Chapter 5: Efficiency CBA Part 1: Market failure and shadow-pricing Flashcards

1
Q

In a perfectly competitive market economy, the allocation of factors will be…

A

Pareto Optimal

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2
Q

Some conditions for a perfectly competitive market economy

A
  • no monopoly or monopsony
  • no distorting taxes or regulations
  • profit maximising producers and utility maximising consumers
  • a complete set of private property rights
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3
Q

Pareto optimality

A

A situation where no reallocation of factors of production can make one person better off without making someone else worse off

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4
Q

If we lived in a perfectly competitive market economy, the private sector would…

A
  • Choose to undertake all projects that are efficient from an economic point of view (contribute to Pareto optimality)
  • Never choose to undertake an inefficient project
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5
Q

If we lived in a perfectly competitive market economy, would would the role of government be in promoting economic efficiency?

A
  • There would be no role for government in promoting economic efficiency
  • Public projects wouldn’t be required because all efficient projects are already being undertaken by the private sector
  • Private projects would not require government approval because they always contribute to economic efficiency
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6
Q

Would there by any role for government in a perfectly competitive market economy?

A

The government might want to redistribute income in a way that did not alter the efficiency of private resource allocation decisions

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7
Q

Would there be any role for benefit-cost anlaysts in a perfectly competitive market economy?

A

No. There would be no public projects aimed at improving resource allocation, and private projects would not have to be appraised and approved by government regulators

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8
Q

How do models of perfectly competitive market economies help?

A

They provide a standard of efficiency against which the performance of real-world economies can be assessed

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9
Q

Is there an alternative to the theoretical model of the perfectly competitive economy?

A
  • In principle: Yes. Resource allocation decisions could be made by economic planners rather than the market
  • In theory: If planners had access to all relevant information, they could allocate resources efficiently
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10
Q

The free market economy and the centrally planned economy are…

A

Theoretical extremes

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11
Q

Efficiency CBA

A
  • Deals with overall net benefits of a project, irrespective of who the gainers and losers are
  • Measures the economic efficiency of the project
  • Ignores distribution of net benefits
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12
Q

If Efficiency CBA net benefit is positive…

A

The project brings about a more efficient allocation of resources than the alternative (the world “without” the project)

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13
Q

Which groups will the net benefit of the project under the efficiency cba flow to?

A
  • Private sector (profits)
  • Public sector (taxes/charges)
  • General public (employment benefits, rent, pollution costs, etc.)
  • Residents of foreign countries
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14
Q

Kaldor-Hicks Criterion

A

If the project is a potential Pareto improvement, it represents an increase in economic welfare

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15
Q

Two problems we face when conducting efficiency cba

A
  • Missing markets (e.g. pollution, recreational fishing)
  • Markets in which market price does not measure the value to the economy (e.g. non-competitive markets, markets distorted by taxes/regulations)
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16
Q

How do we deal with the problems we face when conducting efficiency CBA?

A
  • Non-market valuation techniques

- Shadow-pricing techniques (adjusting observed market prices to make them reflect marginal benefit/cost to the economy)

17
Q

For what elements of a CBA do we create shadow prices?

A
  • Material inputs/outputs (taxes, subsidies, regulations, market imperfections)
  • Factor inputs (labour, land, capital, taxes, regulations)
  • Cost of public funds
  • Corrective taxes and subsidies
18
Q

Prices when markets are distorted

A
  • When markets are distorted, there are two prices at Q*:
  • Pb (reflecting demand conditions)
  • Ps (reflecting supply conditions)
19
Q

Taxes and subsidies: Pb for ad velorem/specific taxes/subsidies?

A

Ad velorem tax: Pb = Ps(1+t)
Specific tax: Pb=Ps+t
Ad velorem subsidy: Pb=Ps(1-s)
Specific subsidy: Pb=Ps-s

20
Q

After tax/before tax prices

A

After tax price: Pb (the price the buyer payers)

Before tax price: Ps (the price the seller receives)

21
Q

After subsidy/before subsidy prices

A

Before subsidy price: Ps (the price the seller receives)

After subsidy price: Pb (the price the buyer pays)

22
Q

Shadow pricing: material inputs with indirect tax (e.g. GST)

A
  • If input is sourced through additional supply, use Ps
  • If input is diverted from other users, use Pb
  • If output is replacing other suppliers, use Ps
  • If output is satisfying additional demand, use Pb
23
Q

Shadow pricing: material imported input with tariff

A
  • If input is sourced through additional imports, use Pw
  • If input is diverted from other users, use Pb
  • If output is replacing imports, use Pw
  • If output is satisfying additional demand, use Pb
24
Q

Shadow pricing: material inputs with subsidy

A

With subsidy, buyers pay less than what sellers receive

  • If input is sourced through additional supply, use Ps
  • If input is diverted from other resources, use Pb
  • If output is replacing other suppliers, use Ps
  • If output is satisfying additional demand, use Pb
25
Q

Material inputs with Price > MC (e.g. economies of scale)

A
  • If input is sourced through additional supply, use Pm (mc)
  • If input is diverted from other users, use P
  • If output replacing other suppliers, use Pm
  • If output satisfying additional demand, use P
26
Q

Labour input: distortion? two prices at Q*?

A
  • Distortion: minimum wage, results in excess supply of labour (unemployment)
  • At Q*: two prices of labour:
  • Price indicated by the demand curve (Wm, the minimum wage)
  • Price indicated by the supply curve (Ws, the reservation wage - the wage required to induce an extra unit of supply)
27
Q

Shadow pricing: labour input with minimum wage

A
  • If labour is diverted from other employers, use Wm (=VMPl)

- If labour is sourced from unemployed, use Ws (additional supply)

28
Q

Shadow pricing: labour input drawn from monopolist

A
  • If labour is diverted from other employer/monopolist, use Wp (=VMPL), not market wage W
29
Q

Shadow pricing: labour input drawn from monopsonist

A
  • If labour is diverted from other employer/monopsonist, use Wp = (VMPL), not market wage W
30
Q

What does the efficiency cba shadow pricing rule tell us?

A

Tells us which is the appropriate price to use to value project outputs/inputs in the cba (demand curve or supply curve price?)

31
Q

Efficiency cba shadow pricing rule

A

VALUED AT EQUILIBRIUM ON DEMAND CURVE (Pb):

  • OUTPUT: satisfies additional demand (after tax; after subsidy)
  • INPUT: sourced from an alternative market use (after tax; after subsidy)

VALUED AT EQUILIUBRIUM ON SUPPLY CURVE (Ps):
- OUTPUT: satisfies existing demand from an alternative source (before tax; before subsidy)
INPUT: sourced from additional supply (before tax; before subsidy)

32
Q

Logic of the pricing rule

A
  • Sourced from an alternative market use (e.g. otherwise employed elsewhere) -> opp. cost is the value of output foregone in that use. If alternative use is in a competitive undistorted market, labour’s VMP in that use equals wage, measured by a point on the demand curve for labour
  • Sourced from additional supply (e.g. otherwise unemployed) -> opp. cost is the value of leisure time (the reservation wage) measured by a point on the supply curve