Control of contractual terms Flashcards

1
Q

George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds [1983]

seeds; reasonableness of limitation clause

A
  • claimant planted seeds over 63 acres and spent many hours on the crops
  • BUT they only produced a small plant
  • contract contained cluase which limited liability to price of the seeds (£192)
  • claimant had lost £60,000 + interest on the defective seeds
  • CoA held that the clause was unreasonable as the buyer would not have been aware of the fault whereas the seller would

  • ‘freedom of contract’ often ends up meaning freedom for the stronger party to do whatever they want with the weaker party suffering -> hence why we need control of terms
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2
Q

Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armament SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967]

Lord Reid ‘[if the customer] did understand and object to any of them, he would generally be
told he could take it or leave’

A
  • the customer either doesn’t have time to read the clauses, or doesn’t understand them. If they do, they’ll be told to take it or leave it, and every supplier will tell them that
  • Lord Denning’s approach on fundamental breach: ‘liability for fundamental breach cannot be excluded no matter how widely or clearly it is drawn’ was rejected in this case -> the effect of a fundamental breach on an exclusion or limitation clause depends on the proper interpretation of the contract
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3
Q

L’Estrange v Graucob [1934]

purchaser bound by contract they did not read

A
  • E bought a cigarette vending machine from G which stopped working after a few days
  • E had signed an order form which excluded liability for all express and implied terms and statements, even though she hadn’t read them and didn’t know about this
  • The exemption clause was in ‘regrettably small print’, on brown paper, and in an unexpected place
  • NEVERTHELESS, the Court held that E was bound by her signature and so none of the exemptions applied
  • A party is bound by the contract they sign, regardless whether they have read the document / are aware of its contents

If the case arose today, section 6(1A) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 would apply

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4
Q

Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire [1996]

A
  • D was a plant hire company, who approached T, an engineering company for work -> T hired some of D’s employees
  • T’s manager signed a time sheet that D drew up, in which there were contract terms
  • T didn’t read the terms
  • Court held that the terms were not incorporated and thus not binding, as no reasonable person would have expected to find terms on such a document
  • The document must be one which could reasonably be expected to contain contractual terms
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5
Q

Curtis v Chemical Cleaning Co [1951]

dry cleaner’s staff misrepresented exclusion clause

A
  • the claimant bought her wedding dress to the cleaners
  • the assistant asked her to sign a form, and told her the form excluded liability for any damage to the beads and sequins of the dress -> the form actually contained a clause excluding all liability for any damage
  • the dress was returned badly stained
  • The Court held that, even though she had signed and hadn’t read the document, the assistant had misrepresented the clause, and so it was not incorporated and not binding -> can’t be relied on
  • a misrepresentation induced a customer to sign the document
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6
Q

Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel Ltd. [1949]

hotel room; exclusion clause in room only seen after making contract

A
  • claimant booked into a hotel -> her fur coat stolen
  • the contract was made at the reception desk, with no mention of an exclusion clause
  • in the hotel room, on the back of the door there was a notice that sought to exclude liability of the hotel for any lost, stolen or damaged property
  • Court held that the notice was ineffective as the contract had already been made by the time the claimant had seen the notice
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7
Q

Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971]

exclusion clause on notice in car park not incorporated; insufficient steps to draw to attention prior to contract formation

A
  • the claimant was injured in a car park
  • the claimant was received a ticket on entering the car park, after putting money in a machine
  • ticket had an exclusion clause on it
  • The key issue was when the offer and acceptance had occurred, and thus whether the notice had been provided at the time of the contract formation
  • Held that the machine constituted an offer, which was accepted when the claimant put his money in - ticket was dispensed after this acceptance, so clause was not incorporated into contract
  • where a condition is particularly onerous or unusual the party seeking to enforce it must show that that condition was fairly brought to the notice of the other party

highlights importance of timing of contract with regards to incorporation

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8
Q

Chapelton v Barry UDC [1940]

deck chairs; ticket received after contracting was insufficient communication of terms at time of contract

A
  • claimant hired a deck chair from Barry for use on the beach and was injured
  • a notice on the beach next to the deck chairs ‘respectfully requested’ that the public obtain tickets for their deck chairs
  • the claimant took the ticket and put it in his pocket without reading it -> it contained an exclusion clause for personal injury
  • Court held that, (1), the ticket seemed like a receipt, and no reasonable person would expect terms to be found on it and (2), the contract had already been formed by the time the ticket was provided -> thus clause was not incorporated
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9
Q

Parker v South Eastern Railway [1877]

customer deemed to have read ticket conditions

A
  • claimant left his bags in the cloakroom of a station
  • notice in the cloakroom stated no responsibility for anything exceeding £10 - claimant’s bag exceeded £10
  • the ticket given to customers had the same notice printed in legible writing
  • initially, judge stated that Parker was right; he had seen the ticket as a receipt and hadn’t read it
  • Court ordered a re-trial - the correct question was whether SER had done enough to bring reasonable attention to the notice
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10
Q

Thomson v LMS Railway Co [1930]

A
  • the claimant was injured whilst stepping off a train
  • the company had prominent notices on platforms, as well as on tickets, about excluding liability for personal injury
  • claimant was illiterate and couldn’t read the signs -> argued that company hadn’t taken sufficient steps to bring clause to her attention
  • Court held that the clause was incorporated -> reasonable steps had be taken; no duty to ensure that every traveller is aware of the clause
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11
Q

Sugar v LMS Railway [1941]

clause obscured by date stamp

A
  • the claimant was injured, and the company sought to rely on an exemption clause on the back of the ticket
  • on the front of the ticket it is stated to look at the back, but the terms on the back were covered by a date stamp -> so they were unreadable
  • Court held that this meant there was no incorporation because sufficient notice was not given
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12
Q

Spurling v Bradshaw [1956]

Denning LJ ‘red hand rule’

A
  • ‘the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it’
  • The red hand rule: ‘In order to give sufficient notice [the onerous term] would need to be printed in red ink with a red hand pointing to it, or something equally startling’
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13
Q

Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes [1988]

hire of images; clause stating high charge for late return not incorporated

A
  • Stiletto (D), an advertising firm, ordered photographic transparencies from Interfoto (C)
  • C sent 47 transparencies with a delivery note stipulating a ‘holding fee of £5 per day per transparency retained past the stipulated period’
  • D was invoiced for 3783.40 pounds when it returned the transparencies two weeks late
  • amount was substituted for a quantum meruit award of £3.50 per transparency per week, based on fair market value
  • The more onerous the term, the more that needs to be done to provide reasonable notice to the offeree so as to incorporate the term into the contract
  • “if one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce it must show that that particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other” -> in this case, this had not been done
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14
Q

AEG (UK) v Logic Resource [1996]

cost of return – ‘unusual’ or ‘onerous’ terms

A
  • D made purchases from claimant on C’s standard order form which stated that a full set of terms and conditions was available on request. D didn’t request it.
  • a clause unusual to the industry, that defective equipment was to be returned to C for repair/replacement at D’s own expense was not included in the order form -> D did not see it
  • D refused to pay the cost of bringing the machine back from Iran and C sued him for it.
  • Whether a clause is onerous and unusual needs to be considered from the perspective of the contract as a whole. The clause should not be looked at in isolation
  • The burden of proving that a clause is reasonable under UCTA is on the party seeking to rely on the clause

Hobhouse LJ dissented, arguing that the question was not about incorporation but rather about reasonableness under UCTA

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15
Q

O’Brian v MGN [2002]

scratch card winners separate draw – not unusual

A
  • O’Brian, scratch card winner did not know that if there was more than 1 winner, the winners were entered into a prize draw to decide who got the money
  • O’Brian brought an action to recover the money, sying that on the day he bought the newspaper, the rules weren’t printed on it, and so not enough steps had been taken to bring it to his attention
  • Court held that this was not an onerous or unusual term, and so didn’t need extra steps -> O’Brian was unsuccessful
  • Furthermore, the rules were printed from time to time on the newspaper, and were available at the offices of the newspaper
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16
Q

British Crane Hire v Ipswich Plant Hire [1975]

parties had only contracted twice previously on same forms

A
  • C and D had dealt before on two occasions, and printed forms were used
  • C leased a crane to D, a printed form was sent to D but D did not sign it
  • The crane sank into marshland, leading to high cost of recovery
  • C sought to recover from D
  • C argued that the terms in the printed form were incorporated into oral contract and under those terms D had to indemnify C
  • The two transactions were not sufficient to establish a course of dealing
  • BUT the parties knew that firms in the trade always imposed the same conditions
  • Thus, the terms are incorporated by their common understanding derived from conduct
  • Both were on equal footing -> equal commercial bargaining power
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17
Q

McCutcheon v MacBrayne [1964]

ferry; incorporation through course of dealing

A
  • C regularly transported his car using D’s ferry service
  • C’s car was lost when D’s ferry sank due to negligence
  • D sought to exclude liability by reference to a risk note that C had signed 4 times previously when using its services, but on the actual day when the ferry sank D had forgotten to get C’s agent to sign the risk note
  • C admitted that he knew that the risk note contained conditions but did not know of their specific content
  • Court held that the claim in negligence was allowed -> the exemption clause was not incorporated by course of dealing
  • The bare fact that there have been previous dealings is not enough
  • For terms to be incorporated into a contract by course of dealing:
    -> 1. the course of dealing must be consistent
    -> 2. the parties must have actual knowledge of the terms during the course of dealing
18
Q

Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) [1972]

had signed forms exempting garage from liability

A
  • C’s car was sent to repair at D’s garage
  • A fire broke out and damaged the car
  • C brought claim for negligence
  • On three or four previous occasions, C signed the invoices which included a exclusion of liability clause
  • C did not sign the invoice this time -> oral agreement instead
  • A course of dealing must be regular for incorporation to occur by that means; three or four previous dealings over 5 years is insufficient

this was a case between a consumer and a company, it is usually more likely for the courts to side with the individual rather than the business

19
Q

Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources Plc [2016]

A
  • Transocean owned drilling rig
  • Providence wanted to use it -> contract based on standard form
  • there was a clause in the contract that disentitled the parties from claiming consequential losses from each other
  • Providence tried to get back some losses, but Transocean claimed they fell in the consequential loss category (Clause 20 of the contract)
  • Court held that clause 20 was not simply an exclusion clause -> inappropriate to apply contra proferentem
  • The modern approach to exclusion clauses is to interpret them in light of their natural and ordinary meaning, rather than to automatically apply presumptions such as the contra proferentem rule
  • The contra proferentem rule should only be used where an exclusion clause is one-sided and ‘genuinely ambiguous’
20
Q

Triple Point Technology v PTT Public [2021]

UKSC interpretation of exclusion clauses

A
  • in contractual interpretation the court should proceed on the basis that in the absence of clear words the parties did not intend to derogate from the normal rights and obligations that a contract would give
  • recent cases have signalled a retreat from the Canada Steamship principles, which (along with the contra proferentem rule) have been described by the Supreme Court as ‘old and outmoded’
    -> CS principles no longer apply to exemption clauses in commercial contracts
21
Q

Ailsa Craig Fishing v Malvern Fishing [1983]

limitation rather than exemption from liability

A
  • Ailsa hired a security firm to supervise their vessel
  • the firm negligently caused the ship to sink one of Malvern’s boats
  • M sued A for £55,000 - A tried to get that back from the security firm -> BUT in their contract, there was a clause limiting liability to £1000
  • Court held that limitation clause should be interpreted using normal principles of contractual interpretation
  • The more stringent rules for interpreting clauses which completely exclude liability for negligence do not apply to limitation clauses
  • Limitation clauses are not interpreted as restrictively as exclusion clauses
22
Q

Canada Steamship Lines v The King [1952]

exemption from negligence

A
  • The government leased a freight shed to the appellant
  • Clause 7 of the contract stated that the appellant would not have any claim against the government for damage to goods kept in the shed & Clause 8 required the government to keep the shed in repair
  • Clause 17 stated that -> the [appellant] shall at all times indemnify…the [government] from and against all claims […]
  • government’s employees negligently burned down the shed while repairing it, destroying both the shed and its contents -> appellent sued gov.
  • gov argued that appellant can’t sue because of Clause 7 and clause 17
  • Court held that clause 17 wasn’t worded clearly enough to apply to negligence liability
  • When determining whether an exclusion or indemnity clause covers negligent acts, the courts will be guided by a three-stage process of construction:
  • Does the clause expressly refer to negligence liability? If so, it covers negligence.
  • If not, is the wording of the clause wide enough to cover negligence? Any ambiguity is resolved against the party who seeks to rely on the clause.
  • If the words are wide enough to cover negligence, might the breaching party might be liable for something other than negligence? If another type of liability exists, and is not so fanciful or remote that it was unlikely that the breaching party wanted protection against it, the clause is construed as only covering non-negligence liability.
23
Q

African Export-Import Bank v Shebah Exploration [2017]

s3(1) UCTA

A
  • claimant was a lender who entered into a loan agreement with the defendants
  • The parties made significant modifications to the standard contract in negotiations. The ultimate contract included an exclusion clause which barred the defendants from relying on any defence of set-off
  • company failed to pay back the loan - claimant sued
  • defendants argued that the claimant was not entitled to rely on the exclusion clause. This was because, they argued, the clause fell within the scope of s.3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
  • Court of Appeal held in favour of the claimant -> no evidence that the loan agreement was made on the claimant’s written standard terms of business -> unable to invoke s.3 of UCTA
  • case establishes 4 elements needed to satisfy s.3(1)
    1. Term must be written
    2. Term must be a term of business
    3. Term must be part of other party’s standard terms of business
    4. the other party is dealing on those written standard terms of business
  • if the terms can be negotiated, that may exclude UCTA, even if the challenged term itself is not negotiated, because it challenges idea of standard terms of business
24
Q

Chester Grosvenor Hotel v Alfred McAlpine Management [1991]

whether terms are ‘standard’ is a matter of fact and degree

A
  • Stannard J observes that it would ‘emasculate’ UCTA if it could be evaded simply because it could be shown that the term was occasionally varied or not used
  • Party that proffers terms must regard them as its standard terms and should ‘habitually contract’ on those terms
  • “it is a question of fact whether those terms have been so altered that they must be regarded as not having been employed on that occasion”
25
Bates v Post Office (3) [2019] ## Footnote standard terms used without alteration
- Claimants were sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses who were accused of financial discrepancies resulting from the use of Horizon, argued that the Post Office had failed to provide adequate training and support for the use of Horizon - standard terms need to be ‘terms which the company in question uses for all, or nearly all, of its contracts of a particular type without alteration’; ‘it is the essence of such terms that they are not varied from transaction to transaction’ - in finding various terms of sub-postmasters’ contracts with the Post Office unreasonable, Fraser J noted that the two parties were ‘not remotely equal’ but in fact ‘almost uniquely unequal’
26
St Albans City v International Computers [1996] ## Footnote standard term – no ‘sham’ negotiations
- claimant was a local authority -> collected a community charge from the populace of St Albans - claimant invited tenders for the supply of a computer system to administer this work - claimant sued the defendant for breach of contract as the software was faulty - did plaintiffs ‘deal’ on defendant’s written standard terms of business? - Court held that defendant was in breach of contract - Court also held that claimant did deal with the defendant on the defendant’s ‘written standard terms of business -> While there were technically negotiations between the parties, the defendant’s standard conditions remained the same throughout - Court also held exclusion clause was void for unreasonableness --> reasons for unreasonableness: defendant’s considerable resource, defendant was one of the few companies in the world that could offer what the claimant wanted -> claimant didn't have many options, lack of any clear objective justification for the selection of £100,000 as the limitation figure
27
Timeload v British Telecommunications [1995] ## Footnote contract termination at any point, s(2)(b) UCTA
- illustrates the potential width of section 3(2)(b) - BT’s contract to supply services gave BT the right ‘at any time’ to terminate on one month’s notice - T argued that the clause was an exemption clause under section 3(2)(b); BT answered that T could not expect that which the contract never offered (ie enjoyment of services for an indefinite period) - Sir Thomas Bingham MR disagreed. Given that BT was a public telecommunications operator: If a customer reasonably expects a service to continue until BT has substantial reason to terminate it, it seems to me at least arguable that a clause purporting to authorise BT to terminate it without reason purports to permit partial or different performance from that which the customer expected - outcome in Timeload is questionable since the right to terminate was mutual. Moreover, it is unclear that there was a ‘substantial’ deviation from what was reasonably expected (as required by s 3(2)(b)(i)) - as a quasi-monopoly at that time, BT needed customers less than customers needed BT’s services ## Footnote this case basically argues that what is reasonably expected can be seen outside of the contract as well -> doesn't make a lot of sense
28
Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co [1992] ## Footnote Schedule 2 and s11(2) UCTA
- claimant agreed to install and test an overhead conveyor system on the defendant’s premises - defendant was to pay 15% of the price on making the order and the remainder in instalments - Clause 12.4 of the contract stated that the defendant could not withhold any of these payments by reason of any set-off, payment or credit due to them, or for any other reason -> defendant argued this clause was void under s.3 or s.13 UCTA - defendant refused to pay the final 10%, so the claimant brought an action for this sum - Court held it couldnt' fall under s.3 because it wasn't an exclusion / limitation clause BUT could fall under s.13 -> was unreasonable and so void - explained that s.11(2) requires the court to have regard to the factors listed in Schedule 2 of the Act when determining reasonableness under sections 6 and 7 - those factors ‘are usually regarded as being of general application to the question of reasonableness.’ -> Courts can take them into account when applying other provisions - all subsections and Schedule 2 guidelines apply to all of UCTA -> don't have to look at them individually - use all elements to figure out what is fair
29
Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group [1984] ## Footnote Staughton J – small print and ‘prolix’
- Staughton J said that he was inclined to find the exemption clause unreasonable because the print was so small as to be barely legible and ‘the draughtsmanship was so convoluted and prolix that one almost need[ed] an LLB to understand them’ - a term is also unreasonable if it makes the remedying of defects subject to the customer’s return of the product (eg a ship in this case)
30
Goodlife Foods v Hall Fire Protection [2018] ## Footnote exemption clauses all depend on the circumstances
- an exclusion clause was not unreasonable where G had the option to have the liability reinstated at greater cost - Factors relevant to whether an exclusion clause is void for unfairness under UCTA include: - The stringency and breadth of the clause, including whether it deals with liability for a condition (rather than an innominate term or warranty); - Whether other terms of the contract offset the stringency of the clause (such as the clause concerning replacement of faulty parts in the present case); - Whether the other party could have gone elsewhere for better terms; - The extent to which the parties had equal bargaining power; - Whether there was any negotiation between the parties on terms; - Whether the party knew or ought to have known of the clause; - The availability of insurance, and which party was best place to acquire such insurance. - Coulson LJ noted that a clause is not automatically unusual or onerous purely because it is a limitation or exclusion clause: ‘Everything turns on context’.
31
Photo Production v Securicor [1980] ## Footnote security guard burned factory; exclusion clause covered liability
- Photo Productions (C) engaged Securicor (D) to provide security in its factory - D’s employee started a fire to keep warm and burnt D’s factory down - C sued D in negligence for the damage - D sought to rely on an exemption clause in their contract - House of Lords held that the challenged clause was reasonable since the claimant would already have to insure against fire and the defendant might not have been able to obtain the appropriate insurance, in any case, not without passing its cost on to the claimant in higher charges for its security service - Lord Denning tried to state that a 'fundamental breach', as a rule of law, meant that the party couldn't rely on an exclusion clause - This was dismissed by HoL -> not a rule of law - HoL: whether an exclusion clause should be applied to a fundamental breach is a matter of construction of the contract - Court held that after the UCTA 1977, in commercial matters generally, when parties are not of unequal bargaining power, when risks are normally borne by insurance, there is no case for judicial intervention -> It is parliament’s intention to allow parties to freely apportion risks
32
DG of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2002] ## Footnote interest rates when commercial borrowers defaulted; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
- A term in a standard form loan agreement permitted the bank to charge additional interest where a borrower defaulted on the repayment of the loan and agreed to pay off the debt by instalments over a longer period - Regulation 3(2)(b) provides that contract terms relating to the adequacy of remuneration are not subject to the fairness test - The House of Lords held that the term was not unfair (guided by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice) but regardless of that, their Lordships considered that good faith implies “open and fair dealing” (Lord Bingham) - At the same point, Lord Steyn warned that “any purely procedural or even predominantly procedural interpretation of the requirement of good faith must be rejected” - Court held that the term was NOT a core term and could be judged for fairness - There is a ‘significant imbalance’ where the term is so heavily weighted in favour of the business that it tilts the parties’ relationship in their favour. This is assessed by reference to the whole contract. - ‘Good faith’ refers to ‘fair and open dealing’. It requires clauses to be expressed fully and clearly, stressing any elements which might be disadvantageous to the consumer. It also requires the business to avoid, deliberately or otherwise, taking advantage of the consumer’s weaker bargaining position.
33
ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] ## Footnote charge for exceeding free stay period in car park
- a sign at the entrance of a car park close to retailers, which stated that a consumer could park for free for up to two hours, but would incur an £85 charge for breaking stated rules, such as overstaying this permitted period - customer overstayed by an hour - Court held that 1. charge was not the price for use of the car park and so was not excluded from review for unfairness 2. significant imbalance: while the term did create the relevant significant imbalance, the management company and the owners of the car park had a legitimate interest in imposing a liability on consumers -> term was ‘objectively reasonable’ since the consumer was given valuable parking in exchange for a charge for overstaying which was not disproportionately high 3. good faith: a reasonable consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual negotiations - Lord Toulson had a strong dissenting view: 1. charge as significantly imbalanced against the consumer since it far exceeded anything that was likely to be recovered as damages 2. On good faith, the starting point is that the consumer needs special protection -> it is for the trader to show that a non-core term would have been agreed to by a reasonable person -> he didn't think people would agree; £85 is a lot 3. charge has no room for adjustment -> e.g. overstaying by a very short time
34
Matei [2015]
- This case establishes distinction between “the essential obligations of the contract and, as such, characterise it” and “ancillary" clauses - helps us understand scope of s.64(1)(a) CRA - ECJ held that the following terms were not exempted from unfairness review 1. An interest rate variation clause in the event of significant changes in the market -> on the list of presumptively unfair terms BUT is considered ancillary 2. The ‘risk charge’, which is aimed at ensuring the consumer’s repayment of the loan and is an important part of the lender’s income
35
Kásler v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt [2014] (Kásler) ## Footnote Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive: term calculating repayments in loan agreement foreign currency not remuneration
- involved a mortgage loan denominated in a foreign currency - repayment provision set the exchange rate as the creditor bank’s ‘selling rate’ in one term, but the bank’s ‘buying rate’ in another - The claimants challenged the former as unfair since it applied a different exchange rate to that used for the advancement of the loan - ECJ held that this term could not be excluded from review -> financial costs resulting from the difference between the buying and selling rates of exchange could not be regarded as remuneration due as consideration for a service - if the deletion of an unfair term would render the contract unenforceable, the court could substitute the invalidated term with a supplementary provision of the law to further the aims of consumer protection by rebalancing the contract while preserving, as far as possible, the validity of the contract - term should not just make grammatical sense but should also put consumer into a position of being able to evaluate on the basis of clear intelligible criteria, the economic consequences for him which derive from it
36
OFT v Abbey National [2010] ## Footnote charges for bank customers’ unauthorised overdrafts; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999; core terms
- terms imposing charges (amounting to billions of pounds) on UK personal current account customers who went into unauthorised overdraft were exempt from review for unfairness as price terms - main reasons were that: 1. the exemption from review was of ‘the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied in exchange’. This should be given its natural meaning. -> no distinction between main and ancillary price 2. These charges are part of the essential bargain because they form over 30 per cent of the banks’ revenue stream - the charges could be challenged for unfairness ‘according to other criteria’, in particular, ‘whether it is fair to subsidise some customers by levies on others who experience contingencies that they did not foresee when entering into their contracts’. -> Lady Hale thought the banks’ charging structure was not ‘necessarily unfair when viewed as a whole’.
37
# Phillips Products v Hyland [1987] Phillips Products v Hyland [1987] ## Footnote hire of machine and operator, who caused damage; exemption clause unreasonable under s2(2)
- P hired a JCB excavator and driver from H, but condition 8 of the contract made the driver P’s employee -> made P responsible for all claims arising from the driver’s operation of the excavator - driver negligently crashed the excavator into P’s factory wall and P claimed damages - H relied on condition 8 and argued that it was outside the control of section 2(2) of UCTA because it did not exempt liability for breach of duty -> merely restricted H’s duty (by shifting it to P) so that H committed no breach (ie negligence) in the first place - Court rejected this argument: reference to section 13(1) and the ‘but for’ test -> in considering whether there was negligence liability, the court must ignore the clause being relied on to defeat the negligence claim (ie would H be liable ‘but for’ the challenged term?) - term was struck out as unreasonable under section 2(2) of UCTA because 1. the contract was entered into at short notice 2. The claimant was given little opportunity to familiarise himself with the term 3. The claimant was forced into a take it or leave it situation as had no choice but to accept the driver. 4. There was little opportunity to arrange own insurance cover 5. The claimant had no choice in the selection of driver or to assess their qualifications or suitability to do the job.
38
Thompson v Lohan (Plant Hire) [1987] ## Footnote hire of machine and operator; clause making the hirer responsible for the operators’ acts was not an exclusion clause
- D was a company which hired plant and machinery with operators if necessary - claimant hired some machinery with two of the defendant’s operators -> 1 of the operators killed due to negligence of the other - defendant then claimed an indemnity against the claimant under the terms of the agreement -> agreement contained a clause which provided that operators were to be considered the servants of the hirer and that the hirer alone should be liable - claimant appealed on the basis that the clause was not sufficiently clearly worded to absolve liability or alternatively it was an exclusion clause and therefore was invalid under section 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 - Court held that the clause was effective in respect of passing liability to the claimant at common law - it was not an exclusion clause within the meaning of the 1977 Act because the purpose of the Act was the protection of victims of negligence -> effect of clause was simply to decide who would carry burden of liability - this clause was not subject to s.13 or s.2 UCTA -> outside their scope
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Smith v Eric Bush [1989] ## Footnote reasonableness of surveyor’s exemption clause concerning home
- C obtained a mortgage with a bank for the purpose of purchasing a property - The bank commissioned a report from D surveyor, C paid the bank for the cost of the report - The report led to C purchasing a house which was later found to need expensive repair owing to subsidence - The report contained a disclaimer that neither the bank nor surveyor warranted that the report would be accurate - Court held D was liable for negligence - D knew or ought to have known that C would rely on the report if they were to purchase the house. - This case extended the duty of care for negligent misstatement to third parties who are not parties to a contract nor direct recipients of advice - supports the 'but for' test -> would liability arise ‘but for’ the challenged term?
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Aziz v Caixa d ’Estalvis de Catalunya [2013] ## Footnote Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive: banking customer defaulted on mortgage
- Aziz took out a mortgage which he secured using his existing property. The contract allowed the bank to call on the loan if Aziz defaulted on his payments. - Aziz claimed one of the clauses as unfair under Directive -> Spanish law had no remedies for him if the term was deemed unfair - ECJ advised that, in determining the question of ‘significant imbalance’, the court must ask: what rules of national law would apply in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that regard -> to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in force - A significant imbalance can only result from a sufficiently serious impairment of the consumer’s legal situation - Good faith exists if the seller, ‘dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations’.