Comprehensive Exam 1 Flashcards

1
Q

“Man, the State, and War”

A

Written by Kenneth Waltz, Realism
-3 Levels of Analysis
-Individual Level (Human nature (fear, greed of indiv ldrs), humans want self-preservation)
-Societal Level (nature of state wanting to survive, regime type)
-Systemic level (nature of Intl anarchy, every state must protect itself without a hierarchical authority)
Conclusion: the IR system determines war
Note: Nukes are domestic level decision that affected systematic level
Note: Pre WWII was less stable than post WWII given multi-polarity to bi-polarity
Note: More defensive weapons/strategies equals less war

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2
Q

“Tragedy of Great Power Politics”

“Neorealism, or Structural Realism”

A

Written by John Mearshimer

  • Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis
  • State’s actions are explained by pressures of Intl structure. This limits and constrains their choices.
  • States are in anarchy
  • Survival is primary goal of all states, and power is means to gain security.
  • Lack trust—security dilemma
  • States are rational actors - think strategically to maximize security and power, optimizing through alliances.
  • Bipolarity is more stable
  • War is normal
  • Ex of deterrence and 2nd strike capability
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3
Q

“Security Dilemma”

A

Written by Robert Jervis

  • Anarchy as starting point, states cannot be sure of each other’s intentions (are weapons increases only for defensive purposes?)
  • States should increase mutual cooperation and understanding. Increase rewards of cooperation (stag hunt). Increase cost of defection.
  • Peace is possible when there is a strong distinction between Off and Def wpns, to decrease need for Offensive posture.
  • Rationale against anti-ballistic missile systems.
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4
Q

“Offensive Realism”

A

Concept of states continually reaching for power until reaching hegemony, since one can never be sure of other state’s intentions.

  • Mearshimer
  • Security dilemma is inescapable
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5
Q

“Defensive Realism”

A

Jervis, Snyder
Concept of states continually striving for surviving, but not wanting to gain too much power as that might be dangerous.
-Waltz argues “weaker states try to find balance with rivals and form alliances with a stronger state to obtain security guarantees against offensive action”
-Wars stem from security dilemma

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6
Q

“Hegemonic Stability Theories”

A

Written by Robert Gilpin

  • Rising states start wars
  • Intl system is most stable when there is a single dominant power
Dynamic Differential (Levy/Copeland)
-Same, except that dominant power initiates war.
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7
Q

“Classical Realism”

A

-Hans Morgenthau, among others
-Primary motivation of states is the desire for power or security and resources, rather than ideals or ethics. Human nature and the “urge to dominate” are central for the explanation of war.
Assumptions: Anarchy, Rationality, Intl Org’s have little power (only as states accept them). Military and economic power are central to state’s position in Intl system.
-Natural state of system is war, due to evil nature of almost all states.
-Multipolar balance of power is most stable.

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8
Q

“Liberalism”

A
  • John Ikenberry in “After victory”, Thomas Friedman
  • Shares “Inl anarchy” of Realism, but says states ARENT THE ONLY actors
  • Believes states are rational
  • Believes systemic challenges can be overcome for peace through Intl institutions, cooperation, spread of democracy, economic interdependence and trade, globalization and mass communications
  • Peace and cooperation for mutual interests is the norm
  • PROBLEM: Institutions are imperfect, subject to corruption and/or countries can disregard or resign membership
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9
Q

Liberalism Solutions (Systemic Level)

A
  • Democratic world government

- Intl institutions, free trade, cooperation, collective security agreements

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10
Q

Liberalism Solutions (State and Indiv Level)

A
  • Democratic Peace Theory (State Level)

- Democratic gov and liberal markets through social contract with people (Indiv level)

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11
Q

Constructivism

A
  • Alexander Wendt, Ted Hopf.
  • Questions our definition of “anarchy, balance of power, states and sovereignty, human rights, money, laws or other social constructs”
  • Our structures are determined by shared ideas, not given by nature.
  • Transitions from conflict to stability is a matter of changing mindsets.
  • Challenge to Realism: Intl structure is result of social behavior and ideas
  • Challenge to Liberalism: Human rights, money, laws are social constructs
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12
Q

“Anarchy is what states make of it”

A

Written by Alexander Wendt

  • “Realism as construct of historical state thinking, but that it’s possible to transform reality and social construct.
  • Connects to liberalism and how institutions “transform interests and identities”
  • Describes “predator” problem in IR, and how it forces all others to engage in power politics
  • States define interests: Nukes
  • Problems- nationalism and culture
  • Ex of FR and GER after WWII (bad relations) through today (both democracies, good)
  • Ex: if US and USSR decide to get along, the cold war is over (COLLECTIVE MEANINGS!!)
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13
Q

“Constructing Norms”

A

Written by Martha Finnemore

  • States are intervening in other’s affairs for reasons beyond security, power and wealth
  • Signals changing norms—norms shape interests, and interests shape actions
  • Ex of HA/DR and how it now gains political capitol on world stage
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14
Q

“Nuclear Taboo”

A

Written by Nina Tannenwald

  • Bottom up societal pressure
  • Normative power politics (state want to delegitimize nuclear weapons b/c they give adversary strength)
  • Indiv leaders, personal preferences and consciences
  • Iterated behavior over time—nobody will use first strike
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15
Q

Sovereignty

A

The right to exercise political power over a group of people or a geographical area. A gov is considered sovereign if it has the final word on political decisions within its boundaries.

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16
Q

Legitimacy

A

Occurs when citizens accept the political decisions made by governing body, based on the citizenry thinking the gov is right, lawful and should be in power. Power may be based on ethnic identity, tradition, history, elections, international recognition or coup results.

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17
Q

Democratic Peace Theory

Mansfield and Snyder

A
  • Well institutionalized democracies with true self-determination by the people.
  • Democracies are better at war. Probably because of self-interest of average voter bearing the cost of war, the norms of bargaining and conflict resolution in Democracy, and the moderating impact of constitutional checks and balances.
  • Other explanatory variables?

Mansfield and Snyder

  • Democratization is often violent for at least a decade (based on study from 1811 to 1980)
  • Increased risk for external/internal war
  • Due to weak central authority, instability, high energy mass politics, elites abuse
  • How do you define a democracy?
  • Democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than stable systems.
  • Although, mature democracies fight with same frequency as non-democracies
  • What about covert actions?
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18
Q

Terrorism

A
  • Use of violence (often against civilians) to instill fear, generate publicity, and sometimes destabilize governments. Generally used by small groups, but sometimes by gov’s.
  • Ideological: promote a particular belief
  • State: gov terror against own citizens
  • Intl Terrorism: State Sponsored terrorists attacking in other countries
  • Irrationality
  • No home state or defined territory
  • No single type of terrorist
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19
Q

The New Calculus of Pre-Emption

A
  • Robert Litwak
  • Preemption when WMD use by adversary is imminent.
  • Prevention aims to forestall WMD development
  • Risks: Could drive WMD programs underground, or may face ire of Intl Community (Iraq)
  • Risks: Collateral damage (innocent civs)
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20
Q

“Strategic culture” by Carnes Lord

State Level

A
  • Strategic culture is traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized
  • Culture (Ideas, values, beliefs) has an impact on our behavior
  • Applies to US priority of technology and massive firepower in warfighting
  • Applies to belief in solving global problems
  • Affected by geo-political setting, military history, IR relations, political culture and ideology, civil military relations and military technology
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21
Q

Allison: Essence of a Decision
Model 2
(Individual Level)

A

Model 2: Organizational Behavior

  • Gov’s are a conglomerate of semi-feudal and loosely allied organizations
  • Org output is from “factory” agencies that put information through “machines” and give a standardized output
  • Complex Tasks are often broken down and assigned according to pre-established org lines
  • Actor isn’t a unitary state, but a constellation of loosely allied org’s (DOD vs. DOS)
  • Ex of post-combat Iraq and that it may have been “outside DOD’s normative framework for analysis and planning”

Problem: Incremental change (1-5 yr budgets, logic of appropriateness), time and resource limitations.
-Normative framework of organization. DOJ and DIA think differently about things.

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22
Q

Allison: Essence of a Decision
Model 3
(Individual Level)

A

Governmental politics

  • Gov action is best understood as the result or “outcome” of politicking/negotiation by top leaders
  • Even with shared interests, different concepts of how to achieve goals based on personal interests and background.
  • Factors such as charisma, personality and ranking and proximity to decision making
  • If a leader has already implicitly decided on a particular COA, an advisor wishing to have influence must work within the framework of that decision.
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23
Q

Let us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back

Individual Level

A
  • Byman and Pollack
  • Individuals matter! (Hitler, Napoleon, Hussein, al-Assad, Qadaffi, Eisenhower)
  • Set the ultimate and secondary intentions and strategies of a state.
  • Affect behavior of opposing states.
  • Concludes that states led by dictators do a poorer job of analyzing info and make less informative decisions. Delusional leaders start and prolong wars unnecessarily. Grandiose visions are likely to destabilize the system. Predictable leaders have stronger and enduring allies.

-Most important when leader is very powerful, times of great change or when we’re trying to estimate strategies and capabilities of a state.

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24
Q

Misperception in International Politics

Individual Level

A

Robert Jervis

  • Inaccurate image of others and their intent
  • Leaders tend to fit incoming into existing theories and images…perceive what we expect
  • Tend to see others as more hostile than are
  • Tend to see actions as more planned and purposeful in some grand EN strategy
  • Never think of “selves” as menace
25
Q

Analogies in Foreign Policy

A

Khong

  • Historical analogies really do matter
  • Skeptics: “there is something for everyone in the cookie jar of history”
  • Conclusion: Leaders should have many people influencing a decision, many people with different viewpoints, beliefs and analogies
  • Leaders use them extremely poorly
  • Due to poor historical knowledge and limits to cognitive capacity to adequately structure and consider example(s).
  • Often over simplified

Question: To what extent can we generalize from history?

26
Q

Use of Force

A

Thomas Schelling

  • War is absence of politics (without a common power, constant condition of war) by Hobbes in Leviathan
  • War is a policy instrument (Clausewitz)

Schelling-War is meant to coerce the EN
-Methods of war affects the way states conduct IR (Nuc weapons, technology)**

  • Defence-deterrence
  • Brute force-intimidation
27
Q

Coercion

A

Thomas Schelling

  • Exploitation of potential hurt
  • Works in both peace and war
  • Threat or demonstrative use of force to accomplish IR goals by focusing adversary’s attention to how you will hurt them
  • Must have clarity: Need to understand what is desired and the consequences if non-compliant
  • Must be credible: EN should perceive capability, determination. EN must also be “open to hurt”
  • Can we hurt terrorists? Failed states?
28
Q

Deterrence

A
  • Prevention through coercion threat (Schelling)
  • Threat of retaliation
  • Graduated deterrence involves progressively ratcheting up to prove resolve in the face of doubt.
  • Type I: Protect self; carry out threat and stop
  • Type II: Protect allies/nuclear umbrella
29
Q

Compellence

A
  • Seek to force an adversary to do something they would not normally do without forcing them, or to stop an adversary from continuing with certain actions. The EN “loses face”
  • Means initiating something, creating momentum
  • Must be definite–needs to be a deadline
  • Must be enough time for threat to deadline for compliance
  • Ex of 2 Atomic Bombs in Japan as brute force given small amt of time
30
Q

Soft Power

A

Nye

  • Soft power is “ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, use force or give money as a means of persuasion”
  • Culture (attractiveness to others)
  • Historical narrative
  • Political Values
  • Foreign Policies (Credibility)
  • Controlling outcome is more difficult with soft power
  • Results take a long time
  • Many soft power instruments are not under the control of governments

Strategy: Agenda setting, attraction and persuasion

  • Directly influence leaders
  • Indirectly influence leaders through public
31
Q

Dealing with Terrorists

A

Beyond deterrence–influence
-Different types of terrorism requires different sanctions
Terrorists are complex adaptive systems
-Influence different parts of system (“doers” vs. enablers, potential recruits, etc…)
-Actors, actions, life-cycles, ideas
-Attack the network with range of options
-Attack weaker links and subgroups
-Goal is to cause hopelessness, rather than fear
-Deter by denial (hardened targets)
-Deter political goals, not life or liberty
-SUCCESS?: No victory, surrender or peace treaties. Relative measures of # and scope of attacks, growing sense of security among ordinary people, defections, etc…

Robert Pape “Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”

  • Military intervention does not work
  • Decapitation does not work
  • All concessions will encourage terrorists about the utility of their method
  • Best Method: Homeland security, such as airport/FBI and ethnic separation.
32
Q

Civil War

A

Violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups aiming to take power at center, in a region, or to change gov policy.
-Not necessarily a coup d’etat.

33
Q

Changing Strategic Context of war

A
  • LIC, Small Wars, etc…
  • Actors, aims, means and methods
  • Global surveillance (Media, communications)
  • Motivated by Greed or Grievance
34
Q

Military Responses to Refugee Disasters (Barry Posen)

A
  • Genocide/ethnic cleansing, collateral damage and primitive military logistics are causes of pol-mil mass displacement.
  • Military remedies include punishment of assailant, creation of a safe zone (Kurdistan, which is risky b/c it can entrap protector in full war), creation of safe havens (risky b/c EN may hide among populace), impose a truce (risk, what happens when you leave?)
  • Conclusion: These are all short-term solutions. They don’t solve original political problems.
35
Q

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

Post R2P Summit: 3 Pillars

A

“States as instruments at the service of their peoples” (Annan)

  • State has responsibility to protect its own population
  • Commitment of Intl community in assisting states to meet these obligations.
  • Responsibility of UN member states to respond in a timely manner…when a state is failing such protection
36
Q

“Give War a Chance”

“The delusion of impartial intervention”

“Moral Hazard of Humanitarian intervention”

A

Edward Luttwak
-Argument against intervention, says it raises costs and prolongs war because it preserves weaker side. We’re too focused on CNN.
Richard Betts
-Civil and ethnic conflict exposes significant underlying issues. Interveners should expect to kill and be peace makers, not peace keepers.
-3 Ways to end war (Victory, compromise after long stalemate, overpowering opponents from imperial power)
-Avoid half-measures
Alan Kuperman
-R2P is well intentioned, but sometimes counter-productive. Should only intervene when state retaliation is grossly disproportionate. Should deliver purely humanitarian aid to minimize benefit to rebels.
-R2P Norm leads some sub-state actors to rebel and expect intervention to enable their victory

37
Q

Just an Unjust Wars (1977)

Just and Unjust Occupations

A

Michael Walzer
-Attempt at a secular, contemporary theory of just war, just cause, just rebuilding (endgame)

  • Jus ad bellum (Justified)
  • Self Defense, protection of civilians, last resort, probability of success
  • Strategic proportionality
  • Jus in Bello (moral conduct of war)
  • Differentiate between combatants and non-c
  • Tactical proportionality
  • Hold soldiers/leaders accountable for actions
  • Jus post bellum
  • Who carries costs of reconstruction?
  • How do we define legitimate occupation?
  • How can regime change be justified?

-Torn by invasion of Iraq. Sees it as unjust intervention, but if Shia and/or Kurds were under Sunni-led genocide, then it would be just.

38
Q

Democratic Peace Theory

John Owen

A

Liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to maintain peace with one another, but also cause war with illiberal states.

  • Structural democratic peace lead to institutional constraints on democracies, meaning checks and balances on war declaration.
  • Normative democratic peace, ideas or norms held by democracies making it unjust or imprudent to fight one another.
  • Still, threats to liberalism itself mean possibility that it’s not a certain precursor to perpetual peace.
39
Q

Domestic Politics and War

Jack Levy

A
  • Need a methodology distinguishing whether internal conflict causes external, or if external conflict generates internal.
  • Domestic elections play a huge role in IR
  • Realism says the interests of states are constant and leaders are not relevent
  • Ex of Spain change in leadership after terror bombings and greater isolation
  • Democracies are more restrained (rule of law, competitive elections), but go to war with more of a “crusading” mentality and to promote their way of life
  • Econ structure: free market democracies prioritize trade and prosperity over war.
  • Nationalism and Public Opinion
  • Scapegoat: War can sometimes drive leaders to adopt aggressive policies to increase or maintain support.
40
Q

Allison’s Conceptual Model 1

A

Rational Policy
-Actors make rational choices based on conscious calculations to maximize strategic goals and objectives for national security.

Problems: Gov’s cannot have perfect Sit Awareness or KNOW EVERYTHING. Every decision will be one of competing demands, so how do we decide which has a higher payoff or value?

41
Q

Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War

A

Strategic airpower can inflict terror, death and damage. Still, successful coercion must “capture” EN’s highly valued territorial goals.

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman
-Airpower is good, but not total. Should use it with diplomacy, economic sanctions and as coercive measures with the threat of ground troops.

Robert Pape

  • Target your adversary’s COG through CV
  • Rolling Thunder (65-68) targeted civ
  • Freedom Train 72 targeted infrastructure
  • Linebacker in 72 targeted supply lines
42
Q

Power of Positive Sanctions

A

David Baldwin
-Concept of providing a state with something as alternative to threatening the state
-Psychological aspects of incentive vs. negative sanctions
CHALLENGE: Difficulty assessing EN’s baseline, especially given their changing nature

43
Q

Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy

A

Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan

  • Positive incentives are often forgotten, but should be used
  • Some fear that we “sell-out to our adversaries” when using positive incentives
  • Should be used for conditional engagement
  • Isn’t necessarily appeasement
44
Q

Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment

A

Jeffrey Larson

  • Arms control is a way to achieve “peace through the manipulation of force”
  • Goal is to address the negative effects of the security dilemma and enhance national security, not necessarily reduce arms.
  • 3 main objectives of reduce likelihood of war, minimize scope and violence of war if occurs, reduce pol and econ costs of preparing for war.
  • AC won’t prevent conflict if parties believe they will gain power or obj.
  • Still, AC is valuable with China’s rise and India-Pak.
45
Q

Security Cooperation

A

Alliances: Formal long-term cooperation.
Entente: Loose pact
Coalition: Short term.
US is partial to institutions like NATO

46
Q

“Power Shift” (article in Foreign Affairs)

A

Jessica Matthews

  • Central role of state is decreasing
  • More influence of NGO’s, transnationals (IMF, World Bank, etc…)
  • Non-traditional threats are up
  • Business: one world, nationalities blur
  • Tech: Shifting power from states to markets
  • Markets set rules, not governments
  • IT heavily favors non-state actors
47
Q

Pursuit of Power

A

William McNeil

  • Emphasis on connection (cycle) of war and economic activity.
  • Similarities between “traders” and warriors.
  • Military industrial complex
  • Superior tech extends power, which then extends revenue, which supports R&D for new military technology (cycle)
48
Q

Robert Jervis on Nuclear Weapons

A
  • Nukes don’t serve political objectives
  • No “winners” in nuclear war
  • Nuclear war cannot serve foreign policy
  • Strategic superiority or parity is unimportant as long as 2nd Strike capability exists
49
Q

RMA

A

DOD: Application of adv tech to oper. problems in combination with new org and oper concepts to cause fundamental change.

  • Involves not only tech and tactical change, but a strategic shift. Not just warfare, but political, social and econ structures.
  • 2 Periods of fundamental military change in 20th century. Emergence of aircraft, vehicles and chemwar in WWI, nukes, missiles and computers in WWII.
  • Rumsfeld (faster, lighter) was prominent supporter
  • Questions definition of mil effectiveness.

Gentry

  • RMA is a utopian vision of battle
  • Gentry says these dreams are doomed to fail
  • Easy counter measures to tech

RMA Underway

  • C4ISR, Stealth, etc. have fundamentally altered US fighting strategy
  • Get rid of “fog of war”?
  • RMA doesn’t mean “threat reduction”
  • Asymmetric as consequence of our RMA
50
Q

Quotes 1

A
  • General Zinni: “Understanding the type of war you are fighting is the first step in winning”
  • Clausewitz’s quote on “statesman and commander needing to establish…the kind of war on which we are embarking”
51
Q

Brooks

A

Attacking a trading partner makes no sense as it destroys a market

52
Q

Prospect Theory

A

Jack Levy

  • Loss aversion: People value a gain less than they fear a loss of equal size
  • Endowment effect: overweighting of current possessions
  • Instant endowment effect: after a gain is made, people evaluate future gains and losses based on this new reference point; after a loss occurs, however, people continue to evaluate future gains and losses on former reference point
  • Status quo bias and risk aversion, but not universally followed by all leaders
  • Perception of decline can lead to risky behavior
  • PROBLEM: developed for individual decision making and mostly tested financially
  • Conclusion: Avoid strategies to “corner actors”…always give them an “out”
53
Q

Banality of Ethnic War

A

John (SSgt) Mueller
-Nationality and ethnicity are just “organizing principles” by criminals and leaders

Challenges: Holocaust in WWII? What about the shocking level of violence in ethnic wars?

54
Q

Barry Posen and Security Dilemma

A

Ethnic antipathies don’t completely explain ethnic wars.

  • Collapse of imperial regimes leads to anarchy, then t insecurity, then to military buildup, then to security dilemma.
  • Offensive “windows of opportunity” when a group perceives it has an advantage.
  • UN reinforces incentive for offense as the stronger your position on the ground, the stronger your position in negotiations
55
Q

Kalyvas on Civil War

A
  • Usually an over-emphasis on national level cleavages…usually more local.
  • Still, there is an alliance between national and local (private) level interests
56
Q

Collier et al on Ethnic War

A

Feasibility is cause. If a rebellion is possible, it will occur.

  • Level, growth and structure of income
  • Wars often follow growth collapse
  • Risk of CW greater at low income levels
  • # of young men in society
  • Mountainous terrain
  • Legacy of civil war
  • Natural resources as guerrilla funding
57
Q

UN Peace Support Operations

A
  • Key tool in IR (66 PSOs since 1948)
  • Who benefits?
  • Local pop-Unintended consequences? PSO doesn’t provide econ, social improvement.
  • Intervener-Increased stature or own national security? Risk of blowback? Max power?
  • Intl system?

Short or long-term?
“Do no harm”?
UN was started by elite countries. Are we really serving in Intl comm’s best interest?

58
Q

Francis Fukuyama

A

“End of History”

  • History should be viewed as evolutionary process
  • Events still occur at end of history
  • Pessimism is warranted b/c of man’s inability to control technology
  • Liberal democracy is the final form of gov for all nations. There can be no progression from liberal democracy to an alternative system.
  • Democracy may still face “setbacks” (even for centuries), but that it will still return to democracy.