Chapter 5 - Cognitive Influences on Attitudes Flashcards
Yale Model of Persuasion
Messages change people’s attitudes by presenting an incentive for attitude change (utilitarian or social benefits)
How can incentives be influence (Hovland et al.)? (3)
- Source - different (ex. expert, likeability, attractive) and low or high vested interest
- Context (size of audience, weather, fear appeal)
- Target (mood, who, interested, self-esteem, intelligence)
Hovland et al.’s three processing stages for persuasive messages to work (3)
- Notice/pay attention to message
- Comprehend it
- Accept message’s conclusions
Information-Processing Paradigm (McGuire) (6 stages)
- Presentation Stage
- Attention Stage
- Comprehension Stage
- Yielding Stage
- Retention Stage
- Behaviour Stage
Compensation Principle for IPP
Opposing effect sizes at different stages should produce curvilinear effects on persuasion (ex. high self-esteem ^ change of attending but less driven to agree)
Criticisms of Information-Processing Paradigm (2)
- Does not explain how message acceptance emerges
2. Cannot explain effects of weak messages
Cognition-in-Persuasion Model (Albarracin)
People who receive a message have a specific interpretation of it based on information available at the time
Persuasion understood by cognitive responses (DEFINE)
Message relevant thoughts following a message based on (1) beliefs, (2) communication itself, (3) other factors
Attitude change more likely if people generate +ve cognitive responses
Acceptance-Yielding-Impact Model or Believe x Evaluation Model (Fishbein and Ajzen)
Messages should cause attitude change when they change beliefs underlying attitudes and/or their evaluations of those believes
Focus on salient** beliefs
How does AYI Model work?
If new attitude reflects ^ acceptance of message (adds to beliefs) then yielding has occurred
Message can also affect other beliefs indirectly (ex. laundry detergent as harmful)
Expectancy x Value Perspective
Belief change can occur by altering either (1) expectancies associated w/ beliefs or (2) values associated with them
Difficult to test*
The two dual-process models of persuasion (2)
- Elaboration Likelihood Model
- Heuristic-System Model
Two main ideas:
- High motivation and ability should cause strong arguments to influence attitudes more than weak arguments
- Low motivation or ability should mean attitudes affected by simple cues (ex. heuristics)
Elaboration Likelihood Model seven propositions (7)
- Aim to attain correct attitude*
- # /nature of elaboration can vary
- Vars can affect attitudes as arguments or as cues*
- Motivation ^ argument scrutiny
- Motivation and Ability ^ use of arguments over cues
- Biased processing = biased issue-relevant thoughts
- Elaboration causes strong attitudes
Heuristic-System Model eight propositions (8)
- Aim to attain correct, value-expressive OR image-maintaining attitude
- Heuristic processing and systematic processing
- Least effort and sufficiency principle if low confidence needed
- Ability hypothesis (heuristic easier than systematic)
- Additivity Hypothesis (H and S can co-occur with independent effects)
- Bias Hypothesis - heuristics can affect systematic
- Attenuation Hypothesis - When contradiction, S will reduce use of H
- Enhancement Hypothesis - when confidence needed is high but ability is low, will rely more on heuristics
Dual process models and Comprehensive Exam schedule study
- Personal relevant (timing) x expertise of group recommending x content (strong or weak arguments
- Ps rated attitude toward exam
Results: when personal relevance, strong arguments led to ^ favourably (no effect of expertise)
When personal relevance was low, more favourable if from expert source
Differences in scrutiny between ELM and HSM
ELM - weigh strengths/weaknesses more strongly when biases present
HSM - heuristic process affects nature of people’s message content (bias hypothesis)
Role of heuristics such as expertise in ELM and HSM
ELM - expertise (1) acts as cue for more/less evaluation when motivation low, (2) scrutinized as argument when motivation high, (3) affect motivation when elaboration not determined by other variables
HSM - expertise act as a heuristic (bias) for more processing only when they contradict gist of message
Advertising by untrustworthy or trustworthy source dual-process study
More scrutiny when untrustworthy source was endorsing product
STOP REVIEW UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE ELM AND HSM MODELS
GO GO GO!!!
Testing HSM predictions when strength of argument is moderate study
- Ps given info about product, manipulated relevance x credibility x argument strength (strong, weak, moderate)
Results: when low relevance, Ps attitudes more +ve following highly credible source (argument strength had no impact)
When high relevance, strong argument persuaded Ps and credibility had no impact
BUT when neutral and relevance was high** source contributed to attitude
Unimodal Model (Kruglanski)
Persuasion through a single process where any info that is relevant to the attitude judgment can be used as compelling evidence to form an attitude even when info is a cue
I.e. source is relevant as its own argument
Criticism of unimodal model (2)
- Low validity as previous studies found differences in cues and content even when dependent on each other (9 vs. 3 weak arguments)
- Dual process model states than any variable can serve multiple roles (ie. cue CAN be an argument under high relevance)
Meta-cognitive Model
Role of meta-cognitions (thinking about thoughts) in attitude formation and change
Predicts when we receive new info but do not agree, we still remember it but tag as invalid
Persuasive Interventions effect in Meta-Cognitive Model
- introduce new evaluative association with attitude object
2. Reshape old association
Meta-Cognitive Model and predictions for explicit and implicit measurements
Explicit: At conscious level attitude may appear unchanged
Implicit: Unconscious level may appear ambivalent
(seen at both measurements if new info is added AND believed)
People descriptions switched and the Meta-Cognitive Model study
Ps corrected judgments on explicit measures but showed evidence of conflict on implicit measures
