Chapter 25 Flashcards
isolationism
Critics often describe the US as being “isolationist”, but in fact, the US played a more active role in world affairs than it had at almost any previous time in history.
Washington Naval Conf.
Most important effort of Hughes to build safeguards against future wars that would not hamper American freedom of action in the world. 1921, was an attempt to prevent what was threatening to become a costly and destabilizing naval armaments race between America, Britain, and Japan.
Hughes startled the delegates by proposing a plan for dramatic reductions in the fleets of all three nations and a ten year moratorium on the construction of large warships. He called for the scrapping of nearly 2 million tons of existing shipping. Far more surprising than the proposal was the fact that the conference ultimately agreed to accept most of its terms, something that Hughes himself apparently hadn’t anticipated.
Five Power Pact established both limits for total naval tonnage and a ratio of armaments among the signatories. For every 5 tons of American and British warships, Japan would maintain 3 and France and Italy 1.75 each.
The Wash. Conference also produced two other, related treaties, the nine power pact, pledging a continuation of the open door policy in china, and the four power pact, by which the US, Britain, France, and Japan promised to respect one another’s Pacific territories and cooperate to prevent aggression.
Kellogg-Briand Pact
Kellog Briand Pact of 1928 concluded the effort to protect the peace and international economic interests of the US. When the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, asked the US in 1927 to join an alliance against Germany, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg instead proposed a multilateral treaty outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Fourteen nations signed the agreement in Paris amid great solemnity and wide international acclaim. 48 other nations later joined the pact. It contained no instrument of enforcement, but rested instead on the “moral force” of world opinion.
Dawes Plan
in 1924, Charles G. Dawes, and American banker and diplomat, negotiated an agreement under which American banks would provide enormous loans to the Germans, enabling them to meet their reparation payments; in return, Britain and France would agree to reduce the amount of those payments. Dawes won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, but in fact the Dawes Plan did little to solve the problems it addressed. It led to a troubling circular pattern in international finance. America would lend money to Germany, which would use that money to pay reparations to France and England, which in turn would use those funds to repay war debts to the US. The flow was able to continue only by virtue of the enormous debts Germany and other European nations were accumulating to American banks and corporations.
Benito Mussolini
Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Party had been in control of Italy since the early 1920s, by the 1930s, the regime was growing increasingly nationalistic and militaristic, and Fascist leaders were loudly threatening an active campaign of imperial expansion.
Chiang Kai Shek
there was a major crisis in Asia that was an early step toward WWII. The Japanese, reeling from an economic depression of their own, were concerned about the increasing strength of the Soviet Union and of Premier Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist China. In particular, they were alarmed at Chiang’s insistence on expanding his government’s power in Manchuria, which remained officially a part of China but over which the Japanese had maintained effective economic control since 1905. When the moderate government of Japan failed to take forceful steps to counter Chiang’s ambitions, Japan’s military leaders staged what was in effect a coup in the Autumn of 1931 , seizing control of foreign policy from the weakened liberals. Weeks later, they launched a major invasion of northern Manchuria.
Stimson’s response to Japan’s aggression
For a while, Sec. of State Henry Stimson continued to hope that Japanese moderates would regain control of the Tokyo government and halt the invasion. The militarists, however, remained in command; and by the beginning of 1932, the conquest of Manchuria was complete. Stimson issued stern (but essentially toothless) warnings to Japan and tried to use moral suasion to end the crisis. But Hoover forbade him to cooperate with the League of Nations in imposing economic sanctions against the Japanese. Stimson’s only real tool in dealing with the Manchurian invasion was a refusal to grant diplomatic recognition to the new Japanese territories. Japan was unconcerned and early in 1932 expanded its aggression farther into China, attacking the city of Shanghai and killing thousands of civilians.
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act
Although the new administration had no interest in international currency stabilization or settlement of war debts, it did have an interest in improving America’s position in world trade. FDR approved the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, authorizing the administration to negotiate treaties lowering tariffs by as much as 50 percent in return for reciprocal reductions by other nations. By 1939, Sec. of State Cordell Hull, a devoted free trader, had negotiated new treaties with 21 countries. The result was an increase in American exports of nearly 40 percent. But most of the agreements admitted only products not competitive with American industry and agriculture, so imports into the US continued to lag. Thus other nations were not obtaining the American currency needed to buy American products or pay off debts to American banks.
recognition of the USSR
The US and Russia had viewed each other with mistrust and even hostility since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the American government still had not officially recognized the Society regime by 1933.
New relationship was desired to improve trade. Russians also were eager because they hoped for American cooperation in containing the power of Japan, which they saw as a threat. In Nov. 1933, therefore, Soviet foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov reached an agreement with FDR in Washington, the Soviets world cease their propaganda efforts in the US and protect American citizens in Russia. In exchange, the US would recognize the Soviet regime.
Despite this promising beginning, relations with the Soviet Union soon soured once again. American trade failed to establish much of a foothold in Russia; and the Soviets received no reassurance from the US that it was interested in stopping Japanese expansion in Asia. By the end of 1934, as a result of these disappointed hopes on both sides, the USSR and the US were once again not trusting one another.
“Good Neighbor Policy”
efforts to enhance both diplomatic and economic relations with Latin America, one of the most important targets of the new policy of trade reciprocity. During the 30s, the US succeeded in increasing both exports to and imports from the other nations in the Western Hemisphere by over 100%. Closely tied to these new economic relationships was anew American attitude toward intervention in Latin America. The Hoover administration had unofficially abandoned the earlier American practice of using military force to compel Latin American governments to repay debts, respect foreign investments, or otherwise behave “responsibly.”
The Good Neighbor Policy did not mean, however, that the US had abandoned its influence in Latin America. instead of military force, Americans now tried to use economic influence. The new reliance on economic pressures eased tensions between the US and its neighbors considerably. It idd nothing to stem the growing AMerican domination of the Latin American economies.
Nye committee
An investigation by a Senate committee chaired by Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota revealed exorbitant profiteering and blatant tax evasion by many corporations during the war, and it suggested that bankers had pressured Wilson to intervene in the war so as to protect their loans abroad. FDR himself shared some suspicions of the Nye investigation. Nevertheless, he continued to hope for at least a modest American role in maintaing world peace
invasion of Ethiopia
It became clear that Mussolini’s Italy was preparing to invade Ethiopia in an effort to expand its colonial holdings in Africa. Fearing that a general European war would result, American legislatures began to design legal safeguards to prevent the US from being dragged into the conflict. Resulted in the Neutrality act of 1935
Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, & 1937
The 1935 act, and the Neutrality Acts of 1936 and 1937 that followed, was designed to prevent a recurrence of the events that many Americans now believed had pressured the US into World War I. The 1935 law established a mandatory arms embargo against both victim and aggressor in any military conflict and empowered the president to warn American citizens that they might travel on the ships of warring nations only at their own risk. Thus, isolationists believed, the “protection of neutral rights” could not again become an excuse for American intervention in war. THe 1936 Neutrality Act renewed the provisions, and in 1937, with world conditions growing even more precarious, Congress passed a new Neutrality Act that established the so called cash and carry policy by which belligerents could purchase only nonmilitary goods from the US and had to pay cash and carry the goods away on their own vessels.
“Quarantine” speech
The United States, FDR believed, could not allow the Japanese aggression to go unremarked or unpunished. In a speech in Chicago in October 1937, the pres. warned forcefully of the dangers that Japanese aggression posed to world peace. Aggressors, he proposed, should be “quarantined” by the international community to prevent the contagion of war from spreading. The president was deliberately vague about what such a “quarantine” would mean. Nevertheless, public response to the speech was disturbingly hostile. As a result, FDR drew back.
Panay incident
1937-provided evidence of how formidable the obstacles to Roosevelt’s efforts remained. Japanese aviators bombed and sank the US gunboat Panay as it sailed the Yangtze River in China. The attack was almost undoubtedly deliberate. It occurred in broad daylight, with clear visibility. A large American flag had been painted conspicuously on the Panay’s deck. Even so, isolationists seized eagerly on Japanese protestations that the bombing had been an accident and pressured the administration to accept Japan’s apology.
