Chapter 8 - Test 3 Flashcards
The most common organization structure for implementing a corporate diversification strategy is the U-form.
f
Another name for the M-form is the multidivisional structure.
t
In the multidivisional structure, each business that the firm engages in is managed through a division.
t
The divisions in an M-form organization are true profit-and-loss centers.
t
All firms that use the multidivisional structure use the same criteria for defining the boundaries of profit-and-loss centers.
f
Divisions in an M-form organization should be large enough to represent identifiable business entities but small enough so that a division general manager can manage each one effectively.
t
Divisions in an M-form organization should be large enough to represent identifiable business entities but small enough so that a division general manager can manage each one effectively.
f
The M-form structure is designed to create checks and balances for managers that increase the probability that a diversified firm will be managed in ways consistent with the interests of its equity holders.
t
Whenever one party to an exchange delegates decision-making authority to a second party, an agency relationship has been created between these parties.
t
In an agency relationship the party delegating the decision-making authority is called the agent.
f
One common agency problem occurs when managers decide to take some of a firm’s capital and invest it in managerial perquisites that do not add economic value to the firm but that do directly benefit those managers.
t
In an M-form organization the role of the board of directors is to formulate corporate strategies consistent with equity holders’ interests and to assure strategy implementation.
f
In principle, only the CEO and the president report to the board of directors while other senior managers report only to the CEO.
f
Research on outside members of boards of directors tends to show that outside directors, as compared to insiders, tend to focus less on monitoring a firm’s economic performance than on other measures of firm performance.
f
Research has shown that separating the roles of CEO and board chair is positively correlated with firm performance when firms operated in high-growth and very complex environments.
t
To the extent that a board of directors begins to operate a business on a day-to-day basis, it goes beyond its capabilities.
t
A board of directors typically consists of 15 to 30 individuals drawn from a firm’s top management group and from individuals outside the firm.
f
The title chairman of the board often, but not always, identifies the firm’s senior executive.
f
Institutional owners are usually pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, or other groups of investors that have joined together to manage their investments.
t
In 1970, institutions owned 62 percent of the equity traded in the United States; by 1990, institutions owned 48 percent of this equity and by 2002, they owned only 32 percent of this equity.
f
The senior executive in an M-form organization has two responsibilities: strategy formulation and strategy implementation.
t
In an M-form organization, the chief executive officer is solely responsible for strategy implementation.
f
Only accounting measures of performance can be used in accurately measuring the performance of divisions within a diversified firm.
f
One of the strengths of using a hurdle rate to measure the performance of divisions in a diversified firm is that if the corporation has a single hurdle rate, there is little ambiguity about the performance objectives of divisions.
t
Most accounting measures of divisional performance focus on long-term benefits and minimize the possibility of a short-term bias.
f
Economic methods of divisional performance in a diversified firm build on accounting methods but adjust those methods to incorporate short-term investments that may generate long-term benefits.
t
Economic measures of divisional performance in a diversified firm compare a division’s performance with a firm’s cost of capital and these measures increase the potential for gaming, which is generally minimized by accounting measures.
f
The most popular economically oriented measure of division performance in a diversified firm is economic value added.
t
By adjusting for a division’s earning and accounting for the cost of investing in a division, economic value added is a much more accurate estimate of a division’s economic performance than are traditional accounting measures of performance.
t
If a well-managed diversified firm uses both accounting and economic measures, it will be able to unambiguously evaluate divisional performance.
f
To the extent that a firm exploits real economies of scope in implementing a diversification strategy, it will be able to unambiguously evaluate the performance of individual division in that firm.
f
In zero-based budgeting, each project has to stand on its own merits each year by being included among the important projects that a firm can afford to fund and no project receives funding for the future simply because it received funding in the past.
t
Intermediate products or services are those products or services that are produced in one division of a diversified firm that are used as inputs by another division.
t
In a diversified firm, market prices are set by a firm’s corporate management to accomplish corporate objectives while transfer prices are determined by the market forces of supply and demand.
f
In choosing which transfer pricing system to use, a firm should be less concerned about finding the “right” transfer-pricing mechanism and be more concerned about choosing a transfer-pricing policy that creates the fewest management problems.
t
Traditionally, the compensation of corporate managers in a diversified firm has been only loosely connected to the firm’s economic performance.
t