Chapter 4 - integration and its alternatives Flashcards

1
Q

property rights theory (PRT)

A

explains how integration affects performance in the vertical chain

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2
Q

integration matters because it …

A

determines who gets to control resources, make decisions, and allocate profits when contracts are incomplete and trading partners disagree

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3
Q

residual rights of control

A

owner obtains all rights of control that are not explicitly stipulated in the contract

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4
Q

three alternative ways to organize a transaction

A
  • nonintegration
  • forward integration
  • backward integration
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5
Q

nonintegration

A

two firms are independent; each manager has control over its own assets

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6
Q

forward integration

A

firm 1 owns the assets from firm 2

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7
Q

backward integration

A

firm 2 owns the assets form firm 1

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8
Q

path dependence

A

past circumstances could exclude certain possible governance arrangements in the future

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9
Q

technical efficiency

A

whether the firm is using the least-cost production process

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10
Q

agency efficiency

A

the extent to which the exchange of goods/services in the vertical chain has been organized to minimize the coordination, agency and transaction costs

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11
Q

economizing

A

describes balancing act between technical and agency efficiency

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12
Q

scale and scope economies

A

a firm gains less from vertical integration when outside market specialists are better able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope

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13
Q

product market share and scope

A

a firm with a large product market share benefits more from vertical integration. same holds for a firm with multiple product lines (e.g., save costs by producing shared components)

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14
Q

asset specificity (reg. vertical integration)

A

a firm gains more from vertical integration when production of inputs involves investments in relationship-specific assets

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15
Q

double marginalization

A

applying another markup to already marked-up supply prices

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16
Q

double markup causes the prices of finished goods to …

A

exceed the price that maximizes the joint profits of the supplier and buyer

17
Q

tapered integration

A

mixture of vertical integration and market exchange

18
Q

benefits of tapered integration

A
  • expands firm’s input and/or output channels without requiring substantial capital outlays
  • firm can use information about cost/profitability of its internal channels for negotiation
  • firm can motivate its internal channels by threatening to expand outside (vice versa)
  • firm can protect itself against holdup
19
Q

disadvantages of tapered integration

A
  • forced to share production, both internal and external channels might not achieve sufficient scale to produce efficiently
  • may lead to coordination, monitoring problems
  • managers may maintain internal capacity rather than close facilities that had formerly been critical to a firm
20
Q

drawbacks of strategic alliances/joint ventures

A
  • firms also risk losing control over proprietary information
  • there are often no formal mechanisms for making decisions or resolving disputes expeditiously
  • agency costs can arise within departments of firms that are not subject to market discipline
  • free rider problem: each firm is insufficiently vigilant in monitoring alliance’s activities because neither captures the full benefit of such vigilance
  • influence costs arise due to employees that engage in influence activity
21
Q

implicit contracts

A

unstated understanding between independent parties in a business relationship