Commodity tax Flashcards
When does producer bear burden of tax?
- elasticity of demand = large
- elasticity of supply = small
When does consumer bear burden of tax?
- elasticity of demand = small
- elasticity of supply = large
When is DWL large?
- both elasticities higher
2. tax rate higher
- If capital and labour are elastic in the long-run, which factor of production does the burden of taxation ultimately fall on (in perfect general equilibrium)?
- Why?
- Land
2. It’s the only inelastic factor of production
Why is the social value of government revenue higher when taxes are higher?
- Relaxing the revenue constraint by £1 means we can reduce taxes by £1
- Because the DWL is proportional to the square of the tax rate, the gain in social welfare from reducing taxes by £1 is greater when taxes are high
If relax revenue raising constraint by £1, why is it better to reduce taxes by £1, rather than give out £1 as lump-sum?
- Reduces taxes by £1 and handing out £1 lump-sum benefit both increase income by £1
- But, given that taxes distortionary, additional welfare benefit from reducing taxes (lower DWL)
When does social marginal utility of consumption = social marginal utility of income?
If there are no income effects
What problem is the inverse elasticity rule an answer to?
- Simple version of single person Ramsey tax problem (1 person, independent goods)
i. e. no cross-price or income effects
What are the implications of the General Ramsey tax rule?
- Optimal tax system reduces compensated demand for each good by same proportional rule
- Substitutes – when taxing a good, tax its substitutes too (or you won’t reduce demand for each good by same proportional rule)
- Complements – when taxing a good, take care over taxing its complements (potentially tax complements less)
What is the only untaxed good in the Ramsey framework?
Leisure
Why does Ramsey taxation imply the same disincentive for work as labour taxation?
- Leisure = only untaxed good (i.e. most desirable, relatively)
- If leisure the most desirable good, this means labour is the least desirable
- Hence, same disincentive to work as labour taxation
Corlett and Hague (1953) theorem
- In 3 goods case (2 consumption goods and leisure), the good more complementary with leisure should be taxed more heavily
- Reason - want to encourage work (i.e. discourage leisure)
Implications of many person Ramsey rule?
- Tax goods in inverse proportion to demand elasticities
- Subsidise good if disproportionately demanded by people for whom social marginal utility of transfer is positive (high-gamma people)
Key tax incidence conclusions to remember
- Statutory incidence ≠ economic incidence
- Equilibrium independent of who nominally ‘pays’ tax
- More inelastic factors bear more of the tax
Assumptions made for all versions of the single person Ramsey tax problem?
- No income tax
- No individualised lump-sum taxation
- Producer prices fixed
- Commodity taxes are linear
Key assumption to derive simple non-general version of single person Ramsey rule?
No cross-price effects
Why does general Ramsey rule recommend taxing complements of leisure?
- Leisure the only untaxed good in Ramsey framework (i.e. relatively most desirable)
- Hence same disincentive to work as labour taxation
- So, to reduce compensated demand for each good (including leisure) by the same proportional rule, tax the complements of leisure
- Taxing complements of leisure increases incentive to work
- What is the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem?
- Implications for design of commodity tax system?
- Intuition for result?
- Assume absence of:
(i) Externalities
(ii) Non-competitive behaviour
(iii) Restrictions on tax instruments that can be used
1b. Given assumptions, necessary (in Pareto sense) feature of optimal tax system = production decisions left undistorted - Implication – business transactions shouldn’t be taxed
- Intuition – distorting product decisions reduces aggregate output
Key limitation of the inverse elasticity rule?
Ignores cross-price effects
Evidence that multiple VAT rates substantially increase reporting burden on businesses?
Cnossen (2003)
- Evidence that weak separability condition consistently empirically rejected?
- How strong is this effect?
- Implication/conclusion?
- Crawford et al (2008)
- Effects of hours worked on commodity demands = small
- Gains from moving to ‘optimally differentiated’ commodity tax system might be small
Implications of fact that DWL increases (approximately) with the square of the tax rate?
For efficiency:
- Spread taxes across goods
- Spread taxes across time
Some favour capital taxation to hit the rich, but how might this burden ultimately fall back on labour to some extent?
- Capital taxes decrease returns to capital, which may lower savings
- If savings fall, then capital stock falls
- Fall in capital stock will cause wages to decrease (hurting workers)
- What do theories of optimal taxation generally ignore?
2. Therefore, what should be kept in mind?
- Incidence of taxation
2. Keep in mind general equilibrium effects (e.g. tax on capital may hurt labour)
When is the social value of government revenue higher?
When R (revenue that needs to be raised) is higher
Answer to simple version of single person Ramsey tax problem (1 person, independent goods)
Inverse elasticity rule
Key implications of inverse elasticity rule
Optimal commodity taxation is:
- Positive
- Inversely proportional to elasticity of demand
- Higher on all goods, if revenue-raising constraint R is higher
What problem is the general Ramsey tax rule an answer to?
General version of single person Ramsey tax problem (1 person, cross-price and income effects)
What does optimal commodity tax differentiation depend on?
- Degree of concern for the poor (inequality aversion)
2. Differences in consumption patterns between rich and poor
….. et al (…..)
- Ending all zero and reduced rates (except housing/exports), whilst increasing all means-tested benefit/tax credit rates by …..% would:
(i) leave poorest …..% better off (on average)
(ii) raise extra £….. - Reason - …..
Crawford et al (2010)
- Ending all zero and reduced rates (except housing/exports), whilst increasing all means-tested benefit/tax credit rates by 15% would:
(i) leave poorest 30% better off (on average)
(ii) raise extra £11 billion - Reason - income tax/transfers = better targeted instruments than commodity taxes
Crawford et al (2010)
- Ending all zero and reduced rates (except housing/exports), whilst increasing all means-tested benefit/tax credit rates by 15% would:
(i) leave poorest 30% better off (on average)
(ii) raise extra £11 billion - Reason - income tax/transfers = better targeted instruments than commodity taxes
Evidence that the case for using differential VAT rates to help the less well-off is weak
Crawford et al (2010)
- Ending all zero and reduced rates (except housing/exports), whilst increasing all means-tested benefit/tax credit rates by 15% would:
(i) leave poorest 30% better off (on average)
(ii) raise extra £11 billion - Reason - income tax/transfers = better targeted instruments than commodity taxes
Cnossen (2003)
Evidence that multiple VAT rates substantially increase reporting burden on businesses
Possible implication of ignoring cross-price effects in inverse elasticity rule
Increased tax on good w/low price elasticity could even fall in total tax revenue or more distortions
What does weak separability between consumption and leisure condition mean?
All goods similarly complementary w/leisure
Sufficient condition for uniform commodity taxation to be optimal?
- Weak separability between consumption and leisure (all goods equally complementary with leisure)
Crawford et al (2008)
- Examples of goods that are complementary with leisure?
- Examples that are complementary with work?
- Complements w/leisure (higher tax):
(i) Food
(ii) Domestic energy
(iii) Children’s clothing
(iv) Public transport - Complements w/work (lower tax):
(i) Alcohol
(ii) Food eaten out of home
(iii) Motor fuel
Practical problems with differential commodity taxes
- Cnossen (2003) – multiple VAT rates substantially increase reporting burden on businesses
- Increased lobbying for preferential treatment
- Assume absence of:
(i) Externalities
(ii) Non-competitive behaviour
(iii) Restrictions on tax instruments that can be used
1b. Given assumptions, necessary (in Pareto sense) feature of optimal tax system = production decisions left undistorted - Implication – business transactions shouldn’t be taxed
- Intuition – distorting product decisions reduces aggregate output
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem
Theorem to support idea that business transactions should not be taxed in optimal tax system?
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem
- Assume absence of:
(i) Externalities
(ii) Non-competitive behaviour
(iii) Restrictions on tax instruments that can be used
1b. Given assumptions, necessary (in Pareto sense) feature of optimal tax system = production decisions left undistorted - Implication – business transactions shouldn’t be taxed
- Intuition – distorting product decisions reduces aggregate output