Chapter Eight Flashcards
What is the difference between contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk?
The defense of contributory negligence shifts the loss from the defendant to the plaintiff by completely barring the negligence plaintiff from recovery. The plaintiff is barred even though the defendant was negligent and, in most cases, was more negligent than the plaintiff. Comparative negligence was created as an alternative to the all-or-nothing approach of the contributory negligence system and provides that the plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced in direct proportion to the plaintiff’s percentage of contribution to his or her own injuries. A plaintiff who volunteers to take the chance that harm will occur is said to have assumed the risk.
What is the rationale for contributory negligence?
The rationale for this judge-created rule stems from the notion that negligent plaintiffs should be punished for failing to protect their own safety. Additionally, some courts have argued that the plaintiff’s negligence becomes the proximate cause of his or her injuries, thus removing the defendant as the proximate cause.
What have some courts done to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine?
In most jurisdictions the question of contributory negligence is left to the jury, who have an opportunity to apply a comparative negligence standard in those cases in which application of a contributory negligence standard would lead to unfair results.
What is the last-clear-chance doctrine?
Under this doctrine, if the defendant has an opportunity that is unavailable to the plaintiff to prevent the harm that occurs and does not take advantage of it, the defendant will remain liable despite the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. In essence the defendant’s failure to take advantage of an opportunity to prevent the harm negates, or wipes out, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
What variations to this doctrine exist?
i. Plaintiff is helpless and defendant discovers danger but negligently fails to avoid it.
ii. Plaintiff is helpless and defendant fails to discover danger because he or she is inattentive.
iii. Plaintiff is inattentive but not helpless and defendant discovers danger but negligently fails to avoid it.
iv. Plaintiff is inattentive but not helpless and defendant fails to discover danger because he or she is inattentive.
v. Defendant is unable to avoid harming the plaintiff (even though the defendant is aware of the danger) because of the defendant’s earlier negligence (first-clearchance doctrine).
vi. What is the first-clear-chance doctrine? Defendant is unable to avoid harming the plaintiff (even though the defendant is aware of the danger) because of the defendant’s earlier negligence. b. When is the last-clear-chance doctrine not applicable? The doctrine is not applicable when the plaintiff is helpless and the defendant negligently fails to discover the plaintiff’s situation because the defendant is inattentive. It is also not applicable if both the defendant and the plaintiff are inattentive so that neither discovers the danger.
When is contributory negligence not a defense?
Contributory negligence cannot be used as a defense to an intentional tort or if the defendant’s conduct was “willful and wanton” or “reckless,” unless the plaintiff’s conduct was also willful and wanton or reckless.
What is the justification for the development of the comparative-negligence standard?
Comparative negligence was created as an alternative to the all-or-nothing approach of the contributory negligence system and provides that the plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced in direct proportion to the plaintiff’s percentage of contribution to his or her own injuries.
What is the difference between pure comparative negligence and the 50 percent approach?
Under a pure comparative negligence system a plaintiff can still recover 20 percent of his or her damages if the plaintiff is found to be 80 percent negligent by the jury. Under the 50 percent approach, the plaintiff would be precluded from recovering any damages because the plaintiff was more than 50 percent responsible for his or her own injuries.
What is the difference between the “not greater than” and “not as great as” approach?
Under the “not as great as” approach the plaintiff’s claim is barred as soon as the plaintiff’s negligence is as great as the defendant’s negligence; under the “not greater than” approach the plaintiff is barred only when the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than the defendant’s.
Why is this difference significant? (in the not greater than and not as great as approach)
The reason this subtle distinction can give rise to tremendous differences in outcome results from the tendency of juries to assign a fifty-fifty apportionment in terms of blame. In a fifty-fifty apportionment the plaintiff would be barred under the “not as great as” approach (because the plaintiff’s negligence would be as great as the defendant’s) but would not be barred under the “not greater than” approach (because the plaintiff’s negligence would not be greater than the defendant’s).
How have states that have adopted comparative negligence treated the last-clear-chance doctrine?
Some states have retained the last-clear-chance doctrine as a distinct doctrine, either reasoning that the last-clear-chance doctrine is not incompatible with comparative negligence, or not questioning the compatibility.
Are contributory negligence and comparative negligence a defense to intentional torts?
Comparative negligence generally is not used in reference to intentional torts to reduce the plaintiff’s damages; thus, a defendant who commits an intentional tort may not use the argument that the plaintiff contributed to his or her own injuries.
Are contributory negligence and comparative negligence a defense to reckless or willful and wanton conduct?
The defendant whose conduct is willful and wanton or reckless may still rely on the defense of comparative negligence to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery. Most states adopting the comparative negligence approach have allowed for the reduction of the negligent plaintiff’s recovery in cases in which the defendant violated a safety statute and was therefore negligent per se. Unlike contributory negligence, the same stance is taken even when the statute is designed to protect members of the plaintiff’s class and to place all responsibility on the defendant. Some states, however, have denied apportionment, arguing that it would defeat the purpose of the statute in question.
Are contributory negligence and comparative negligence a defense to negligence per se?
Most states adopting the comparative-negligence approach have allowed for the reduction of the negligent plaintiff’s recovery in cases in which the defendant violated a safety statute and was therefore negligent per se. Unlike contributory negligence, the same stance is taken even when the statute is designed to protect members of the plaintiff’s class and to place all responsibility on the defendant. Some states, however, have denied apportionment, arguing that it would defeat the purpose of the statute in question.
How does assumption of risk compare to contributory negligence?
Contributory negligence is characterized as “recklessness” and the plaintiff is compared to a reasonable person (objective standard). Contributory negligence is not a defense to reckless conduct and not generally a defense in strict liability cases. Assumption of risk is characterized as “adventurousness” and applies a subjective standard. (Did plaintiff understand the risk?) Assumption of risk is a defense to reckless conduct in strict liability cases.