Criminal Law All cases Flashcards
Parker 1977 Facts and significance (reckless)
Facts- D slammed the phone down in a phone box in a fit of rage, causing criminal damage
Significance- held that he could be guilty for recklessly causing criminal damage, and the judge extended the definition to include one who closes there mind to the obvious fact to the risk of damage. If he has closed his mind to something, he has firstly recognised its existence, and that will suffice.
Stephenson 1979 facts and significance (recklessness)
Facts- Man with Schizophrenia set fire to hay to keep him warm as he slept,
Principle- eventually acquitted of criminal damage because subjective recklessness was the correct approach and his mental impairment impeded his ability to recognise a risk
Caldwell 1982 Facts and significance (recklessness)
Facts- drunk man set fire to hotel, guilty of aggravated arson as reckless as to whether life was endangered.
Principle- modified reckless to be an objective test, where someone is judged against the standard of the reasonable person and therefore his intoxication was not taken into account as to whether it would affect his ability to foresee a risk.
R v G and another facts and significance (recklessness)
[leading authority]
Facts- two children set fire to newspaper and left it under a bin, which set fire to a shop and caused criminal damage
Principle- reaffirmed that recklessness was a subjective test and circumstances such as age and mental capacity would affect someones ability to foresee a risk. Couldn’t be compared the reasonable man.
Facts and significance of Steane 1947? (intention)
Facts- D was convicted of intentionally assisting the enemy when he broadcast on German tv during the war.
Principle- his actions were virtually certain to help the enemy but he had no purposive or direct intent to do so, it was so at odds with his ulterior motive that a conviction was this crime would be unsafe, considering his family were threatened to make him work.
Chandler V DPP facts (intention)
Facts- Defendants convicted of conspiracy under the official secrets act for immobilising an air base to contest the use of nuclear weapons. They were said to be acting in the best interest of the government, but there intention was simply to disrupt the air base, and they were convicted under the official secrets act, despite their apparent motivations.
Principle- courts aren’t concerned with motive, and so motive is not synonymous with intent
Moloney 1985 facts and significance? (Intention)
Facts- A man was acquitted of murder but charged with manslaughter after shooting his father with a shotgun in an intoxicated state. The case rests on the intent of D to kill V, and it was held that the death of V was not foreseen as virtually certain from D shooting the shotgun in the close vicinity of V.
Applied test in Nedrick: two questions- 1) was death or GBH a natural consequence of Ds action
2) Did D foresee this as a natural outcome.
If yes to both questions, the jury may infer intent for murder, but in the absence of this, they are unable to. Furthermore, they are not bound by law to infer the requisite intent on account of it being the natural and probable consequence of their actions. (criminal justice act 1967)
Hancock 1986 facts and significance? (intention)
Facts- striking miners charged with murder but substituted for manslaughter when they pushed a block off a bridge and it killed a taxi driver
Principle- foresight could not be equated with intention The fact that killing or doing bodily harm had happened was not enough to satisfy the intention for murder, there is a subjective element as to whether this was intended by the defendant.
-Foresight is at best evidence by which the jury might infer intention, not an alternative form of it.
Woolin 1999 facts and significance (intention)
Facts- man threw baby at pram in a fit of rage, it died after it clarted off the wall
Principle- murder substituted with manslaughter, foresight of virtual certainty was at best evidence which a jury may use to infer intention, but could not be equated.
–If they find A and they find B, then they may find C. C is neither A, nor B, nor a combination of the two, but merely a possible inference drawn from the existence of both A and B.
Facts and significance of stone and Dobinson? (omission)
Facts- S and D had taken a lodger, S’s half sister, cared for her, fed her and washed her with the help of a neighbour, she died eventually
Principle- manslaughter by omission was possible where there was a duty of care owed and the defendants omitted to take the steps excepted of the reasonable person to help the victim. Had they not assumed some right of care over the lodger they wouldn’t have been guilty by mere omission; the law does not impose duties to act where no duty is owed.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993 facts and significance (omission)
Facts-Bland was injured in the Hillsborough disaster and was in a permanent vegetative state. He could breathe on his own but required a feeding tube and constant care. The doctors that were treating bland were granted approval to remove the tube, and Bland died as a result.
Significance-It is not lawful to cause or accelerate death, but to withhold life-prolonging treatment differs from the administration of a drug which shortens or ends the life of V.
-V could not consent to any continuation or withdrawal of treatment, and ceasing treatment was in his best interests; therefore this act/ omission was lawful.
Miller facts and significance (omissions and negligence)
Facts- D fell asleep with a lit ciggy in his, woke up, saw he’d set fire to the mattress and then left it to continue to burn
Principle- crime by omission possible where someone had adverted to the risk which they had created and failed to mitigate its effect
- As with R v Evans 2009, where D contributes to life threatening state of affairs, he is under a legal duty to mitigate this effect.
- Negligence was a test of objectiveness.
- Miller rationale also relevant where someone ceases an action but it continues to have effect eg here there was no continuing action of lighting the mattress on fire, and this was a result of the single action of dropping the cigarette, yet it continued to have effect and therefore D was under an obligation to mitigate the adverse effects of his action.
Fagan v MPC 1969 facts and significance (coincidence of AR and MR and omissions)
Facts- man drove car onto foot of policeman, became a battery when he adverted (gained mens Rea) and refused to remove it, verbally abusing policeman too
Principle- Ar and MR had to coincide for him to be guilty of the battery
- -His act against the policeman was a continuing act which F failed to end on the discovery that he was committing the offence against the policeman
- The offence could not be committed via an omission, but the act of driving onto the foot and refusing to cease the act was a continuing act.
Hughes [2013] UKSC 56
(Sine qua non/ substantial cause) facts and significance?
Facts- H was driving without insurance and crashed into V, an insured driver driving on the wrong side of the road under the influence of drugs
Principle- causing death whilst uninsured was a strict liability offence, but held on appeal that he had to actually have caused the death, the defendant had to be shown to have done something or omitted to do something to be charged for his contribution to death to be more than minimal
Taylor 2016 UKSC 6 facts and significance??
Facts- Taylor had taken a friends van without permission, and was over the legal alcohol limit, when a mans scooter had collided with the van and the driver was killed.
Significance- Taylor was charged with aggravated vehicle taking and causing death whilst uninsured.
-The causing death whilst uninsured charge was dropped because, following Hughes, the driver was not out fault with his driving, and therefore had not CAUSED the death, it was once again a state of affairs.
Williams 1992 facts and significance? (Flight and fright )
Facts- a hitchhiker was picked up by 3 people, and proceeded to jump from the car as he felt he was being threatened by the defendants
Principle-
Significance- in first instance judge should’ve directed jury as to whether the reaction to jump out of the vehicle was reasonably foreseeable given the actions of the others in the vehicle. Chain of causation was broken
–there was a lack of evidence as to gravity of the threat, as in the apparent threats of asking for money or leaving did not constitute to a reasonable person jumping out of the car voluntarily and of free will
Jordan 1956 facts and principle?
Facts- V died from a stab wound from D, D charged with murder. Medical evidence showed the actual death was caused by administration of a drug with V was intolerant too and also too much liquid- due to misadministration by the doctors, who had failed to effectively communicate the condition and allergies of the victim.
Significance- -the medical intervention was deemed to constitute to ‘novus actus interveniens’, as had the medical treatment been ‘normal’ it’s unlikely that the victim would’ve died. The stab wound was no longer an operating and substantial cause of death, and this maladministration between the two doctors was instead a break in the chain of causation.
Hayward facts and significance??
flight and fright
Facts- D chased his wife, V, into the road, shouting at her and issuing threats of violence. A medical condition meant she reacted to the shock and died. D charged with manslaughter.
Significance- a pre-existing medical condition won’t break the chain of causation, D still liable for her death. Must take victim as found.
Smith 1959 facts and significance
Intervening acts or events
Facts- soldier stabbed in bayonet fight with another soldier, dropped on way to medical tent and given abnormal medical treatment.
D charged with murder and upheld.
Significance- the stab wound was still an operating and substantial cause of death at the time despite the dire medical treatment which was bad but not extraordinary so as to break the chain of causation.
Roberts (1972) (intervening acts and events)
Facts- girl jumped from car after being sexually assaulted by the driver, who made sexual threats and attempted to remove her coat
Significance- Assault occasioning ABH upheld because the actions of the girl were reasonably foreseeable, even if they weren’t foreseen by the driver
- Her response was in the range of reasonably foreseeable options available to the girl.
- She had not jumped under free, willing and voluntary conditions and therefore did not break chain of causation of driver.
Blaue 1975 (medical case) (intervening acts and events)
Facts- V was stabbed by D and refused life-saving treatment due to being jevovas witness.
Significance- D must take V as found, omitting to save their own life does not break the chain of causation. Stab wound was still operating and substantial cause of death.
Kennedy (No 2) 2008
Facts- A prepared a syringe of heroin and handed it to B, who self-administered the drug and died. A was convicted of manslaughter and supplying class A drugs, but appealed to the AC.
ignificance- -A was acquitted of manslaughter because whilst he supplied the drugs to B he could not be guilty of
unlawfully administering a drug contrary to section 23 of the 1861 Act as it was not him who actually administered the drug. B had made a voluntary and informed decision to self-administer
-Adults of sound mind are presumed to hold personal autonomy and undertaking a free, deliberate and informed decision could warrant no liability for anyone else in this situation
Pagett 1983 (policeman as innocent third party)
Facts- D was acquitted of murder but charged for manslaughter after firing at police, whilst using a pregnant girl as a body shield. The police shot back in self-defence and the girl was killed
Significance–the action of an innocent third party (the police firing back in self-defence) did not constitute to a Novus actus interveniens, and therefor did not break the chain of causation for the defendant even if he did not physically shoot the girl himself.
–even if he wasn’t the sole or main reason for her death he was still guilty of manslaughter and his assaults qualified as the actus reus for this
Hancock 1986 facts and significance
Facts- A taxi driver was killed when a concrete block was thrown onto the motorway. Murder was decided before the Lords substituted for manslaughter
Significance- A taxi driver was killed when a concrete block was thrown onto the motorway. Murder was decided before the Lords substituted for manslaughter
–the higher the probability of an outcome, the more foreseeable it would be to the defendant, and the more foreseeable it was, the more likely there was to be intention, however this was only evidence of intention and does not constitute intention.
Morhall [1996] 1 A.C. 90 (cases for provocation under old common law)
Facts-D was convicted of murder after stabbing V, who criticised him for his solvent abuse. Under the 1957 Homicide act the judge directed the jury to apply the test of the reasonable man’s reaction but were told to exclude his solvent abuse addiction
Significance- -as shown by this case, the intention of this [HA 1957] statute was to allow characteristics of the defendant to be given weight in assessing the gravity of his provocation and subsequent reaction. Not merely assessing the reactions of the reasonable man, but that this reasonable man shares characteristics of the defendant which may change the effect of provocation to said defendant
Attorney general for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580 (provocation under the common law)
Facts- D and V were both alcoholics who often got into arguments when they drank together. V made comments about Ds self-esteem and taunted him as he held an axe saying ‘you haven’t got the guts’. D struck V and she died. D was originally charged with murder in the court of appeal of jersey and then substituted for manslaughter in the UK AC, using the defence of provocation
Significance- Privy council ruled that Smith was wrongly decided and that there was a distinction to be drawn between those characteristics of D which affect the gravity of the provocation that he faced (characteristics were important) and the characteristics relating to the ability to exercise self-control (not relevant).
Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2; [2013] Q.B.
Voluntary manslaughter under new laws
Facts- Clinton killed his wife because of her sexual infidelity, convicted of murder and arson (life imprisonment).
Significance- Where D loses self control solely on the discovery of sexual infidelity, he loses the partial defence, but where sexual infidelity is one factor which plays into a complex range of emotions which might cause D to lose self-control, it should still be admissible as evidence.
- If it plays part of a more complex set of motivations or context eg abuse, it should not void the defence of LOSC.
Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322
Voluntary manslaughter under new laws
Facts- Dawes has stabbed V after an altercation when finding him asleep on a sofa with his wife. The judge found that the defence of LOSC did not qualify because D had incited the conflict with V, and so no trigger was applicable to him, as expressly put in section 55 6(b)
-His appeal against the murder conviction was not allowed.
Significance- Lack of evidence to suggest that he had actually incited the violence but also lack of evidence that he had in fact lost control; loss of control is subjective in that it is not enough that the reasonable person in Ds situation would’ve lost control themselves. D must have personally lost control to begin qualification for the partial defence.
Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim facts and principle? (Diminished responsibility)
Facts- D stabbed V 60 times, attempting to rely on diminished responsibility under his acute intoxication which was a recognised medical condition. Murder upheld and appeal dimissed
Significance-Acute intoxication did not suffice as a ‘recognised medical condition’ nor was it parliaments intention to replace the law on voluntary intoxication with a lower threshold of diminished responsibility
-Diminished responsibility first had to arise from a recognised medical condition before it could be decided if it satisfied the other tests for diminished responsibility.
Newbury 1977 AC 500
UAM train
acts- Two boys pushed a paving stone off of a railway bridge into the path of a train, smashing through the glass window and killing the security guard inside. They were convicted of manslaughter, with their appeals rejected.
Principle- Reinforced UAM as a constructive crime requiring nothing more than MR towards the basic unlawful act.
the two boys intentionally performed an act which was unlawful and dangerous in the way in which it was performed.
2)the intention unlawful and dangerous act led to the death of the security guard.
3)It was not necessary whether or not the boys foresaw the danger of their acts; an objective test was to be applied as to whether the reasonable sober person would have recognised a risk of some harm to the security guard on the train from the intentional acts of the boys.
Goodfellow [1986]83 Cr App R 23 facts and principle?
Facts- G planned to be rehoused and to do so he douses his house in petrol and lit it, to burn his house down and reclaim. He’d planned to rescue the other inhabitants in the house, but they had died due to the speed by which the flames had spread.
Principle- The Unlawful act need not be aimed at a specific person, so long as it is objectively viewed as being performed dangerously because there was a risk of SOME harm.
Kennedy no 2 facts and principle? (in relation to UAM)
Facts- Heroin was prepared by D and subsequently self-administered by V, who died as a result.
-Manslaughter was given by the court of appeal, but this was quashed on appeal
Principle- D couldn’t be convicted of UAM as he had not jointly administered the heroin with V. V was an adult of sound mind exercising autonomy and a free, willing and voluntary decision.
-D must be proved to have committed the unlawful act before building a case for UAM.
Adomako 1995 (GNM)
Facts-D was an anaesthetist, performing eye surgery, when a tube became detached from a ventilator, leading to V suffering cardiac arrest and dying. D was convicted of GN manslaughter under the breach of duty. Appeals dismissed
Principle-The question for the jury was ‘was the defendants conduct so bad in all circumstances that it ought to amount to criminal’?.
-3 questions of 1) Was there a duty of care owed? 2)Whether there was a breach of that duty? 3)Had that breach of duty caused death? And therefore should this be treated as gross negligence warranting criminal liability.
R v Evans 2009 facts and principle? (heroin half sister)
Facts- E had bought heroin and handed some to her half-sister V, who died later. E thought V looked like she’d taken an overdose and spent the night with her but didn’t call for medical assistance as she didn’t want to get in trouble.
Principle- Someone in the position of E would or ought to have known that they had created this life-threatening state of affairs, and therefor failed to take reasonable steps to divert away from this danger.
D.P.P. v K [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1067 facts and principle?
Facts- K hides acid in school hand-dryer, V uses drier on face and suffers GBH.
Principle- battery need not be directed against a specified person. K was reckless as to another person using the hand drier, and therefore assault occasioning GBH upheld (perhaps wouldn’t be the case now post- R v G)
Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 facts and principle?
CONSENT
Facts- unlawful to inflict ABH or higher on another, even with consent, unless it is beneficial in the view of the public and falls into one of the specified categories, consent is not a defence.
Principle- group of specified activities where consent to ABH was not vitiated (sports, personal adornment, surgery, rough horseplay etc)
Ireland and Burstow [1998] A.C. 147
Psychiatric harm counting as ABH?
Facts- D made several threats against v, including ringing her house with silent phone calls, causing her to apprehend immediate violence. She suffered psychiatric harm as a result.
Significance- The Lords held that psychiatric harm constituted ‘bodily harm’, relevant to s18, 20 and 47 of OAPA, subject to it materialising into a recognised medical condition.
- Silent phone calls could constitute an assault given the wider context of the abuse, as the context and circumstances meant that V could reasonably be said to have apprehended immediate and unlawful violence.
- ‘inflict’ in the statutory provisions wasn’t limited to physical infliction or ‘touching’. More synonymous with causation.
Dica and Konzani general facts and principles?
General facts- Ds were convicted of assault occasioning GBH as they had unprotected sex with women who had consented to unprotected sex, but not the risk of HIV transmission which both defendants were reckless towards.
- Dica won his appeal and the judges ruled that they were not looking to criminalise all risks involved in non-protected sex, looking to protect personal autonomy.
- Konzani didn’t win his appeal and he was convicted of a s20 offence for maliciously causing GBH, as he was aware of his condition and was reckless as to whether he would inflict it on his sexual partners; R v B shows that this is currently only relevant to an OAP rather than sexual offence (vitiating consent), which many academics disagree with.
Principle- Consent to unprotected sex did not follow with implied consent to the risk of HIV that the defendants were reckless to, it was eventually held in Konzani. Where there was no known risk to either party, there could not be a crime if HIV was passed on, but if D foresaw that he could pass it on because he suspected he could be infected, he is likely to have the requisite mens rea.
-The law was not criminalising people having sex where there was a known risk of infection, but as the risk was not known to the victims, and there was no honest belief in consent to the risk on behalf of the defendants, the victims had a case.
Barnes [2005] 1 W.L.R. 910]
Implied consent in sport.
Facts- D had broken Vs leg with a late challenge, appealing against his conviction for inflicting GBH under s20 of OAPA.
Principles- implied consent to ABH or GBH within sport, where players are playing within the parameters of the laws of the game.
-D was first held to have gone over and above the threshold of implied consent for football-related injuries, but this was eventually overturned on appeal
Savage and Parmenter facts and principle?
Assault occasioning ABH
Facts- -D had intended to throw beer at V but the glass had also been thrown, and had smashed and wounded V. D was charged with unlawful and malicious wounding of another under s20 of OAPA 1861. This was substituted for a verdict of assault occasioning ABH under s47 of the same act
Principle- The House of Lords affirmed the second charge on the basis that no further mens rea was required for the Assault occasioning ABH under s47 of OAPA 1861, than merely mens Rea for an assault or battery. It was a constructive crime resting on whether actual bodily harm was to occur or not, which in this case it did even without any relevant recklessness or intention on D’s behalf.
-In the case of GBH, it was required that D subjectively foresee the risk of some harm from their actions, but not serious harm- it could not be committed as a constructive crime where D foresees no risk of harm, whereas a s47 charge requires no further foresight than the risk of causing the assault or battery.
Jheeta [2008] 1 W.L.R. 2582
S76 (nature or purpose) v s74 (definition of consent)
Facts- A deceived B into sexual intercourse with him, saying she would be arrested and he would kill himself if not
Significance- he was not guilty when applying s76 for deceit of the nature or purpose. The nature was sexual and the purpose was for his sexual gratification. He was instead liable for rape due to the lack of consent under the definition given in s74, as she did not have the freedom to consent effectively, which was obvious from the threats that she had submitted to.
B [2013] EWCA Crim 3 facts and significance
reasonable belief in consent compared to pre-2003
Facts- -The defendant’s convictions for raping his partner were safe where there was expert evidence that his mental illness had not affected his ability to understand whether his partner had consented. Even if that were wrong, delusional beliefs that a victim was consenting could not render reasonable a belief that the victim was consenting when they were not.
Significance- -The 2003 act DID NOT MAKE a genuine belief in consent by D enough to raise a defence of consent. IT HAS TO BE AN OBJECTIONABLY VIEWED REASONABLE RELIEF.
-Unless the state of mind amounted to insanity in law, beliefs in consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic illness or personality disorders had to be judged by objective standards of reasonableness and not by taking into account a mental disorder that induced a belief which could not reasonably arise without it
Calhaem 1985 (complicity, counselling, causal connection) C!
Facts-The defendant was convicted of murder under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. She had counselled Z to murder the victim through payment. Z decided not to carry out the murder, going to the house with an unloaded shotgun to give the impression of a murder; but had gone berserk and eventually killed the victim anyway. The defendant appealed her conviction.
Principle–“counselling” did not require any CAUSAL CONNECTION between the counselling and the principal offence (i.e. the actual murder), nor substantial cause. An offence under s.8 was established by the presence of counselling and the principal offence was committed by the person counselled within the scope of the authorisation or instruction (i.e. not by accident).”
Coney 1882- (complicity)
Facts- -Two defendants presence at an illegal fist fight, who were neither involved in the management of the fight or encouragement of the fight (through saying or doing something, or paying for tickets) were charged with abetting the illegal fight
Principle- Mere presence at a crime scene cannot be equated with being an accessory, merely evidence that the jury may wish to use to determine whether their presence of actions constituted encouraging or assisting. Some MR and AR was also required by DD
What does Smith and Hogan say that aiding, abetting, procuring and counselling consists of in terms of causation, consensus and assistance?
- Aiding requires assistance but neither causation nor consensus
- Abetting and counselling requires consensus but not causation
- Procuring requires causation but no consensus
What is the position on conditional intent and what case confirmed it?
SC confirmed in Jogee that D must intent to assist or encourage P to commit the offence, and to act with whatever mental element is required of P.
-SC confirmed that Ds intent can be conditional ie he can intend for another crime be committed conditional on a circumstance, therefore rendering him guilty if that further crime is committed; it is imperative to convey to juries that conditional intent is not a less stringent form of intention and foresight is merely evidence from which the requisite intention can be inferred.
NCB v Gamble1959 1 QB11
(national coal board) facts and principle
(MR of D)
Facts-M, who worked for a haulier firm, had his lorry filled up at a National Coal Board (NCB) colliery. He then drove to a weighbridge where the operator told him that his load was overweight. M, nevertheless, accepted the risk of taking the overload. He was later stopped by the police. Charge appealed
Principle- The Court found that aiding and abetting was proved if there was a positive act of voluntary assistance and knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence. Motive is irrelevant in this case.
The sale was thus completed by the weighbridge operator despite having had knowledge that an offence was being committed. Thus, the NCB’s actions constituted aiding and abetting.
-D knew he had the right to prevent the lorry driving onto the public roads but had omitted to stop him and acted by handing him the ticket, and he knew that his action would help P to commit the crime, even if he was indifferent whether or not he would do so.
Bainbridge 1960 1 QB129 facts and significance?
(MR of D
Facts- D bought oxygen cutting equipment, and P used it to break into a bank. D was convicted before the fact, on the grounds that he knew that its use was for a break in. He appealed
Principle–It is sufficient to prove that the defendant knew of Ps general intention to commit the crime, but no further knowledge of the time and place of the crime. The conviction was upheld based on the fact that D knew the general type of crime that would be committed with the oxygen-cutting equipment.
Maxwell v DPP for N.Ireland 1978 1 WLR 1350
MR of D
Facts- D drove P to the pub, knowing that P was going to try and commit a range of offences, including planting a bomb, shooting people or committing robbery.
Principle- -Following Bainbridge, house of Lords held that there was no specific crime that D needed to be aware of when aiding or encouraging P.
-The principle is that if D Aids or encourages P, knowing that P will commit X, y or Z or a combination of the three, this enough to constitute liability as a secondary party
What is the case which shows recklessness would not suffice for complicity?
Blakely and Sutton:
Facts- B was having an affair with T. At a pub, T told B that he intended to go home to his wife. B discussed this with S, who suggested that if they added alcohol to T’s tonic water, T would not drink and drive. B & S intended to tell him before he left to drive home so that he would not go home. Unfortunately, T (the principal) left before they could tell him and was subsequently found to be over the limit when breathalysed.
Significance- B & S were subsequently convicted of procuring that offence after the magistrates decided that they had been reckless (within the meaning of Caldwell).
-The Court of Appeal quashed their convictions and held that objective recklessness was not enough for liability. The court expressed the opinion that only intention should suffice.
Powell and Daniels 1990 Ac 1 Joint enterprise?
Facts- P, D and another went to Vs house to pick up weed but P ended up shooting V. P and D were both convicted as principals for murder. D said that he was unaware that P had the gun until he used it to kill V. appeals dismissed.
Principle- “Where there is joint enterprise to commit a crime, to found a conviction of murder for a secondary party, it is enough to show that they contemplated that the primary party might kill with intent to do so or cause serious injury. Thus, P and D’s appeal was dismissed.”
-This clearly isn’t the case anymore post jogee
Jogee V the queen 2017 AC 387 facts and significance
Facts- This joint case involved two separate appellants who had been convicted for murder on the basis of joint enterprise, after a co-defendant had actually killed the victim. In the case of Jogee, he had been vocally encouraging the principal while he murdered a police officer. In the case of Ruddock, liability was based on his participation in a botched robbery during which the principal murdered the victim (an act which the principal admitted)
Significance- The court held that in order to prove accessorial liability, it was not sufficient to only prove the necessary mental element, but also the element of conduct.
- This could be discharged by proving that the accessory either assisted or at least encouraged the principal in committing the offence.
- The mental element is discharged by proving that the accessory intended to so assist or encourage the principal. The mental element however is not discharged by mere foresight that the principal might commit an offence.
- Therefore, someone may provide the AR or assisting or encouraging the commission of the crime, but may only foresee that in committing the AR they might help P commit a crime.
Bourne 1952 36 Cr App r125
No convicted principle
Facts-D by duress (threats, violence or both) compelled his wife P to have sex with a dog. She had still committed the offence but was excused from punishment.
Principle- The wife was acquitted of buggery and whilst she had both AR and MR, she had a defence,, whereas D was charged for abetting her to commit buggery
-can be a party to a crime where the principal has a full defence
Cogan and leak 1976 QB 217
no convicted principle
Facts-D terrorised his wife, V, into submitting into sexual intercourse with P. P was convicted of rape and D was convicting as a secondary party, but P had to be acquitted as there were doubts over his mens rea, in that it couldn’t safely be said that he didn’t believe in Vs consent
Principle- D appealed on the basis that as the principal offender had not committed a crime, he could not be a secondary party to that crime.
-Courts held he had the necessary mens rea and had abetted the AR of the offence, which was effectively a substantive offence to procure the commission of the AR of any crime’ S and H
Thorton and Mitchell no convicted principle
Facts-a bus conductor, negligently signalled to the driver of his bus, P, to reverse, killing two pedestrians who D could not see. P was acquitted of careless driving, but D was also acquitted. D had no AR as it could not be said that he had driven the bus, and P had no MR, so there was no crime committed by P, although a case for negligent manslaughter by D was certainly viable.
Principle-Therefore, if there was no AR by P, D could not be convicted of abetting that crime. (he could however sufficiently been found guilty of negligent manslaughter.)
Richards 1984 no convicted principle
Facts- R hired B and S to beat up her husband, V. She gave a signal to them as V was leaving work, and they proceeded to attempt to hospitalise him for a month through the infliction of injuries.
- Vs injuries were not as severe as expected, requiring no hospitalisation.
- B and S were found guilty under s20 of OAPA for inflicting GBH recklessly whereas R was convicted as a principle for s18 of the same act (a felony rather than a misdemeanour). She appealed.
Principle–QB held that someone who was the accessory to an assault could not be an accessory to a more serious event which did not happen, even if they had the MR for that event
-The AR of the more serious event did not happen.
DPP v K and B doli incapax
Facts-The DPP appealed by way of case stated against the acquittal of K and C, two girls aged 14 years and 11 years respectively, of charges of procuring the commission of the offence of rape upon W, aged 14, by an unknown person. It was alleged that K and C had falsely imprisoned, threatened and robbed W. A boy joined the girls, and K and C told W to remove her clothing and have sexual intercourse with the boy. Partial penetration occurred. The boy was never traced
Principle- -Doli Incapax, a defence for minors under the age of 10 who cannot commit a crime, was not put forward to the jury
-Just because the principal in the case could not have had the mens rea as a result of their age, doesn’t meant that the accessories who procured the AR of the principal was exempt from guilt, and just because it was two girls who could not have committed rape (no penile penetration), didn’t excuse them from being guilty as accessories to rape.
Beccera 1976 62 CR App R 212
Limits to liability (withdrawal)
Facts- D handed P a knife so he could use it on anyone interfering with the burglary. D did not make a sufficient withdrawal when V appeared and said to P ‘come on lets go’ and left via a window
-P used the knife on V and D was held to be an accessory to murder for his aid (providing the knife)
Principle- -The defence of withdrawal can only be achieved through an unequivocal communication of withdrawal.
- If D does an act of aiding, abetting, procuring or counselling, he must take the steps necessary to neutralise his involvement, something often left to juries to decide.
- Therefore D is still liable for any assisting or encouraging despite his withdrawal, unless he can neutralise the effect of this.
- D failed to neutralise his involvement, and his decision to leave through the window did not account for any neutralisation
Tyrell 1894 1 QB 710
Limits to liability, victims as parties to crimes.
Facts- D, a girl aged between 13 and 16, abetted P to have intercourse with her. P was convicted under the relevant law at the time, but D was not convicted of aiding or abetting the crime
Principle-D was in the class of people which the law sought to protect, and therefore could not be a secondary party to that crime against herself
What is the importance of A-Gs reference No 1 of 1975 (complicity)
Facts- D had put alcohol in Ps drink, unbeknown to P, who went on to commit a drink driving offence, which was one of strict liability.
Significance- distinguishes procure from aid, abet and counsel because there must be some causal factor in procuring, with procuring meaning to ‘produce by endeavour’. They are NOT synonymous however, but closely linked.
- D knew that P was going to drive or was at least reckless towards it, this may not be the case following Blakely and Sutton.
- It would be different if P knew he had been laced and chosen to drive, applying the Kennedy rationale of autonomous adults exercising free, willing and informed decisions. This would’ve broken the chain of causation.
Pace and Rogers (attempts)
Facts-The facts of Pace and Rogers is that DD were convicted of attempting to conceal, disguise or convert criminal property. They ran a scrap metal business and were approached by undercover police officers attempting to sell them metal, which they suspected might be stolen (reckless as to circumstances) but was in fact not stolen. If it had been stolen, they would’ve committed the substantive offence, so long as they knew or suspected it to be stolen. There was only proof of recklessness towards the metal being stolen, and their appeals were allowed as a result.
Principle- CA took a strict approach, saying even if recklessness was the necessary MR towards the circumstance rendering it illegal, anyone who attempts it must intend that these circumstances are the case. This therefore differs to the wider view held in A-Gs reference, in which the MR of the substantive offence must be held by he who attempts the commission of the offence, even if that MR is mere recklessness
Facts and significance of Khan?
Facts- charged with the attempted rape of a 16-year-old girl, B. A had unsuccessfully tried to engage in sexual intercourse with B. The trial judge directed the jury that the issues relevant to the mens rea for attempted rape were the same as for a charge of rape. It was therefore directed that the offences of both rape and attempted rape require 1) an intention to have sexual intercourse (consequence) and 2) knowledge of, or recklessness as to, the absence of consent (circumstance). The men were convicted and appealed.
Principle-CA held that unless intention was the necessary MR towards the circumstances rendering it illegal, then foresight or recklessness would suffice. So if the substantive offence had a MR requirement of belief or suspicion (eg rape) proof of recklessness will suffice for a charge of attempt.
- with regards to consequences, there must be intention as to the consequence of the substantive crime.
- Under Pace and Rogers principle, recklessness as to the consent of V on Ds behalf would not suffice for attempted rape, why should the failed rapist escape liability for attempting to fulfil the missing elements of rape with the requisite mens rea.
A-Gs reference (No 3 of 1992), what is said about circumstances and consequences?
Facts- DD had thrown petrol bombs at a car and missed, guilty of attempting aggravated arson
Principle– A defendant, in order to be guilty of an attempt, must be in one of the states of mind required for the commission of the full offence, and did his best, so far as he could, to supply what was missing from the completion of the offence. It is the policy of the law that such people should be punished notwithstanding that in fact intentions of defendants have not been fulfilled”
- this extends the scope decided in Khan, in that someone could be reckless as to the consequence but intend the circumstances ie someone who is aware that tampering with another’s property (his land lords tv cabling) but is reckless as to whether the cabling is damaged.
- You have to intend to commit the missing element, and then have the mens Rea with regards to the other element. Whether or not this is compatible with another case depends whether or not the missing element is consequence or circumstance.
Campbell 1991 facts and principle (AR of attempt)
Facts- D was arrested by police when, armed with a fake gun, he approached within a yard of the door of a post office with intent to commit robbery
Principle- . His conviction for attempted robbery was quashed as courts held there was not enough evidence for them to say his acts were ‘properly and safely’ more than merely preparatory, epitomising a very strict approach to the meaning of ‘attempts’. This formed much of the reasoning of the law coms further recommendations for reform.
