Colonialism Flashcards
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (reversal)
Reversal in the quality of institutions. Places that were poor before got good institutions because they became neo-Europes (similar climates so no large disease burden), while extractive institutions persisted in previously rich areas, which colonisers either maintained or introduced → reversal in relative incomes in late 18th and early 19th centuries. Shows institutions rule, because it is the opposite of what geography would predict. However, it is unclear whether this is due to the long-run effects of colonialism, or whether the institutions were already bad in areas where Europeans set up extractive institutions.
This supports other studies showing societies that provide incentives and opportunities for investment are richer than those that fail to do so (eg. North and Weingast and Olson). Poor places which were sparsely populated made it easier for settlers to settle and develop institutions that helped investment, and large population and prosperity made extractive institutions profitable for colonisers: eg. forced to work in mines and plantations, or taxed. Also similar to Engerman and Sokoloff, who emphasise the adverse effects of the plantation complex in the Carribean and Central America in creating inequality
Rebuts Sachs’s temperate drift hypothesis, arguing that it would predict that reversal in incomes should have occurred when European agricultural technology spread to colonies, but reversal occurred in late 18th century, which was related to industrialisation
Banerjee and Iyer
Landlord-owned colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India led to lower agricultural investments and productivity compared to democratically-owned areas, as they led to different policy interests and preferences, which manifested in a legacy of vastly different land-holding policies. In areas where proprietary rights in land were given to landlords, there were lower agricultural investments and productivity after independence, compared to areas where rights were given to cultivators. This was a persistent effect as a result of different land revenue policies; they were abolished after they left, so there were no direct taxes or agricultural incomes anymore
Channels for persistence:
1. Class-based antagonism created by the formal structure of landlordism persisted post-independence
2. Conflictual environment limited collective action
3. States with a higher proportion of landlord districts have lower levels of public development, due to public spending gaps between landlord and non-landlord districts in health, education and agricultural tech
4. Landlord districts were unable to claim their fair share of public investment
Why was the land system important?
1. Landlords were given a free hand to set terms for the tenants, and could appropriate most gains in productivity. Landlords grew richer and inequality increased
2. The distribution of wealth influenced growth: a) determined how many in the peasantry had enough land or wealth to make investments needed to raise productivity, b) affected the balance between those who cultivated their own land and those who cultivated others’ land (principal-agent problem and inefficient), c) political interests of rural masses diverged from that of the elite
3. The right to set land revenue rates and penalise those who did not pay gave landlords a lot of apolitical power, leading to insecure peasant property, discouragement of investments due to risk of expropriation by landlords
4. Arbitrary power created class-based resentment, especially when landlord states were busy carrying out land reforms while others focused on development
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
In the Scramble for Africa, conflict was more likely in ethnic groups partitioned by borders (without input from Africans), led to increased violence and discrimination and made countries poorer. Shows that borders were drawn arbitrarily wrt to ethnic partitioning, with no respect for local political geography. Civil conflict was higher, and partitioned groups often face discrimination from the national government and engage in rebellions to counter repression, often supported by co-ethnics on the other side of the border. Partitioned ethnicities are 11-14% more likely to engage in civil wars and 7% more likely to be the subject of discrimination from the national government
Cites other scholars:
1. Herbst argues that artificial border fostered ethnic struggles and conflict, and split groups across newly minted African states.
2. Horowitz argues that ethnic partitioning led to successionist tendencies and nationalism, as well as irredentism, which are movements where members claim territory they consider ‘lost’ to their nation. Split groups have been instrumentally used by governments to destabilise neighbouring countries
Nunn and Wantchekon
Current differences in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. Individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today, with most of such impact through internal, individual factors, such as cultural norms, beliefs and values
Slave trade led to a ‘culture of mistrust’ - ‘individuals could partially protect themselves by turning against others within their community’. The culture of mistrust caused because slaves were initially captured through state organised raids and warfare; as trade progressed, individuals turned on each other, and kidnapped, tricked and sold each other into slavery. Places hit harder by transatlantic slave trade (measured by distance to port and ease of transport) have less trust now. Individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade today exhibit less trust in neighbours, relatives, as well as their local government. Such a lack of trust is very detrimental to the development of institutions, whether political or economic, and also greatly raises the costs of enforcing laws and informal agreements. This was controlled with other forms of European influence, esp the period of formal colonial rule after the slave trade. They also note that the internal effect on beliefs/values (measured by ancestors) were twice as important as the effects of external environment (institutions)
Now, individuals with ancestors who were more heavily affected by the slave trade disapprove more of their local government council, report they are corrupt, and feel that the officials do not listen
Tabellini
Explains the persistence of culture/trust explained by Nunn and Wantchekon.
1. People inherit norms from parents and make political choices that determine the quality of institutions
2. Norms of cooperation hence affect quality of domestic institutions
3. Negative shock to norms of cooperation means the next generation is less trusting, and the next generation chooses institutions with weaker enforcement, leading to poor behaviour and entrenched lower levels of trust. Culture also changes slowly, so it may be the case that the shock caused by the slave trade has not dissipated yet
Dell
Long-run effect of mining mita, a forced labour system in Peru and Bolivia, where 1/7 of the male population worked in mines. Methodology: used the discountinuity in the conscription system for an RD set up, with the mining change an exogenous variable. Exploits a geographical boundary, where on one side all communities had to send the same proportion of the population, while on the other, all communities were exempt.
Findings: places within the mita area are poorer today, with 1) fewer haciendas, 2) less integrated infrastructure, 3) more subsistence farming, 4) lowered household income by 25%, and increased the prevalence of stunted growth in children around 6%. Due to colonialism’s legacy on land tenure and public goods provision
4) Large landowners can be a good thing, because they have the incentive to develop and provide public goods.
5) Effects now: mita districts are less integrated into road networks, and mita residents are more likely to be subsistence farmers
Long-term presence of large landowners in non-mita districts provided a stable land tenure system that encouraged public goods provision, whereas Peruvian government abolished communal land tenure in mita districts after mita ended, but did not replace it with a system of peasant titling; so confiscation of peasant lands, peasant rebellions etc occurred in mita districts in late 19th and 20th centuries. Concludes that elites using state machinery to coerce labour is harmful
What were the channels of persistence?
1. Haciendas - rural estates with an attached labour force, which developed outside the mita catchment. Under the mita policy, the state promoted communal land tenure instead, which affected hacienda concentration until 1940. Established landowners in non-mita districts had more secure title to property and experienced higher returns from investing in public goods. Hacienda also successfully lobbied for roads, government funds etc, leading to strong economic development
2. Mitas lowered educational attainment
3. Mitas increased the prevalence of subsistence farming
VS Engerman and Sokoloff - hypothesise that high land inequality is the cause of Latin America’s poor long-run growth. Argue that high historical inequality and large landowners lowered investment in public goods and led to worse outcomes in areas of the Americas. BUT their counterfactual (secure, enfranchised smallholders) does not fit Peru or other places
Easterly and Levine
Economic benefits of colonialism based on factors Europeans brought (not Europeans themselves) including 1) institutions, 2) human capital, 3) technology, 4) connections with international markets, and 5) cultural norms. These factors offset the extractive institutions by minority European settlement
Feyrer and Sacerdote
Use wind patterns (exogenous variable) -some countries were harder to sail to and were colonised for a shorter period of time.
Findings: 1) places which have been colonised for a longer time are richer today - an increased 100 years of colonial history is associated with a 42% increase in GDP
2) US and Dutch colonies were better than Spanish and Portugese colonies, perhaps due to their institutions
3) later colonialism was better than earlier colonialism, perhaps because of the Enlightenment
Glaeser et al
European share of the population during colonization influenced the rate of human capital accumulation. Europeans directly added human capital skills and created institutions which created long-run economic growth
North et al
Former British colonies prospered relative to former French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies because of the strong legal, economic and political institutions and culture they inherited from Britain
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (institutions)
Extractive colonial institutions led to poor economic growth in places where Europeans could not settle due to high settler mortality rates in disease-prone environments. European colonisers implemented two broad types of institutions in the colonised countries - either having ‘extractive states’, such as the Belgian colonisation of Congo, with little protection of private property and the aim to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the coloniser; or having ‘neo-Europes’ (Crosby) such as Australia and the US, where they tried to replicate European institutions with strong emphasis on private property. Once the effects of institutions on economic performance is controlled for, the distance from the equator is no longer significant: shows that worse institutions matter more than geography and culture. Also control for other variables eg. identity of main coloniser, legal origin, climate, religion, geography, natural resources. Similar to Engerman and Sokoloff, who also emphasise institutions, but link institutions to factor endowments and inequality. Findings do not mean that institutions today are predetermined by colonial policies and can never change; colonial experiences are just one of many factors which affect institutions
Scramble for Africa history
Started in 1860s when French and British began systematic exploration of West Africa. In the Berlin Conferences in mid-1880s, the key consideration for European partition of the continent was to prevent conflict among Europeans, which explains why they drew borders without accounting for local conditions. African leaders had no say, and this was in such a rush that they did not wait for information to arrive from geographers etc.
African independence started with North African countries in the 1950s, with 40 countries independent by 1966
