Criminal law Flashcards
The purpose of criminal law
(1) protect individuals; (2) preserve order in society; (3) punish offenders
Incapacitation
Depriving of legalcapacity to engage in an act
Deterrence
Discouraging crime
Examples of laws made by judges
(1) Shaw v DPP (1962) - offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals; (2) R v R (1991) - marital rape
Classes of crime depending on where the case will be tried
(1) Indictable offences; (2) Triable either way offences; (3) Summary offences
Indictable offences
Serious; tried in Crown Court, e.g. murder, maslaughter, rape; police can arrest for 24h, prelong for 48h, prelong for 96h (on special permission)
Triable either way offences
either in Crown Court or Magistrate Court; e.g. theft, burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Summary offences
not serious; tried at Magistrates Court; i.e. assaulting policeman in duty; common assault; police can arrest for 24h
Classes of law by source
(1) Common law (judge-made); (2) Statutory law (defined in Acts of Parliament; (3) Regulatory law (set out in delegated legislation)
Elements to be proved by prosecution in offence
Actus reus (physical element) and Mens rea (fault element)
For crimes of strict liability the prosecution must prove
only actus reus
Even if there is actus reus and mens rea defendant may be not guilty if
he has a defence
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)
FACTS: D accidentally drove his car onto police officer’s foot and refused to move the car, he was convicted of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty (this involved proving assault); LAW: The actus reus of assault could be a continuing act so that if D developed the necessary mens rea at any time during that period, he could be guilty of battery
Thabo Meli (1954)
FACTS: Ds attacked a man and believed they killed him, but he died afterwards of exposure; LAW: provided that mens rea and actus reus for murder were combined in a series of acts, D could be guilty
Woolmington v DPP (1935)
FACTS: D wanted to threaten his wife that he would kill himself if she wouldn’t return to him and showed her a gun and accidentally killed her; LAW: When D raises a defence, it is for the prosecution yo negate that defence
Burden of proof + standard of proof (2)
(1) On prosecution + ‘beyond reasonable doubt’; (2) On defendant + of balance of probabilities
ECHR was incorporated to UK law by
The Human Rights Act 1998
Art.6(1) ECHR
Right to fair trial
Art.6(2) ECHR
Presumption of innocence; hence the burden of proof is on prosecution
Art.7(1) ECHR
No punishment without law
Art.3(1) ECHR
Right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment
Art.8 ECHR
Right of respect for a person’s private life
Art.14 ECHR
No discrimination on grounds of sex, race, colour, religion, political opinion
Lambert (2001)
FACTS: D argued that s 28(2) of Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (D should be acquitted if he proves he didn’t know he possessed controlled drugs) meant that he had to prove his innocence what is in breach of art.6(2) ECHR; LAW: It was held s28(2) was imposing only evidential burden on defendant
Brown (1993)
FACTS: Ds consented sado-masochistic acts, but were charged with offences of assault causing actual bodily harm (s 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861) and malicious wounding (s 20); LAW: Consent could not be used as a defence to charges of assault
Wilson (1993)
FACTS: Husband branded his intials on her wife’s buttockes at her request causing harm. Convicted of assault causing actual bodily harm (s 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861); LAW: Consent is a defence, but law should develop on case-by-case basis; on appeal conviction quashed
Actus reus
Physical voluntary element of crime; could be (1) an act; (2) an omission such as negligence; (3) a state of affairs i.e. being found drunk in public place; (4) a consequence i.e. in murder stabbing must result in death (death = actus reus)
Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983)
D was drunk in a public place = actus reus
Larsenneur (1933)
D was considered to be alien under law, was brought back to UK by Irish police; being alien = actus reus
Hill v Baxter (1958)
Examples of involuntary conduct: (1) being stung by bee or stone; (2) having heart attack while driving; (3) another person pushed D causing his action; (4) a reflex action; (5) a muscle spasm
Broome v Perkins (1987)
If defendant knew he could loose controle of his movement i.e. due to health condition = voluntary act
Defence of automatism
D was asleep, his consciousness was impared, or act occured due to reflex, spasm or convulsion
Situations where there is a duty to act (5)
(1) due to relationship such as parent & child (Gibbins & Proctor); (2) under a contract i.e. of employment (Pittwood); (3) due to public office i.e. police officer (Dytham); (4) following dangerous situation created by D (Miller); (5) voluntarily undertaken i.e. care of elderly relative (Stone & Dobinson)
Pittwood (1902)
A railway crossing keeper omitted to shut the gates so that a person crossing the line was struck and killed by train; guilty of manslaughter
Gibbins and Proctor (1918)
A child’s father and his mistress failed to feed a child so it dies of starvation; guilty of murder
Evans (2009)
Mother was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter when she failed to take an action although she knew that V had taken drugs and was ill
Stone and Dobinson (1977)
Ds had undertaken the care of Stone’s elderly sister, guilty of manslaughter in failing to care for her or help her when she bacame helpless
Dytham (1979)
A police officer witnessed a violent attack on the victim, but took no steps to intervene; guilty of willfully neglecting his duty
Miller (1983)
A squatter accidentally started a fire and left when he realised it; guilty of arson
DPP v Santana-Bermudez (2003)
D’s failure to tell police woman that he had a hypoderminc needle which could injury her while she was searching his pockets could amount to actus reus for assault of causing actual bodily harm if she was injured
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993)
Discontinuance of medical treatment where it is in the best interest of the patient is not an omission that can form actus reus
Whether an offence defined by Act of Parliament or statutory instrument can be committed by omission…
is determined by the wording
Causation: proving consequence of an offence
Proving that D’s conduct was (1) the factual and legal cause of that consequence; (2) there was no intervening act which broke the chain of causation
Factual cause
The consequence would not have happend ‘but for’ D’s conduct
White (1910)
D put cyanide in V’s drink intending to kill her; she died of heart attack before drinking it; not guilty of murder, but of attempted murder; D’s act must be factual cause
Legal cause
D’s conduct must be more than minimal cause of the consequence (Cato (1976)) but not necessarily substantial and the only cause
Intervening act
An act breaking chain of causation i.e. act of 3rd party, V’s own act, natural but unpredictable event; must be sufficiently independent of D’s conduct; D is no more responsible for the consequence
Rafferty (2007)
When V’s death was caused by deliberate independent act of 3rd party, D is not responsible for death even if took part in assault
Pagett (1983)
A reasonable response in self-defence does not break the chain of causation; D was firing at policed, so did police and shot V hold by D, D charged with manslaughter
Kennedy No 2 (2007)
Where D has prepared an injection for V, but V self-injects, V’s act breaks the chain of causation
Cheshire (1991) and Jordan (1956)
Medical treatment (even negligent) is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s act and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that D’s acts are insignificant
Blaue (1975)
Jehovah’s witness died after assault because she refused blood transfusion; D must take the victim as he finds him; Thin skull rule - you take victim as you find it
Malcherek (1981)
Switching off a life support machine does not break the chain of causation
Roberts (1971)
If D causes victim to react in a forseeable way, any injury to V will have been caused by D -> Test: was V’s action a natural reasonably forseeable result of what D did?
Williams and Davis (1992)
If V’s reaction is unreasonable, this may break the chain of causation
Liability
Legal responsibility for one’s acts or omissions
Strict liability
Automatic responsibility for damages caused due to possession or use of dangerous things; (1) no need to prove negligence or mens rea; (2) actus reus must be proved; (3) defence of mistake is not available
Absolute liability
Higher level of strict liability, very rare; results from dangerous activities; (1) mens rea is not required; (2) actus reus doesnt have to be voluntary; (3) defence of mistake is not available
The Gammon test
(1) Presumption that mens rea is required for criminal offence (2) This presumption applies to statutoty offences and can be displaced only if statute implies so (3) This happens in issues of social concern and public safety; (4) Even the mens rea can be disregarded if creation of strict liability will help to prevent commission of the prohibited act
Larsonneur (1933)
Absolute liability; D was alien under UK law but was brought to UK by Irish police; LAW: Even if act in not voluntary and lacks mens rea, a state of affairs can amount to absolute liability
Sweet v Parsley (1969)
D rented farmhouse out to students who smoked cannabis there; D was charged with being concerned with cannabis management; LAW: not guilty since had no knowledge and there was a presumption that the offence required mens rea
G (2008)
D aged 15 had sexual intercourse with girl aged 12 but D believed she was 15; D was charged with rape of a child under s 5 of Sexual Offences Act 2003; he appealed and claimed breach of art.6(1)&(2) of ECHR; LAW: The concept of strict liability does not breach human rights
Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd (1984)
Statutory offence; Ds were charged with deviating from building work in a material way from approved plan; LAW: The presumption that mens rea is required can be only displaced if it is clearly the effect of the statute
B (a minor) v DPP (2000)
A minor asked 13 yr old girl to have oral sex with him; he was charged with inciting child to commit gross indecency under s 1(1) of the Indecency with Children Act 1960; LAW: the starting point is that mens rea is required
Sherras v de Rutzen (1895)
D was convicted of supplying liquor to a constable on duty under s 16(2) of the Licensing Act 1872; LAW: Mistake can be defence only if offence is not of strict liability
Harrow LBC v Shah and Shah (1999)
Ds owned a buisnness with lottery, their staff sold a lottefy ticket to minor under 16 contrary to law; LAW: Even if D acts with due diligence, he can be guilty of strict liability offence
Principal offender
(1) his action is immediate cause of actus reus (2) must have mens rea to be guilty (3) there can be more co-principals
Joint principals
(1) both have mens rea and actus reus (2) might be difficult to prove which one did actus reus
Mohan v R (1967)
If offenders have joint purpose; even if one is principal and the other accessory; both guilty of the offence
Accessory
Someone who gives assistance to the perpetrator of a crime without taking part in it
Strudwick (1993)
If both offenders have no joint purpose neither can be convicted
Innocent agent
Person used by principal to do the act; innocent if (1) has no capacity i.e. child; (2) has no mens rea; (3) has defence i.e. insanity
Secondary party (accessory)
Can be guilty of the same crime under s 8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 and s 44 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 if even if principal was acquitted if accessory had actus reus
Bourne (1952)
Accessory can be convicted even if principal is acquitted if the latter has a defence not available to the secondary party
Donnington (1984)
If principal has attempted the main crime then the secondary party can be guiltt as an accessory to the attempt
Gnango (2011)
In a gun battle, V was a by-passer and was shot; LAW: D can be accessory even if he is intended victim of the main crime, since he has no defence under accessorial liability
Bainbridge (1959)
Providing tools to carry out a bulglary before offence is crime; LAW: (1) Helping principal before crime is an offence (2) No need to know details of the offence; mere knowledge about the type of crime is enough as mens rea for secondary participation
Wilcox v Jeffery (1951)
Presence at illegal performance can an offence of abetting
Clarkson and others (1971)
Soldiers were present in a room where woman was being raped; not guilty; LAW: Mere presence at the scene of crime is not enough for secondary participation, there must be intention to encourage
Tuck v Robson (1970)
If there is a duty to control then passive presence may be enough for an offence of abetting
Calhaem (1985)
(1) counseling (advising or encouraging) takes place before commission of the offence (2) no need for casual link between counseling and the commission of the offence
Powell: English (1997)
Powell: killing drug dealer; LAW: (1) Contemplation or foresight that the principal may commit a certain type of offence is enough for mens reas for secondary participation; criticised; (2) If principal does completely different act that was supposed to, then the secondary party is not liable
Rahman (2008)
Many people wanted to kill V, unknown which did the act; all convicted; LAW: Principal’s intention is irrelevant to (1) whether the killing was within the scope of common purpose, and (2) whether P’s act was principally different from what D foresaw
Withdrawal from joint enterprise
Must be clear and effective
Bryce (2004)
Mere regret or remorse unsupported by action demonstrating withdrawal from joint enterprise is insufficient
Steward abd Schofield (1995)
If a secondary party does not forsee or contemplate serious injury or death, he cannot be liable for murder
Uddin (1998)
(1) if all intend serious injury or death, they are all liable for murder; (2) if a very different weapon is used, D is not liable for the death
Principal offender
(1) his action is immediate cause of actus reus (2) must have mens rea to be guilty (3) there can be more co-principals
Inchoate offences
Anticipating or preparatory to a further criminal act, such as (1) encouraging or assisting an offence; (2) conspiracy; (3) attempt
Blackshaw: Sutcliff (2011)
Ds published info encouraging riot; LAW: Placing inciting material on Facebook or other social media can be an offence under Serious Crime Act 2007
Jackson (1985)
Ds shot a man in leg if he was convicted to provide a mitigating factor; charged with conspiring to pervert the course of justice; LAW: Even if the plan involves commission of an offence, but is not an offence itself, defendant is guilty (statutory conspiracy)
Contingency
A future event or circumstance which is possible but cannot be predicted with certainty
Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1975)
D agreed with employees to remove films in cinema for D to make pirate copies; LAW: (1) fraud covers conduct which may not be a substantive criminal offence; (2) it is not necessary to prove that economic loss was suffered, but V’s economic interest must be put at risk; (3) deception is not required
Mens rea of an attempt
Is the same as for the attempt as for completed crime
Easom (1971)
D picked up woman’s handbag and put it back without taking anything; not charged; LAW: D has to intend to commit substantive offence for an attempt to occur
Millard and Vernon (1987)
Ds repeatedly pushed against a wooden fence that could break, but didn’t; not convicted of attempted criminal damage; LAW: D must intend consequences, recklessness with regard to them is not sufficient for the offence of attempt
Shivpuri (1987)
D thought he was dealing in prohibited drugs but wasn’t; convicted of attempt to do so; LAW: Confirmed that attempt to do impossible is an offence
Limitations on capacity
(1) children under age of 10 (2) mentally ill (3) corporations
JTB (2009)
D aged 12 was charged with sexual offences to child aged 13; LAW: Confirmed that children over 10 are responsible for their actions
Corporate liability
By principle of (1) identification (2) vicarious liability (3) breach of statutory duty
Salomon v Salomon (1897)
A corporation is a legal person, so can be criminally liable
Crimes for which a corporation cannot be liable
(1) offences for which only physical punishment is available (2) crimes of physical nature such as bigamy, rape, perjury (3) corporation might be liable as accessory
HL Bolton(Engineering) v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd (1957)
It is neccessary to identify persons being ‘directing mind and will of the company’ since corp has no physical existence
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (1972)
Tesco store advertised washing machine powder at reduced price and due to employee’s negligence was charged with indicating false price after it run out of powder; LAW: (1) only those in senior positions can be ‘controlling mind’ of the corp and can make company liable (2) their acts and intentions are considered as of the whole company
Identification principle
Mens rea and actus reus should be established not against those who acted for or in the name of the company, but against those who were identified as the embodiment of the company
Vicarious liability
Attachment of responsibility to a person for harm or damages caused by another person in either a negligence lawsuit or criminal prosecution; i.e. employer can be liable for his employee’s action
Coppen v Moore (No 2) (1898)
D, owner of six shops instructed employees not to state orgin of the ham sold, but one of them did; D was convicted; LAW: (1) even if employer took reasonable steps to ensure that an offence is not committed he can be liable for employee (2) this occurs when employee did authorised act in unauthorised way
Adams v Camfoni (1929)
D was charged with selling alcohol in his shop after permitted hours, but in fact unauthorised messenger boy did so; D not convicted; LAW: If employee did unauthorised act, the employer cannot be liable
Vane v Yiannopoullos (1965)
D was the licensee of a restaurant and ordered waitress not to sell alcohol under certain conditions, but she did; D not liable; LAW: Delegation of responsibility must be complete for the principal to be vicariously liable
DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch (1975)
D was ordered by terrorist to drive him to a place where T shot a policeman; LAW: Duress defence applies where D’s will has been overborne by serious threats of death or serious injury
Graham (1982)
D helped to kill his wife cuz he was threatened by his homosexual lover; LAW: Duress test: (1) Was D compelled to act as he did? - subjective test (2) Would a sober reasonable person of the same characteristics responded in the same way? - objective test
Wilson (2007)
D aged 13 and his father were charged with killing mother; LAW: Duress defence is not available for murder even if D was aged 13
Hasan (2005)
D associated with drug dealer and claimed that he committed bulglary due to threats; LAW: (1) D must believe in the threat and his believe must be reasonable; (2) Defence of duress does not apply if D could or did forsee the risk of being subject to threat
Bowen (1996)
D had low IQ; obtained by deception some goods to hand in to two men bcuz of petrol-bomb threat; LAW: Established characteristics to be taken into consideration while applying defence of duress: (1) age (2) pregnancy (3) serious physical disability (4) recognised mental illness or psychiatric disorder (5) sex; IQ is irrelevant
Gill (1963)
D was threatened and stole a lorry, but had time to escape and raise the alarm; LAW: defence of duress does not apply if D gas a ‘safe avenue of escape’
Re A (Conjoined Twins) (2000)
Conjoint twins were born; in the course of operation to seperate them one died; LAW: Recognised a defence of necessity (even for murder); requirements: (1) act done to avoid otherwise unavoidable consequences (2) which would have inflicted irreparable evil; (3) no more was done than just what was necessary; (4) evil inflicted was not disproportionate to evil avoided
Dudley and Stephens (1884)
Ds were shipwrecked with V for 20 years and finally killed and ate V; charged with murder; LAW: Necessity does not justify murder of an innocent victim
Role of necessity
Can be used for justification for (1) breach of statutory provisions i.e. speed limit (2) self-defence and (3) duress of circumstances
DPP v Morgan (1975)
D incited friends to have sex with his wife although she did not consented, but he claimed she did; LAW: A mistaken belief must be genuinely held, but need not to be reasonable
Williams (Gladstone) (1987)
D saw V dragging a youth calling for help; D punched V, but V turned out to be a policeman; LAW: D must be judged on facts as he believed (both self-defence and mistake)
Intoxicated mistake
D can still rely on the defence
O’Grady (1987)
D and V drunk fell asleep; D woke up cuz V was beating him; he beated V and found out later on that he killed him; LAW: If D is mistaken to other thing than the fact itself (i.e. amount of force needed in self-defence) he cannot rely on the defence if he is intoxicated
Mistakes of strict liability
Even if mistake is reasonable D cannot use defence of mistake
Clegg (1995)
D was a soldier on duty at a checkpoint and killed a passanger in a car that did not stop on the checkpoint; LAW: If the force used for self-defence is excessive for given circumstances, the defence of self-defence fails
Dica (2004)
Ds were guilty of causing GBH by infecting Vs with HIV during sex, but Vs were not informed Ds has HIV positive status; LAW: Consent must be willing and informed
Homicide
Unlawful killing of human being (reasonable creature in being); types: (1) murder; (2) manslaughter - voluntary and involuntary; (3) statutory offences
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) (1997)
Killing foetus is not homicide, but if foetus is injured and after birth dies as a result of it = actus reus for manslaughter
Malcherek and Steel (1981)
A ‘brain dead’ person is not a reasonable creature in being, so doctors can switch off life support
Actus reus for homicide
Death must be caused by D’s act or omission
Murder
No statutory definition; ‘unlawfully killing a resonable person with malice aforethought (intention to kill or harm), express or implied’ [Lord Coke]; killing an enemy in the course of war is not a murder, but war prisoner is
Dowds (2012)
D and V were heavy drinkers; D hit V several times when intoxicated; V died in result; LAW: Mere voluntary intoxication is not a ground for diminished responsibility
Wood (2008)
After heavy drinking D killed V in uncontrolled attack; D was alcohol-dependant; LAW: Alcohol dependency syndrome can amount to an abnormality of mind
Zebedee (2012)
D lost control towards his elderly father and killed him; charged with murder; LAW: There must be circumstances of an extremely grave character for the loss of control defence to apply
Involuntary manslaughter - types
(1) constructive manslaughter (2) gross negligence manslaughter (3) reckless manslaughter
Lowe (1973)
D was convicted of wilfully neglecting son and manslaughter, but the conviction of manslaughter was quashed; LAW: Only act (not omission) can create liability for constructive manslaughter
Church (1966)
D had fight with V and knocked her out; D thought V was dead and pushed her into river so that she died; LAW: For constructive manslaughter the unlawful act must be dangerous in an objective test meaning that a sober and reasonable person would recognise risk of harm
Reckless manslaughter
Stone and Dobinson (1977); ‘D had been so indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or actually to have forseen the risk but determined to run it’
Non-fatal offences against the person
(1) common assault (assault and battery) (2) assault occasioning actual bodily harm (3) malicious wounding or inflicting grievious bodily harm (4) wounding or causing GBH with intent
Assault
Actus reus - causing V to fear immediate unlawful violence; mens rea - intention or subjective recklessness as to causing V to fear immediate unlawful violence (subjective test - D must realise the risk of violence); no actual injury is required
Battery
Actus reus - applying unlawful violence even the slightest touching (Wilson v Pringle (1986); mens rea - intention or subjective recklessness as to applying unlawful force (Venna (1976))
Ireland (1998)
Putting V in fear of possibility of immediate force via i.e. words is sufficient for an assault; even silent telephone is enough
Martin (1881)
D’s wilful act prevented people from getting out of theatre after he raised fire alarm; LAW: Actus reus for battery may be through indirect act such as booby trap (an apparently harmless object containing a concealed explosive device designed to detonate when someone touches it)
Venna (1976)
D and others were fighting; D kicked policeman when he tried to arrest him and caused ABH; LAW: Subjective recklessness is sufficient for the mens rea of battery
T v DPP (2003)
V was chased by D; V felt, D kicked him and V lost consciousness; LAW: Momentary unconsciousness can be ABH
Savage (1991)
D threw beer over a woman in a pub but it cut V’s hand; LAW: No need for D to be reckless as to whether ABH is caused; intention to apply unlawful force is sufficient
Parmenter (1991)
D injured his 3month-old baby when he threw it in the air and caught him; charged with causing ABH; LAW: D need not forsee or realise possibility of serious injury for malicious wounding offence
Marcus (1981)
Harmless substance may become poison if administered in large quantity
Lawrence (1971)
Taxi driver takes more money from foreigner that does not know national money; theft; LAW: Question whether there is a theft if owner has consented to appropriation; appropriation can happen if V did not genuinely consented to the taking; here:
Morris (1983)
If owner consented to D’s act, there is no appropriation
Gomez (1991)
D was assisstant manager in a shop and persuaded manager to sell goods to his accomplice by accepting checks which were then stolen; LAW: Appropriation is assumption of any of the rights of the owner
Things in action and other intangible property
Include patents, copyrights and credit balance in bank account
Oxford v Moss (1979)
Information or knowledge such as content of exam paper is not capable of being stolen; but paper with info can
Turner (No 2) (1971)
D was held guilty of theft of his car from repair garage (without paying); property is regarded as belonging to the one in possession or in control of it; LAW: The owner can still his property if other person is of control on it
Gosh (1982)
D was a doctor and claimed fees for carrying out operations he did not; LAW: Test for dishonesty: (1) would reasonable man say the act was dishonest? (2) Did D realise that his act was dishonest?
Lloyd (1985)
The projectionist gave D film so that D could make an illegal copy of it; D returned it before next screening; no theft; LAW: Appropriation may happen if D borrows sth and keep it until ‘the goodness, the virtue, the prectical value… has gone out of the article’; borrowing can be equivalent to outright taking
Allen (1985)
D did not pay for his stay in hotel but his defence was that he intended to pay after receiving sufficient money to cover the bill; LAW: Intending to delay or defer payment is not sufficient for the offence, D must intend to avoid payment at all
Different levels of mens rea H > L
(1) (Specific) intention; (2) subjective recklessness; (3) negligence; (4) strict liability
Intention
Can be divided in (1) direct intent) and (2) oblique intent; the highest lvl of mens rea; required to make the accused guilty; crimes of specific intention include: murder, robbery, bulglary and theft
Subjective recklessness
D must have realised there was a risk of offence due to his behaviour, but took the risk anyway; crimes of minimum lvl of intention: common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and malicious wounding
Negligence
Where D is under duty of care and his behaviour is below standard of care of reasonable person
Strict liability
The prosecution only needs to prove D voluntarily did the forbidden act; no need to prove intention
Mens rea
Mental element of offence which requires no knowledge that the act is forbidden, =/= motive
Direct intent
D has a certain aim or result in mind and intends to acheive it; purposive intent
Oblique intent
D has one purpose in mind, but in acheiving it he cause other consequences which he did not intend; foresight of consequences
Moloney (1985)
D shot his father by accident when they drunk were competing who will load gun faster; LAW: foresight of consequences is evidence from which intention can be inferred
Nedrick (1986)
D had feeling of resentment against woman. He poured paraffin through the letterbox of her house and set it alight. In result child died in fire; conviction of murder was quashed; LAW: the consequence has to be virtual certainy and D must have realised that so that there is evidence on which to infer that D had necessary intention
Foresight
Ability to predict what will happen
Recklessness
Taking of an unjustifiable risk
Cunningham (1957)
Lied a subjective test for recklessness; D tore a gas meter from the wall of an empty house to steal money in it. This caused gas to seep into the house next door affecting a woman there; LAW: not guilty; D did not intend to cause harm, nor had been subjectively reckless (= maliciously)
G and another (2003)
Two boys accidentally spread fire to many shops causing great damages when they set fire to the bin; LAW: Recklessness means that D must realise there is a risk and take that risk; overruled Caldwell
Maliciously
Doing sth intentionally or being subjectively reckless about the risk involved; indicates mens rea
Bateman (1925)
D (doctor) attended a woman who was due to give birth. Due to his negligent supervision she died. LAW: D’s conduct must show such disregard for life and safety of others as to amount to a crime; gross negligence
Adomako (1994)
Patient died during operation as a result of negligence; 3 elements of negligence must be present and the breach must be sufficiently serious to make it criminal; elements: (1) D must owe V a duty of care; (2) D must be in breach of that duty; (3) the breach must cause the death or be sufficiently serious to make it a criminal behaviour (criminal liability)
Knowledge required for the offence
(1) actually knowing of a particular fact; (2) being virtually certain that a particular fact is true; (3) being willfully blind to truth; this indicates mens rea
Transferred malice
D is guilty if he intended to commit a similar crime but against a different V
Latimer (1886)
D during a dispute aimed a blow with his belt at the man, but cut a woman on her face; guilty under s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; LAW: An intention can be transferred to unintended victim
Pembliton (1874)
In the course of fight, D threw a stone in direction of a man, but broken a window; LAW: If mens rea if for completely different type of offence, D may not be guilty
