Chp 3 - Classical demand theory Flashcards

1
Q

What is monotone and strongly monotone?

A

Monotone
x=(3,2,1)
x’=(4,3,2)

Strongly monotone:
x=(1,2,3)
x’=(2,2,3)

CD is strict, Leontif is monotone.

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2
Q

Define the indifferent set, upper level set (contour set), lower level set.

A

Indifference set:
x in X = {y: y~x}

Upper level set
x in X = {y: y≥x}

Lower level set
x in X = {y: y≤x}

Det ska vara preferens linjer

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3
Q

What feature will monotonicity give our indifference curves?

A

They will be downward sloping.

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4
Q

Which assumptions are necessary for preferences?

A
  • Rationality
  • Local non-satiation
  • Convexity
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5
Q

What is convexity in preferences and what feature will it yield?

A

A preference relation is convex on x if the upper level contour set in convex.

This makes the consumer prefer a diverse bundle of goods (de vill alltid ha en blandning av varor). No corner solutions tror jag?

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6
Q

Which preferences can not be represented by utility functions?

A

Lexo-graphical preferences.

To avoid this, preferences needs to be continuous.

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7
Q

What assumption will yield that Walras law is satisfied så we have xp=w?

A

Local non-satiation or monotonic preferences.

Note, we will inly have this when we have utility functions where the exponent parameters adds to 1. Other wise it could be that we derive negative utility from one good etc….

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8
Q

Suppose that u(.) is a continuous function representing a locally non satiated preference relationship. Then the Walrasian demand correspondence x(p,w) possesses the following properties

A

H.M of degree zero in (p,w): x(ap, aw) = x(p,w) for any p,w and scalar a>0.

Walras law holds. That is, px=w with equality.

Convexity/uniqueness. If the preference relationship is convex then u(.) is quasiconcave, then x(p,w) is a convex set. If the preference relation ship is strictly convex, then u(.) is strictly convex and x(p,w) consists of a single element, i.e., we have a single solution.

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9
Q

What are the features of the Slutsky demand vs the Hicksian demand?

A

Slutsky Demand: The previous bundle needs to be affordable

Hicksian demand: Previous utility needs to be affordable.

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10
Q

When can we say that X_1 ≥ 0 and X_2 ≥ 0 holds with equality?

A

When we have a function where the terms put together, like in the CD case.

X_1 X_2.

Because if one of then then is zero, then the whole expression is zero and we have a solution at origio.

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11
Q

Write the budget set for L goods and the budget set for two goods

A

L goods:

B_{p,w} = {x ⊂ R^L_+: px ≤ w}

Two goods

B_{p,w} = {x ⊂ R^2_+: p_1 x_1 + p_2 + x_2 ≤ w}

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12
Q

Derive the Slutsky Equation

A

See notes or notation.

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13
Q

Prove that the expenditure function is homogeneous of degree one in prices

A

See notion

e(ap,u^) = min_x apx s.t.u(x) ≥ u^

take out a

ae(p,u^) = a min_x px s.t.u(x) ≥ u^

Boken skriver

e(ap,u) = apx* = ae(p,u)

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14
Q

Show that the expenditure function is non decreasing in p.

A

Lets say we have

p < p’

multiplying with h(p,u)

ph(p’,u) < p’h(p’,u)

Where RHS is the expenditure function when price is p’, we thus have:

ph(p’,u) < e(p’u)

Then one can claim that when p < p’

ph(p,u) ≤ ph(p’,u) < e(p’u)

Or using ph(p,u) = using e(p,u)

e(p,u) ≤ ph(p’,u) < e(p’u)

Thus the expenditure function is non decreasing in prices.

u should be \bar u…. See notion for neater expressions.

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15
Q

Show that the expenditure function is concave in price.

A

Show a diagram with e(p,u) on the y-axis and p_i on the x-axis. Show how his total expenditures increases linearly with p_i as a 45 degree line. Then show a second concave line that lies under the 45 degree line representing what happens i the consumer minimizes. See notes.

Also see the formal proof in notion where one uses p’’ as a linear combination of p and p’’.

e(p’‘,u) = aph(p,u) + (1-a)p’h(p’,u)

etc until

e(ap + (1-a)p’,u) ≥ ae(p,u) + (1-a)e(p’,u).

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16
Q

What assumption does that Walras law hold?

A

Walras law follows from the local non-satiation assumption. Proposition 3.D.2

17
Q

When is x(p,w) convex? The walrasian demand…

A

If the preference relation is convex so u(.) is quasi concave, then x(p,w) is a convex set. If the preference relationship is strictly convex so u(.) is strictly quasiconcave, then x(p,w) consists of a single element.

18
Q

The indirect utility function is homogeneous of degree….

A

Zero!

19
Q

Show that the indirect utility function is homogeneous of degree zero

A

$$
v(\alpha p,\alpha w) =v(x(\alpha p,\alpha w))
$$

That is, the v(a,p) = v(x), and the indirect utility function is the value function for the Walrasian demand. Since the Walrasian demand is homogeneous of degree zero, the indirect utility function will also be homogeneous of degree zero.

So

$$
v(x(p,w))
$$

That is:

$$
v(\alpha p,\alpha w) \rightarrow v(x(\alpha p,\alpha w)) \rightarrow v(x(p,w))
$$

20
Q

How should one tackle a question regarding price dispersion?

A

We should use concavity or convexity.

E.g., from the point of the consumer, I should show that the expenditure function is concave.

21
Q

What is roys identity?

A

(dv/dp) / (dv/dw) = -xi

V = indirect utility function

22
Q

How do you go from indirect utility function to the demand?

A

Use roys identity.

(dv/dpi) / (dv/dw) = -xi