Criminal Law All cases Flashcards

Question

Morhall [1996] 1 A.C. 90 (cases for provocation under old common law)

Answer 1

Facts-D was convicted of murder after stabbing V, who criticised him for his solvent abuse. Under the 1957 Homicide act the judge directed the jury to apply the test of the reasonable man’s reaction but were told to exclude his solvent abuse addiction Significance- -as shown by this case, the intention of this [HA 1957] statute was to allow characteristics of the defendant to be given weight in assessing the gravity of his provocation and subsequent reaction. Not merely assessing the reactions of the reasonable man, but that this reasonable man shares characteristics of the defendant which may change the effect of provocation to said defendant

Answer 2

Facts- D and V were both alcoholics who often got into arguments when they drank together. V made comments about Ds self-esteem and taunted him as he held an axe saying ‘you haven’t got the guts’. D struck V and she died. D was originally charged with murder in the court of appeal of jersey and then substituted for manslaughter in the UK AC, using the defence of provocation Significance- Privy council ruled that Smith was wrongly decided and that there was a distinction to be drawn between those characteristics of D which affect the gravity of the provocation that he faced (characteristics were important) and the characteristics relating to the ability to exercise self-control (not relevant).

Answer 3

Facts- Clinton killed his wife because of her sexual infidelity, convicted of murder and arson (life imprisonment). Significance- Where D loses self control solely on the discovery of sexual infidelity, he loses the partial defence, but where sexual infidelity is one factor which plays into a complex range of emotions which might cause D to lose self-control, it should still be admissible as evidence. - If it plays part of a more complex set of motivations or context eg abuse, it should not void the defence of LOSC.

Answer 4

Facts- Dawes has stabbed V after an altercation when finding him asleep on a sofa with his wife. The judge found that the defence of LOSC did not qualify because D had incited the conflict with V, and so no trigger was applicable to him, as expressly put in section 55 6(b) -His appeal against the murder conviction was not allowed. Significance- Lack of evidence to suggest that he had actually incited the violence but also lack of evidence that he had in fact lost control; loss of control is subjective in that it is not enough that the reasonable person in Ds situation would've lost control themselves. D must have personally lost control to begin qualification for the partial defence.

Answer 5

Facts- D stabbed V 60 times, attempting to rely on diminished responsibility under his acute intoxication which was a recognised medical condition. Murder upheld and appeal dimissed Significance-Acute intoxication did not suffice as a ‘recognised medical condition’ nor was it parliaments intention to replace the law on voluntary intoxication with a lower threshold of diminished responsibility -Diminished responsibility first had to arise from a recognised medical condition before it could be decided if it satisfied the other tests for diminished responsibility.

Answer 6

acts- Two boys pushed a paving stone off of a railway bridge into the path of a train, smashing through the glass window and killing the security guard inside. They were convicted of manslaughter, with their appeals rejected. Principle- Reinforced UAM as a constructive crime requiring nothing more than MR towards the basic unlawful act. the two boys intentionally performed an act which was unlawful and dangerous in the way in which it was performed. 2)the intention unlawful and dangerous act led to the death of the security guard. 3)It was not necessary whether or not the boys foresaw the danger of their acts; an objective test was to be applied as to whether the reasonable sober person would have recognised a risk of some harm to the security guard on the train from the intentional acts of the boys.

Answer 7

Facts- G planned to be rehoused and to do so he douses his house in petrol and lit it, to burn his house down and reclaim. He’d planned to rescue the other inhabitants in the house, but they had died due to the speed by which the flames had spread. Principle- The Unlawful act need not be aimed at a specific person, so long as it is objectively viewed as being performed dangerously because there was a risk of SOME harm.

Answer 8

Facts- Heroin was prepared by D and subsequently self-administered by V, who died as a result. -Manslaughter was given by the court of appeal, but this was quashed on appeal Principle- D couldn't be convicted of UAM as he had not jointly administered the heroin with V. V was an adult of sound mind exercising autonomy and a free, willing and voluntary decision. -D must be proved to have committed the unlawful act before building a case for UAM.

Answer 9

Facts-D was an anaesthetist, performing eye surgery, when a tube became detached from a ventilator, leading to V suffering cardiac arrest and dying. D was convicted of GN manslaughter under the breach of duty. Appeals dismissed Principle-The question for the jury was ‘was the defendants conduct so bad in all circumstances that it ought to amount to criminal’?. -3 questions of 1) Was there a duty of care owed? 2)Whether there was a breach of that duty? 3)Had that breach of duty caused death? And therefore should this be treated as gross negligence warranting criminal liability.

Answer 10

Facts- E had bought heroin and handed some to her half-sister V, who died later. E thought V looked like she’d taken an overdose and spent the night with her but didn’t call for medical assistance as she didn’t want to get in trouble. Principle- Someone in the position of E would or ought to have known that they had created this life-threatening state of affairs, and therefor failed to take reasonable steps to divert away from this danger.

Answer 11

Facts- K hides acid in school hand-dryer, V uses drier on face and suffers GBH. Principle- battery need not be directed against a specified person. K was reckless as to another person using the hand drier, and therefore assault occasioning GBH upheld (perhaps wouldn't be the case now post- R v G)

Answer 12

Facts- unlawful to inflict ABH or higher on another, even with consent, unless it is beneficial in the view of the public and falls into one of the specified categories, consent is not a defence. Principle- group of specified activities where consent to ABH was not vitiated (sports, personal adornment, surgery, rough horseplay etc)

Answer 13

Facts- D made several threats against v, including ringing her house with silent phone calls, causing her to apprehend immediate violence. She suffered psychiatric harm as a result. Significance- The Lords held that psychiatric harm constituted ‘bodily harm’, relevant to s18, 20 and 47 of OAPA, subject to it materialising into a recognised medical condition. - Silent phone calls could constitute an assault given the wider context of the abuse, as the context and circumstances meant that V could reasonably be said to have apprehended immediate and unlawful violence. - 'inflict' in the statutory provisions wasn't limited to physical infliction or 'touching'. More synonymous with causation.

Answer 14

General facts- Ds were convicted of assault occasioning GBH as they had unprotected sex with women who had consented to unprotected sex, but not the risk of HIV transmission which both defendants were reckless towards. - Dica won his appeal and the judges ruled that they were not looking to criminalise all risks involved in non-protected sex, looking to protect personal autonomy. - Konzani didn't win his appeal and he was convicted of a s20 offence for maliciously causing GBH, as he was aware of his condition and was reckless as to whether he would inflict it on his sexual partners; R v B shows that this is currently only relevant to an OAP rather than sexual offence (vitiating consent), which many academics disagree with. Principle- Consent to unprotected sex did not follow with implied consent to the risk of HIV that the defendants were reckless to, it was eventually held in Konzani. Where there was no known risk to either party, there could not be a crime if HIV was passed on, but if D foresaw that he could pass it on because he suspected he could be infected, he is likely to have the requisite mens rea. -The law was not criminalising people having sex where there was a known risk of infection, but as the risk was not known to the victims, and there was no honest belief in consent to the risk on behalf of the defendants, the victims had a case.

Answer 15

Facts- D had broken Vs leg with a late challenge, appealing against his conviction for inflicting GBH under s20 of OAPA. Principles- implied consent to ABH or GBH within sport, where players are playing within the parameters of the laws of the game. -D was first held to have gone over and above the threshold of implied consent for football-related injuries, but this was eventually overturned on appeal

Answer 16

Facts- -D had intended to throw beer at V but the glass had also been thrown, and had smashed and wounded V. D was charged with unlawful and malicious wounding of another under s20 of OAPA 1861. This was substituted for a verdict of assault occasioning ABH under s47 of the same act Principle- The House of Lords affirmed the second charge on the basis that no further mens rea was required for the Assault occasioning ABH under s47 of OAPA 1861, than merely mens Rea for an assault or battery. It was a constructive crime resting on whether actual bodily harm was to occur or not, which in this case it did even without any relevant recklessness or intention on D’s behalf. -In the case of GBH, it was required that D subjectively foresee the risk of some harm from their actions, but not serious harm- it could not be committed as a constructive crime where D foresees no risk of harm, whereas a s47 charge requires no further foresight than the risk of causing the assault or battery.

Answer 17

Facts- A deceived B into sexual intercourse with him, saying she would be arrested and he would kill himself if not Significance- he was not guilty when applying s76 for deceit of the nature or purpose. The nature was sexual and the purpose was for his sexual gratification. He was instead liable for rape due to the lack of consent under the definition given in s74, as she did not have the freedom to consent effectively, which was obvious from the threats that she had submitted to.

Answer 18

Facts- -The defendant's convictions for raping his partner were safe where there was expert evidence that his mental illness had not affected his ability to understand whether his partner had consented. Even if that were wrong, delusional beliefs that a victim was consenting could not render reasonable a belief that the victim was consenting when they were not. Significance- -The 2003 act DID NOT MAKE a genuine belief in consent by D enough to raise a defence of consent. IT HAS TO BE AN OBJECTIONABLY VIEWED REASONABLE RELIEF. -Unless the state of mind amounted to insanity in law, beliefs in consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic illness or personality disorders had to be judged by objective standards of reasonableness and not by taking into account a mental disorder that induced a belief which could not reasonably arise without it

Answer 19

Facts-The defendant was convicted of murder under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. She had counselled Z to murder the victim through payment. Z decided not to carry out the murder, going to the house with an unloaded shotgun to give the impression of a murder; but had gone berserk and eventually killed the victim anyway. The defendant appealed her conviction. Principle--“counselling” did not require any CAUSAL CONNECTION between the counselling and the principal offence (i.e. the actual murder), nor substantial cause. An offence under s.8 was established by the presence of counselling and the principal offence was committed by the person counselled within the scope of the authorisation or instruction (i.e. not by accident).”

Answer 20

Facts- -Two defendants presence at an illegal fist fight, who were neither involved in the management of the fight or encouragement of the fight (through saying or doing something, or paying for tickets) were charged with abetting the illegal fight Principle- Mere presence at a crime scene cannot be equated with being an accessory, merely evidence that the jury may wish to use to determine whether their presence of actions constituted encouraging or assisting. Some MR and AR was also required by DD

Answer 21

- Aiding requires assistance but neither causation nor consensus - Abetting and counselling requires consensus but not causation - Procuring requires causation but no consensus

Answer 22

SC confirmed in Jogee that D must intent to assist or encourage P to commit the offence, and to act with whatever mental element is required of P. -SC confirmed that Ds intent can be conditional ie he can intend for another crime be committed conditional on a circumstance, therefore rendering him guilty if that further crime is committed; it is imperative to convey to juries that conditional intent is not a less stringent form of intention and foresight is merely evidence from which the requisite intention can be inferred.

Answer 23

Facts-M, who worked for a haulier firm, had his lorry filled up at a National Coal Board (NCB) colliery. He then drove to a weighbridge where the operator told him that his load was overweight. M, nevertheless, accepted the risk of taking the overload. He was later stopped by the police. Charge appealed Principle- The Court found that aiding and abetting was proved if there was a positive act of voluntary assistance and knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence. Motive is irrelevant in this case. The sale was thus completed by the weighbridge operator despite having had knowledge that an offence was being committed. Thus, the NCB’s actions constituted aiding and abetting. -D knew he had the right to prevent the lorry driving onto the public roads but had omitted to stop him and acted by handing him the ticket, and he knew that his action would help P to commit the crime, even if he was indifferent whether or not he would do so.

Answer 24

Facts- D bought oxygen cutting equipment, and P used it to break into a bank. D was convicted before the fact, on the grounds that he knew that its use was for a break in. He appealed Principle--It is sufficient to prove that the defendant knew of Ps general intention to commit the crime, but no further knowledge of the time and place of the crime. The conviction was upheld based on the fact that D knew the general type of crime that would be committed with the oxygen-cutting equipment.

Answer 25

Facts- D drove P to the pub, knowing that P was going to try and commit a range of offences, including planting a bomb, shooting people or committing robbery. Principle- -Following Bainbridge, house of Lords held that there was no specific crime that D needed to be aware of when aiding or encouraging P. -The principle is that if D Aids or encourages P, knowing that P will commit X, y or Z or a combination of the three, this enough to constitute liability as a secondary party

Answer 26

Blakely and Sutton: Facts- B was having an affair with T. At a pub, T told B that he intended to go home to his wife. B discussed this with S, who suggested that if they added alcohol to T’s tonic water, T would not drink and drive. B & S intended to tell him before he left to drive home so that he would not go home. Unfortunately, T (the principal) left before they could tell him and was subsequently found to be over the limit when breathalysed. Significance- B & S were subsequently convicted of procuring that offence after the magistrates decided that they had been reckless (within the meaning of Caldwell). -The Court of Appeal quashed their convictions and held that objective recklessness was not enough for liability. The court expressed the opinion that only intention should suffice.

Answer 27

Facts- P, D and another went to Vs house to pick up weed but P ended up shooting V. P and D were both convicted as principals for murder. D said that he was unaware that P had the gun until he used it to kill V. appeals dismissed. Principle- “Where there is joint enterprise to commit a crime, to found a conviction of murder for a secondary party, it is enough to show that they contemplated that the primary party might kill with intent to do so or cause serious injury. Thus, P and D’s appeal was dismissed.” -This clearly isn't the case anymore post jogee

Answer 28

Facts- This joint case involved two separate appellants who had been convicted for murder on the basis of joint enterprise, after a co-defendant had actually killed the victim. In the case of Jogee, he had been vocally encouraging the principal while he murdered a police officer. In the case of Ruddock, liability was based on his participation in a botched robbery during which the principal murdered the victim (an act which the principal admitted) Significance- The court held that in order to prove accessorial liability, it was not sufficient to only prove the necessary mental element, but also the element of conduct. - This could be discharged by proving that the accessory either assisted or at least encouraged the principal in committing the offence. - The mental element is discharged by proving that the accessory intended to so assist or encourage the principal. The mental element however is not discharged by mere foresight that the principal might commit an offence. - Therefore, someone may provide the AR or assisting or encouraging the commission of the crime, but may only foresee that in committing the AR they might help P commit a crime.

Answer 29

Facts-D by duress (threats, violence or both) compelled his wife P to have sex with a dog. She had still committed the offence but was excused from punishment. Principle- The wife was acquitted of buggery and whilst she had both AR and MR, she had a defence,, whereas D was charged for abetting her to commit buggery -can be a party to a crime where the principal has a full defence

Answer 30

Facts-D terrorised his wife, V, into submitting into sexual intercourse with P. P was convicted of rape and D was convicting as a secondary party, but P had to be acquitted as there were doubts over his mens rea, in that it couldn’t safely be said that he didn’t believe in Vs consent Principle- D appealed on the basis that as the principal offender had not committed a crime, he could not be a secondary party to that crime. -Courts held he had the necessary mens rea and had abetted the AR of the offence, which was effectively a substantive offence to procure the commission of the AR of any crime’ S and H

Answer 31

Facts-a bus conductor, negligently signalled to the driver of his bus, P, to reverse, killing two pedestrians who D could not see. P was acquitted of careless driving, but D was also acquitted. D had no AR as it could not be said that he had driven the bus, and P had no MR, so there was no crime committed by P, although a case for negligent manslaughter by D was certainly viable. Principle-Therefore, if there was no AR by P, D could not be convicted of abetting that crime. (he could however sufficiently been found guilty of negligent manslaughter.)

Answer 32

Facts- R hired B and S to beat up her husband, V. She gave a signal to them as V was leaving work, and they proceeded to attempt to hospitalise him for a month through the infliction of injuries. - Vs injuries were not as severe as expected, requiring no hospitalisation. - B and S were found guilty under s20 of OAPA for inflicting GBH recklessly whereas R was convicted as a principle for s18 of the same act (a felony rather than a misdemeanour). She appealed. Principle--QB held that someone who was the accessory to an assault could not be an accessory to a more serious event which did not happen, even if they had the MR for that event -The AR of the more serious event did not happen.

Answer 33

Facts-The DPP appealed by way of case stated against the acquittal of K and C, two girls aged 14 years and 11 years respectively, of charges of procuring the commission of the offence of rape upon W, aged 14, by an unknown person. It was alleged that K and C had falsely imprisoned, threatened and robbed W. A boy joined the girls, and K and C told W to remove her clothing and have sexual intercourse with the boy. Partial penetration occurred. The boy was never traced Principle- -Doli Incapax, a defence for minors under the age of 10 who cannot commit a crime, was not put forward to the jury -Just because the principal in the case could not have had the mens rea as a result of their age, doesn’t meant that the accessories who procured the AR of the principal was exempt from guilt, and just because it was two girls who could not have committed rape (no penile penetration), didn’t excuse them from being guilty as accessories to rape.

Answer 34

Facts- D handed P a knife so he could use it on anyone interfering with the burglary. D did not make a sufficient withdrawal when V appeared and said to P ‘come on lets go’ and left via a window -P used the knife on V and D was held to be an accessory to murder for his aid (providing the knife) Principle- -The defence of withdrawal can only be achieved through an unequivocal communication of withdrawal. - If D does an act of aiding, abetting, procuring or counselling, he must take the steps necessary to neutralise his involvement, something often left to juries to decide. - Therefore D is still liable for any assisting or encouraging despite his withdrawal, unless he can neutralise the effect of this. - D failed to neutralise his involvement, and his decision to leave through the window did not account for any neutralisation

Answer 35

Facts- D, a girl aged between 13 and 16, abetted P to have intercourse with her. P was convicted under the relevant law at the time, but D was not convicted of aiding or abetting the crime Principle-D was in the class of people which the law sought to protect, and therefore could not be a secondary party to that crime against herself

Answer 36

Facts- D had put alcohol in Ps drink, unbeknown to P, who went on to commit a drink driving offence, which was one of strict liability. Significance- distinguishes procure from aid, abet and counsel because there must be some causal factor in procuring, with procuring meaning to 'produce by endeavour'. They are NOT synonymous however, but closely linked. - D knew that P was going to drive or was at least reckless towards it, this may not be the case following Blakely and Sutton. - It would be different if P knew he had been laced and chosen to drive, applying the Kennedy rationale of autonomous adults exercising free, willing and informed decisions. This would've broken the chain of causation.

Answer 37

Facts-The facts of Pace and Rogers is that DD were convicted of attempting to conceal, disguise or convert criminal property. They ran a scrap metal business and were approached by undercover police officers attempting to sell them metal, which they suspected might be stolen (reckless as to circumstances) but was in fact not stolen. If it had been stolen, they would’ve committed the substantive offence, so long as they knew or suspected it to be stolen. There was only proof of recklessness towards the metal being stolen, and their appeals were allowed as a result. Principle- CA took a strict approach, saying even if recklessness was the necessary MR towards the circumstance rendering it illegal, anyone who attempts it must intend that these circumstances are the case. This therefore differs to the wider view held in A-Gs reference, in which the MR of the substantive offence must be held by he who attempts the commission of the offence, even if that MR is mere recklessness

Answer 38

Facts- charged with the attempted rape of a 16-year-old girl, B. A had unsuccessfully tried to engage in sexual intercourse with B. The trial judge directed the jury that the issues relevant to the mens rea for attempted rape were the same as for a charge of rape. It was therefore directed that the offences of both rape and attempted rape require 1) an intention to have sexual intercourse (consequence) and 2) knowledge of, or recklessness as to, the absence of consent (circumstance). The men were convicted and appealed. Principle-CA held that unless intention was the necessary MR towards the circumstances rendering it illegal, then foresight or recklessness would suffice. So if the substantive offence had a MR requirement of belief or suspicion (eg rape) proof of recklessness will suffice for a charge of attempt. - with regards to consequences, there must be intention as to the consequence of the substantive crime. - Under Pace and Rogers principle, recklessness as to the consent of V on Ds behalf would not suffice for attempted rape, why should the failed rapist escape liability for attempting to fulfil the missing elements of rape with the requisite mens rea.

Answer 39

Facts- DD had thrown petrol bombs at a car and missed, guilty of attempting aggravated arson Principle-- A defendant, in order to be guilty of an attempt, must be in one of the states of mind required for the commission of the full offence, and did his best, so far as he could, to supply what was missing from the completion of the offence. It is the policy of the law that such people should be punished notwithstanding that in fact intentions of defendants have not been fulfilled” - this extends the scope decided in Khan, in that someone could be reckless as to the consequence but intend the circumstances ie someone who is aware that tampering with another's property (his land lords tv cabling) but is reckless as to whether the cabling is damaged. - You have to intend to commit the missing element, and then have the mens Rea with regards to the other element. Whether or not this is compatible with another case depends whether or not the missing element is consequence or circumstance.

Answer 40

Facts- D was arrested by police when, armed with a fake gun, he approached within a yard of the door of a post office with intent to commit robbery Principle- . His conviction for attempted robbery was quashed as courts held there was not enough evidence for them to say his acts were ‘properly and safely’ more than merely preparatory, epitomising a very strict approach to the meaning of ‘attempts’. This formed much of the reasoning of the law coms further recommendations for reform.

Answer 41

This case showed the first understanding of the 1981 CAA law, and held that an offence of attempt could not be committed where it was impossible to commit, or there was no evidence which could be shown that the full offence was committable. This created the objectively innocent test, following Nock 1978. - The defendant was found in possession of a video recorder. She refused to name the source but admitted that she believed it to be stolen. After it became clear that there was no evidence that it was in fact stolen, she was convicted of attempting to handle stolen goods. - The 1981 Act had changed the common law position, and the mere doing of preparatory acts which, if completed would constitute an offence, was not now sufficient. A conviction was now prevented where the full offence could not follow from the preparatory acts. None of the subsections would turn what was in fact an innocent act into an offence of attempting to commit the crime, merely by virtue of the defendant’s criminal intent.

Answer 42

Shivpuri [1987] AC 1: This case overruled the thinking in Anderton v Ryan. Shivpuri (S) was persuaded to act as a drugs courier. S collected a suitcase which contained several packages of white powder which he admitted in police interview that he believed to be either heroin or cannabis but was in fact legal snuff. S was charged with attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring the controlled drug of heroin. it is immaterial that S did not know the exact nature of the substance in his possession, but nevertheless believed he was dealing with controlled drugs the importation of which was prohibited. The statutory offence of attempt under Section 1 of the 1981Act requires (1) an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence and (2) the accused intended to commit an offence.

Answer 43

- Narrow view of ‘course of conduct’ as undertaken in Nock1978 AC 979, BEFORE THE 1977 ACT: - Facts- defendants agree to extract cocaine from a substance by subjecting it to a certain process, but the substance contained no cocaine. The HL interpreted course of conduct to mean proof only of the physical acts. If D1 and D2 agreed on that course of conduct, it would not necessarily amount to or involve the commission of the crime. - the narrow view was therefore that the course of conduct agreed cannot equate to conspiracy if it the agreed course of conduct won't necessarily amount to the commission of the crime.

Answer 44

If D1 and D2 agree that a course “shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either a)will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of the offence by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence impossible, they are guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence(s) in question”

Answer 45

-Kenning [2009] QB 221 has confirmed that ‘an agreement to aid and abet an offence is not in law capable of constituting conspiracy under section 1(1) of the 1977 act. They sold materials which could be used for the growing of cannabis but exhibited a notice warning customer’s against this. They told undercover police however of the profits to be made. Held: The appeal succeeded. An agreement which amounted to no more than to aid and abet an offence did not constitute a criminal conspiracy

Answer 46

Facts- The defendant entered into an agreement with an undercover narcotics officer in a hotel in Hong Kong. The agreement was that the defendant was to give the officer 5kg of heroin to be smuggled into Australia. In return, the officer was to receive US$16,000. The police officer never flew into Australia and in fact never met the defendant because of a cancelled flight. Significance=Lord Griffiths in this case said ‘the crime of conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act WITH THE INTENT OF CARRYING IT OUT. IT IS THE INTENT TO CARRY OUT THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCE THAT CONSTITUTES THE MENS REA OF THE OFFENCE.’

Answer 47

- The common law idea that children aged between 10-14 had a defence of doli incapax unless it could be proved that they knew it was seriously wrong was abolished. - S34 of Crime and disorder act 1998 says “The rebuttable presumption of criminal law that a child aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence is abolished”. The defence rather than the mere presumption had been abolished despite contention. - Following T [2009] 1AC 1310, HL concluded there was no authority for the existence of the defence separate from the presumption and that parliaments intention was clearly to abolish the concept of doli incapax as having any effect in law. - “B, who was aged 12 at the time of the offences, had been convicted on 12 counts of causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity. He had pleaded guilty after the trial judge ruled that the defence of doli incapax was not available to him. B's appeal against conviction on the ground that the judge's ruling was wrong was unsuccessful.”

Answer 48

- M’Naghten rule: “The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crims, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong”

Answer 49

- Quick 1973 QB 910: D who had caused ABH called medical evidence to show that he was a diabetic and that he was suffering from a hypoglycaemic attack at the time of the alleged offence and was unaware of what he was doing (defence of insanity), which D pleaded guilty. On appeal it was held that Ds mental condition at the time of the offence was caused not by Ds diabetes (internal factor) but by his use of insulin prescribed by the doctor coupled with his failure to follow that prescription by eating after injecting insulin (external factors). A plea of sane automatism should’ve been left to the jury. Shows fine line between the two pleas and the possible success of such pleas. - In Hennesy the taking of another persons car was due to a hyperglycaemic episode as it resulted from his underlying diabetes and could properly be described as a disease of the mind.

Answer 50

- The ‘disease of the mind’ has to have given rise to a ‘defect of reason’; Ds power of reasoning must be impaired and Ds mere failure to use powers of reasoning which he possesses does not bring him within the M’Naghten rules. - In Clarke, D claimed that she had taken articles from a supermarket without paying for them because of absent-mindedness resulting from depression it was held that even if she was suffering from a disease of the mind, (which is arguable), she had not raised the defence of insanity but was simply denying that she had MR. This could help recognise those who are morally irresponsible.

Answer 51

- Decided in Stephens and Dudley that duress of circumstances or necessity is not a defence to murder. Facts of the case are that Dudley killed and ate a boy whom he was shipwrecked with for 18 days in an open boat without food. It was found that the men probably would’ve died if they hadn’t done so and the boy probably would’ve died before they were rescued, and yet they were indicted for murder. Held that such a defence would rapidly reduce morality and further, the immorality of measuring and selecting a victim. - The principle in Stephens and Dudley is distinguishable where there is no problem of selection, where both are going to die, it is immaterial whether two people die quicker as a result of one of their actions, pending immediate death anyway.

Answer 52

Re (a) Conjoined twins: The court held that in special circumstances it was lawful to kill the weaker of the two twins, B, in order to save the life of the stronger, A. This was not a simple matter of choice, as both would die if the operation to detach the twins was undertaken, but A would likely survive if they were detached whereas B would die anyway. 3 requirements for the defence of necessity were: 1) The act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil. 2)No more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved and 3)the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided. In this case, unlike Stephens and Dudley, A was selected via the circumstances. HOWEVER this authority is not claiming to be an authority for necessity as a defence for murder “This case is too slender a thread on which to hang a far-reaching development of the common law” -Didn't require a value judgement as in Dudley and Stephens.

Answer 53

Pommell 1995 2 Cr App: police officers discovered the defendant to be in possession of a firearm without a firearms certificate. The defendant sought to raise the defence of necessity or duress of circumstances, on the basis that he had been visited in the early hours by a friend who intended to kill another person. The defendant had taken the gun in order to prevent the killing and had intended handing over the gun to the police the following day. It was held that the continued availability of the defence depended on the defendant desisting from the commission of the offence as soon as he reasonably could. Firstly, he had failed to give the gun to the police as soon as he reasonably could, which led to his first conviction.

Answer 54

- A subjective belief, no matter how unreasonable, will suffice for a case of self-defence, but an objective view is taken as to whether, in the facts known to D, D used force expected of the reasonable man with similar characteristics in Ds situation. - The defendant must be charged in accordance with his honest belief, even though that belief may be mistaken. But the jury has then to decide whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be. - An objective approach of reasonableness was to be taken towards a subjective mistake of facts by D.

Answer 55

- If D had the MR for the required crime, it makes no difference whether his intoxication was voluntary or involuntary, nor whether the crime was one of specific or basic intent. - Kingston 1995 2 AC 355: D had committed a sexual offence against a 15-year old boy, giving way to his paedophiliac inclinations because his drink had been laced by a third party. A drugged intention is still an intention. The fact he may not have committed such an offence if he hadn’t been spiked is immaterial. You can still possess MR of an offence whilst involuntarily intoxicated.

Answer 56

- Majewski 1977 AC 443: D assaulted a number of police officers when he was being restrained, after taking a combination of drink and drugs. D claimed that his self-induced intoxication was a sufficient plea which prevented him from forming the mens rea. The Lords affirmed his conviction and confirmed the rule in Beard that a self-induced intoxication would succeed if the crime charged was one of specific intent, but not to any other crime. Basic intent crimes eg sexual assault or rape therefore mean there is no defence as these require nothing more than the MR of the crime.

Answer 57

- Heard 2008 QB 43: D, whilst V intoxicated, rubbed his cock on a police officer’s leg, and Ds plea was that he had no recollection of the incident. This should have been the end of the matter and would never suffice for a plea. However, D relied on the defence of V intoxication to suggest it prevented him forming the MR of intention in intentional touching. However, the judge held that this was a crime of basic intent and therefore V intoxication was not a defence for this. The law does not require any purposive intent in the crime of sexual touching, for example there need not be an ulterior intent of gaining sexual gratification, just the MR towards performing the AR of the crime.

Answer 58

- Jaggard v Dickinson: D had a friend, H, who invited her to treat his house as if it was her own. When Drunk, D went to a house which she thought was Hs but was in fact Rs, who barred her way. D gained entry by breaking windows and damaging curtains, charged with criminal damage. She relied on the clause that she was entitled to acquittal if D believed she had consent to damage the house as if it was Hs. Was held that she couldn’t rely on V intoxication as a defence, but the mistake of fact arising from her intoxication sufficed for the clause in the CDA 1971.

Answer 59

- Hasan 2005- Hasan was charged with the crime of aggravated burglary. He was associated with a gang and relied on the defence of duress, pleading that he was blackmailed into committing the burglary to prevent his family from being harmed. The court held that the defence of duress was unavailable for Hasan because of his voluntary gang association and as such, he should have foreseen or ought to have foreseen the risk of being subjected to compulsion to commit criminal offences. While he may not have foreseen that he would be compelled to commit a burglary, his association with the gang and other persons with a tendency to commit unlawful acts was enough to exclude the defence. where D foresees that his affiliation with people will lead him to be subject to threats, he does not have the defence of duress.

Answer 60

Keane 2010- D had verbally abused a woman, causing another to retaliate and D to cause V GBH in a fight, where V fell back and hit his head on the concrete. Where D provokes V to attack him, his self-defence plea will not automatically be successful, must be weighed against the reaction of V and the level of provocation by D.

Answer 61

-This is sufficient; he has intended to A or E P in the offence, and there is no need that it does in fact A or E P, D must foresee that it might.

Answer 62

It is essentially a denial of mens Rea arising out of intoxication. For involuntary intoxication, it can be a denial of mens Rea for both specific and basic intent crimes, whereas for voluntary intoxication, it can only be a defence for specific intent crimes. An intoxicated intention, whether voluntary or involuntary, is still an intention and therefore the defence shall not run.

Answer 63

- Ds belief does not need to be reasonable, but it must be genuinely held. - Although Ds belief does not need to be reasonable, the more unreasonable it is, the less likely the jury is to accept that it was genuinely held. Where the natural inference from Ds conduct in the particular circumstances is that he intended or was reckless towards a particular result, the jury are very likely to convict him if he introduces no testimony that he did not in fact foresee, but the onus of proof remains on the crown throughout.

Answer 64

-It is an objective test; firstly was the threat objectively reasonable to submit to, and secondly was the reaction of D reasonable in response to the threat.

Answer 65

-Someone who is guilty of UAM need not foresee any risk of death or serious harm, whereas reckless manslaughter exists where there is foresight of serious harm or death and D unreasonably goes on to take take risk

Answer 66

- For a charge of UAM, the court must first prove that the unlawful act was actually committed. - In Kennedy 2, it was eventually found that Vs act of self-administering a toxic substance broke the chain of causation, and therefore D could not have committed the crime of unlawfully administering a noxious substance contrary to OAPA 1861, and the resultant death therefore could not be attributable to D for UAM.

Answer 67

Criminal attempts act 1981 -Section 1 of the 1981Act requires (1) an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence and (2) the accused intended to commit an offence.

Answer 68

Criminal law act 1977- -Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, if a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either— (a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or (b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any of the offences impossible, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question.

Answer 69

Facts- -The defendant's convictions for raping his partner were safe where there was expert evidence that his mental illness had not affected his ability to understand whether his partner had consented. Even if that were wrong, delusional beliefs that a victim was consenting could not render reasonable a belief that the victim was consenting when they were not. Significance- -The 2003 act DID NOT MAKE a genuine belief in consent by D enough to raise a defence of consent. IT HAS TO BE AN OBJECTIONABLY VIEWED REASONABLE RELIEF. -Unless the state of mind amounted to insanity in law, beliefs in consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic illness or personality disorders had to be judged by objective standards of reasonableness and not by taking into account a mental disorder that induced a belief which could not reasonably arise without it

Answer 70

Facts- -The appellant (H) appealed against his conviction of sexual assault contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.3. The victim had been approached by H, who made a sexual proposition towards her. The victim walked away, but H approached her again and asked if she was shy. H then attempted to pull her towards him by grabbing at a pocket that was located along the side seam of her tracksuit bottoms. H had attempted to place a hand over the victim's mouth, but had failed and the victim escaped The Court of Appeal defined the test for determining whether touching is ‘sexual’ in cases where the touching is not inherently sexual: 1. Does the jury consider that the touching could be sexual? 2. If so, in all the circumstances of the case, does the jury consider that the purpose of the touching was sexual? If so, the touching is sexual within the meaning of the Act. While the judge’s directions in the present case had not been entirely adequate as he had not adopted this two-stage approach, the jury had been entitled to conclude that the touching was sexual. The convictions were therefore safe.”

Answer 71

Gross is wrong to say that a “Woman's sexual autonomy is often championed by a declaration that ""No' means "no'." No less important in the same cause is a recognition that ""Yes' means "yes' because this is a very naïve (at best) view as to sexual culture and the pressures many women face with regards to having sex. Acquiescence does not require neither a yes or a no, but to act in such a way where no ‘no’ therefore means yes, and then to take this ‘yes’ at face value and run with it does not truly reflect the experience of a woman pressured or shocked at the prospect of sex, and reluctantly ‘agreeing’.

Answer 72

Facts- D charged with damaging property, raised defence of intoxication after taking valium, a sedative -Where a drug is taken which is not known to induce aggression and or unpredictability, D can rely on this defence to basic intent crimes if it can be proved that he was not reckless as to carrying out the actus reus of the crime. Had D taken a sedative and then committed a crime whilst driving, it may be less clear that D did not subjectively foresee the crime resulting, and she may therefore be liable. It does not offer a complete defence for basic intent crimes.

Answer 73

- Hancock and Shankland disapprove of the 'natural consequence' argument proposed in Moloney but radiate the importance of foresight of virtual certainty being required before any consideration of intention being found in a murder case. - Foresight, following G, is to be assessed SUBJECTIVELY, and following Hancock, is not to be equated with intention, merely evidence from which intention could be inferred, with reference to Lord Scarman's sliding scale of foresight and probability.

Answer 74

- Following the test set out in Woolin, in which the jury may be entitled to infer intention from foresight of virtual certainty, the application of this rule will be opposed bu the moral threshold argument advanced by NOrrie. - The argument uses the case of steane, in which Ds conviction for intending to assist the enemy was eventually quashed. His actions were indeed virtually certain to help the enemy and in all other circumstances its possible that a jury could reasonably infer his intention to do so from his actions, but the moral threshold argument must also be weighed against this. - His actions in assisting the enemy were so at odds with his moral objective, of saving his family from the threats aimed at them, and his intention was none other than an intention to save his family. - The moral point in Steane was better achieved through a narrowing of the law of intention by recognising the moral threshold between the direct intent (saving the family) and the indirect intent (assisting the enemy) - Not every virtually certain crime is intended in light of the moral threshold.

Answer 75

Facts- D switched labels on supermarket items, intending to purchase the more expensive of the two items under the price of the other Significance- An appropriation is satisfied by ANY assumption of the rights of the owner. The right to label items is one of the owner and therefore this suffices for an appropriation, but would not be theft without the other elements being included.

Answer 76

Facts- D stole money from the open wallet of a foreign taxi passenger who didn't understand the currency system Significance- D had dishonestly appropriated more money than he was entitled to, this was not a case of consent, as V had not implied consented to D taking any more money than he was legally expected to pay to D for the taxi ride

Answer 77

Facts- D had persuaded V to sell £17,000 worth of goods to his accomplice X, accepting cheques in the form of two stolen and worthless cheques. Significance- theft could be committed even when there was consent as to the appropriation, as the consent was gained via fraud.

Answer 78

Facts- D was said to have committed theft when he dishonestly appropriated property from V, a vulnerable pensioner who gifted D £200 a day and a tv. V was not entitled to restitution under the civil law and D was legally the owner Significance- there was consent as to the appropriation but

Answer 79

Facts- D had bought a house in her own name on behalf of her family members, against their wishes. The letter of authority was signed by the family members but in the name of Briggs. Significance- Where a victim caused a payment to be made by deceptive conduct, there was no theft in accordance with s3(1) of theft act 1968. Appropriation required a physical act by D (open to a conviction of deception and fraud instead)

Answer 80

Things in action= Must be property which can be appropriated, intangible property may be appropriated by assuming rights of an owner over it and is best illustrated in the case of bank accounts. The property A has when he has money in a bank is one in action, as there is no dedicated pile of money for which he could claim to be his. D can appropriate Vs bank account by exercising any right which V has over it, such as making purchases.

Answer 81

Oxford v moss 1978- student had obtained his upcoming exam paper, and meant to return the paper itself, but obviously he retained the intellectual property. He was convicted but this was eventually quashed because it was held that it could be dealt with under the civil law and through damages and injunctions, rather than the criminal law. Therefore confidential information was not to be considered as property.

Answer 82

S was convicted for theft after stealing £50 worth of stolen heroin from a drug dealer. They appealed on the basis that s4 did not make an express provision that stolen property could be subject to theft. It was held that a lack of mention did not make such tangible property incapable of being stolen, and the conviction was upheld. The appropriation of these drugs was therefore sufficient.

Answer 83

- Turner (No 2)- D had left his car with V for repair, promising to pay for the repairs when he returned. D returned a few hours later and took the car with the spare key. Although he claimed he was entitled to do so, he was acting dishonestly and his conviction for stealing the car was affirmed. It is a hard case to justify because D can still be guilty of theft of his own property when he has the power to terminate Vs proprietary interest in his property. This case ignored the lien that D owed to V, in that V should remain in possession until D paid off the debt for his rep

Answer 84

- If D is under no legal obligation to retain and deal with property which has been delivered to him, he can lawfully do what he likes with it, and it is incapable of being stolen, as are its proceeds. This is ordinarily the position where money is lent; it is not always easy to determine whether D was under an obligation to retain and deal or at liberty to dispose of the property entirely as he wished. Property received for a particular purpose: If there is no legal obligation on D to retain and deal with the property in a particular way, it is his to do as he likes with, and it cannot be theft for him to do what he entitled to do, because he has been delivered or gifted the property. But where there is such an obligation, it seems right that the property should be capable being stolen by D. eg where D agrees to do certain work for £100 and fails to do the work or return the money, there is a breach of contract under the civil. But where there is no contract eg D is given money to buy materials, not returning the money or the materials would constitute theft.

Answer 85

Hall 1973- D, a partner in a firm of travel agents, had received money from V and others as deposits for flights to the USA. The flights never happened and the deposits, paid into companies general trading account, were never returned. CA held that he had acted dishonestly in spending the deposits but quashed conviction for theft on the ground that D had not received the money to be spent in a particular way under obligation. This shows if D owes money to V and dishonestly disposes of his assets when the time comes for payment to V, and he had no funds from which to meet his debts, he will not be under an obligation for the purposes of s5(3). - He would still be liable under the civil law. - The crucial issue for similar cases is whether D was given money for use in a particular circumstance

Answer 86

D steals the excess of his wages if he dishonestly appropriates it, if there is a mistake which D and V are both unaware of, D cant be taken to have committed theft until he gets mens rea (dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive). - A-Gs reference no 1 of 1983- Ds salary was paid into her bank account by direct debit and she was mistakenly overpaid by £74.74. The ‘money in the bank’ was hers to spend as she pleased but she was under an obligation to repay the equivalent value to her employers. Subject to her dishonesty, she was guilty of theft if she failed to return it. - there must be legal obligation to return the property.

Answer 87

- D IS NOT DISHONEST, WHETHER REASONABLY OR NOT, WHEN HE BELIEVES THAT HE HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO DO THE ACT WHICH IS ALLEGED TO CONSTITUTE AN APPROPRIATION OF THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER. The prosecution must disprove any belief raised by the defence. It is now a jury question whether a moral belief will suffice for the defence, as the act only makes reference to a belief that he has a legal right to appropriate as he does

Answer 88

1) was what was done dishonest according to the standards of the reasonable and honest person? If no, D is not guilty, if yes: 2) Did the defendants realise that the reasonable and honest person regard what he did as dishonest (subjective)? If yes, he is guilty, if not, no guilt. Ivey v Genting persuasive but not a criminal case.

Answer 89

In Ghosh, D was a surgeon who had claimed fees for work that others in the NHS had carried out. He felt he was entitled to the money because it was the equivalent of what he was already owed for his other work.

Answer 90

- “1) What was Ds knowledge or belief as to the facts? (subjective test, the reasonableness of the belief is a matter of evidence of the belief being genuinely held) - 2) In light of the conclusion in relation to 1), was Ds conduct honest or dishonest applying the objective standards of ordinary decent people?”

Answer 91

- Section 6(2) provides: “Without prejudice the generality of subsection 1 above, where a person, having possession or control (lawfully or unlawfully) of property belonging to another, parts with the property under a condition as to its return which he may not be able to perform this (if done for purposes of his own and without the others authority) amounts to treating the property as his own to dispose of regardless of the others rights’

Answer 92

It is not a theft or a fraud to take a film away from its rightful owner purely for the purpose of copying, then to return it. Per curiam: section 6 should only be referred to in exceptional cases only. D, a cinema projectionist, took films away from the cinema for his associates to copy on video. He returned them before their absence was noticed. D and his associates were indicted for conspiracy to defraud. Held, allowing the appeal, that (1) s.6(1) required an intention to return the thing in such a changed state that it had lost all its goodness or virtue; the borrowing had not been for such a period or in such circumstances as amounted to the equivalent of an outright taking or disposal and there was no theft. “A defendant takes things and then offers them back to the owner for the owner to buy if he wishes. If the taker intends to return them to the owner only upon such payment, then, on the wording of s6(1) that is deemed to amount to the necessary intention to permanently deprive”

Answer 93

V, a manager, took GBP 1,050 from a safe at work without permission and in breach of company rules. He claimed to police that he had lent the money to a friend and expected to return it on the following Monday. He appealed against the conviction for theft on the ground that he had no intention permanently to deprive the owner of the money, albeit that he would not be able to replace the exact notes or coins taken. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the trial judge had correctly ruled that V's intention to repay the money (with different notes or coins) did not afford V a defence. He had the requisite intention permanently to deprive. He had no intention to return the objects he had taken.

Answer 94

- Appropriation/ any issues of consent, assumption of any rights suffice following Morris - Dishonesty with regards to Ghosh and Iver Genting - Property, is it capable of theft? - Intent to permanently deprive- handling or dealing without regards to the other persons rights, parting with property as to a condition of its return etc

Answer 95

Collins is the most important case here. V invited D into her home when he climbed her to her window via ladder in an attempt to rape her. He had a boner and it was contested whether he was ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the window when she invited him in. They had sex and then she realised it wasn’t her boyfriend. His conviction was quashed on account that the judges held that the entry must be ‘substantial and effective’ but this doesn’t appear to represent the law now. If Collins knew that the victim didn’t know he wasn’t her boyfriend, he would be guilty have intentionally entered as a trespasser. - Collins also sets out a principle that D knows facts or is reckless towards facts which would make him a trespasser (for which this case is authoritative) - The entry now does not need to be substantial and effective for D to achieve their ulterior purpose, and therefore Collins is not authoritative for this.

Answer 96

- In Jones and Smith, the occupier’s son D, had general permission to enter his fathers house. He entered the house with E for the purpose of stealing, constituting burglary. D had knowingly exceeded the permission granted to him by his father, rendering him a trespasser. - Even if D was not outside of his fathers permission, his accomplice certainly was. D had gone further than the general permissions which were granted to him, entering as a trespasser at the dead of night with the intent that he would steal or attempt to do so.

Answer 97

Burglary requires that D knew or was reckless to the facts which render him a trespasser (Collins). If D had an honest belief of a right to enter, no matter how unreasonable, the prosecution would have to prove otherwise. - It must be proved that D either: 1) entered with intent to steal, inflict GBH or unlawful damage to the building or anything therein 2) Entered and committed or attempted to commit stealing or inflicting GBH or unlawful damage - It must be proved that D had the requisite intention upon entering; Ds intention may be conditional at the time of entry, but this is no defence. It is a crime of INTENTION and recklessness that entering the building will lead to the ulterior offence being committed won’t suffice

Answer 98

Valujeys:- The defendants, Mr Valujevs and Mr Mezals, were unlicensed gangmasters who supplied agricultural work, transport and accommodation to migrant workers from Latvia and Lithuania. It was alleged that the defendants required workers to rent rooms from them as a condition of work, at rates far above the market cost. When workers were unable to keep up with these inflated payments, work was withheld. Once in significant debt, wages earned by workers were withheld or subject to deductions by the defendants in order to ‘pay back’ their financial debt. Significance- someone who commits fraud by deception must be in a fiduciary position or a position 'akin to fiduciary' ie someone consistently expected to respect the financial interests of the victim. Other examples would be a financial advisor or real estate agent.

Answer 99

Knowing that the representation is or might be false: - Knowledge is a strict form of MR, more so that belief, suspicion, recklessness or reasonable grounds to believe. THIS IS A SUBJECTIVE TEST- REASONABLE PERSONS UNDERSTANDING IS NOT NECESSARY - He will only be guilty if he is misleading or gives a falsity, in a way which is dishonest applying the understanding in ivey v genting/ Ghosh

Answer 100

- Dishonesty - make a gain for himself or another - or incur a loss or expose to a risk of loss - false representation= untrue or misleading

Answer 101

-To wound:To Wound: - The continuity of the whole skin must be broken to constitute a wound. Breakage of the skin is the vital element, not merely the outer skin or inner skin, but always both. The wound should be directly inflicted (whether via a weapon or instrument or not) through a battery or otherwise. - Maliciously- D acts with malice if he intends or foresees a risk and takes the risk unjustifiably. The level of harm foreseen by D must be some harm, not serious harm. - Subjective recklessness as in G and another should be used.

Answer 102

-GBH inflicted-GBH is to mean any harm which seriously interferes with health or comfort, but smith ensures that the word grievous still retains its normal meaning. Inflict- Unlike in the past, where inflict connoted a physical assault, it has been held that inflict is to be treated more as a synonym for causation, in that there is no material difference in meaning as per Ireland. Maliciously-D acts with malice if he intends or foresees a risk and takes the risk unjustifiably.

Answer 103

74 “Consent” For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.

Answer 104

Facts-A, aged 25, and B, aged 19, had both voluntarily consumed a large amount of alcohol and it was accepted by both parties that they would have sex after. A was charged with rape on the basis that she was unconscious throughout most of it, but B gave evidence that she had consented and was conscious. Significance- voluntary consumption of large quantities of alcohol does not default to ones inability to consent to sex. If they remained conscious and capable of consenting, this would suffice as evidence. - if one falls unconscious despite consenting to sex, A becomes liable for rape as presumed lack of consent is triggered, when A becomes aware of Bs unconsciousness he must cease the act, or he will be guilty. - Also shows the operation of the evidential presumptions proved in SOA 2003- they are evidential presumptions for a lack of consent, but on their own are not conclusive to found guilt for a sexual offence.

Answer 105

- Murder - arson/ criminal damage with intent to endanger life - s18 wounding/ intentionally causing GBH

Answer 106

- Whilst D knew he was HIV positive, V had supposedly impliedly consented to the risks associated with unprotected sex, including the risk of infection and unintended pregnancy. - In order to protect personal and sexual autonomy, it would be wrong to criminalise all the risks associated with sexual intercourse. - There is no conviction where V provides informed consent to the risk, in order to uphold personal autonomy, but where there is a lack of informed consent, and D is reckless as to transmission of disease, this should warrant liability for a GBH charge following Konzani. This is however not relevant to a charge for a sexual offence, following R v EB

Answer 107

R v EB argues that consent to sex without knowing the HIV status of the other party, where he fails to disclose his status, will only be relevant to the consent to GBH or the risk of GBH, rather than being a factor relevant to consent to sex, which V is said to have done. - This is the underlying argument as to whether non-disclosure or active deception can be considered a factor which vitiates consent, either through the definition of consent in s74, or through deception as to the nature and/ or purpose of the sex. - It is the law coms extension of the s3 charge under SOA 1956 which might rectify this problem, as it would be a crime to procure sex by deception, in this case deception as to the HIV status (actively lying) but this would not lead to unfair labelling problems advanced by Ashworth, whereby D could not be considered a rapist under this charge.

Answer 108

- For a charge under s20 of OAPA, for malicious wounding or for causing GBH, there must be intention or foresight or causing some harm. Malicious in malicious wounding includes recklessness - In savage, D was not reckless towards malicious wounding when the beer glass slipped from her hand and cut Vs wrist; therefore a s20 offence was replaced with s47 offence of assault occasioning ABH, because there is no further MR necessary than simply what is required for assault or battery; the AR only changes in that the battery causes the ABH and the bodily harm be less than grievous but more than trivial and transient.

Answer 109

Facts- G planned to be rehoused and to do so he douses his house in petrol and lit it, to burn his house down and reclaim. He’d planned to rescue the other inhabitants in the house, but they had died due to the speed by which the flames had spread. Principle- The Unlawful act need not be aimed at a specific person, so long as it is objectively viewed as being performed dangerously because there was a risk of SOME harm.

Answer 110

Making off without payment. (1) Subject to subsection (3) below, a person who, knowing that payment on the spot for any goods supplied or service done is required or expected from him, dishonestly makes off without having paid as required or expected and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due shall be guilty of an offence. (2) For purposes of this section “payment on the spot” includes payment at the time of collecting goods on which work has been done or in respect of which service has been provided.

Answer 111

- Perhaps it is important that someone with a warped yet honest belief in their act should not escape liability. Property defences serve a purpose of protecting valuable assets, whether they are economically valuable or of sentimental value; penal actions under the criminal law should be taken when the rights over such assets are compromised without good reason or consent, whether or not D thinks his actions are honest. - Drawbacks- the standards of the reasonable man in regards to dishonesty cannot easily be ascertained, with different agents attributing different levels of honesty to different acts; one who purchases goods at massively undervalued prices, due to imperfect knowledge between parties to the transaction may be considered dishonest by one party, yet the other would recognise this as economical market failure, which is inherently non-criminal.

Answer 112

Drawback-The fact that D can set his own standard, and the more grossly warped understanding of morals and honesty he holds, the more likely he will be excused for his actions. The criminal law should discourage behaviour which goes on to impede on the rights and autonomy of citizens, where there is no reasonable belief in consent or honesty -However, in its general sense, dishonesty implies that D acts in a way which he knows is not in-line with an objective moral threshold in society. How can one be dishonest when, subjectively, they are acting with honesty, a genuine (although maybe unreasonable) belief in their actions? Movement towards a purely objective test may be unsatisfactory for this very reason; D’s inability to appreciate his behaviour as dishonest would not be considered, and thus, going by the meaning of the word of dishonest as connoting a guilty state of mind, D would be guilty without necessarily having mens rea

Answer 113

Facts- Cheshire shot a man during the course of an argument. The victim was taken to hospital to have surgery and shortly after developed respiratory issues. The doctors inserted a tracheotomy tube, which remained in place for four weeks and initially improved the victim’s condition. Several days later the victim complained of respiratory issues, his condition soon worsened and he died shortly afterwards. D charged with murder. Significance- departing from R v Jordan, the court does now not need to compare the competing causes of death in assessing whether negligent medical treatment broke the chain of causation; now it has to be a very high degree of negligence to preclude D from liability; the treatment had to be so independent of the wound/ injury for it to break the chain of causation. Negligent medical treatment will not break the chain of causation in the majority of cases.

Answer 114

When D enters as a trespasser (knowledge or recklessness as to being present without a reasonable belief in consent (or a genuine belief in a legal right to enter)) with one of the requisite intentions for the 3 substantive offences.

Answer 115

Confidential information cannot be stolen, and intangible property does not cover everything which is not in physical existence- other intangible property eg confidential information could be covered by the civil law. Confidential information may exist in coded/ digital form

Answer 116

(1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence. (2) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether belonging to himself or another— (a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and (b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered;shall be guilty of an offence. (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson.

Answer 117

Threats to destroy or damage property. A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other would fear it would be carried out,— (a)to destroy or damage any property belonging to that other or a third person; or (b)to destroy or damage his own property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of that other or third person; shall be guilty of an offence.

Answer 118

-This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person. D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) which—constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. - The LOSC need not be sudden - It is to be disregarded to the extent that Ds fear of serious violence arose from D inciting V to act in this manner, or the justifiable sense of being seriously wronged and circumstances of an extremely grave character, or solely on the discovery of sexual infidelity, or to - Ds LOSC was attributed to a considered desire for revenge. - characteristics relevant to D are all those other than those which bear on his ability to exercise self-control and restraint.

Answer 119

D had a recognised medical condition which substantially (R v Gold) impaired his ability to do ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS: appreciate the nature of his conduct, form a rational judgement and exercise self-control. -It must also provide an explanation for Ds killing or being party to a killing (applies to an accomplice as well).

Answer 120

keane- reasonableness and proportionality were treated as synonymous here. Facts were that D had attacked his driver after thinking that he was going to attack him, because D had pushed the original woman to the ground. Where the defendant was the aggressor or deliberately provokes the victim into punching him, there is no guaranteed right to rely on self-defence.

Answer 121

Ray- Ray held that proportionality was the test to be considered with regards to household case, and that any act by D in response to household violence or threat is not firstly to be judged as to whether its reasonable given the threat, but instead whether its proportionate to the threat. - On account of being disproportionate, this does not preclude it from still being found reasonable. It has to be grossly disproportionate to be considered unreasonable in every case, and where it is disproportionate, it is for the jury to decide whether this is reasonable or not.

Answer 122

Facts- D had gone round to Vs house and cut off a substantial amount of her hair; namely her whole ponytail Significance- this amounted to a charge under s47 of OAPA for assault occasioning ABH because 1) 'bodily' is to be construed as the whole body, including the organs, nervous system, brain and the hair on the scalp and 2) the cutting of hair was more than trivial and transient, bruising or breaking of the skin was not required for the charge. The cutting was actual on account of being substantial, not merely insignificant or transient.

Answer 123

maliciously means recklessly, and the recklessness is such that D only foresees that his actions might cause some harm, not serious or GBH. For ABH, no more is needed to be foreseen than the actual assault or battery ie they may be guilty of assault occasioning ABH whilst only intending or being reckless as to an assault alone.

Answer 124

- Inflict is synonymous with causation - Psychiatric harm can count for GBH or ABH, so long as it results in a recognised medical conditional rather than merely mental disturbance.

Answer 125

- That D is under a duty act where they have contributed to the life threatening situation of V, and therefore should take reasonable steps to mitigate the adverse effects of their actions - The law doesn't generally impose liability for omissions, but it certainly does where D is under a duty to act after contributing to life-threatening circumstances. D is therefore expected to undertake (objectively) reasonable steps to mitigate the effect of their actions.

Answer 126

- If there is no duty to act, an omission is lawful where it results in death. This is the case when living is NOT in the best interests of the victim and the doctor omits to continue to keep him alive. V must also be unable to consent - However, Euthanasia is not lawful at common law, and turning off a life support machine to end suffering and cause death is not synonymous with a doctor administering drugs which are virtually certain to accelerate death but also alleviate pain. Actively causing death to alleviate suffering is not lawful ie a lethal injection or turning of a life-support machine where D is capable of consenting and it is not in his best interests. - Omitting to save the life of someone who's best interest is death is lawful instead.

Answer 127

- D believes that him or someone who D can reasonably be construed as responsible for is under the threat of death or serious bodily injury. - It must be both a reasonable belief in the threat (even if no threat in fact exists) and his reaction must too be reasonable. Someone of reasonable firmness and exercising a reasonable degree of tolerance would not have given in to the threat of harm or death would preclude D from accessing the defence, because his actions would be considered unreasonable and non-excusable.

Answer 128

- It must be held that D felt subject to the immediate threat of death or serious injury; the evasive action he could take but chooses not to won't preclude him from guilt; it needs to be judged whether the threat was still operating when D committed the substantive offence. - Hasan shows that the element of immediacy is the 'cardinal feature' of the defence.

Answer 129

1)Reckless crimes being basic whilst intention crimes being specific- rape is basic intent but requires intention as to penetration. Could be two elements of the offence, such as rape, which have different mens Rea as to AR Components 2)Defence applying to the relevant MR that was mistaken by D. direct the jury that the defendant has a defence if he is mistaken or has no MR of the specific intent part of the crime but has MR for the basic element? Very confusing for the jury to apply, hard to determine which part D failed to exercise on account of his intoxication. (LAW COM PROPOSAL) 3)Ulterior intent test- something which hangs of the end ie wounding with intent to do GBH or arson with at least recklessness as to whether life be endangered (aggravated arson). Wouldn't accommodate for murder, which is often the main offence which should be protected by this defence, in that the court must find MR or else he is convicted of manslaughter.

Answer 130

In s44, D intends to assist or encourage D, and intends that it will help, even if they do not believe that it actually will be committed. He must be reckless as to P acting with the requisite mens Rea, as well as to circumstances rendering it an offence. In s45, there is a more serious mens Rea, where D does an act capable of assisting or encouraging, and he believes that the act will be committed and he believes his act will assist or encourage. The effect on the world from his act is more serious than s44 and therefore the mens Rea involves higher culpability, because he intends to help and believes that he actually will help In s 44 he does not need any foresight or belief that the offence be committed. -Again, D must do an act capable of A or E, believe that it will be committed, be reckless as to P acting with MR and be reckless as to circumstances rendering it an offence.

Answer 131

1) Only direct intention exists 2) Intention gives the jury a choice, you may find intention it requires that D foresees it as a virtual certainty and it is in fact a virtual certainty. 3) Foresight of virtual certainty is equatable to intention.

Answer 132

Howe for murder and Gotts for attempted murder.

Answer 133

- It does not provide that in all cases where one of these evidential presumptions applies, that there is a presumed lack of consent ie it is not conclusive, but evidence from which a jury may infer a lack of reasonable belief in consent. - Their may be a difference for strangers compared to people in relationships or marriage as to whether there is a reasonable belief in consent, given the circumstances,

Answer 134

"Ciccarelli. In this case D went back to his flat with his girlfriend and another girl and then performed sexual acts on the other girl whilst she was sleeping. The court distinguished between 'virtual strangers' and people in a relationship who might have reasonable belief in consent even if someone was asleep." do not copy word for word

Answer 135

That D intended to deceive V as to the nature or purpose of the sexual act, or that D intended to impersonate a person known to V in order to procure sexual intercourse.

Answer 136

-That a plea of insanity must arise from something which can comfortably be considered an internal factor; a disease of the mind, such as epilepsy. Any disease of the mind or internal factor (which is a recognised medical condition) can suffice for a plea of insanity, but not for sane automatism.