Crim Law Flashcards
What is the purpose of criminal laws?
Express
Express the moral norms of the community
Call
Call violators to amount to the community
Ensure
Ensure public safety
Provide
Provide a framework for social control:
* Based on safety & morality
* Based on hierarchy (e.g., race, gender, class)
* To enforce behavioral norms (e.g., confine sexuality)
Discourage
* Discourage vigilante justice
- Pieces of the Criminal System
o Policing
How the sovereign watches for and respond initially to violations of criminal law (including protective, investigative, and surveillance functions)
o Criminalizations
How the sovereign determines which behaviors are wrong and which are appropriate for criminal sanctions
o Diversion/deflection/prosecution
How the system decides which cases (offenses, people, circumstances) to bounce out, which to keep in, and how to characterize them
o Adjudication
What standards courts use to determine guilt or innocence
o Procedure
Standards used to govern how cases are prosecuted, investigated, or adjudication
o Sanctions/disposition
What options are available as sanctions
o Punishment/sentencing
Assuming criminal punishment is imposed, what is the appropriate term and type?
o Reintegration
When does the criminal system’s involvement end and what happens to people after they finish their involvement
- What makes the criminal system different?
o The sovereign, not the victim, is the opposing party
o Life and liberty may be at stake
o Due process concerns are greater (and standards of proof more difficult to meet)
o Conviction carries stigma/condemnation
o Conviction assigns moral blame
- Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (1884)
o Facts
* Regina = the queen (the state)
* Thomas Dudley and Edwin Stephens (defendants) were on the crew of an English yacht, along with fellow seamen Brooks and Richard Parker.
Parker was the lowest-ranking employee on the ship and was much younger than the others.
* Due to a storm, the men were lost at sea in an open boat for approximately twenty-four days. They had no water except for occasional rainwater, and little food.
* After over a week without any food, Dudley and Stephens approached Parker, who was sick and in a much weaker state, and slit his throat. The three remaining men fed off Parker’s body for four days until a passing ship rescued them.
Dudley did the killing, Stephens and Dudley conspired for the murder, Brooks only participated in the feeding after the killing
* Timeline
Day 1 - shipwreck
4 – catch turtle
12 – turtle & turnips gone
14 – no more water
18 – conversation
19 – proposal
20 – killing
24 – rescue
o Procedure
* Dudley and Stephens were put on trial in order to determine whether the act of killing Parker was murder.
* The jury determined that the men would not have survived to the time of rescue if they had not fed off Parker’s body and that, at the time, it was reasonable to assume they would die of starvation before they were rescued.
* The jury also determined that Parker would likely have died before the other three men.
* The jury made these conclusions of fact but was ultimately unable to reach a verdict as to Dudley and Stephens’ culpability. It instead submitted a special verdict requesting the court to determine Dudley and Stephens’s culpability based on its findings of fact.
o Rule
* The defense of necessity does not justify homicide unless the killing was committed in self-defense.
* The court ruled this way for expressive reasons– the court didn’t want to ever say that murder was OK other than in the case of self-defense
o Self defense & necessity are complete defenses– the result would be full acquittal if the defense succeeds
* Necessity is a subset of self defense
o Application
* The intentional killing of another is murder unless there is some legal justification.
* Necessity is only a justification for murder when the killing is committed in self-defense. Thus, the defense of necessity may not be used to justify the killing of an innocent bystander.
o Conclusion
* Accordingly, Dudley and Stephens are sentenced to death. [Editor’s Note: Dudley and Stephens’s death sentences were commuted to six months in prison.]
- People v. Suitte (NY State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1982)
o Facts
* James Suitte (defendant) was arrested for unauthorized use of a vehicle in New York.
* During the incident, police officers found a loaded pistol in Suitte’s possession. The pistol was registered to Suitte in North Carolina, but not in New York.
* Suitte was charged in state trial court with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, which was a class D felony.
Suitte knew about the laws, had the gun for about 7 years, and still failed to register it
o Procedure
* Suitte pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, which was a class A misdemeanor.
* Prior to sentencing, the trial judge noted that Suitte had never before been convicted of a crime, had carried the pistol for protection because he operated his tailor shop in a high-crime area, and was an otherwise upstanding citizen.
* The trial judge sentenced Suitte to 30 days’ imprisonment and three years of probation. Suitte appealed.
* State had a statute for a minimum of one year, but Suitte got only 30 days of prison.
The law was for the purpose of general deterrence (and a little bit of expression)
o Rule
* A state appellate court may review a trial court’s sentencing decision in a criminal case using either a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard or a substituted-discretion standard.
o Application
* In an effort to curb the increasing proliferation of illegal weapons in the state and in New York City, the state legislature has substantially increased the penal sanctions for the possession and sale of illegal arms. As part of this major change, the legislature has imposed a mandatory term of one year in prison for any defendant convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.
* In enacting the new gun law, the legislature clearly sent a “get tough” message to citizens that the illegal possession of a weapon will not be tolerated. However, the law permits a lesser sentence for a defendant who has not been previously convicted of a felony or a class A misdemeanor within the preceding five years.
Principal aim of this legislation was general deterrence
* the sentencing court viewed general deterrence as the overriding principle, and we cannot say that the emphasis was erroneous or that the interests of justice call for a reduction
* four principal objectives of punishment:
Retribution – affirmation of societal norms for purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves, community condemnation, and community’s emotional desire to punish offender
* The only non-utilitarian theory here
* The only one that is backward looking
* Punishment corresponds to crime
Deterrence
* Individual deterrence – to deter that specific offender from repeating crimes
* General deterrence – aims to discourage general public from recourse to crime
Rehabilitation – directed at reforming the individual
Isolation – segregates offender from society to prevent criminal conduct
Expression – sending a message to the criminal that we do not accept this conduct
* On an exam, you can write at the end “I don’t think the person should be punished in this way because it doesn’t fulfill any of these five purposes….”
* Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Suitte a lesser sentence.
we cannot view the new gun law as containing a blanket exception of first offenders from the scope of its penal provisions
o Conclusion
* Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
- How do we punish?
- Death
- Imprisonment
o Term of years vs indeterminate sentencing - Sometimes there is a mandatory minimum term of years
- In juvenile court, the term is usually not in years, you just go to a facility for a period until they decide to let you out
o Jail vs prison - Jail is before adjudication, usually under one year at the county level
- Prison is after adjudication, usually over a year, at the state level
- Money (fines, restitution)
- Community service
- Probation
MPC Article 1 and §§ 6.06, 6.08, 6.12;
- Article 1
o General guidelines & definitions - 6.06 sentence of imprisonment for felony; ordinary terms
o (1) first degree: 1-10 years, maximum life
o (2) second degree: 1-3 years, maximum 10
o (3) third degree: 1-2 years, maximum 5 - 6.08 sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors; ordinary terms
o Misdemeanor: one. Year or less
o Petty misdemeanor: thirty days or less - 6.12 reduction of conviction by court to lesser degree of felony or to misdemeanor
o Court can enter judgment for lesser degree of felony or misdemeanor and impose sentence accordingly if court thinks punishment is unduly harsh
Standards of proof (hardest to easiest)
- Beyond a reasonable doubt
- Clear and convincing
o Between preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt - Preponderance of the evidence
o More likely than not (over 50%) - Probable cause
- Reasonable suspicion
Discretion & Review
- Prosecutor decides whether to charge and what to charge
o Decision to charge requires probable cause and must be approved by judge
o Decision not to charge is not reviewable by court - Jury decides whether the evidence is enough to convict
o Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and can be appealed
o Acquittal cannot be appealed (absent legal error or new facts) & jury not required to provide explanation
- People v. Williams (CA S. Ct. 2001)
o Facts
* Arasheik Williams (defendant), who was 18 years old, was indicted for criminal conduct committed against his 16-year-old former girlfriend, Jennifer B., during three separate incidents on three different days.
For one of the incidents, Williams was charged with the misdemeanor offense of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.
o Rule
* A juror who is unable or unwilling to determine the facts of a criminal case and render a verdict in accordance with the court’s instructions may be discharged from jury service.
o Application
* Jury nullification is a violation of a juror’s oath and occurs when a jury renders a verdict that is inconsistent with the law or unsupported by the evidence, or when a single juror refuses to apply the law or follow the trial court’s instructions.
* If a juror or jury were allowed to ignore the law or the trial court’s instructions and render a decision based on personal feelings, this would result in lawlessness, a denial of due process, and an exercise of erroneously seized power.
* Your role as a juror is to fairly apply the law
* A juror who refuses to follow the court’s instructions is “unable to perform his duty
* Here, Juror No. 10 was unable to perform his duty when he refused to apply the state law criminalizing sexual intercourse with a minor, as instructed by the trial court.
Williams claims that the trial court erred in removing Juror No. 10, because the juror was exercising a right to engage in juror nullification by refusing to follow the law. However, Williams cites no case in support of his argument.
There is ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Juror No. 10 was unable to perform his duties as a juror.
* Juror No. 10 objected to the law criminalizing unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and expressly told the judge that he was unable to abide by his oath to follow the trial court’s instructions.
* Therefore, the trial court properly discharged Juror No. 10 and replaced him with an alternate juror.
o Conclusion
* Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
- Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case in chief: Paul Butler (1997)
o For virtually every crime African-Americans are disproportionately arrested, prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned
o The reason why I believe that African-American jurors have a moral claim to selective nullification is based on this idea that they do not effectively have a say; they do not have the say that they should in the making of the law
o For violent crimes, for crimes with victims, there should be no nullification.
o for drug offenses, I think that jurors in those cases should consider nullification
- Race-Based Jury Nullification: Rebuttal (Part A): Andrew Leipold (1997)
o If potential African-American jurors were to embrace the Butler plan, and if they were honest during voir dire, their belief in jury nullification would at least give prosecutors a race-neutral explanation for removing these jurors with their peremptory strikes
o The problem with nullification is that once we tell a jury, directly or indirectly, that it is okay to engage in an uninformed cost-benefit analysis, we have no moral basis for complaining about any decision that a jury makes
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facilities v. Rockefeller
- Facts
o After an inmate uprising at New York’s Attica Correctional Facility (Attica), numerous inmates and the mother of an inmate who was killed during the revolt (collectively “plaintiffs”) brought suit against Rockefeller, the state’s Governor, and several senior government officials (collectively “defendants”) for aiding and/or abetting in the commission of various crimes committed by New York State Police Troopers and Corrections Officers who killed 32 inmates without provocation during the uprising.
o The complaint requested mandamus that the state investigate and prosecute the responsible state officials and that the U.S. Attorney investigate, arrest, and prosecute the same state officers for committing federal offenses. - Rule
o Federal courts may not compel federal prosecutors to investigate and initiate criminal prosecutions. - Application
o Plaintiffs seek mandamus to compel the U.S. Attorney to investigate and prosecute state officers. Federal mandamus is available only to compel an officer or employee of the United States government to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
o Federal courts have generally not imposed upon the discretionary decisions of federal prosecutors, who are executive branch officials, even in cases where serious questions of civil rights violations have occurred. - The primary justification for this has often been the separation of powers doctrine.
o Plaintiffs argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1987 removes a federal prosecutor’s discretion and that such officials are “authorized and required to institute prosecutions against all persons violating” any of the statutes protecting civil rights. Plaintiffs’ argument is rejected. - The word “required” is insufficient to evince a broad Congressional purpose to bar the exercise of executive discretion in the prosecution of federal civil rights crimes.
- With respect to state defendants, plaintiffs have cited no authority creating any mandatory duty upon the state officials to bring such prosecutions.
On the contrary, New York law places broad discretion in prosecutors whether to prosecute a given case or not, which is not subject to review in state courts. - Conclusion
o The order of the district court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
In re Winship
- Facts
o Samuel Winship (defendant), a juvenile, was found guilty by a preponderance of the evidence in a juvenile-delinquency proceeding of committing acts that would have amounted to larceny if they had been committed by an adult. - Procedure
o Court initially used the preponderance of the evidence standard - Rule
o For both adult criminal defendants and juveniles in delinquency proceedings, the prosecution must prove an alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. - Application
o Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law and to protect against the possibility of confinement and stigma associated with a criminal conviction.
o It is important to a free society that every person has confidence that the government will not adjudge him or her guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder, typically a jury, of every element of a criminal charge with utmost certainty. - Conclusion
o The matter is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. - Harlan concurrence
o In a criminal proceeding, the social disutility of convicting an innocent man is not equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty. Therefore, the reasonable-doubt standard is bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. - Black dissent
o The Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require that criminal defendants, whether adult or juvenile, must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. - Because this right is not contained in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the Court should not add it as a due-process requirement.
- Burger dissent
o Juvenile courts are purposefully different from traditional criminal courts. - The juvenile-adjudication process requires flexibility to deal with the unique and sensitive issues that may arise with juvenile offenders.
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of juvenile offenses seems like a step in transforming juvenile courts into criminal courts and may hinder the important rehabilitative functions of the juvenile-adjudication system.
Misdemeanors
- Far more defendants come into the system for misdemeanors than for felonies.
- Misdemeanants may not be entitled to counsel if they do not face incarceration.
- NRS section 178.397 requires appointment of indigent defense counsel only for felonies and gross misdemeanors (facing 6-12 months).
- Natapoff argues that procedural protections are illusive at the early stages, so:
o 1. Defendants plead guilty when clearly innocent
o 2. All discretion is concentrated at the decision to stop/arrest, which weighs more heavily on minority communities
Defense attorney role
- Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) – 6th and 14th Amendments guarantees the right to a defense attorney in state felony criminal cases
- Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) – applies to misdemeanor defendants facing imprisonment
The jury’s role
- Juries can “nullify” a conviction by voting to acquit against the weight of the evidence. Juries do not provide an explanation of the verdict, and an acquittal is not generally appealable.
- Is this power an accident of procedure? An integral part of the system necessary to prevent injustice? A right of the defendant? An expressive right of the jurors?
- People v. Williams (CA 2001): Permits dismissal of juror who makes intent to nullify clear
Crime =
- Crime = [actus reas + mens rea] + [any conditions + any required result]
o EX: homicide is a result crime
o Most conditions are modified by the mens rea, but not always
Interpreting Statutes
- Find plain meaning of text
- Interpret words in context
- Apply semantic canons
- If not clear, determine legislative intent
- If still ambiguous, apply canons governing construction of ambiguous statutes
- U.S. v. Dauray (2nd Cir., 2000)
o Facts
* Charles Dauray (defendant) was sitting in his car at a state park in Connecticut when a park officer approached his car and found him to be in possession of 13 unbound pictures from magazines of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
* Dauray was indicted by a federal grand jury for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which punishes the possession of three or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or “other matter” having passed through interstate or foreign commerce and which contains any visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
A jury found him guilty.
* The district court then considered Dauray’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment.
Dauray argued that each picture in his possession was itself a “visual depiction” and thus could not be “other matter” containing any visual depiction. Thus, Dauray reasoned the indictment failed to charge an offense.
o Procedure
* The district court held that the pictures constituted “other matter” within the meaning of the statute, denied dismissal of the indictment, and denied defense counsel’s request to apply the rule of lenity. Dauray appealed.
o Rule
* In a criminal prosecution the rule of lenity requires that ambiguities in the statute be resolved in the defendant’s favor to ensure the defendant received fair warning of the conduct covered by the statute pursuant to due process requirements.
o Application
* Here, the terms “other matter” could reasonably be construed to support Dauray’s claim that the pictures were not in a container, such as a magazine or book, but rather were abstracted from a container.
Thus, Dauray argues, a picture in itself cannot be considered “other matter” within the meaning of the statute.
However, the phrase may equally support the prosecution’s stance that “other matter” is a catch-all to include any physical medium.
A picture cut from a magazine can be said to contain an image imprinted by ink.
Further, Dauray argues that Congress could have explicitly prohibited the possession of individual pictures, but did not.
Conversely, the prosecution claims that Congress intended to punish someone in possession of three or more individual pictures.
Further, a statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids absurd results.
When the statute is read according to Dauray, the possession of three or more books, each containing one inappropriate image, would be prohibited, but would allow possession of stacks of unbound pictures.
On the other hand, the government’s reading of the statute would prohibit the possession of three individual pictures, but allow the possession of two illustrated books.
Consequently, in criminal prosecutions, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguities in a statute be resolved in the defendant’s favor.
* This requirement springs from due process concerns surrounding the defendant receiving fair warning of the conduct prohibited.
Under these circumstances, the court must apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Dauray’s favor.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of conviction is reversed.
1st amendment
No law “abridging the freedom of speech… or the right of the people to peaceably assemble”
Cannot criminalize thoughts, speech, or expressive conduct
8th amendment
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”
Punishment must be proportional to crime –> no punishment for status only
5th/14th amendment
No person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” (5th and 14th amendments):
A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide:
1. Notice; OR
2. Standards to protect against arbitrariness.
14th amendment
No state shall “deny to anyone… the equal protection of the laws”
[also incorporates other amendments to states]
No intentional different treatment based on race, gender, or other protected status
- Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (SCOTUS, 1972)
o Facts
* Margaret Papachristou and others (defendants) were arrested and charged with vagrancy.
* Florida’s vagrancy ordinance prohibited several general activities, among them loafing, wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose, hanging around places where liquor is sold, common night walking, and men “habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children,” despite being able to work.
o Rule
* Under the U.S. Constitution, a law must (1) give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the person’s conduct is forbidden by the law and (2) must not give unfettered discretion of enforcement to police.
If a law does not fulfill both of these requirements, then the law is void for vagueness
o Application
* A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest
* In this case, Florida’s vagrancy statute originates from early English law, and much of the language is antiquated and not applicable in today’s society.
The statute is not specific about what it renders a crime.
* As such, the statute does not give individuals notice of what conduct the statute prohibits.
* The statute also gives unfettered discretion to police officers in enforcement.
* This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions
o Conclusion
* Florida’s vagrancy statute is unconstitutional and void for vagueness.
- Kolender v. Lawson (SCOTUS, 1983)
o Facts
* Lawson (defendant) was detained or arrested fifteen times between 1975 and 1977 for violation of a California statute requiring street loiterers to provide “credible and reliable identification” to officers who asked for the identification.
Of these fifteen detainments and arrests, Lawson was convicted only once.
* After his conviction, he brought a civil action in district court in order to have the statute declared unconstitutional.
o Rule
* A criminal statute is constitutional only if it can be fairly enforced and if it gives individuals fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited by the statute.
o Application
* The statute is too vague to be constitutional because it does not state what an individual must do in order to be a suspect under the statute.
* Here, individuals must present proper identification to officers on the street if the officer believes that the individual is “suspicious.”
The word suspicious in this statute is too vague and arbitrary because it does not state what the officer needs to be suspicious of regarding the individual in order to ask for his identification.
* The term “credible and reliable identification” is also up for interpretation.
o Conclusion
* Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional on its face due to its vagueness, and Lawson’s conviction under the statute is vacated.
- Masculinities, Post-racialism, and the Gates controversy: the false equivalence between officer and civilian (Frank Rudy Cooper)
o Massachusetts statute was overly broad
* Criminalized things like disorderly acts, annoying the opposite sex, etc
o Massachusetts Court narrowed the scope of the statute’s application
* Court defines disorderly as requiring some degree of purposeful or reckless mens rea
* the Commonwealth must prove the defendant committed at least one of the following actions: he either engaged in fighting or threatening; engaged in violent or tumultuous behavior; or created a hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act that served no legitimate purpose.
* Second, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant’s actions were reasonably likely to affect the public
* the Commonwealth must prove the defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm
o Crowley was a black police officer, got a call about two black men breaking in
o Crowley goes to the house and sees Gates, a black man inside the home, and asks to speak with him
* Gates is a Harvard professor
* Crowley says Gates was yelling and engaging in disorderly conduct. Crowley arrests Gates.
o Gates’ view
* Gates’ house door was jammed, so he had to force it open when Crowley came to his house
* Gates asked Crowley for his name and badge, but Crowley refused
* Gates says he was never yelling or engaging in disorderly conduct
o Obama’s comment
* Crowley was dumb for arresting someone who was in their own home
* Obama’s approval ratings fell among whites
* Obama invited the parties to the White House for a “beer summit”
Predatory Policing: Devon W. Carbado (2017)
- Mass criminalization includes the criminalization of relatively non-serious activities
- because the above crimes are non-serious or vague, police officers will have little difficulty establishing the requisite probable cause to justify arresting people for committing them
- the more law criminalizes activities in which many people engage, the wider the pool of people from which police officers may pull to make arrests
- Option 1: social control pathway to arrest
o The two critical features of social control policing, then, are monitoring and spatial management, including the interruption, questioning, and directing of people in public spaces.
o mass criminalization provides a kind of legal cover for police officers to engage in social control policing - Option 2: direct pathway to arrest
o Arrest the person at the outset of the interaction - Option 3: predatory policing pathway to arrest
o When one adds the problem of money bail to the problems of mass criminalization and predatory policing, we end up with a criminal justice system in which too many people are effectively required to buy their freedom
- The floor to pass the “void for vagueness” test:
o The law needs:
1. Notice
2. Some type of standard to protect against arbitrariness, but not much is needed.
- Sessions v. Dimaya (SCOTUS, 2018)
o Facts
* James Dimaya (defendant) was a native of the Philippines and a lawful resident of the United States.
* Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) – if you are an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, you can be deported
Aggravated felony includes violent crime with at least one year of imprisonment term
Crime of violence defined as:
* (a) any offense w/ an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property
* (b) any other felony offense that involves a substantial risk of physical force against person or property
* Following Dimaya’s second conviction for first-degree burglary, the government (plaintiff) initiated a removal proceeding against Dimaya.
* Both an immigration judge and an appeals board held that first-degree burglary was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
* However, while Dimaya’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551(2015), that the definition of “violent felony” in another federal law was unconstitutionally vague.
The relevant section of that law was worded similarly to the law being applied to Dimaya.
* Relying on Johnson, the court of appeals ruled that § 16(b) was also unconstitutionally vague.
o Rule
* The void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits laws that require courts to identify the type of conduct the ordinary case of a crime involves and to judge whether that abstraction presents an unspecified degree of risk.
o Application
* To decide whether a party’s conviction falls under this clause, court use the categorical approach.
Under this approach, the question is not whether the particular facts of a conviction posed the risks stated in Section 16(b).
Instead, courts look to the nature of the offense more generally.
Courts must ask whether the ordinary case of an offense possesses the requisite risk.
The § 16(b) inquiry instead turns on the “nature of the offense” generally speaking. More precisely, § 16(b) requires a court to ask whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk
o Conclusion
* The lower court’s ruling is affirmed.
o Gorsuch concurrence
* Void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the 5th and 14th due process clause and separation of powers
o Thomas dissent
* Says the void for vagueness doctrine is not in the constitution
- Most crimes in the United States consist of four basic elements:
o (1) a voluntary act (or omission when there is a legal duty to act) that results in some kind of social harm (in legalese, an “actus reus”);
o (2) a prohibited mental state (in legalese, a “mens rea,” or guilty mind);
o (3) a chain of causation that links the defendant’s actions with the social harm; and
o (4) concurrence between the mens rea and the actus reus.
- Wisconsin v. Mitchell (SCOTUS, 1993)
o Facts
* Mitchell (defendant) was a young black man who, along with a group of friends, beat up a white boy in Wisconsin (plaintiff).
* Mitchell instigated the attack after viewing a movie in which a white man beat up a black boy, asking his friends, “Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?”
o Procedure
* Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery, which has a maximum sentence of 2 years
Enhanced penalty intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is committed because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person.
* Mitchell argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, because it punished the motives behind the attack. The United States Supreme Court considered the statute’s constitutionality.
o Rule
* The First Amendment permits states to enact statutes imposing stricter penalties on defendants who choose victims based on their membership in a protected class, such as race.
o Application
* While Mitchell argues that Wisconsin’s hate crimes statute is unconstitutional, because it punishes motive, this Court has held in prior cases that federal and state antidiscrimination laws may address discriminatory motives as long as the targeted conduct is not protected speech under the First Amendment.
* Wisconsin determined that crimes motivated by racial bias deserve enhanced penalties, because those crimes are more harmful to the victims and society at large.
o Conclusion
* Therefore, the penalty-enhancement statute does not violate the First Amendment and is upheld.
No punishment for thoughts/beliefs
- Legislatures cannot punish thoughts/beliefs alone just because legislature disagrees with them. Constitution does not erect a barrier to the admission of evidence considering beliefs simply because they are protected by first amendment. Legislatures may impose greater punishment base on greater harm and may punish inchoate conduct as long as it moved beyond pure thought.
8th amendment
- Prohibits certain types of punishment as too cruel
- Prohibits punishment grossly disproportionate to crime
a. Some crimes can never be punished with death
b. Some categories of people can never be punished with death or life without possibility of parole
i. EX: children, mentally disabled people - Prohibits criminalization of some things because any punishment is too severe
o You cannot punish status
- Robinson v. California (SCOTUS, 1962)
o Facts
* A California statute makes it a criminal offense for a person to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”
* Robinson (defendant) was convicted under a California statute that made it illegal for someone to be addicted to drugs.
* Four months prior to his conviction, a Los Angeles officer had found scars and needle marks on both of Robinson’s arms.
* Robinson at the time admitted that he had previously used narcotics.
o Rule
* A state statute that imprisons a defendant solely on account of the defendant’s addiction to narcotics is in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
o Application
* This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.
Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the “status” of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted “at any time before he reforms.”
* A state exercises considerable discretion in regulating drug traffic throughout the state. It may pass laws criminalizing the sale or possession of drugs, as well as establish compulsory treatment programs or public health education programs.
However, a state statute that makes drug addiction a criminal offense is in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
* Here, the trial judge instructed the jury that even if it found Robinson had not used drugs, it could still find him in violation of the statute if it found Robinson was addicted to drugs.
The possibility that the statute can punish solely on the basis of drug addiction renders it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
o Conclusion
* The conviction is reversed.
o Clark dissent
* Because the trial court’s jury instructions defined addiction to include only volitional use of illegal drugs, the state statute was not unconstitutional as applied.
Additionally, California’s civil commitment statute only applies to addicts who have lost control over their volition concerning illegal drug use.
A state may properly enact criminal laws seeking to control volitional drug use.
* Furthermore, the primary purpose of California’s criminal statute is treatment rather than punishment of drug addicts, and the statute is also constitutional for that reason.
- Powell v. Texas (SCOTUS, 1968)
o Facts
* Leroy Powell (defendant) was arrested for public intoxication, in violation of state law.
* Powell argued that his conduct was unavoidably caused by his disease of chronic alcoholism. He further argued that punishing him for conduct that was symptomatic of his disease would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
o Rule
* The punishment of conduct that is symptomatic of chronic alcoholism is not in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
o Application
* Powell relies on Robinson v. California (1962) to argue that punishing a defendant for conduct that results from a disease results in cruel and unusual punishment. However, Robinson dealt with a defendant who was punished for merely having an addiction, not for participating in any criminal conduct. It did not touch upon situations where actual criminal conduct occurs.
* Here, Powell is not punished for being a chronic alcoholic. He is punished for breaking the law by going out in public while intoxicated.
o Conclusion
* The conviction is affirmed.
o White concurrence
* Under Robinson, if a defendant cannot be punished for being a drug addict, it follows that he cannot be punished for succumbing to that addiction. Similarly, a chronic alcoholic should not be punished for drinking.
* Here, however, Powell was not convicted for drinking. He was convicted for being drunk in a public place. It is possible that some chronic alcoholics, particularly the homeless, do not have the option of drinking in a private place. In these situations, the statute would effectively punish the homeless chronic drinker for drinking. This would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
o Fortas dissent
* The statute does not punish solely on the basis of status. But it does punish Powell for being in a condition that he could not avoid due to his chronic alcoholism.
* The trial judge’s findings imply and the Eighth Amendment requires that one should not be punished if his crime is symptomatic of a disease.
Martin v. City of Boise (9th Cir., 2018)
- Facts
o The City of Boise (defendant) had two city ordinances related to homeless persons. - The camping ordinance prohibited camping on public property.
- The disorderly conduct ordinance banned sleeping in any public or private place without permission.
o The state conducted a count of homeless individuals in the county in which Boise sits, Ada County. - The results indicated that there were about 867 homeless persons in the county.
- At the time of the count, 125 individuals were unsheltered.
o Ada County had three homeless shelters, all located in Boise. The three shelters had 354 beds and 92 overflow mats combined. Two of the shelters had restrictions on who may stay. - Rule
o The government may not criminalize conduct that unavoidably stems from a person’s involuntary status. - Application
o In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the court advanced the principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from criminalizing an involuntary status like narcotics addict. - Narcotics addiction is an illness which could be contracted involuntarily, so a person’s status as a narcotics addict may be unavoidable due to the person’s state of being.
- The court found a state may criminalize conduct or actions, not an individual’s status or being.
o Therefore, the government may not criminalize camping in public or sleeping in places without permission because the prohibited conduct is effectively involuntary due to an individual’s status as homeless in a locale without sufficient shelter sleeping space. - Conclusion
o The district court judgment is reversed.
No punishment for status
- Legislatures may not punish “a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change” (Powell v. Texas dissent) and may not punish “an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being” ( Jones v. City of L.A./Martin v. City of Boise), but they may punish conduct not unavoidably tied to status. NO PUNISHMENT FOR STATUS
- Elements of a crime:
o Actus reus
* Voluntary act
* Causes social harm
o Mens rea, or culpable mental state
o Causation between act and harm
o Concurrence between act and mental state
- What counts as a voluntary act?
o Low bar
o What about unconscious acts? Drunken acts? Forced acts>
o What about attempted but incomplete acts? How far must attempt progress to be an act
- When does an omission qualify as an act
o Omission counting as an act is an exception.
- What is a voluntary act?
o Volitional, not unconscious
o Not forced, coerced, or performed by the state
o More than a thought
o More than a status
o Not simply a failure to act, or omission (except where D has a legal duty to act)
- When does an omission qualify as an act?
o D Violates legal duty to act
o D Physically capable of acting but does not
o D Aware of need to act but does not
o D Will not put self in danger by acting
- When does a person have a legal duty o act?
o Statute imposes a duty
* Statute defining the crime, or
* General good Samaritan statute
o D’s special relationship to V gives rise to duty
o Contract gives rise to duty
o D voluntarily assumes care of V
* (A person may voluntarily assume the care of a helpless human being… the duty assumed being that of a caretaker and protector to the exclusion of others. - Beardsley
o D creates the risk of harm
- Omission cases
o Hoaward: Parent has legal duty to protect child, and discharge of this duty requires affirmative performance
o Beardsley: No legal duty is created based upon a mere moral obligation. V being in D’s house creates no such legal duty
o Pestinikas: Duty to act imposed by contract is legally enforceable and creates a legal duty. Failure to perform a duty imposed by contract may be the basis for a charge of criminal homicide.
- Martin v. State (Alabama C of A, 1944)
o Facts
* Martin (defendant) was arrested at his home by police officers and placed in a police vehicle where he was separately charged for being drunk and using loud and profane language on a public highway.
* Martin was convicted under a state statute which held that any person who, while intoxicated or drunk, appeared in “any public place where one or more persons are present, and manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and profane discourse, shall, on conviction, be fined.”
o Rule
* Criminal liability may only be imposed when the unlawful conduct is committed voluntarily.
o Application
* Under the plain language of the statute, one convicted of being drunk in a public place must have voluntarily placed himself there.
* If the accused is taken involuntarily and forcibly carried to a public place by an arresting officer, a charge of being drunk in a public place cannot stand.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of conviction is reversed.
- State v. Decina (C of A of NY, 1956)
o Facts
* Decina (defendant) suffered an epileptic attack while driving which caused his vehicle to travel at a high rate of speed, jump a curb, and strike four individuals, killing them.
* Decina was charged with, and convicted of, “criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death.”
Decina’s doctor testified that they previously spoke about his epilepsy history
The indictment states essentially that defendant, knowing “that he was subject to epileptic attacks or other disorder rendering him likely to lose consciousness for a considerable period of time,” was culpably negligent “in that he consciously undertook to and did operate his Buick sedan on a public highway”
o Rule
* A criminal defendant who disregards the consequences that can result from driving a vehicle with knowledge of a health condition that can produce involuntary actions may be found guilty of vehicular homicide.
* Make the window of time of the act bigger to find the moment where the accused may have made a voluntary decision.
o Application
* Here, Decina had prior knowledge that he was subject to epileptic attacks at any time and that driving, giving his condition, was very dangerous.
However, Decina disregarded this knowledge and chose to drive his vehicle anyway.
Consequently, Decina’s awareness of his epileptic condition coupled with a disregard of the consequences renders him liable for culpable negligence.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of the appellate division is affirmed.
2.01 Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an Act.
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.
(3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or
(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
(4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.
- five situations in which individuals have a legal duty to act:
o (1) when there is a special relationship between the defendant and the victim, such as the relationship between husbands and wives, parents and children, and masters and servants;
o (2) when the defendant enters into a contract which requires him or her either explicitly or implicitly to act in a particular way (e.g., a contractual duty to provide care to an elderly individual);
o (3) when there is a statutory duty to act (such as the duty to pay federal taxes found in the Internal Revenue Code);
o (4) when the defendant creates the risk of harm to the victim; and
o (5) when the defendant, who otherwise would not have a duty to act, voluntarily assumes care of a person in need of help.
- People v. Beardsley (SCT Michigan, 1907)
o Facts
* Respondent Beardsley (defendant) was a married man who arranged to meet with an acquaintance, Blanche Burns, at his apartment while his wife was away.
* Beardsley and Burns had known each other for a while and had spent the night together on two prior occasions.
* Burns arrived at his home on Saturday, March 18, 1905, and they began drinking.
* Burns stayed there continuously until the following Monday.
* Unknown to Beardsley, Burns asked a coworker of Beardsley’s to purchase morphine tablets for her. (Burns was suicidal)
* Beardsley later saw her consume a few tablets and attempted to knock them out of her hand.
* Burns went unconscious and Beardsley could not revive her.
* Beardsley took her to a neighbor and asked him to look after Burns until she awoke.
* That night, the neighbor became concerned about Burns’ condition and called the authorities.
* After an examination, Burns was proclaimed dead.
o Rule
* One is not under a legal duty to care for a houseguest such that the failure to do so makes one criminally punishable for any resulting harm.
o Application
* Here, there was no statute or contract imposing a duty of care on Beardsley, nor was there a special relationship between Beardsley and Burns which required Beardsley to take measures to prevent Burns’ death. Burns was merely a guest in Beardsley’s home.
* The fact that they had been acquaintances for a while or that she stayed in Beardsley’s home for several days did not change the status of their relationship.
The fact that this woman was in his house created no such legal duty as exists in law and is due from a husband towards his wife, as seems to be intimated by the prosecutor’s brief
Had Burns been a male drinking companion, it is unlikely anyone would impose a duty of care on Beardsley.
* The fact that Burns was a woman does not change the legal relationship between Burns and Beardsley.
o Conclusion
The conviction is set aside and Beardsley is ordered released.
- Commonwealth v. Howard (SCT PA, 1979)
o Facts
* Darcel Howard (defendant) and her five-year-old daughter lived with Howard’s boyfriend, Edward Watts.
* For several weeks, Watts regularly and severely beat and tortured Howard’s daughter with a belt or strap.
* At no time did Howard attempt to stop Watts or report him to the authorities.
* During the course of one beating, Howard’s daughter fell and hit her head on a piece of furniture, and died as a result.
o Rule
* A parent may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for a child’s death if
(1): the parent failed to protect the child from a known and substantial risk of harm that directly caused the child’s death; and
(2): the child’s death was a direct result of this harm
o Application
* Here, Howard and her daughter shared a special relationship as parent and child.
Howard consequently had a legal duty to affirmatively protect her daughter, but failed to do so.
While the immediate cause of the child’s death was multiple injuries to the head and trunk, inflicted on the child by Watts over a period of several weeks, appellant may still be held culpable for her continuing failure to protect the child during all that time
Howard consciously disregarded the regular physical abuse that was routinely inflicted upon her daughter by Watts.
* this is sufficient to show that appellant consciously disregarded a manifestly apparent risk to the health and safety of her young child and that this neglect was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct the reasonable parent would observe under the circumstances
Howard’s failure to protect her daughter from this known and substantial risk of harm posed by Watts was a direct cause of her daughter’s death.
The overwhelming evidence shows that Howard had full knowledge of a continuing pattern of harm that was regularly inflicted upon her daughter by Watts.
* Despite this knowledge, Howard failed to act to protect her daughter pursuant to her legal duty.
* Therefore, Howard’s failure to act was reckless and grossly negligent under the circumstances and was a direct cause of her daughter’s death, thus giving rise to criminal culpability for involuntary manslaughter.
o Conclusion
* Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
- Commonwealth v. Pestinikas (SCT PA, 1992)
o Facts
* Joseph Kly met Walter and Helen Pestinikas (defendants) when he contacted them about prearranging his funeral.
* Kly was living with his stepson and was later hospitalized and diagnosed with a disease that made it difficult for him to swallow food. When he was discharged, Kly said he did not want to return to his stepson’s home, and arrangements were instead made for the Pestinikases to care for Kly in their home.
* On the day of Kly’s discharge, the Pestinikases were given care instructions and a prescription to fill for Kly.
* The Pestinikases orally agreed to follow the instructions and provide Kly with food, shelter, care, and the required medicine.
* According to the evidence at trial, the prescription was never filled. Instead of allowing Kly to live in their home, the Pestinikases placed him in a small, enclosed porch of a distant building, where there was no insulation or bathroom and he was exposed to outside weather conditions.
* The Pestinikases took Kly to the bank where they had their names added to his account.
* Over time, the Pastinikases withdrew over $30,000 from the account.
* About two years after Kly’s discharge from the hospital, he was found dead, and an autopsy revealed starvation and dehydration as the causes of death.
o Rule
* A failure to perform a duty imposed by a private contract may be the basis for a criminal charge.
o Application
* An omission to act may support a criminal prosecution if (1) such a failure causes the death of another person, and (2) all other elements of the offense are satisfied.
* It is clear that when a duty is imposed by law, and a statute makes an omission to perform a legal duty sufficient for criminal liability, there was a purposeful distinction between a legal duty to take affirmative action and a mere moral duty to act.
* A contractual duty to act is legally enforceable and therefore forms a legal duty. As a result, failing to perform a duty undertaken in a contract may properly support a criminal murder charge.
* However, the omission to act must also be joined by the requisite mens rea.
In the absence of malicious intent, an omission to perform private contractual duties will not suffice for a murder conviction.
* Our holding is not that every breach of contract can become the basis for a finding of homicide resulting from an omission to act.
A criminal act involves both a physical and mental aspect.
An omission to act can satisfy the physical aspect of criminal conduct only if there is a duty to act imposed by law
* Here, there was evidence that Kly’s death had been caused by the Pestinikases’ failure to provide food and medical care, which they had agreed to do by oral contract with hospital personnel.
If the jury found that the Pestinikases maliciously deprived Kly of required food and care, a murder conviction would be appropriate.
Therefore, the Pestinikases’ omission to act was sufficient to support a conviction for murder, and the trial court’s jury instructions were correct.
o Conclusion
* The convictions are affirmed.
o Good Samaritan laws
- The first type of statute protects from civil liability those who help or rescue others in emergency situations
- A second type of good samaritan statute imposes an affirmative duty on ordinary people to assist others in need. Failure to provide such assistance may result in criminal punishment.
Only a handful of states have enacted laws that require non-professional persons to act under penalty of criminal prosecution
- Regina v. Cunningham (Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957)
o Facts
* Roy Cunningham (defendant) ripped off the gas meter in the cellar of an unoccupied home and stole the money inside.
* Cunningham did not turn off the gas, which seeped into an adjacent house where an elderly woman named Sarah Wade was sleeping. Wade was partially asphyxiated.
* In addition, Cunningham was indicted under § 23 of the Offenses against the Person Act, 1861, which provides that it is a felony to “unlawfully and maliciously” administer to or cause another person to take poison in a manner that endangers his or her life or causes serious injury.
o Rule
* The term malice in a criminal statute means that the person acted with either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done or (2) reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk that the harm would result, meaning the person was aware of the risk of harm and did the act anyway.
o Application
* In this context, malice does not mean mere wickedness as it does colloquially.
There is no doubt that Cunningham behaved badly when he took the gas meter.
* However, the real issue here is whether Cunningham foresaw that taking the gas meter could seriously harm someone but did it anyway. That question should properly have been submitted to the jury.
* There is no way to know whether a reasonable jury, instructed on the correct definition of malice, would have convicted Cunningham.
o Conclusion
* As a result, Cunningham’s appeal is allowed; the conviction is quashed.
- Mens rea
o Guilty mind
* Older usage: moral guilt generally
* Modern usage: mental state that is an element of the crime
o Some form of mens rea generally applies to all material elements of a crime (act and conditions)
* Under common law, different mens rea might apply to different elements
* See Yermian and Holloway for examples of how courts read mens rea terms in statutes
* Under MPC, stated mens rea applies to all material elements unless statute shows clear intent otherwise
- Common law structure – mens rea
o Specific intent
o General intent/knowledge
o Recklessness/criminal negligence
o Civil negligence
o Strict liability
* No mental state at all
- Under the common law, the mental state of intent is defined in two ways.
o First, one acts with the requisite intent if it is his or her conscious object or purpose to cause a certain result or to engage in certain prohibited conduct.
o Alternatively, one intends a particular social harm if one knows to a virtual certainty that one’s actions will cause that social harm
- State v. Fugate (C of A of Ohio, 2nd Dist., 1973)
o Facts
* Herbert Fugate (defendant), a 19-year-old man, entered a commercial parking garage with a loaded shotgun.
* Fugate intended to rob the owner of the parking garage, Sylvester Leingang, who was 66 years old.
* Fugate struck Leingang two times with the barrel of the shotgun, causing severe head wounds.
* Fugate then ordered Leingang into the basement of the garage, where Fugate shot and killed him.
o Rule
* Intent = conscious object or knowledge to a virtual certainty
* Court approved two methods of interring intent:
Circumstances surrounding the act must be examined, including the instrument used and the manner of inflicting a fatal wound
Intent to kill may be presumed where the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act is to produce death
o Application
* The element of intent may be determined from the circumstances surrounding the crime and from the evidence developed during trial.
* In this case, Fugate’s intent to kill may be presumed, because the natural and probable consequence of his wrongful actions toward Leingang was to cause the older man’s death.
o Conclusion
* Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
* Conditional intent – I meant to do X, but Y happened. Is this intent? Generally, courts say yes.
- U.S. v. Jewell (9th Cir., 1976)
o Facts
* Jewell (defendant) was convicted of knowingly transporting 110 pounds of marijuana worth $6,250 in a secret compartment between the trunk and the rear seat of an automobile, from Mexico into the United States.
* At trial, Jewell testified that he did not know the drugs were there.
There was circumstantial evidence that showed Jewell had knowledge of the drugs and was therefore lying.
And there was also circumstantial evidence that showed although Jewell knew of the presence of the secret compartment and that it likely contained marijuana, he deliberately avoided positive knowledge of the presence of the drugs in order to avoid responsibility in the event he was caught.
o Rule
* “Knowingly” includes positive knowledge as well as a defendant’s awareness of the high probability of an illegal act but purposely fails to investigate the presence of the illegal act in order to remain ignorant.
* Knowledge = knowing a fact or being aware of and correctly believing it exists
* If a crime requires knowledge, willful blindness is included in that
o Application
* To act “knowingly,” therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, “positive” knowledge is not required
o Conclusion
* The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Intent Rules
- You can deduce intent form surrounding circumstances (Fugate)
- D presumed to intent the natural and probable consequences of actions (Fugate)
o Not same as taking (reckless or negligent) risk of death - Knowledge includes willful blindness (Jewell)
o Not enough to show indifference to known risk but requires subjective belief of high probability fact exists & deliberate steps to avoid learning it
o Conditional intent is usually enough to satisfy intent (Holloway) - Usually if someone intends to do one crime, but another crime occurs, the intent does not transfer. But, if someone intends to kill person A and accidentally kills person B, that usually satisfies intent. Intent can usually be transferred across people, but not across different offenses.
- General rule: intent to do one kind of harm cannot transfer to intent to do another kind of harm
- Exception: Intent to kill one person can “transfer” to supply intent necessary t kill an unintended victim
o Usually at issue in bad aim homicide cases, but can also apply to other crimes
o Not applicable to different types of acts/harms
o Is not generally used to supply intent for an attempt on the wrong person - Alternate formulations:
o Legal fiction: - Shooting act + intent to kill A(MR1) + A not dead; result = no crime
- Shooting act + no intent to kill B (no MR1) + B dead; result = no crime
- Transfer MR1 into equation 2 to make a completed crime
- Dressler formulation: reframing intent to “intent to kill a person” eliminates need to engage in fiction of transfer
- MPC incorporates in causation definitions (2.03(3))
- People v. Scott (SCT CA, 1996)
o Facts
* The romantic relationship between Calvin Hughes and Elaine Scott soured, and their interactions became increasingly hostile, resulting in a physical altercation one evening.
* Scott’s adult sons, Damien Scott and Derrick Brown (defendants), came to their mother’s aid and forced Hughes from the shared apartment.
* A few days later, Hughes and a friend drove to a neighborhood park. The defendants followed Hughes, drove into the park, and sprayed the area with bullets from an automatic weapon, intending to kill Hughes.
* Instead, a bystander was killed, and several others were injured by the gunfire.
o Rule
* Common law allows fiction of transfer, but intent is not “used up” when transferred because it is really grounded in a policy of not allowing D to escape liability for bad aim.
* The doctrine of transferred intent may be used to assign criminal liability to a defendant who kills an unintended victim, even if the defendant is also prosecuted for the attempted murder of the intended victim.
o Application
* Here, the defendants shot at one person with an intent to kill Hughes, missed him, and killed a bystander instead.
* Consequently, under Suesser, the defendants may be held criminally liable for the death of the bystander and the attempted murder of Hughes and his friend.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
General & Specific Intent)
- Specific intent
o Intent to commit a further act OR intent to achieve a specific result - General intent
o Intent to act - Look for clues in the language
- Common law distinction only (abolished in MPC)
- Why does it matter? Voluntary intoxication and unreasonable mistake of fact are defenses to specific intent crimes only (they can negate the mens rea for specific intent crimes only)
- People v. Atkins (SCT CA, 2001)
o Facts
* Robert Atkins (defendant) told his friends that he was going to burn down the house of Orville Figgs.
* The next day, a fire was reported in the canyon where Figgs lived.
A soil sample collected by the fire marshal revealed the presence of gasoline, and Atkins’s wallet was found near the site where the fire had originated.
* When interviewed by the fire marshal, Atkins said that he and his brother had been drinking all day and then drove to the canyon and kept drinking.
* Atkins said that the area was overgrown with weeds, which he decided to burn with gasoline. The fire spread quickly, and after Atkins and his brother tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire, they panicked and fled.
* Atkins said that he did not mean any harm by setting the fire, and maintained that the fire was an accident.
o Rule
* A criminal defendant may not introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the existence of general criminal intent.
* Arson is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime, so evidence of intoxication cannot be offered. Determination based on language and structure of statute.
o Application
* Specific-intent crimes and general-intent crimes are distinguishable.
If a criminal statute does not refer to an intent to commit a further act in addition to the particular criminal act, the crime is a general-intent crime.
* A general-intent crime is committed when the defendant intends to commit the criminal act but nothing more.
* General intent only requires an intent to perform the act that causes the harm.
If a criminal statute refers to an intent to commit a further act or achieve an end beyond the particular criminal act, the crime is a specific-intent crime.
In essence, general intent only requires an intent to commit the act that causes the harm, while specific intent requires an intent to commit the act and to cause the harm that results from the act.
* The mens rea for arson is a general intent to cause a fire on forest land.
The arson statute only requires an intent to set the fire that results in the burning of forest land, not an additional intent to burn the land.
Because arson is not a specific-intent crime, the trial court was correct when it instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to arson.
o Conclusion
* Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeal.
Recklessness/criminal negligence
- What is negligence in criminal law?
- Common law unintentional crimes
o Generally, criminal law wants more culpability than tort law (worse negligence)
o Recklessness and criminal negligence may mean the same thing
o Negligence usually means criminal or gross negligence, but state statutes can provide for civil (simple) negligence liability - How is the model penal code different?
Common law:
Specific intent
General intent/knowledge
Recklessness/criminal negligence
Civil negligence
MPC
Purpose
Knowledge
Recklessness
negligence
Strict liability
MPC Provisions on mens rea
- 2.02 – Defines mens rea terms; prescribes rules for statutes lacking mens rea term; prescribes rules for interpreting mens rea terms
- 2.04 – Mistakes of law and fact (see also 2.02(9) regarding mistakes about illegality of conduct)
- 2.05 – Strict liability
- 1.13 – Defines “material element”
- 1.04 – Difference between violations and crimes
Model Penal Code mens rea definitions
- Purpose
o Conscious object to engage in conduct or cause result
o Aware of conditions, believes conditions exist, or hopes conditions exist
o Conditional purpose is enough – 2.02(6) - Knowledge
o Aware of the nature of conduct
o Aware of circumstances
o Practically certain that conduct will cause result
o Knowledge satisfied if D aware of high probability of existence of a circumstance is enough, unless actually D believes it does not exist - 2.02(7)
o (version of willful blindness)
o Knowledge satisfies “willfully” - 2.02 (8) - Recklessness:
o Conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
o Disregard of risk involves gross deviation from standard of conduct of law abiding person
o Must be aware of risk in order to disregard
o Default mental state for MPC - Negligence
o Should be aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk
o Failure to perceive risk is gross deviation from standard of care of reasonable person in same situation
o Defined but rarely used in MPC (except in homicide)
o Not civil negligence
- Morissette v. U.S. (SCOTUS, 1952)
o Facts
* A scrap metal and junk dealer, Morissette (defendant), entered an Air Force bombing range and took several spent bomb casings that had been lying around for years exposed to the weather and rusting.
* Morissette subsequently flattened the casings out and sold them for an $84 profit.
o Procedure
* Morissette was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 which made it a crime to “knowing convert” government property.
At trial, Morissette admitted he knew he was taking Air Force property but honestly believed the government had abandoned the casings.
The trial judge rejected Morissette’s defense and instructed the jury that “the question on intent is whether or not he intended to take the property.” Morissette was convicted and he appealed.
o Rule
* Statutes codifying “infamous common law crimes” should be read to incorporae common law mens rea requirement. Balint and Berman distinguishable because they involved new “public welfare offenses”
o Application
* Congressional silence as to the mental element in § 641 will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.
* Here, the trial judge wrongly instructed the jury that it was not allowed to consider Morissette’s honest belief that he thought the casings were abandoned as a defense.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of conviction is reversed.
- Elonis v. U.S. (SCOTUS, 2015)
o Facts
* Elonis (defendant) posted violent language directed at his estranged wife online.
* The United States (plaintiff) charged Elonis with making interstate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
Section 875(c) did not contain any required mens rea.
o Procedure
* Elonis argued he did not violate section 875(c) because he did not intend to threaten anyone.
The district court instructed the jury to use a reasonable person standard in determining whether Elonis’s postings constituted threats. The jury convicted Elonis.
o Rule
* The meaning of Congress’s omission of an intent requirement is not plain. Morissette rule of construction governs.
* What mens rea should be read in? Only that required to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. Negligence (reasonable person would have perceived it as a threat) is generally not enough. Intent is. Recklessness might be.
* Criminal statutes generally include a requirement that a person is aware that he or she is committing a crime, even if the statute does not explicitly contain such a mens rea requirement.
o Application
* In this case, Elonis’s conviction must be reversed.
Although section 875(c) does not explicitly contain a required mens rea, it implicitly includes a requirement that a person is aware that he or she is violating the statute.
Elonis was found guilty of violating section 875(c) because of how a reasonable person would view his postings.
The reasonable person standard is suited for civil actions but is not appropriate for criminal statutes.
* The lower courts effectively reduced the culpability requirement for section 875(c) to a negligence standard.
o Conclusion
* The conviction is reversed.
- Commonwealth v. Barone (SCT PA, 1980)
o Facts
* While driving to work on a clear and dry morning, Theresa Barone (defendant) approached a stop sign located at an intersection of a busy street. Traffic was heavy.
* As Barone crossed the intersection to turn left, a motorcycle struck the right side of Barone’s vehicle, killing the operator.
Facts establish Barone was not negligent
* Barone was charged with a violation of § 3732 of the state’s motor vehicle code, which provided that any person who unintentionally caused the death of another person while engaged in a violation of state law or a municipal ordinance during the operation of a vehicle was guilty of homicide by vehicle, a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a possible fine.
o Procedure
* Barone filed a motion to demurrer to the charge.
The trial court granted Barone’s motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to be heard by a jury. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed.
The court finds additional support in the code’s similarity to the MPC, which strongly implements the common law tradition against strict penal responsibility unless legislative intent “plainly appears”
o Rule
* Even though the word “unintentional appears, whether it is plain should be determined with reference to common, traditional usage. This suggests “unintentional” means criminally negligent. The word “unintentionally” in the context of homicide means “without purpose” but does not encompass non-negligent accidents. At minimum, it is ambiguous. Leg intent” seems to be aimed at criminally (grossly) negligent homicide (previously unpunished under homicide laws).
* A state criminal law imposing a conviction for homicide and an unduly harsh sentence upon a defendant for unintentionally causing the death of another during the commission of a violation of traffic laws shall not be interpreted as a strict-liability offense.
o Application
* Here, the evidence clearly shows that Barone acted reasonably under the circumstances.
* Given that a jury could not have found Barone’s actions amounted to a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the same situation, no violation of § 3732 occurred.
* Therefore, the trial court properly granted Barone’s motion to demurrer to the charge.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Strict liability
- Crime does not require a mental state at all for some material element
- Common law:
o SL may apply to “public welfare offenses” lacking mens rea term (Morissette) or where legislative intent to eliminate mental state is otherwise plain
o Some traditional crimes have always been SL as to a particular element (adultery, statutory rape, bigamy) - MPC Strict Liability
o Disfavors SL, so recklessness will be supplied unless clear intent to impose SL - Mens rea may be inferred even if statute encompasses “unintentional” conduct (Barone)
o SL can only apply to “violations” or offenses defined by non-criminal law where leg intent is plain - 2.05
o “Violations” are offenses punishable by fines only - 1.04 (different than common law)
No mens rea? c/l vs. MPC
Common law
* Traditional crime - mens rea inferred in accordance with common law understanding (Morissette)
* Rule of construction for these is to interpret statutes to include “broadly applicable scienter requirements,” reading in only the MR necessary to separate wrongful from innocent conduct (Elonis)
* (New) “public welfare offense” - may be “strict liability” but check for constitutional problems (see Barone)
Model penal code
* Recklessness is the default and will be inferred - 2.02(3)
* Criminal negligence is exceptional basis for liability under MPC
Should statute be construed as imposing SL?
- What did the legislature intend? Consider an offense is traditional or public welfare (and whether it is more appropriate to read in a MR or construe it as imposing SL), consider these factors:
a. History of offense
b. Standard CL definition
c. Harm
d. Level of public condemnation
e. Harshness of penalty (but CL courts have permitted some imprisonment for SL, see Barone concurrence)
f. Practices of other courts - If legislature intended SL (if it is a public welfare offense or intent is otherwise clear), consider whether there is a due process problem
Mistakes
- Mistake is generally a case-in-chief defense (plaintiff proves it, defendant can poke holes in it)
- Common law: mistake of fact v. mistake of law
- MPC: Single rule for mistakes – 2.04
CL on Mistakes
- Mistake of fact (Navarro)
o Specific intent negated by good faith mistake
o General intent negated by good faith and reasonable mistake
o Mistake of fact may not be a defense if conduct is morally wrong or legally wrong anyway - Mistake of law
o Not an excuse, except: - Reliance on official interpretation of law (Marrero; Clegg; Tallmadge; Fridley)
- Knowledge of illegality is element of crime (Cheek; Bryan)
- Lack of fair notice (Lambert; Bryant)
MPC on mistakes
- Does not distinguish fact/law or specific/general intent
- Ignorance or mistake of any kind is a defense if it negates the mens rea – 2.04(1)
- In general, knowledge of (or even negligence regarding) the specific law is not required – 2.02(9)
- Affirmative defense for official interpretation of law or where law marking it a crime is not available – 2.04(3)
o D must prove by preponderance of the evidence - Only a partial defense if the mistaken situation would still be a crime, but conviction can be reduced to lesser included offense 2.04(2)
Triage
- Actus reus
a. (was the act voluntary? If an omission, how is duty established? Did the act cause the result, if required?) - Mens rea
a. (must a mens rea be supplied? Did a mistake (or intoxication) affect mens rea? What kind of mistake? Consider CL v. MPC) - Concurrence
a. (which mens rea applies to each condition? If there was a mistake, which element/MR does it apply to? Consider moral/legal wrong rule)
* = CRIME
A. Mistakes of Fact – People v. Navarro
- People v. Navarro (LA County Superior Court, 1979)
o Facts - Appellant Navarro (defendant) took four wooden beams from a construction site. He was convicted of petty theft.
- The relevant statute says that anyone who steals another person’s property with a felonious motive is guilty of theft.
o Procedure - At trial, Navarro proposed jury instructions saying that if he took the wood beams with the good faith belief they were abandoned or that he had permission to take them, he was not guilty of theft, even if his good faith belief was unreasonable.
The court instead instructed the jury that if Navarro took the wood beams with the good faith belief that they were abandoned or that he had permission to take them, he was not guilty of theft as long as his good faith belief was reasonable.
o Rule - An honest mistake of fact is a defense to a specific intent crime regardless of whether the mistake was unreasonable.
For specific intent crimes, a mistake of fact does not need to be reasonable.
o Application - Here, Navarro is accused of the crime of theft. Theft is a specific intent crime. It requires Navarro to possess the felonious intent to steal another’s property.
In order to possess a felonious intent to steal, Navarro must have known that what he was taking was not his to take. - If for any reason, Navarro truly believed the beams were abandoned or that he had permission to take them, he did not possess the necessary felonious intent.
o Conclusion - The judgment is reversed.
B. Mistakes of the Law
* Under both the common law and the Model Penal Code, the general rule regarding mistakes of law is that ignorance of the law is no excuse
o three exceptions to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse
- “official interpretation of the law” and is also known as “entrapment by estoppel
a person who reasonably relies on an official interpretation of the law that turns out to be erroneous can be exonerated. This defense is often called - ignorance of the law can be a defense to a crime if knowledge that the prohibited conduct is unlawful is an element of the crime
- the U.S. Supreme Court has held that under certain limited circumstances, the prosecution of a person who lacks fair notice of a legal duty imposed by law can violate due process
- The official interpretation of the law defense has four basic components.
o The defendant must have
* (1) reasonably relied on
* (2) an official interpretation of the law,
* (3) later determined to be erroneous,
* (4) contained in a statute or other enactment or obtained from a person or public body with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law defining the offense
- People v. Marrero (C of A of NY, 1987)
o Facts
* Marrero (defendant), a federal corrections officer, was arrested in Manhattan at a social club for unlicensed possession of a loaded .38 caliber pistol in violation of state law.
* Penal Law § 265.02(a)(1)(a) expressly exempted “peace officers,” from the statute. The term “peace officers” was defined by the statute to include “correction officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution.”
o Rule
* One who violates a statute may not raise a good faith mistaken belief as to the meaning of the law as a defense.
o Application
* Marrero argues that his mistaken belief about his conduct was founded upon an “official statement” of the law contained in the statute itself.
* the interpretation of the statute relied upon must be “officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.” We agree with the People that the trial court also properly rejected the defense under Penal Law § 15.20(2)(d) since none of the interpretations which defendant proffered meets the requirements of the statute
o Conclusion
* The order of the appellate division is affirmed.
- U.S. v. Clegg (9th Cir., 1988)
o Facts
* Eugene Ray Clegg (defendant), a teacher at an American school in Pakistan, was charged with exporting firearms in violation of federal law.
* During pretrial proceedings, Clegg requested that the federal government produce documentary evidence that Clegg claimed authorized his conduct, namely the smuggling of weapons through Pakistan to Afghan rebels so that the rebels could resist Soviet occupation of their country.
* Clegg alleged the documents would show that two high-ranking United States Army officers assisted Clegg in contacting the rebels, obtaining weapons and ammunition, and planning a large, secret arms shipment that never took place.
* Clegg was eventually arrested in Pakistan, imprisoned, and subsequently released to U.S. officials, who transported Clegg back to the United States for prosecution in federal district court.
o Rule
* A defendant may raise mistake of law as a defense if the defendant relied in good faith on the representations of federal military officials authorizing the exportation of firearms, despite those actions being a violation of federal law.
o Application
* In U.S. v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987), the court entertained a similar case involving a defendant charged with violating a federal law that prohibits a convicted felon from receiving a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1982).
Tallmadge raised a mistake-of-law defense on the ground that his state felony conviction had been reduced to a misdemeanor, and after disclosing that information to a licensed firearm dealer, the dealer nonetheless sold Tallmadge a firearm.
The court exonerated Tallmadge, in part, because a firearm dealer is required by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to collect certain information from customers purchasing firearms.
Thus, the Tallmadge court concluded that the licensed firearms dealer was a de facto federal agent, and Tallmadge had a right to rely on the representations of the dealer who should have known the federal law governing ownership of a firearm.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
- State v. Fridley (SCT ND, 1983)
o Facts
* During a traffic stop for speeding, police officers conducted a routine check of Gaylord Duane Fridley’s (defendant) driver’s license and learned that it had been revoked.
* Fridley was arrested and charged with driving with a revoked license, a class B misdemeanor and strict-liability offense.
* Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine to prevent Fridley from introducing evidence at trial of his telephone conversation with a driver’s license division (division) employee named Debbie.
During a hearing on the motion, Fridley testified that Debbie told him that in order to obtain a work permit to drive, Fridley was required to take the driver’s test and forward the appropriate documentation and payment to the division.
Fridley further testified that Debbie told him that while the paperwork was being processed, Fridley would be without a license for seven days.
Fridley stated that he interpreted the conversation with Debbie to mean that he was permitted to drive in the interim.
Fridley argued that he intended to introduce the evidence of his conversation with Debbie to raise a mistake-of-law defense at trial.
o Rule
* The defense of excuse based upon mistake of law is not applicable to a strict-liability offense for which proof of culpability is not required.
o Application
* However, state law provides that the mistake-of-law defense does not apply to criminal violations for which proof of culpability is not required.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
- Cheek v. United States
o Facts
* John Cheek (defendant) was involved with an anti-tax advocacy group that claimed that federal tax laws were unconstitutional.
* Based on the group’s advice, Cheek stopped filing federal tax returns.
* Cheek was charged with several counts willfully failing to file a federal income tax return for a number of years in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 26 U.S.C. § 7203(1), which are specific intent crimes.
* At trial, Cheek’s defense rested on his sincerely held belief that he owed no taxes on his wages.
o Rule
* Whether a purportedly good-faith misunderstanding of the law will negate the specific intent requirement of willfulness under criminal tax laws is a question of fact for the jury; there is no legal requirement that the belief be objectively reasonable.
o Application
* The complexity of federal tax regulations has made it difficult for average citizens to keep up.
Consequently, Congress made specific intent to violate the law an element of criminal offenses.
A defendant will satisfy the willfulness requirement if she made a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.”
* This means that the defendant must
* (1) know about the duty and
* (2) purposely violate it.
* A trial judge may instruct a jury that it should not consider claims like Cheek’s that the tax code is unconstitutional.
Cheek’s beliefs that wages did not constitute income and that he was not a taxpayer should have been put to the jury.
o Conclusion
* The judgment of conviction is vacated, and the matter is remanded.
* [On retrial, the jury was instructed to consider “whether the defendant’s stated belief about the tax statute was reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that belief in good faith.” Cheek was convicted. United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1993)].
