criminal landmark cases Flashcards
Dusky v US
Set the standard for adjudicative competence in the US.
Milton Dusky assisted in kidnapping and raping an underage girl. Despite clearly suffering from MI, he was found competent and sentenced to 45y.
USSC ruled that, to be competent, a D must have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
Statutes vary from state to state, with two elements in common:
1. D must understand the charges.
2. D must have the ability to aid counsel in his or her defense.
(Many state statutes and the federal statute do not incorporate the rationality standard.)
Wilson v US
Amnesia does not constitute incompetency, per se.
“… amnesia per se in a case where recollection was present during the time of the alleged offenses an where D has the ability to construct a knowledge of what happened from other sources and where he has the present ability to follow the course of proceedings against him and discuss them rationally with his attorney does not constitute incompetency per se, and that a loss of memory should bar prosecution only when its presence would in fact be crucial to the construction and presentation of a defense and hence essential to the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings.”
Jackson v Indiana
The State cannot constitutionally commit a D for an indefinite period of time on the sole grounds that he is incompetent to stand trial as it is a violation of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th A.
“Such a defendant cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that he will not, the State must either institute civil proceedings applicable to the commitment of those not charged with a crime, or release the defendant.”
Theon Jackson, a deaf mute who could not communicate in any way, was charged with two counts of petty theft and committed to a psych hospital for restoration. It was argued that this commitment equated to a life sentence since he had no hope of being restored.
Sieling v Eyman
9th Circuit, 1973
established that the standard for fitness to plead guilty is higher than that to stand trial
Drope v Missouri
If the issue of fitness is raised, regardless of who raises it, the motion should be granted so as not to deprive a defendant of due process, so long as a bona fide doubt exists as to the D’s competency.
Riggins v Nevada
Involuntary treatment must be the least intrusive treatment for restoration of competence. The proposed treatment must be medically appropriate for the individual’s safety as well as that of others.
Godinez v Moran
USSC 1993
If a D is competent to stand trial, he or she is automatically competent for all situations that may occur in a trial, including to plead guilty and thereby waive trial rights and to represent himself/herself.
Cooper v Oklahoma
established the standard of proof of incompetence to be preponderance of evidence (51%)
Indiana v Edwards
USSC 2008
the standard for competency to stand trial was not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself (ie. a D may be competent to stand trial but not competent to rep him or herself.)
A State may impose counsel on an otherwise competent D if a mental illness renders them incompetent to represent themself.
M’Naughten
established the insanity defense in England.
“it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”
Durham v US
The “product” rule.
The D is NGRI if a criminal act was the product of a mental disease.
Washington v US
The jury, not the psychiatric experts, should decide to what extent the alleged offense was a product of mental illness.
Expert witnesses should not testify to the ultimate question of insanity.
Frendak v US
If a defendant has acted intelligently and voluntarily, a trial court must defer to his or her decision to waive the insanity defense. However, the trial court should have the ability to raise the defense if a D is not capable of making or has not made an intelligent and voluntary decision.
Paula Frendak killed coworker, then fled abroad until she was extradited from Abu Dhabi. She had several competency hearings and was finally found competent. She appealed her conviction stating that that trial judge inappropriately raised the insanity defense over her competent objections.
Jones v US
A finding of insanity at trial is sufficient to justify commitment at a preponderance of the evidence standard (lower than the civil commitment clear and convincing requirement), since the verdict is based on a finding of mental illness and a criminal act, which is, by definition, dangerousness.
Insanity acquittees constitute a special class and can be treated differently from civil patients.
US v Torniero
The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in order for it to consider psychiatric evidence for the purposes of insanity, there should be substantial acceptance in the discipline that compulsive gambling is a mental illness and that there is a nexus between gambling and stealing.
John Torniero, a jewelry store manager, stole $750,000 worth of jewelry and argued that his compulsion to gamble rendered him legally insane.
