Crim Pro Flashcards
Two men arrested - stolen automobile.
Taken to the police station, booked, and fingerprinted.
After given Miranda warnings, one said, “we stole that car.”
The other man said nothing, and the first man proceeded to write and sign a full confession.
The man who remained silent pled not guilty to the charge of grand theft auto. At his trial the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence to show that he did not deny that he stole the automobile when the other man told the police in front of him that he was a party to the theft.
Should the court hold that this evidence is proper?
No, because under this circumstance, the man who remained silent had no duty or responsibility to deny the allegation.
The court should hold that this evidence is improper because the man who remained silent had no duty to deny the allegation here. A defendant in custody has no duty to speak at all, and the exercise of this constitutional right cannot be used against a defendant to show probable guilt. The Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty.
A suspect was arrested on a charge of bank robbery. After formal charges had been filed, the suspect was scheduled for a lineup identification procedure. The suspect’s attorney was notified of the lineup and arrived at the station prior to the scheduled lineup. He was directed to wait in the hallway outside the lineup room. When the suspect was escorted into the lineup room, the officer acknowledged the attorney but did not motion for him to follow them into the lineup room. The attorney remained seated in the hallway.
Inside the lineup room, the six members of the lineup, including the suspect, stood on one side of the one-way mirror in full view of the witnesses gathered on the other side in the viewing area. The lineup members stepped forward one by one for a closer inspection. After the first two lineup members had been presented, an officer realized that the suspect’s attorney was not present and immediately escorted him to the viewing area. The attorney arrived in time to witness the presentation of the suspect and the remaining three members of the lineup. Two witnesses then identified the suspect as the robber.
At trial, if the defense objects to the introduction of the lineup evidence, should the objection be granted?
Yes, because the right to have counsel present at a post-charge lineup includes the right to have counsel present for the entire lineup.
The objection should be granted. A post-charge lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which a defendant has the right to counsel. Once the government has initiated adversary judicial criminal proceedings, the presence of counsel is a prerequisite to the conduct of a lineup.
This right attaches as soon as the accused is within sight of a potential identification witness. Here, the attorney was not present in the room until after the lineup had commenced.
If a person questioned by the police has not been deprived of her freedom of movement in any significant way, she is not in ________ and _________ be advised of her constitutional rights.
Thus, the rule of Miranda does not preclude evidentiary use of the woman’s statement to the police officer. The fact that the woman was dazed does not change the admissibility of her statement. If she had been holding the assault rifle when the officer arrived, he probably would have had probable cause to suspect she had committed the offense, and at that time he would have had to read her the Miranda warnings. However, because the weapon was lying on the floor, the officer had no reason to suspect the woman of the crime.
Custody; Need not.
Answer choice saying something like:
“The court should rule for the woman, because the prejudicial effect of such evidence far outweighs its probative value” IS ALMOST ALWAYS WRONG!!!
A police officer who stopped a driver for speeding noticed that the driver resembled the description of a hit-and-run driver who had struck and killed a nine-year-old boy two days before. The officer examined the driver’s car and found recent dents. The driver was arrested for the hit-and-run offense and read his Miranda rights. However, the officer failed to inform him that the child struck in the hit-and-run accident had subsequently died. On the way to the police station in the squad car, the driver blurted out, “You got me. I was the hit-and-run driver. I just hope the kid is okay.” The officer still failed to inform him that the child had died. At the station house, the arresting officer said to the driver, “Look, you’ve already confessed. How about writing it down?” The driver replied, “I don’t think I should write or sign anything without a lawyer, but I’ll talk.” He again admitted that he was the hit-and-run driver. The officer made a tape recording of his confession.
In addition to speeding, the driver has been charged with leaving the scene of an accident and involuntary manslaughter. At the driver’s trial, the prosecution seeks to admit both the first confession (in the squad car) and the second confession (in the station house). The driver’s attorney moves to suppress both confessions.
How should the court rule on the motion?
Denied for both confessions.
The driver’s motion to suppress both confessions will be denied because the facts do not indicate a violation of his constitutional rights. Under the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, a confession will be suppressed if it resulted from a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights or the Miranda rule.
Here, an argument that the arrest was unconstitutional will fail. Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public place if they have probable cause (i.e., facts that would cause a reasonable person) to believe a felony was committed by the arrestee. The officer here had probable cause because the driver matched the description of a hit-and-run driver and his car had recent dents. And there were no Miranda violations. The Miranda rule requires police officers to advise a detainee of certain rights and consequences before conducting a custodial interrogation, including the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the fact that any statements made can be used as evidence against the detainee. The term interrogation includes any conduct by police officers that they reasonably should know would likely elicit an incriminating response. The detainee may make a knowing and voluntary waiver of these rights. If the warnings are given, the rights will be deemed waived unless the detainee explicitly and unambiguously asserts his rights. There was no violation of Miranda as to the driver’s first confession. While he was in custody (i.e., he was arrested and in the back of a police car), there was no interrogation-the driver blurted out his statement without any kind of prompting by the police officer. Moreover, the officer had given the driver Miranda warnings.
Neither was there a Miranda violation as to the second confession, although this conclusion is not as clear cut as in the first confession. Again, the driver was clearly in custody because he was under arrest at the stationhouse. There also was an interrogation (“How about writing [your confession] down”). While the police officer did not give the driver Miranda warnings immediately before this interrogation, warnings were given in the police car and it appears not much time had passed. Neither does it matter that the driver was not told that the victim had died. While the Court requires waiver of Miranda rights to be knowing and voluntary, the police do not have to inform the detainee of possible charges to meet this standard; it is sufficient that the warnings were given. Neither does it matter that the driver does not seem to have understood that spoken confessions are as admissible in evidence as written confessions (since he was willing to talk but not write his confession). Finally, merely saying that he would not write or sign anything without a lawyer was not an explicit or unambiguous request to remain silent or for counsel.
Is “I don’t think I should write or sign anything without a lawyer” sufficient to invoke a detainee’s right to an attorney?
No. It has to be clear and unambiguous = “I want my lawyer”
Does the police have to give Miranda Warnings before interrogation?
Yes. Right before is sufficient.
Is saying “I don’t think I should write or sign anything without a lawyer” sufficiently explicit?
No. Must unambiguously, “I want my lawyer.”
Several students at a public high school told a teacher that a fellow student was selling illegal drugs to other students at the school. The accused student was called into the principal’s office and informed of the accusations. The student denied everything, but the principal grabbed the student’s purse, which was on top of his desk, and opened it. He removed five small transparent plastic bags, each of which contained a white powder, and immediately called the police. The police arrested the student and conducted tests confirming that the white powder was cocaine.
The student was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. At her trial, the state planned to introduce the bags and their contents into evidence. The student’s attorney moved to suppress the evidence.
How should the court rule?
Deny the motion, because the principal had a reasonable suspicion that the student was selling drugs.
The motion should be denied. Due to the nature of the school environment, reasonable grounds for a search are a sufficient basis to justify searches by public school officials. Neither a warrant nor probable cause is required.
A school search will be held reasonable if: (i) it offers a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing; (ii) the measures adopted to carry out the search are reasonably related to the objectives of the search; and (iii) the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
Here, even though the principal did not have probable cause to believe that the drugs were in the student’s purse, the principal did have sufficient reasonable grounds to search her purse.
A school search by a public school official(Principal) will be held reasonable if: (there’s three)
(i) it offers a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing; (ii) the measures adopted to carry out the search are reasonably related to the objectives of the search; and (iii) the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
The sheriff’s department received an anonymous tip that a farmer was growing marijuana on his rural property. Investigators flew low over the farmer’s property in a small plane belonging to the sheriff’s department and took aerial photos of the property. Once developed, the photos indicated that the area in the center of the farmer’s fields contained marijuana plants. That afternoon, four officers went to the perimeter of the farmer’s property. Using wire cutters, they cut their way through the farmer’s barbed wire fence and walked to the center of the field and found the marijuana plants. The officers then obtained a warrant to search the farmer’s house. On arrival, they produced the search warrant and searched the farmer’s house, finding large quantities of marijuana packaged and ready for sale.
The marijuana was seized and the farmer was charged with numerous drug offenses. Prior to trial, the farmer’s attorney moves to suppress evidence of the marijuana seized from the house.
Should the marijuana seized from the farmer’s house be suppressed?
No, because the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant.
The marijuana should not be suppressed. The search of the farmer’s house, which led to the seizure of the marijuana, was based on probable cause and a valid warrant. Therefore, the evidence will not be suppressed.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any land or field not a part of the curtilage. Neither has the Court found such places to be constitutionally protected. Thus, there is no Fourth Amendment protection in such areas. Therefore, the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they took pictures or when they cut through the fence and entered the field. All evidence obtained through those activities could be the basis for a warrant to search the farmer’s house, and a search of a home based on a valid warrant will be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
“Open fields,” even if they are fenced in, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and so a warrant to enter the lands was not necessary. The police may have committed a tort or perhaps violated the state criminal code when they cut the fence and entered onto the land, but the Fourth Amendment was not violated.
Does the Police have the authority to briefly detain a person for investigative purposes even if they lack probable cause to arrest?
Yes. This is called Terry Stop. To make such a stop, police must have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts of criminal activity or involvement in a completed crime. When the source of suspicion of criminal activity is an informant’s tip, the tip must be accompanied by indicia of reliability sufficient to make the officer’s stop reasonable.
If the stop was based solely on an informant’s tip. Because the tip was anonymous and included nothing more than an accusation that a person standing on a certain street corner was selling drugs, it was not sufficient to justify the search. It needed to include more detail (e.g., predicting incriminating movement) to corroborate the accusation.
Does the Police have the authority to frisk the detainee for weapons? If so, under what circumstances?
When a detainee is stopped by the Police(given that there was a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts of criminal activity or involvement in a completed crime), if the police also have reasonable suspicion that the detainee is armed and dangerous(like a bulge on the jacket), they may frisk the detainee for weapons.
Does a person generally have standing to complain about a warrantless search of another’s home?
No, unless the home was also his home OR he was at least an overnight guest in the home.
If the facts say that the person did not live there or fled there, or only stayed there for a few hours, he had no standing as to the warrantless search complaint.
A drug smuggler had just returned home after smuggling in a large quantity of cocaine in the false bottom of his suitcase. As he was about to leave his house again to deliver the cocaine to his contact in the city, a police officer arrived with a trained drug-sniffing dog and asked him if he could come in and ask him some questions. The smuggler declined but the officer stepped into the doorway, and the dog immediately caught the scent of the cocaine and pulled the officer toward the suitcase in the hallway. Based on the dog’s clear indication that the suitcase contained narcotics, the police officer opened the suitcase and found the cocaine. The smuggler was then arrested and the cocaine and suitcase seized.
At a pretrial hearing, should the judge grant the smuggler’s motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine in the suitcase?
Yes, because the search and seizure required a warrant.
To have a Fourth Amendment right, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the place searched or the item seized or must prove that there was a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. In the instant case, the place searched was the defendant’s home, which clearly is a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Even the entry to a home is within the curtilage and protected against unreasonable searches. A police officer nevertheless has an implied license to approach the door of a home and knock, just like anyone else. However, the Supreme Court has held that bringing a drug-sniffing dog along violates the license. Since the presence of the dog at the doorway was a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, the whole episode was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, consent to enter was not granted and no other exceptions apply, so evidence of the cocaine should be suppressed.
A driver was stopped by the police after running a red light. Her roommate was also in the car. Because the driver did not have a driver’s license, the officer lawfully placed her under arrest and put her in his squad car. At the time of the arrest, the officer saw a shopping bag in the back seat containing clothes with price tags on them. The officer asked the driver if she had made any other purchases that day, and she responded that there were additional purchases in the trunk. The officer then searched the trunk of the car, where he found additional clothes purchases along with a clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana. Later testing confirmed that it was marijuana, which the roommates had purchased that morning from a neighbor.
The two roommates were charged with possession of marijuana. Prior to her trial, the driver’s attorney moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana because it was discovered in an illegal search, and the motion was granted.
If the attorney for the other roommate who was the passenger in the car subsequently moves to suppress evidence of the marijuana at her trial, should her motion be granted?
No, because she has no standing to object to an illegal search.
The roommate’s motion should be denied. The roommate has no standing to challenge the search of the trunk because the search did not violate her reasonable expectation of privacy. Merely being a passenger in someone else’s car does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to a search of the car. Something more is needed to have standing to challenge the search, such as if the roommate owned the car (not indicated by the facts).
(Note also that, while each passenger in a car stopped by the police has standing to challenge the stop because each person was seized along with the driver, the stop here was clearly proper: The police may validly stop a car for traffic violations, and here the driver ran a red light. Thus, the roommate’s standing to challenge the stop is irrelevant.)
