Chapter 9 - Test 3 Flashcards
The use of strategic alliances to manage economic exchanges has grown substantially over the last several years.
T
A strategic alliance exists whenever three or more independent organizations cooperate in the development, manufacture, or sale of products or services.
f
In a nonequity alliance, firms create a legally independent firm in which they invest and from which they share any profits that are created.
f
In an equity alliance, cooperating firms supplement contracts with equity holdings an alliance partners.
t
When a firm cannot realize the cost savings from economies of scale all by itself, it may join in a strategic alliance with other firms so that together both firms will have sufficient volume to be able to gain the cost advantages of economies of scale.
t
In general, due to the intangible nature of knowledge, firms are not able to use alliances to learn from their competitors.
f
When both parties to an alliance are seeking to learn something from that alliance, a learning race can evolve.
t
Network industries are characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
f
Firms with high levels of absorptive capacity will learn at higher rates than firms with low levels of absorptive capacity, even if these two firms are trying to learn exactly the same things in an alliance.
t
Learning race dynamics are particularly common in relations among large, well-established firms.
f
In network industries with increasing returns to scale where standards are unimportant, strategic alliances can be used to create a more favorable competitive environment.
f
Explicit collusion exists when firms directly communicate with each other to coordinate their levels of production or their prices and is legal in most countries.
f
Tacit collusion exists when firms coordinate their pricing decisions not by directly communicating with each other but by exchanging signals with other firms about their intent to cooperate.
t
Strategic alliances can help create the social setting within which tacit collusion may develop.
t
Research shows that joint ventures between firms in the same industry may have collusive implications and that these kinds of joint ventures are relatively common.
f
Alliances to facilitate entry into new industries are only valuable when the skills needed in these industries are complex and difficult to learn.
f
When information asymmetry exists between firms that currently own assets and firms that may want to purchase these assets, the selling firm will often have difficulty obtaining the full economic value of these assets.
t
In new and uncertain environments it is not unusual for firms to develop numerous strategic alliances.
t
Research shows that as many as two-thirds of strategic alliances do not meet the expectations of at least one alliance partner.
f
When potential cooperative partners misrepresent the skills, abilities, and other resources that they will bring to an alliance, this is a form of cheating known as adverse selection.
t
In general, the less tangible the resources and capabilities that are to be brought to a strategic alliance, the less costly it will be to estimate their value before an alliance is created and the more likely it is that adverse selection will occur.
f
Moral hazard occurs when partners in an alliance possess high-quality resources and capabilities of significant value in an alliance but fail to make those resources and capabilities available to alliance partners.
t
The existence of moral hazard in a strategic alliance proves that at least one of the parties is either malicious or dishonest.
f
In an alliance a holdup occurs when a firm that has not made significant transaction-specific investments demands returns from an alliance that are higher than what the partners agreed to when they created the alliance.
t
Research on international joint ventures suggests that the existence of transaction-specific investments in their relationships makes these agreements relatively immune to holdup problems.
f
Although holdup is a form of cheating in strategic alliances, the threat of holdup can also be a motivation for creating an alliance.
t
For a strategic alliance to be a source of sustained competitive advantage it must be valuable in that it exploits an opportunity but avoids a threat and it must also be rare and costly to imitate
t
The rarity of strategic alliances depends solely on the number of competing firms that have already implemented an alliance.
f
In the short-run, firms can gain some advantages by cheating their alliance partners but research suggests that cheating does not pay in the long run.
t
Successful strategic alliances are often based on socially complex relations among alliance partners but virtually every firm in a given industry is likely to have the organizational and relationship-building skills required for alliance building making the possibility of direct duplication of strategic alliances very high.
f
In general, firms will prefer to go it alone rather than enter into a strategic alliance when the level of transaction-specific investment required to complete an exchange is low.
t
Capabilities theory suggests that an alliance will be preferred over going it alone when an exchange partner possesses valuable, rare, and costly-to-imitate resources and capabilities.
t
When there is low uncertainty about the future value of an exchange, an alliance will be preferred to going it alone.
f
Transaction cost economics suggests that going it alone is not a substitute for strategic alliances since they are best chosen only when other alternatives are not viable.
t
An alliance will be preferred to an acquisition when there are legal constraints on acquisitions.
t
The primary purpose of organizing a strategic alliance is to enable partners in the alliance to gain all the benefits associated with cooperation while minimizing the probability that cooperating firms will cheat on their cooperative agreements.
t
In general, contracts are sufficient to resolve all the problems associated with cheating in an alliance.
f
Sometimes the value of cheating in a joint venture is sufficiently large that a firm cheats even though doing so hurts the joint venture and forecloses future opportunities.
t
In comparison to strategic alliances, joint ventures increase the threat of cheating by partners.
f
When the probability of cheating in a cooperative relationship is lowest, a joint venture is usually the preferred form of cooperation.
f
In the computer technology-based industries, over \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ alliances were created between 2001 and 2005. A) 5,700 B) 1,200 C) 2,200 D) 3,100
c
A(n) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ exists whenever two or more independent organizations cooperate in the development, manufacture, or sale of products or services. A) vertical market B) strategic alliance C) initial public offering D) market transaction
b
A \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is a form of nonequity alliance that exists when one firm allows another to use its brand name to sell its products. A) supply agreement B) distribution agreement C) licensing agreement D) joint venture
c
In a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, cooperating firms create a legally independent firm in which they invest and from which they share any profits that are created. A) licensing agreement B) supply agreement C) distribution agreement D) joint venture
d
Strategic alliances can create economic value through helping firms improve their current operations by
A) facilitating the development of technology standards.
B) facilitating tacit collusion.
C) exploiting economies of scale.
D) managing uncertainty.
c
When both parties to an alliance are seeking to learn something from that alliance, a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ can evolve. A) learning race B) dynamic race C) learning dynamic D) learning curve
a
Network industries are characterized by A) increasing diseconomies of scale. B) increasing returns to scale. C) decreasing returns to scale. D) decreasing economies of scale.
b
A firm's ability to learn is known as its A) competitive position. B) competitive advantage. C) distinctive competence. D) absorptive capacity.
d
In one study almost \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ percent of the managers in entrepreneurial firms felt unfairly exploited by their large-firm alliance partners. A) 80 B) 20 C) 50 D) 10
a
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ exists when firms directly communicate with each other to coordinate their levels of production and/or their prices. A) Economies of scale B) Explicit collusion C) A learning race D) Tacit collusion
b
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ exists when firms coordinate their production and pricing decisions not by directly communicating with each other but by exchanging signals with other firms about their intent to cooperate. A) Economies of scale B) Explicit collusion C) A learning race D) Tacit collusion
d
Strategic alliances are particularly valuable in facilitating market entry and exit when the value of market entry or exit is A) high. B) low. C) moderate. D) uncertain.
d
Although joint ventures between firms in the same industry ________ collusive implications, research has shown that these kinds of joint ventures are ________.
A) may have; relatively rare
B) are not likely to have; relatively rare
C) may have; relatively common
D) are not likely to have; relatively common
a
As long as the cost of ________ to enter a new industry is less than the cost of ________, an alliance can be a valuable strategic opportunity.
A) vertically integrating; learning new skills and capabilities
B) learning new skills and capabilities; using an alliance
C) using an alliance; learning new skills and capabilities
D) learning new skills and capabilities; vertically integrating
c
Consistent with a real options perspective, firms in new and uncertain environments are likely to A) avoid using strategic alliances. B) develop numerous strategic alliances. C) develop few strategic alliances. D) engage in vertical integration.
b
Research shows that as many as \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ of all strategic alliances do not meet the expectations of at least one alliance partner. A) one-third B) five-eighths C) one-half D) two-thirds
a
If TeleCo were to enter into a strategic alliance with a partner that promised it could deliver a high quality wireless infrastructure when in fact the potential partner had neither the skills nor abilities to provide this infrastructure, TeleCo could be said to be impacted by A) moral hazard. B) adverse selection. C) holdup. D) tacit collusion.
b
Adverse selection in a strategic alliance is likely only when
A) it is difficult or costly to observe the resources or capabilities that a partner brings to an alliance.
B) a potential partner can easily see the resources and capabilities that a firm is bringing to an alliance.
C) it is difficult or costly to know how competitors will react to the strategic alliance.
D) there are significant transaction-specific assets devoted to the alliance.
a
In general, the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ tangible the resources and capabilities that are to be brought to a strategy alliance, the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ costly it will be to estimate their value before an alliance is created, and the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ likely it is that adverse selection will occur. A) more; more; more B) less; more; less C) less; more; more D) more; more; less
c
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ occurs when partners in an alliance possess high-quality resources and capabilities of significant value in an alliance but fail to make those resources and capabilities available to alliance partners. A) Moral hazard B) Adverse selection C) Holdup D) Explicit collusion
a
Often both parties in a failed alliance accuse each other of A) adverse selection. B) tacit collusion. C) moral hazard. D) holdup.
c
When one firm makes more transaction-specific investments in a strategic alliance than partner firms make, that firm may be subject to a form of cheating called \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ that occurs when a firm that has not made significant transaction-specific investments demands returns from an alliance that are higher than what the partners agreed to when they created the alliance. A) adverse selection B) holdup C) moral hazard D) noncompliance
b
Research suggests that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ are the type of alliance where existence of transaction-specific investments often leads to holdup problems. A) licensing agreements B) equity alliances C) joint ventures D) distribution agreements
c
The rarity of strategic alliances
A) depends solely on the number of competing firms that have already implemented an alliance.
B) depends solely on whether or not the benefits that firms obtain from their alliances are not common across firms in the industry.
C) depends not only on the number of competing firms that have already implemented an alliance but also on whether or not the benefits that firms obtain from their alliances are not common across competing firms in the industry.
D) depends solely on the number of substitutes available for alliances.
c
One of the reasons why the benefits that accrue from a particular strategic alliance may be rare is that
A) relatively few firms may have the complementary resources and abilities needed to form an alliance.
B) there is a relatively large number of alliance partners available.
C) relatively many firms may have the complementary resources and abilities needed to form an alliance
D) there may be a relatively low amount of transaction-specific assets to enter into similar alliances.
a
Research indicates that the most common reason that alliances fail to meet the expectations of partner firms is
A) the lack of financial resources.
B) the necessity of transaction-specific investments.
C) the lack of transaction-specific investments.
D) the partners’ inability to trust one another.
d
To the extent that a strategic alliance is based on \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ relations, it will make the alliances costly to imitate. A) socially complex B) tacit collusion C) explicit collusion D) moral hazard
a
Two possible substitutes for strategic alliances include
A) going it alone and tacit collision.
B) going it alone and acquisitions.
C) acquisitions and explicit collusion.
D) explicit collusion and tacit collusion
b