Chapter 4

Question 1

political parties before 1914

Answer 1

• before 1914, there were a wide array of political parties representing different religions, classes, regions and special interest groups
• since the political parties had no say in the choice of governments, this was not a major problem

Question 2

political parties in the Weimar Republic

Answer 2

• in the Weimar Republic, however, the fragmentation of political parties was a matter of great importance since governments needed to command majority support in the Reichstag
• with an electoral system based on proportional representation, no one party was ever in a position to form a government by itself and all governments were therefore coalitions

Question 3

What happened to political parties as German society became more divided

Answer 3

• fragmentation of political parties became even more pronounced as German society became more divided
• moreover, many parties (large and small) were dedicated to the overthrow of the Republic
• this placed an even greater burden of responsibility on the moderate centre parties (the SPD, the centre party, the DDP) to work together to form stable coalitions

Question 4

what put strain on coalition governments?

Answer 4

• although the party leaders understood the need for compromise, the country faced unprecedented problems which called for tough and unpalatable decisions, which placed severe strains on coalition governments

Question 5

examples where coalition governments collapsed

Answer 5

• In June 1919, the Scheidemann cabinet resigned because it could not agree on signing the treaty of versailles
• similarly, disagreements in the Fehrenbach cabinet, over whether to accept the Allied ultimatum on reparations, brought it down in May 1921

Question 6

problem with coalition governments

Answer 6

• in times of social, economic and political crisis, society became more polarised and support for the moderate parties ebbed way
• the more extreme parties on the left and right gained support
• since these parties would not join coalition governments, the task of forming a government with a Reichstag majority became even harder
• this was evident after the 1920 Reichtag election

Question 7

The changing fortunes for the SPD

Answer 7

• in 1918-1919 the SPD had taken the lead in establishing the Republic and trying to form stable governments
• after June 1920, the SPD ceased to take a leading role in any coalition government due to internal divisions and sometimes did not participate in the ruling coalition at all

Question 8

Coalition governments 1919-23
What did this mean for different political parties?

Answer 8

• in the period between February 1919 and November 1923 there were no less than ten coalition governments
• many of the changes in cabinets involved little more than a reshuffling of the political pack of cards
• but these frequent changes meant that continuity of policy was impossible to achieve and confidence in the whole democratic process was undermined
• overall, it was the extreme ant-democratic parties of the left and right which benefitted most from this undermining of confidence in the democratic system

Question 9

Spartacist rising in Berlin

Answer 9

• on 5th January 1919, the Spartacus league, known as the sparticists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, staged an armed uprising in Berlin to overthrow Ebert’s government and set up a revolutionary communist regime
• newspaper offices and some public buildings were occupied

Question 10

why was the spartacist rising not that threatening

Answer 10

• the revolt was poorly prepared
• it was also poorly supported as the Spartacists had not secured the support of the majority of the working class in Berlin, in whose name they claimed to be acting

Question 11

Did the government put down the Spartacist rising?

Answer 11

• Ebert’s government relied upon the army to put down the revolt, but General Groener had few reliable military units at his command
• he therefore had to use the irregular forces of the new Freikorps
• By 13th January, the Spartacist rising had been crushed after brutal street fighting in which many prisoners, including Liebknecht and Luxemburg were executed

Question 12

What did the defeat of the spartacist uprising mean?

Answer 12

• the defeat of the uprising cleared the way for the government to hold elections to the constituent assembly later in January
• but the brutality with which the revolt had been suppressed, and Ebert’s reliance on the army and the Friekorps, deepened the divisions on the left for many years to come

Question 13

The Freikorps

Answer 13

• faced with the disintegration of much of the regular army in the chaos of the defeat and revolution at end of 1918, Field Marshal Hindenburg and General Groener encouraged former officers to recruit volunteer forces into new Friekorps units
• the majority of the recruits came from demobilised junior army officers and NCOs (e.g. corporals and sergeants), but Friekorps also attracted students, adventurers and drifters
• placed under the overall command of General Walter Luttwitz, the Freikorps were supplied with uniforms and weapons from army stores but were not officially part of army
• in action, therefore, the Freikorps were less disciplined and were able to give full expression to their ‘rabid spirit of aggression and revenge’

Question 14

did the defeat of the Spartacists end left-wing rebellion?

Answer 14

• defeat of Spartacists did not end left-wing rebellion
• the workers who had played key role in overthrow of Kaiser in November 1918, had been disillusioned by the ‘revolution’ that followed and frustrated that the Weimar Republic seemed too ready to compromise with the right
• economic conditions also bred disorder, while demobilised soldiers found it har to adjust to civilian life

Question 15

Threat of communist revolution?

Answer 15

• although the new German communist party (KPD) had only minority support in Germany, it was nevertheless a committed, radical minority with strong support in the industrial centres in the Ruhr and Saxony
• inspired by successful Russian Bolshevik revolution in 1917, and heavily influenced by the Comintern, the KPD was keen to lead a communist revolution in Germany
• However, ultimately it did not have the support or determination to do so

Question 16

Left Wing Risings - March 1919

Answer 16

• there was another Spartacist uprising in Berlin
• In Barvaria, a communist government based on workers’ councils, was established
• these were both suppressed

Question 17

Left Wing Risings - April 1919

Answer 17

• there was a wave of strikes in Germany’s industrial heartlands of Halle and the Ruhr valley
• as well as asking for shorter hours, the strikers demanded more control over their own industries and a government based on workers’ councils

Question 18

Left Wing Risings - 1920

Answer 18

• after the workers had shown their power in defeating the right-wing Kapp-Putsch with a general strike in Berlin, communists formed a ‘Red army’ of 50,000 workers and seized control of the Ruhr
• a virtual civil war followed as the regular army and the Freikorps struggled to crush the rising
• troubles also broke out in Halle and Dresden, and over 1000 workers and 250 soldiers and police were killed
• more disturbances in Saxony and Thuringia, where the workers organised self-defence units, were also put down in April

Question 19

Left Wing Risings - March 1921

Answer 19

• the KPD tried to force a revolution, beginning with a rising in Saxony
• the strike disruption spread to Hamburg and the Ruhr
• but the risings were crushed by the police and 145 people were killed

Question 20

Left Wing Risings - 1923

Answer 20

• there was a further bout of strike activity at the time of Germany’s economic collapse
• this was again centred in Saxony and Hamburg
• but it too was suppressed

Question 21

overall threat of these left-wing revolts

Answer 21

• the government was never seriously threatened by these left-wing revolts
• but continued working-class rebellions did damage the Republic as fear of a ‘Red revolution’ frightened the law-abiding middle class into supporting right-wing parties

Question 22

Why were right-wing groups threatening? Why were they critical of the Republic?

Answer 22

• the powerful right wing posed a major threat to the Weimar government
• the Right had been hostile to the Republic from the outset since it did not believe in democracy and it accused the politicians who now led Germany of having betrayed the Fatherland

Question 23

Were right-wing groups a great threat? What made them less threatening?

Answer 23

• there were many competing right-wing groups with different objectives
• some wished to see the restoration of the monarchy, whilst others advocated a dictatorship in one form or another
• in areas such as Bavaria there were groups that fought for separation from the rest of Germany, whilst others wanted a united Germany so that it could become a great power again
• these divisions weakened the ability of right-wing groups to overthrow the Republic
• Nevertheless, right-wing ideas were strong amongst members of the Freikorps and in the army, whilst the large landowners, industrialists, civil servants, police and judges on whom the Republic relied were also traditional conservative anti-Republicans

Question 24

the Kapp Putsch 1920

Answer 24

• the government was obliged to put into effect the terms of the ToV in January 1920, and consequently needed to reduce the size of army and disband some Freikorps units
• in February 1920, the defence minister, Gustav Noske, ordered two Freikorps units, compromising 12,000 men, to disband
• these units were stationed 12 miles from Berlin
• when General Walther von Luttwitz, the commanding general, refused to disband one of them, the government ordered his arrest
• Luttwitz decided to march his troops to Berlin in protest and other sympathetic officers offered their support
• Luttwitz was also supported by the right-wing civil servant and politician Wolfgang Kapp, who was intent on organising a putsch
• crucially, however, General Hans von Seeckt and Ludendorff remained non-committal. They sympathised but were aware of the dangers of voicing open support

Question 25

Who did Ebert try to use to crush the rebellion?

Answer 25

• Ebert’s government was forced to withdraw to Dresden, and when Ebert and his chancellor, Gustav Bauer, called on the regular army to crush the rising, Seeckt famously told Ebert ‘Troops do not fire on troops; when Reichswehr fires on Reichswehr, all comradeship within the officer corps has vanished’

Question 26

How did the Kapp-Putsch come to ab end?

Answer 26

• the situation appeared dangerous, but there was actually considerable tension between the military and civilian elements of the putsch and it failed to gain widespread support, even from the right wing
• civil servants and bankers remained at best lukewarm and often hostile, whilst trade unions, encouraged by the socialist members of Ebert’s government, called a general strike
• Berlin was brought to a standstill and, within four days, the putsch collapsed
• Kapp and Luttwitz were forced to flee
• Ebert’s government returned but not quite with the air of triumph that might have been expected

Question 27

what lessons did the putsch teach?

Answer 27

• the putsch had taught a number of lessons
• the army as not to be trusted
• civil servants could be disloyal
• the workers as a group could show their power (a realisation that gave renewed vigour to the communist movement)
• without the army’s support, the Weimar government was weak

Question 28

How did judges treat those involved in the putsch?

Answer 28

• the leniency shown by right-wing judges towards those brought to trial in the aftermath of the putsch contrasted strongly with the harsh treatment suffered by the left wing, and their behaviour sent a message that the government was not really in control

Question 29

Political assassinations + early victim

Answer 29

• the violence continued as right-wing nationalists organised themselves into leagues, committed to the elimination of prominent politicians and this associated with the ‘betrayal’ of Germany
• these patriotic leagues, often formed out of the old Freikorps units, acted as fiercely anti-republican paramilitaries
• they were potentially very powerful and some were actively supported by members of the regular German army
• on early victim of the assassins’ bullets was Hugo Hasse , a USPD member who had been a member of the council of people’s commissars
• he was shot in front of the Reichstag in October 1919 and died of his wounds a month later

Question 30

The assassination of Erzberger

Answer 30

• in August 1921, the former finance minister, Matthias Erzberger, was assassinated in the Black Forest by two members of the terrorist league Organisation Consul
• he had already been shot in January and left wounded but assassins were determined to complete job
• Erzberger had led the German delegation for the signing of the armistice and had signed ToV
• He was also Germany’s representative on the reparations committee
• even after he was buried, his widow continued to receive abusive letters, including threats to defile his grave

Question 31

the assassination of Rathenau

Answer 31

• On 24th June 1922, it was the turn of the foreign minister, Walther Rathenau
• he was driving to work in open top car when four assassins from Organisation Consul shot at him and hurled a hand grenade for good measure
• Rathenau’s ‘crimes’ were to be a Jew and a leading minister in the republican government
• he had participated in signing of armistice and had negotiated with Allies to try to improve ToV
• Nevertheless, Rathenau had been a popular figure and the following day over 700,000 protestors lined the streets of Berlin
• the assassination had an impact abroad too; the value of the mark fell as other countries feared the repercussions

Question 32

political assassinations 1919-23

Answer 32

• altogether between 1919 and 1923, there were 376 political assassinations
• 22 carried out by the left
• 354 carried out by the right

Question 33

what laws did the Reichstag pass as a result of these political assassinations

Answer 33

• in an attempt to halt this rising tide of lawlessness, in July 1922 the Reichstag passed a law ‘for the protection of the Republic’, which posed severe penalties on those involved in conspiracy to murder and banned extremist organisations
• Organisation Consul was forced to disband, but the law was not effective because the judges who had to enforce it were often right-wing sympathisers
• in Bavaria, the staunchly conservative government even refused to implement it (and so unwittingly allowed the Nazi movement to establish itself)

Question 34

how were the murderers punished?

Answer 34

• Rathenau’s killers and their accomplices received an average of only four years each in prison
• whilst 326 right-wing murderers went unpunished and only one was convicted and sentenced to severe punishment until 1923, 10 left-wing murderers were sentenced to death

Answer 35

• although right-wing activity failed to destroy the republic, the developments of the 1919-23 period bolstered the arrogance of anti-republican nationalists, who showed they could get away with murder
• since the Weimar Republic seemed constantly to exaggerate the threat from the left and to underestimate that from the right, the anti-republican right wing was able to establish itself very firmly in the new German state

Question 36

Political impact of the Ruhr invasion

Answer 36

• Germans of all classes and political allegiances had bee outraged by the French occupation of the Ruhr
• the trauma of hyperinflation had profound psychological effects
• Germany was swept by a wave of anti-French feeling and the country was more united than at any time since after the war
• many blamed the government for what happened and middle-class support for the republic was severely damaged
• organisation representing the Mittelstand accused the government of failing in its responsibility to protect independent small traders and artisans
• on the left, the communists tried to use the crisis to stage uprisings in some areas
• moreover, after the ending of passive resistance, the nationalist right accused the government of betrayal
• the occupation of the Ruhr and the subsequent hyperinflation crisis, were the backdrop to the last attempt to overthrow the Republic by force in 1923 by a small Bavarian-based party known as the (NSDAP or Nazi Party)

Question 37

The establishment of the Nazi Party and the Beer Hall Putsch

Answer 37

• Nazi Party was almost alone in arguing that German patriots should remove the ‘November Criminals’ from government before dealing with French
• When the government of Gustav Stresemann called off the passive resistance in September without winning any concessions from French, there was an outcry from the right
• this was seen as another act of betrayal
• in Bavaria the right-wing government declared a state of emergency and appointed Gustav von Kahr as state commissioner
• amongst right-wing nationalists in the Bavarian capital, Munich, there was growing agitation for a ‘march on Berlin’ to overthrow the government and establish a national dictatorship
• at forefront of the agitation fir a ‘march on Berlin’ was the leader of the NSDAP, then little known, Adolf Hitler

Question 38

whose support did Hitler want

Answer 38

• in November 1923, Hitler made a bid to seize power
• he knew that a putsch could only succeed if he had the support of powerful figures so, having secured the support of Ludendorff, he set out to win over Gustav Ritter von Kahr and Otto von Lossow, the local army commander

Question 39

What happened on 8th November 1923

Answer 39

• On 8th November, he burst into a Munich Beer Hall, where the two were addressing a meeting of 2000, surrounding it with his stormtroopers (SA) and announcing that the revolution had begun
• at gunpoint, in a side room, Kahr and von Lossow were persuaded to agree yo his plan to march on Berlin and to install Ludendorff as the new Commander-in-Chief

Question 40

Did Hitler’s plan work?

Answer 40

• however, their support evaporated overnight and so too did Hitler’s chances of persuading others to support him
• crucially, the stormtroopers were unable to gain control of the Munich army barracks and by the next day, 9th November, it was clear that Hitler’s original plan had failed

Question 41

Did Hitler march through Munich?

Answer 41

• nevertheless, he went ahead with a march through Munich
• the ensuing gun battle with the police later became part of the folklore of the ‘courageous’ Nazis who marched fearlessly through the streets into the arms of a police cordon
• Hitler fell and dislocated his shoulder, possibly in response to the shooting of his companion with whom he had linked arms
• he fled, only to be captured the next day, whilst Ludendorff walked straight up to the police and allowed himself to be arrested

Question 42

How was the Munich Putsch put down? What happened to Hitler?

Answer 42

• the incident showed again the importance of the army to the political survival of the regime
• General Seeckt sent in troops to deal with the aftermath of the abortive putsch, and central control over Bavaria was soon re-imposed
• the Nazis were banned and Hitler imprisoned (although he served just nine months of his five-year sentence)
• once again, the Republic survived