Chapter 7 Flashcards
Self
The feeling of being an individual with private experiences, feelings and beliefs, who interacts in a coherent and purposeful way with the environment.
Mind-brain problem
Issue of how the mind is related to the brain; three main views: dualism, materialism and functionalism.
Mind
Aggregate of faculties humans (and animals) have to perceive, feel, think, remember and want.
Dualism
View of the mind-body relation according to which the mind is immaterial and completely independent of the body; central within religions and also in Descartes’ philosophy.
Consciousness
Word referring to the private, first-person experiences an individual lives through; contains all the mental states a person is aware of; part of the mind that can be examined with introspection.
Free will
Situation in which individuals can choose their course of action; choice is the outcome of an informed deliberation.
Phlogiston
Substance that was believed to make materials flammable before the chemical processes of combustion were understood.
Vital force
Animistic substance thought to be present in living matter before the chemical and biological differences between living and non-living matter were understood.
Materialism
View about the relationship between the mind and brain that considers the mind as the brain in operation.
Folk psychology
Collection of beliefs lay people have about psychological functioning; no efforts were made to verify them empirically or to check them for their internal coherence.
Identity problem
The difficulty the materialistic theory of the mind-brain relationship has to explain how two events can be experienced as the same despite the fact that their realization in the brain differs.
Functionalism
In the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions; predicts that the mind can be copied onto another Turing machine.
Thought experiment
Hypothetical scenario that helps with the understanding of a philosophical argument.
Meme
Information unit proposed by Dawkins that reproduces itself according to the principles of the evolutionary theory (variation, selection and replication.
Symbol grounding problem
The finding that representations (symbols) used in computations require a reference to some external reality in order to get meaning.
Embodied cognition
The conviction that the interactions between the human body and the environment form the grounding (meaning) of human cognition.
Access consciousness
Access conscious information can be reported by the patient, used for reasoning and acted upon intentionally.
Phenomenological consciousness
Refers to the fact that human experiences possess subjective qualities that seem to defy description; experiences have a meaning that goes beyond formal report (semantics instead of syntax).
Masked priming
Experimental technique to investigate unconscious information processing, consisting of briefly presenting a prime between a forward meaningless mask and a subsequent target, and examining the effect of the prime on the processing of the target.
Global workspace model
Model that explains the role of consciousness by analogy to a theater: consciousness is meant to make some information available to the whole brain (e.g. the play), so that the various background processes can align their functioning to what is going on centrally
Chinese room
Thought experiment proposed by Searle (1980) to illustrate the difference between information processing in humans and information processing in computers.
Qualia
Qualities of conscious thoughts that give the thoughts a rich and vivid meaning, grounded in interactions with the world.
Zombie thought experiment
Thought experiment proposed by Chalmers (1996) to illustrate that consciousness is more than the working of the brain or the implementation of information on a Turing machine because it involves a subjective component with qualia.
Hard problem
Name given by Chalmers to refer to the difficulty in explaining in what respects consciousness is more than accounted for on the basis of functionalism. “How and why do physical properties come with subjective experiences?”