Crime cases Flashcards

1
Q

Examples of statutory duties

A

-Road Traffic Act 1988
-Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
-Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004

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2
Q

Example of a contractual duty

A

Pittwood 1902
-railway crossing keeper had a duty to close the gates, his omission formed the AR of manslaughter

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3
Q

Example of official position duty

A

Dytham 1979
-police officer stood by while V was beaten up, D was guilty for failing to perform his duty while in a public position

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4
Q

Example of Special Relationship Duty

A

Gibbins and Proctor 1918
-father starved 7-year-old daughter to death, he had a duty to feed her and the omission formed the AR for murder

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5
Q

Example of Duty undertaken voluntarily

A

Stone and Dobinson 1977
-D’s took in an elderly relative and failed to look after her, Ds were liable for her death

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6
Q

Example of creting a dangerous situation

A

Miller 1983
-D failed to take reasonable steps to deal with a fire he started, he had created a dangerous situation and owed a duty to call the fire brigade, therefore liable when he failed to do so

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7
Q

Pagett 1983 (AR)

A

D was the factual cause of death when he used his girlfriend as a shield and fired at police
-she would not have died ‘but for’ his actions
-factual causation

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8
Q

Benge 1846 (AR)

A

irrelevant that the accident might have been avoided if others has not also been negligent, D substantially caused the death through his negligence
-legal causation

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9
Q

Blaue 1975 (AR)

A

Thin skull rule
-D was held responsible for V’s death when the Jehovah’s Witness he stabbed refused a blood transfusion, despite the fact that she would have survived if she had accepted the treatment
-legal causation

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10
Q

Roberts 1971 (AR)

A

V’s reaction to jump from a moving car was reasonably foreseeable when D made sexual advances towards her. The chain of causation not broken
-Intervening Acts
-Victim’s own conduct

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11
Q

Smith 1959 (AR)

A

Although dropping V twice contributed to V’s death, D was still found guilty of murder, the stab wound was still operating and it was a substantial cause of V’s death
-Intervening Acts
-Medical Treatment

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12
Q

Cheshire 1991 (AR)

A

Althiugh V’s wounds were no longer life-threatening, D was still held liable for the death as his actions had contributed significantly to the death
-Intervening Acts
-Medical Treatment

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13
Q

Jordan 1956 (AR)

A

The chain of causation was broken, the medical treatment was palpably wrong and it was the overwhelming cause of death as the original wounds had virtually healed
-Intervening Acts
-Medical Treatment

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14
Q

Mohan 1975 (MR)

A

Direct intent defined in this as ‘a decision to bring about a prohibited consequence’
D had driven his car straight at a police officer with the aim of injuring him
-Intention

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15
Q

Woollin 1998 (MR)

A

Indirect intent
virtual certainty
D threw his baby son across the room, he argued that he had thrown the baby towards the pram but had not intended to kill him
-Intention

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16
Q

Cunningham 1957 (MR)

A

D tore gas meter from wall to steak money, gas escaped and poisoned neighbour.
D did not realise there was a possibility of this happening, he was not reckless
-Recklessness

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17
Q

Adomako 1994 (MR)

A

Anaethesist was liable for gross negligence manslaughter when he took several minutes to notice a breathing tube had become disconnected during an op. A reasonable anaethesist would have noticed within a couple of seconds
-Negligence

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18
Q

Callow v Tilstone (1900)

A

Butcher convicted for selling contaminated meat, D was guilty, even though he had taken reasonable care not to commit the offence
-Strict Liability

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19
Q

Gnango 2011

A

V shot when D aimed to shoot someone else. D would have been guilty of murder under the principle of transferred malice
-Transferred Malice

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20
Q

Fagan 1986

A

D drove on to a police officer’s foot by mistake (AR of battery), when D realised he refused to move the car, he then formed the MR. AR was treated as a continuing act and therefore it did not matter if the MR was formed slighly after
-Continuing Act

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21
Q

Thabo Meli 1954

A

Ds attacked V intending to kill him, V was unconscious when they thought they had killed him, died hours later. First act was accompanied by MR but was not the cause of death (no AR) . Second act, was the cause of death (AR), not with MR. Court said it was impossible to divide up what was really one series of acts, murder convictions were upheld
-Series of connected acts

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22
Q

Gibbins & Proctor 1918
(murder)

A

the parents failure to feed their 7 year old daughter who starved to death, was enough AR for murder
-Actus Reus for murder

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23
Q

A-G’s Reference 1994
(murder)

A

foetus killed in the womb cannot be a victim of murder, must be independent of the womb to be classed as a ‘human being’

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24
Q

Malcherek 1981
(murder)

A

doctors switched off life support machines as both victims were brain dead. Court decided that doctors can switch off a life support machine when V is brain dead as the person is no longer a reasonable creature in being

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25
Blackman 2017 (murder)
Killing an enemy combatant after they were seriously injured and no longer a threat was killing under the Queen's Peace
26
Vickers 1957 (murder)
D struck V with several blows during a burglary of V's shop. V died. The court decided that where D intends to inflict GBH and dies, this is enough for murder -Malice aforethought
27
Matthews & Alleyne 2003
Ds pushed V from a bridge into a fast flowing river, knowing he couldn't swim. He fell 25 feet abd drowned Foresight of a consequence as a virtual certainty is only evidence from which a jury may find intention -Intention and foresight of consequences
28
Jewell 2014 (VM)
D shot V, claimed he lost control. Court decided that there was insufficient evidence of D having lost self-control, there was overwhelming evidence that D planned execution -Loss of self-control
29
s.8 Criminal Justice Act 1967 (murder)
Test for intention is subjective, based on what D thought, not what the reasonable person would think
30
s.54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Loss of Control Manslaughter
31
s.54(2) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Loss of control need not be sudden
32
s.54(4) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Must not be a considered desire for revenge
33
Dawes 2013 (VM)
No evidence to suggest D lost control so judge right to not put a defence to the jury, difficult for a D who was behaving badly towards V to use anger trigger -LOC
34
s.55(3) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
The 'fear' trigger
35
Ward 2012 (VM)
D killed V after V had attacked D's brother, D did not fear serious violence towards himself. s.55(3) applied as D feared V would use serious violence towards brother -Qualifying trigger
36
s.55(4) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
the 'anger' trigger
37
Zebedee 2012 (VM)
D lost control when his 94 yr old father, who had repeatedly soiled himself neither of the two conditions of s.55(4) were satisfied -Qualifying Trigger
38
Hatter (2013) (VM)
breakup will not normally constitute circumstances of extremely grave character and entitle the other party to feel a sense of being justifiably wronged -Qualifying Trigger
39
s.55(6) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Limitations on Qualifying Triggers -sexual infidelity -incitement -revenge s.55(4)
40
Clinton 2012 (VM)
loss of control triggered by sexual infidelity on its own is not a qualifying trigger -Qualifying Trigger
41
s.54(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Normal Person Test - objective
42
Asmelash (2013) (VM)
The fact that D was drunk was not one of his 'circumstances' that had to be considered as it only related to D's general capacity to exercise tolerance and self-restraint -Normal Person Test
43
Van Dongen 2005 (VM)
D repeatedly kicked V in the head andbody when V was lying on the ground. While a normal person may have lost control, they would NOT have reacted in this way -Normal Person Test
44
s.2 Homicide Act 1957
Dimished Responsibility is defined in this act
45
s.52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Diminished Responsibility is amended by this act
46
Byrne 1960 (VM)
Medical evidence showed D's abnormality of mind meant he was unable to control his perverted desires -Abnormality of mental functioning
47
Golds 2016 (VM)
Psychotic condition (RMC)
48
Boots 2012 (VM)
Post-natal depression (RMC)
49
Brennan 2014 (VM)
Mental Disorder (RMC)
50
Wood 2008 (VM)
Alcohol dependency syndrome - if alcohol has caused brain damage or become a disease then DR may be relevant (RMC)
51
Dietschmann 2003 (VM)
Depressive Illness -even though D had been drinking, he could use the DR defence, provided pre-existing AMF substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal acts (RMC)
52
Jama 2004 (VM)
Asperger's syndrome (RMC)
53
Hobson 1997 (VM)
Battered Spouses' Syndrome (RMC)
54
s.52(1A)(a) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (VM)
To understand the nature of his conduct (SI)
55
s.52(1A)(b) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
To form a rational judgement (SI)
56
s.52(1A)(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
To exercise self-control (SI)
57
s.52(1)(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (VM)
D has to prove that the abnormality of mental functioning provided an explanation for his acts
58
s.52(1B) Coroners and Justice Act 2009
AMF will provide an explanation for D's conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing D to carry out the conduct
59
Dowds 2012 (VM)
Voluntary intoxication at the time of the killing cannot be used as the basis of a defence of DR (EFDC)
60
Lamb 1967 (IM)
No 'unlawful act' existed because they did not properly understand the mechanism of such a gun and had not expected it to fire, V was not therefore in fear of being shot (UA)
61
Church 1965 (IM)
Such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm, albeit not serious harm (Dangerous)
62
Goodfellow 1986 (IM)
It does not matter that D did not realise there was a risk of harm to others, nor does the unlawful act need to be directed at V (Dangerous)
63
Watson 1989 (IM)
There must be a risk of some physical harm, rather than mere emotional disturbance -burglary became dangerous as soon as the old man's frailty would have been apparent to the reasonable person (Dangerous)
64
Kennedy 2007 (IM)
V's voluntary act of injecting himself broke the chain of causation between D's supply and V's death (Causation)
65
Newbury and Jones 1976 (IM)
D only needs to have the MR of the unlawful act, it was not necessary to prove that D foresaw any harm from his act (MR for UA)
66
Singh 1999 (IM)
Faulty gas fire caused the death of tenants, the landlord was held to have a duty to maintain the property (Duty of Care)
67
Evans 2009 (IM)
The mother clearly owed a duty to her daughter, her half-sister also owed a duty to V under the 'Miller principle' of creating a dangerous situation and failing to minimise it (Duty of Care)-omissions
68
Broughton 2010 (IM)
In omission cases, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that V could have been saved (Causation)
69
Misra 2004 (IM)
D's manslaughter conviction was upheld, the foreseeable risk related to death, a risk of serious injury would not be enough (Risk of death)
70
Bateman 1925 (IM)
Beyond compensation and amounts to crime (GN)
71
Adomako 1994 (IM)
D's act or omission was so bad in the circumstances that it was criminal negligence (GN)
72
Sellu 2016 (IM)
conduct which is 'truly exceptionally bad' and such a departure from a reasonably competent person that it amounted to being criminal (GN)
73
s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988
Assault and Battery defined in common law but charged under this act
74
Smith v Woking Police 1983 (A)
The act was looking at a woman in her nightclothes through a window (Actions for assault)
75
Ireland 1999 (A)
Words alone could be enough AR for assault, even silent phone calls (Words for assault)
76
Tuberville v Savage 1669 (A)
"if it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you" words can prevent assault, making it clear violence is not going to be used (Words for assault)
77
Smith v Woking (A)
causes V to apprehend "immediate" unlawful force
78
Logdon 1976 (A)
Recklessly causing V to apprehend immediate unlwaful force (MR for assault)
79
Collins v Wilcock 1984 (B)
"any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to battery" (Unlawful force)
80
Thomas 1985 (B)
Touching someone's clothes while they are wearing them is the equivalent to touching the person (Unlawful force)
81
DPP v K 1990 (B)
Battery can also be committed by an indirect act (booby trap) (Unlwful force)
82
Santana-Bermudez 2003 (B)
An omission can form a battery - D failed to tell a police officer that he had a needle in his pocket whilst being searched
83
Venna 1976 (B)
MR for battery - D committed battery recklessly when struggling with a police officer who was trying to arrest him
84
s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861
Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm
85
Miller 1954 (ABH)
"any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with health or comfort"
86
DPP v Smith 2006 (ABH)
cutting of V's ponytail amounted to ABH
87
T v DPP 2003 (ABH)
Momentary loss of consciousness amounted to ABH
88
Ireland 1999 (ABH)
ABH can include psychiatric injury, not fear or panic, when Vs suffered psychiatric illness as a result, D was guilty under s.47
89
Savage 1991 (ABH)
No need to intend or be reckless as to whether ABH is caused, D threw beer into V's face, glass slipped and cut V, it was sufficient that D had the MR of battery (MR for ABH)
90
s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861
Maliciously wounding or inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm
91
Eisenhower 1983 (GBH s.20)
Wounding means breaking two layers of skin, not internal bleeding
92
DPP v Smith 1961 (GBH s.20)
GBH defined as serious harm -broken limbs -dislocations -permanent disability
93
Bollom 2004 (GBH s.20)
Severity of injuries should be assessed by V's health and age
94
Brown and Stratton 1997 (GBH s.20)
Several minor injuries amounted to GBH
95
Burstow 1997 (GBH s.20)
GBH has been extended to cover psychiatric injury
96
Dica 2004 (GBH s.20)
GBH has been extended to cover biological disease
97
Parmenter 1991 (GBH s.20)
Not necessary that D intended serious harm or even realises the risk of causing serious harm - only SOME harm - D threw baby into the hair and caught him, not guilty of s.20 because he did not realise the risk of any injury
98
s.18 Offences Against a Person Act 1861
Wounding or causing Grievous Bodily Harm with intent
99
Belfon 1976 (GBH s.18)
Confirms that being reckless as to causing serious injury is not enough
100
Taylor 2009 (GBH s.18)
Intention to cause wounding is not enough
101
Morrison 1989 (GBH s.18)
D dived through window to escape arrest, dragging police officer through broken glass - D was convicted of s.18, enough that D intended to resist arrest and was reckless as to whether this caused V some injury