitted the man
to take a bottle of wine worth $700 to his apartment for the dinner as long as he returned it
the next morning. As he had planned all along,
the man instead invited his girlfriend over for a
romantic dinner, at which they drank the bottle
of wine. The next day the man told his coworker
that he had been mugged on his way home and
that the muggers made off with the wine. Suspicious, the coworker found the empty wine bottle
in the man’s trash from his apartment.
If the man is charged with theft in a commonlaw jurisdiction, of which theft offense is he most likely to be convicted? (A) Larceny by trick. (B) Larceny. (C) Embezzlement. (D) No crime.
The man can be convicted of larceny by trick. The owner of the wine gave possession of the bottle
of wine to the man, but clearly did not give up ownership, because possession was transferred
on the coworker’s explicit promise to return it the next day. Therefore, a theft crime of some sort
was committed, but that crime is not pure common law larceny because there was no trespassory
taking. If the man obtained possession of the wine by fraud or misrepresentation, then he is guilty
of larceny by trick. Because it apparently was the man’s intent to drink the wine all along, the
possession was obtained by fraud and the crime is larceny by trick, not embezzlement (the crime
which would have occurred if he obtained rightful possession).
(C) is incorrect because, although the coworker had possession of the wine (which
would normally indicate embezzlement), he obtained that possession by fraud (which indicates
larceny by trick).
A homeowner decided to destroy his home by
fire in order to collect the insurance. A neighbor’s house was located a short distance from
the homeowner’s home. The homeowner knew
that there was a strong wind blowing towards
the neighbor’s home; while he did not want to
burn the neighbor’s home, he nevertheless set
fire to his own home. The fire department was
unable to save the homeowner’s house. They
did manage to put out the fire moments before
it spread to the neighbor’s home, which suffered
damage from smoke and soot. The jurisdiction’s
arson statute covers burning one’s own dwelling
as well as the dwelling of another, but is otherwise unchanged from the common law.
If the homeowner is charged with attempted
arson of the neighbor’s home, is he likely to be
found guilty?
(A) No, because he did not intend to burn the
neighbor’s house.
(B) No, because the fire was put out before any
part of the neighbor’s home was burned.
(C) Yes, because he intended to burn his own
home and took a substantial step toward
burning the neighbor’s house.
(D) Yes, because he acted with malice and took
a substantial step toward burning the neighbor’s house.
The homeowner will be found not guilty because he did not have the requisite mental state. To
convict a person for an attempted crime, the prosecution must establish that the defendant had an
actual specific intent to cause the harm prohibited by the statute and committed an act beyond mere
preparation in furtherance of that intent. Those elements—specific intent and act—are required
regardless of the mental state required by the target offense.
A person who took a substantial step
towards commission of the crime but was only reckless with respect to the target offense could
not be found guilty of attempt. The homeowner did not intend to burn the neighbor’s home. Therefore, he cannot be guilty of attempted arson of the neighbor’s home.
(B) is wrong. The fact thatthe fire was put out before it burned any of the neighbor’s home would not preclude a conviction of attempted arson if the elements of attempted arson were otherwise established.
(C) is wrong. To be guilty of attempted arson of the neighbor’s home, the homeowner must have intended to burn the neighbor’s home. The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempt.
(D) is wrong. A specific intent to burn the home is required for attempted arson. While malice satisfies the state of mind requirement for the completed crime of arson, it will not suffice for attempt.
A gang member determined that he needed
to avenge a recent shooting of his friend by
killing a member of the rival gang responsible
for the shooting. He drank heavily to build up
his courage and then went to the home of the
rival with a loaded gun and knocked on the
door. When the rival opened the door, the gang
member pointed the gun at the rival and pulled
the trigger. However, due to being intoxicated,
he had forgotten to release the safety, so the gun
did not discharge. He was easily disarmed by
the rival and arrested by the police. At his trial,
he testified that he was so intoxicated that he
did not remember anything that happened at the
rival’s house.
The crimes below are listed in descending
order of seriousness.
If the gang member’s testimony is believed,
what is the most serious crime of which the
defendant may be convicted?
(A) Attempted murder.
(B) Attempted manslaughter.
(C) Assault.
(D) No crime.
The most serious crime the gang member may be convicted of is attempted murder. At common
law, murder is the killing of another human being with malice aforethought. Malice could be
shown by the defendant’s (i) intent to kill; (ii) intent to inflict great bodily injury; (iii) reckless
indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life; or (iv) intent to commit a felony.
Attempt requires the intent to commit the target crime plus an overt act in furtherance of such intent. Thus,
even though murder is a malice crime at common law, attempted murder is a specific intent crime.
As a result, voluntary intoxication, which is a defense to specific intent crimes, ordinarily will be a defense to any attempted murder charge. However, one who formed an intent to commit a crime and then drinks in order to work up his nerve to commit it cannot rely on the defense of intoxication, even though he may be too intoxicated to form that intent at the time he did the act.
Here, the gang member intended to kill his rival, went to his house with a gun, and pulled the trigger
when his rival opened the door. Even if the jury believes his testimony that he did not remember
anything that happened at the house, the fact that the defendant had the intent to kill originally
and drank to build up his courage negates intoxication as a possible defense. Without such a
defense, the defendant may be convicted of attempted murder.
(B) is incorrect. Manslaughter requires either a killing committed during the heat of passion or a killing committed by criminal negligence. There are no facts indicating that the defendant was acting under the heat of passion. Furthermore, one cannot be convicted of attempted manslaughter based on negligence theory,
because one logically cannot have the specific intent to be negligent.
A driver was stopped by the police after
running a red light. Her roommate was also
in the car. Because the driver did not have a
driver’s license, the officer lawfully placed her
under arrest and put her in his squad car. At the
time of the arrest, the officer saw a shopping
bag in the back seat containing clothes with
price tags on them. The officer asked the driver
if she had made any other purchases that day,
and she responded that there were additional
purchases in the trunk. The officer then searched
the trunk of the car, where he found additional
clothes purchases along with a clear plastic bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana. Later
testing confirmed that it was marijuana, which
the roommates had purchased that morning from
a neighbor.
The two roommates were charged with
possession of marijuana. Prior to her trial, the
driver’s attorney moved to suppress evidence of
the marijuana because it was discovered in an
illegal search, and the motion was granted.
If the attorney for the other roommate who
was the passenger in the car subsequently moves
to suppress evidence of the marijuana at her
trial, should her motion be granted?
(A) Yes, because the marijuana was the fruit of
an illegal search.
(B) Yes, because the judge had suppressed this
evidence at the driver’s trial.
(C) No, because she has no standing to object
to an illegal search.
(D) No, if she admits that she owns the
marijuana
) The roommate’s motion should be denied. The roommate has no standing to challenge the search
of the trunk because the search did not violate her reasonable expectation of privacy. Merely being
a passenger in someone else’s car does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to a search of the car. Something more is needed to have standing to challenge the search, such as
if the roommate owned the car (not indicated by the facts).
Thus (A) is incorrect. (Note also that,
while each passenger in a car stopped by the police has standing to challenge the stop because
each person was seized along with the driver, the stop here was clearly proper: The police may
validly stop a car for traffic violations, and here the driver ran a red light. Thus, the roommate’s
standing to challenge the stop is irrelevant.)
The sheriff’s department received an anonymous tip that a farmer was growing marijuana
on his rural property. Investigators flew low over
the farmer’s property in a small plane belonging
to the sheriff’s department and took aerial
photos of the property. Once developed, the
photos indicated that the area in the center of the
farmer’s fields contained marijuana plants. That
afternoon, four officers went to the perimeter of
the farmer’s property. Using wire cutters, they
cut their way through the farmer’s barbed wire
fence and walked to the center of the field and
found the marijuana plants. The officers then
obtained a warrant to search the farmer’s house.
On arrival, they produced the search warrant
and searched the farmer’s house, finding large
quantities of marijuana packaged and ready for
sale.
The marijuana was seized and the farmer was
charged with numerous drug offenses. Prior to
trial, the farmer’s attorney moves to suppress
evidence of the marijuana seized from the house.
Should the marijuana seized from the farmer’s
house be suppressed?
(A) Yes, because it is the fruit of the poisonous
tree, since the officers did not have a warrant when they entered the farmer’s property through the fence.
(B) Yes, because the police had no right to rely
on anonymous information to search the
farmer’s property.
(C) No, because the police had probable cause
to obtain a warrant.
(D) No, because the open fields doctrine
applies.
The marijuana should not be suppressed. The search of the farmer’s house, which led to the
seizure of the marijuana, was based on probable cause and a valid warrant. Therefore, the
evidence will not be suppressed. The United States Supreme Court has held that a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any land or field not a part of the curtilage. Thus,
there is no Fourth Amendment protection in such areas. Therefore, the police did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when they took pictures or when they cut through the fence and entered the
field. All evidence obtained through those activities could be the basis for a warrant to search the
farmer’s house, and a search of a home based on a valid warrant will be considered reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
(C) even though it is true that the open fields
doctrine applies to the fields that the officers entered. Here, the motion to suppress relates to the
marijuana taken from the house; for that, a warrant is required
Two men were arrested while riding in a
stolen automobile. They were taken to the police
station, booked, and fingerprinted. They were
then taken to an interrogation room. After the
detective gave them their Miranda warnings, one
of the men said, “Forget it. As soon as you check
for outstanding warrants, you’ll find out that
I escaped from prison. Since I am going back
anyway, it’s a farce to deny that we stole that
car.” The other man said nothing, and the first
man proceeded to write and sign a full confession.
The man who remained silent pled not guilty
to the charge of grand theft auto. At his trial the
prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence to show
that he did not deny that he stole the automobile
when the other man told the police in front of
him that he was a party to the theft.
Should the court hold that this evidence is
proper?
(A) Yes, because silence in this situation is
indicative of guilt and is an implied admission.
(B) Yes, because the man who confessed had
voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent.
(C) No, because an accomplice’s evidence is
inherently unreliable and unduly prejudicial.
(D) No, because under this circumstance, the
man who remained silent had no duty or
responsibility to deny the allegation
The court should hold that this evidence is improper because the man who remained silent had
no duty to deny the allegation here. A defendant in custody has no duty to speak at all, and the
exercise of this constitutional right cannot be used against a defendant to show probable guilt.
The Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty. Thus, (A) is
incorrect
