Corporations 5 Flashcards

1
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Executive Compensation

Circular problem

A

Who sets officer compensation?

Who is on the board?

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2
Q

Treat Executive Compensation Decisions as Conflict of Interest Transactions
- If we don’t have disinterested and informed approval
of the directors/shareholders, we need

A

fairness which is specifically the compensation is reasonable and not excessive.
* If we do have disinterested approval, the business
judgment rule kicks back in

Beholden directors aren’t disinterested

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3
Q

Treat Executive Compensation Decisions as
Conflict of Interest Transactions
- Tax Implications

A
  • Reasonable compensation for employees is a deductible expense for the corporation.
  • Dividends have a dividend tax.
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4
Q

Wilderman v. Wilderman

7 factors of reasonable compensation

A
  • (1) what other executives receive who are similarly situated;
  • (2) the ability of the executive;
  • (3) whether or not the Internal Revenue Service has allowed the corporation to
    deduct the amount of salary alleged to be unreasonable;
  • (4) whether the salary bears a reasonable relation to the success of the corporation;
  • (5) the amount previously received as salary;
  • (6) whether increases in salary are geared to increases in the value of services rendered; and
  • (7) the amount of the challenged salary compared to other salaries paid by the
    employer
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5
Q

What about Director Compensation?

A
  • Unless the charter or bylaws provide otherwise, the board may set director compensation. (DGCL §141(h); MBCA §8.11)
  • Setting an unreasonable compensation will breach the directors’ fiduciary duties.
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6
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

general rule

A

The directors’/officers’
fiduciary duties prohibit them
from diverting or usurping a
business opportunity from
their corporation to
themselves without first
giving their corporation an
opportunity to act.

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7
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity

A
  1. Interest or expectancy (dibs)
  2. Line of business (not dibs)
  3. Becomes aware in the course of their work for the corporation, because of their position pr otherwise uses the corporation’s resources (how heard of opp)
  4. Fairness
  5. 2 step
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8
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity
1. Interest or expectancy

A
  • Interest already existing
  • Expectancy shown by an affirmative action to demonstrate a desire to pursue the opportunity; or
    1. formal board action isnt neccessary
  • Corporation has a substantial need for oppertunity
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9
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity
2. Line of business

A

Avowed business purpose

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10
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity
Director/Officer Defenses

A
  1. Offer it to the corporation first and have it
    disclaimed (ALI §5.05); MBCA § 8.70))
  2. Timely and adequate disclosure of opportunity alone (Broz vs. Cellular Information Systems, Inc. and Ostrowski vs. Avery)
  3. Fairness
  4. The requirement to clear a Corporate Opportunity has been limited or eliminated in the charter (DGCL § 122(17); MBCA § 2.02(b)(6)

NOT lack of $ ( a defense that is no longer a defense on its own)

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11
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity
Director/Officer Defenses
1. Offer it to the corporation first and have it disclaimed (ALI §5.05); MBCA § 8.70))

A
  • Disinterested directors or shareholders disclaim the corporate opportunity after disclosure or knowledge
  • Disinterested superior officer approves (ALI §5.05
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12
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Corporate Opportunity

Tests for Corporate Opportunity
Director/Officer Defenses
3. Fairness

A

Courts are split if this can only be a defense after disclosure (who adopted ALI) or if it is a defense itself (DE and CT)

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13
Q

Relationship between Remedies and Burden
of Proof
- Duty of care and loyalty

A
  • Duty of Care – about damages
    (Show causation)
  • Duty of Loyalty – about getting a deal rescinded/a fair price or getting the opportunity
    (Show a breach that wasn’t cleansed)
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14
Q

Duty of Loyalty Generally

A

Directors and officers must put the
corporation’s interest ahead of their personal
interests

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15
Q

Duty of loyalty circumstances

A
  • Conflict of Interest
  • Executive Compensation
  • Corporate Opportunity
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16
Q

Upholding a Conflict-of-Interest Transaction (safe
harbors)

A
  • (1) Disinterested/informed director authorization
  • (2) Disinterested/informed shareholder authorization
  • (3) Fair when approved

  • need them to know about material facts
  • was it a good deal, was it good for the corp?
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17
Q

Duty of Loyalty: Executive Compensation
- 4 points

A
  1. circular problem
  2. conflict of interest
  3. director compensation
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18
Q

Corporate oppertunity
Director defenses (4)

A
  • (1) Offer it to the corporation first (ALI §5.05); MBCA § 8.70))
  • Disinterested directors or shareholders disclaim the corporate opportunity after disclosure or knowledge
  • Disinterested superior officer approves (ALI §5.05)
  • (2) Timely and adequate disclosure of opportunity alone (Broz vs. Cellular Information Systems, Inc. and Ostrowski vs. Avery)
  • (3) Fairness
  • (4) The requirement to clear a Corporate Opportunity has been limited or eliminated in the charter (DGCL § 122(17); MBCA § 2.02(b)(6))
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19
Q

3 questions for corporate oppertunity analysis

A
  1. Does the state allow
    the charter to
    renounce corporate
    opportunities and has
    the charter done so?
  2. Is there a corporate
    opportunity under
    one of the test?
  3. Is there a defense?
20
Q

General Rules about Duties of Shareholders

Generally,

A

unless a shareholder has contractually agreed to it, a
shareholder has no duty to the corporation or the other shareholders.

21
Q

General Rules about Duties of Shareholders
- exceptions for

A
  • Some courts have made exceptions to the general rule for:
  • Controlling shareholders, particularly in closely held corporations
  • In very closely held corporations in some cases
22
Q

Controlling shareholder duties arise:

A

Conflict of interest
* Sales of the controlling interest

23
Q

A controlling shareholder (or
controlling group) is

A

an investor (or group of investors) with the power to direct corporate affairs.

24
Q

Controlling Shareholder

How do they direct corporate
affairs?

A
  • Ability to elect (and remove) a
    majority of the board of directors
  • Not always just who controls
    the majority of shares
25
Special duties of shareholders
dont owe any special duties - but can through contract
26
Shareholders are allowed to put themseleves
(interest) ahead to a certain degree
27
Rationale for Imposing Duties on Controlling Shareholders
* Directors have duties because they have the power to direct corporate affairs. * If someone or a group can direct a majority of the board, they indirectly have the power to direct corporate affairs. * Not as high a fiduciary standard as directors and officers.
28
Director/Officer Conflict vs. Controlling Shareholder Conflict
* Conflict of Interest statutes for directors/officers don’t apply to shareholders - Approval of informed disinterested directors OR shareholders (Burden of proof for fairness shifts from the defendant to plaintiff) - Approval of informed disinterested directors AND shareholders (Business judgment rule level deference)
29
Excessive dividiends are not a conflict of interest if
everyone got their share, everyone got something
30
# Standards Business Judgment
(1) rational choice in good faith (2) no conflict of interest (or has been cleansed by disinterested and informed directors and/or (as needed) shareholders) + (3)reasonable process= = deference for decisions
31
# Standards Intrinsic Fairness/Entire Fairness
* High degree of fairness and defendant has the burden of proof * Used for self-dealing controlling shareholder claims and director/officer claims that haven’t been cleansed by approvals
32
Minority owners care when the
control changes
33
Reasons why someone would pay more per share for a controlling interest:
* (1) Synergy (biz bought can incorp into biz bought - basically efficency) * (2) Control (Ability to control the board, more expensive per share, buying in bulk cost more money) * (3) Increase Managerial Efficiency (things arent being ran well, want to spruce things up) * (4) Undervaluation (Really really want it, so pay more) * (5) Looting (take all assets from it)
34
Control is a property right of
the owner
35
Absent egregious circumstances, a controlling shareholder may sell their ownership stake
whenever they wish, to whoever they wish, and they get to keep the premium. (ALI § 5.16) (although certain circ's may have to do otherwise, shareholder argreement, org docs can limit, but either way you get your money)
36
Tag Right (Right of Co-Sale)
- not default setting - Can negotiate a requirement to “tag right” on a sale the majority shareholder has negotiated so they would sell pro rata for the number of shares the purchaser wants to purchaser. - need majority for pro rata | Girl scout cookies in the commons example
37
What looting does
improperly stipps corp of assets
38
Aiding and abetting looting equals
selling shareholders
39
Looting exception
* Most courts require the seller to investigate only when suspicious circumstances are present * The burden of proof of showing the facts that should have put the seller on notice will be on the plaintiff attacking the transaction. (ALI § 5.16) | Dont sell a dog to Michael Vick
40
7 Factors suggesting the possibility of looting:
* (1) excessive price willingly paid by the purchaser * (2) liquid and readily salable assets owned by the corporation * (3) purchaser’s insistence on immediate transfer of control * (4) a purchaser’s insistence that the company’s assets be made available immediately * (5) a purchaser’s lack of concern with the operations of the company * (6) a purchaser’s plan to use the corporations' assets to fund the purchase * (7) the prior history of the purchaser
41
Who votes to sell the whole business
Directors and shareholders
42
# Selling whole business If only a portion of the shares are sold,
the shareholders who are selling are the ones who make that decision
43
Conflict of Interest statutes for directors/officers don’t apply to
shareholders
44
3 exceptions to selling the entire business
1. Conversion of a corporate oppertunity 2. Missapropriation of corporate asset 3. secret preminum
45
exceptions to selling the entire business 1. conversion of a corporate oppertunity
46
exceptions to selling the entire business 2. Missappropriation of corporate asset
Can’t sell a controlling interest if it is done to diminish the assets.