CH 3 & 4

Question 1

Bibb, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Illinois
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.
1959

Answer 1

If a state statute is facially neutral, the judiciary will balance the putative local benefits with the
burden the statute places on interstate commerce, and will find the statute invalid if the burden
substantially outweighs the local benefits.

Illinois passed a law requiring all commercial trucks passing through its borders to have curved
mudguards on their rear wheels. In contrast, Arkansas and other states required trucks passing through
their borders to have straight mudguards. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (plaintiff) was an interstate
commercial trucking company that challenged the Illinois law enforced by Bibb, Director of Public
Safety of Illinois (defendant), on the grounds that the Illinois law was unconstitutional because
changing mudguards according to state law constituted an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
Navajo brought suit in district court, which held the Illinois law was an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. Bibb appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 2

Boumediene v. Bush

2008

Answer 2

Courts must provide detainees held as unlawful alien enemy combatants a writ of habeas corpus
to challenge their detention, or, if a writ of habeas corpus is not available, provide an adequate
substitute process to detainees that includes the same procedural protections and opportunities
that would be provided in a writ of habeas corpus.

In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) to provide certain procedures for
Guantanamo Bay detainees to challenge their classification as unlawful alien enemy combatants. In
2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA). Section 7(a) of the MCA prevented
detainees classified as unlawful alien enemy combatants from challenging the conditions of their
confinement and detentions through a writ of habeas corpus. Boumediene (plaintiff) and several
detainees classified as unlawful alien enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay brought actions against
the United States government (defendant) to challenge their detentions through writs of habeas corpus.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
the MCA. The detainees petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 3

Cheney v. United States District Court

2004

Answer 3

A court should issue a writ of mandamus denying civil discovery of presidential advisory
materials created by federal officials within the president’s close operational sphere without first
requiring that the officials assert executive privilege.

Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. § 2, the Sierra Club and
Judicial Watch (plaintiffs) sued the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), Vice
President Dick Cheney who served as NEPDG’s chair, and a number of NEPDG’s participants,
including federal officials, agencies, and private parties alleged to have taken part in the group’s
deliberations (defendants). NEPDG had been established by the Office of the President for the purpose
of advising the president on federal energy matters. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’
suit. The district court dismissed the claims against the private defendants and NEPDG itself but
allowed claims against Cheney and other officials to proceed. Based on the plaintiffs’ allegation that
the private parties were “de facto members” of NEPDG, the court concluded that the defendants should
not be immune from suit under a FACA exemption that applied to groups established by the president
that were composed entirely of government officials or employees. Seeking to avoid discovery, Cheney
and the other officials sought a writ of mandamus from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The
court of appeals denied the writ on the ground that the defendants could defend against discovery by
asserting executive privilege. The defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

Question 4

Clinton v. City of New York

1998

Answer 4

There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact,
amend, or repeal statutes.

The Line Item Veto Act (Act) gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of
provisions signed into law. Specifically, the Act allowed for the cancellation of (1) any dollar amount
of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.
The effect of the cancellation was the prevention of the item from having any legal force or effect.
President Clinton (defendant) invoked the Act to cancel a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 that would have allowed New York to avoid repaying funds received under Title XIX of the
Social Security Act. Individuals who would have benefitted under those provisions of the Social
Security Act (plaintiffs) challenged the cancellation. The district court found that the Act was
unconstitutional. The case came before the United States Supreme Court.

Question 5

Clinton v. Jones

1997

Answer 5

The United States Constitution does not grant the President of the United States immunity while
in office from suit for actions allegedly occurring prior to his assuming the presidential office.

Paula Jones (plaintiff) alleged that before President Bill Clinton (defendant) was elected to the office of
President of the United States, he made “abhorrent” sexual advances toward her which she
“vehemently” rejected. After this time, Jones, a state of Arkansas employee, said she was treated
rudely by coworkers. After Clinton was elected President, Jones stated he defamed her personally to a
reporter and called her a “liar.” Jones brought state law claims against Clinton for defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In bringing these claims, Jones noted that none of the
conduct at issue occurred during Clinton’s time in office as President of the United States. The lower
court held that Clinton was not immune from suit while in office for actions allegedly occurring before
he assumed the presidential office. The district court granted a stay of the proceedings, and Jones
appealed. The appellate court reversed, and the United States Supreme Court considered the case.

Question 6

Aaron B. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia
1851

Answer 6

In the absence of definitive congressional regulation, federal rules apply to business that requires
uniformity of treatment among several states, and business characterized by local peculiarities is
governed by legislative decisions passed by the states.

Pennsylvania passed a law requiring all ships entering or leaving the Port of Philadelphia to use a local
Pennsylvania captain, or to pay a fine amounting to half the fee for a local pilot that went to support
retired Pennsylvania pilots. Cooley (plaintiff), a ship master who was not a Pennsylvania citizen,
brought suit against the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (defendant) to challenge the
state’s regulation. Cooley argued that it was unconstitutional for the state to require him to pay half the
fee of using a Pennsylvania pilot when he did not require one. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
upheld the Pennsylvania regulations, and Cooley appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 7

CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America
1987

Answer 7

A state statute requiring a majority vote of all disinterested shareholders in a corporation to give
voting rights to an entity that acquires “control shares” in the corporation does not interfere with
a federal statute designed to protect the interests of minority shareholders.

Indiana passed a law (Indiana Act) requiring a majority vote of all disinterested shareholders in a
corporation to give voting rights to an entity that acquires “control shares” in the corporation—an
amount of shares that would bring the entity’s amount of shares above 20, 33 1/3, or 50 percent. This
gave the minority shareholders a chance to consider the fairness of the tender offer collectively to make
a well-informed decision in their best interests. Under the Indiana Act, the shareholders must vote on
whether to grant the voting rights to the acquirer within 50 days of the acquisition. Dynamics
Corporation of America (Dynamics) (plaintiff) owned 9.6 percent of the stock of CTS Corporation
(CTS) (defendant) when it announced a tender offer for another million shares of CTS, an amount that
would have brought Dynamics’s ownership interest above the 20 percent threshold under the Indiana
Act. Dynamics brought suit alleging that the Indiana Act was preempted by the federal Williams Act,
and that the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. The Williams Act was passed to regulate
hostile tender offers and protect minority shareholders by putting them “on an equal footing with the
takeover bidder.” The Williams Act required (1) the offeror to disclose certain information about the
offer and the offeror’s business, and (2) certain procedural rules, including a requirement that the offer
remain open for at least 20 business days. Dynamics argued, among other things, that the 50-day
allowance under the Indiana Act conflicted with this 20-day period. The district court ruled that the
Williams Act preempted the Indiana Act and that the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. The
court of appeals affirmed. CTS appealed.

Question 8

Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury
1981

Answer 8

The President has authority to settle claims through executive orders where the settlement of
claims is necessary for the resolution of a major policy dispute between the United States and
another country and where Congress acquiesces to the President’s action.

On November 4, 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis began when the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran
was seized. In response, President Carter, acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), issued an executive order that froze all Iranian assets in the United States. On
January 20, 1981, the Americans held hostage by Iran were released pursuant to an agreement reached
between the United States and Iran. The agreement stated that the government of each country would
seek to end all litigation between itself and nationals of the other country by reaching binding
settlement agreements. A new Iran-United States claims tribunal was established to facilitate
settlements. On April 28, 1981, Dames & Moore (plaintiff) filed this action in district court against the
United States Government and Secretary of the Treasury (defendant) seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of executive orders and Treasury Department regulations
implementing the new agreement with Iran. Dames & Moore argued that the executive branch
exceeded its constitutional powers in making such an agreement, and that the agreement was
unconstitutional because it interfered with enforcement of Dames & Moore’s final judgment against
the government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization.

Question 9

Ex parte Quirin

1942

Answer 9

The United States Congress and President, through the Articles of War and Executive Orders,
may constitutionally place unlawful combatants on trial before a military commission for
offenses against the law of war.

During World War II, a group of German military personnel attempted to sabotage the American
government by secretly landing German submarines on American shores. The saboteurs removed their
uniforms and carried with them a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices. All
had been instructed by the German government to destroy war industries and facilities in the United
States. The saboteurs were captured and held in detention for trial by military commission, which was
appointed by an Executive Order of the President in 1942 to try them for violations of the law of war
and the Articles of War. The saboteurs (defendants) petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district
court, which was denied. The saboteurs appealed to the court of appeals but petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari prior to judgment. The writ of certiorari was granted.

Question 10

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland

1978

Answer 10

Under the Commerce Clause, a state may enact legislation that creates hardships for some
interstate companies operating in the state, provided the statute does not discriminate against or
unduly burden interstate commerce.

The State of Maryland conducted a survey following the 1973 gas shortage and determined that
petroleum producers and refiners had given their own service stations preferential treatment with
respect to gasoline distribution and pricing over independently owned retail service stations. To combat
this, Maryland passed a statute that prohibited producers or refiners from operating retail service
stations within the state. Out-of state oil producers and refiners operate approximately 5 percent of the
state’s retail stations, but no oil is produced or refined in the state. Exxon Corp. (Exxon) (plaintiff)
brought suit against the Governor of Maryland (defendant) on constitutional and statutory grounds,
arguing that the Maryland law impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce and was
preempted by federal policy. Other oil companies filed similar lawsuits. The trial court held that the
statute was invalid, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. Exxon then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.

Question 11

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board
2010

Answer 11

A President may not be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn
restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, because such multi-level protection from
removal prevents the President from fulfilling his Article II duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.

In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Among other provisions, it provided for regulating
of the accounting industry by a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board)
(defendant). The Board was to be composed of five members, appointed to staggered five-year terms.
The Board is under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but the SEC
cannot remove Board members except for good cause. SEC Commissioners determine whether there is
good cause to remove a Board member. SEC Commissioners cannot be removed by the President
except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The Board began an investigation
of Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, after it found deficiencies in its accounting
procedures in an inspection. Beckstead and Watts and the Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit
organization of which Beckstead & Watts is a member, (plaintiffs) brought suit, seeking, inter alia, a
declaratory judgment that the Board is unconstitutional because the Board’s protection from removal is
in conflict with Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President. The lower courts rejected
plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 12

Gibbons v. Ogden

1824

Answer 12

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law
governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce.

Ogden (plaintiff) received a license under New York state law to operate commercial steamboats on
New York waters. Gibbons (defendant) was also given permission from the United States Congress to
operate steamboats in those same waters in an effort to help regulate coastal trade. Ogden filed suit in
the New York Court of Chancery to enjoin Gibbons from operating his boats in New York waters.
Gibbons argued that he was operating his boats pursuant to an order of Congress, and that Congress
has exclusive power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce. The
New York Court of Chancery found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons
from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to the Court of Errors of New York, which
affirmed the decision. Gibbons appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 13

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

2006

Answer 13

(1) The President may only convene military commissions in circumstances where justified
subject to the “Constitution and laws,” including the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions, and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
(2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies to protect persons who are not involved
in an international conflict and requires any judicial proceedings against them to be conducted in
“regularly constituted courts” that provide certain due process protections.

Salim Ahmed Hamdan (defendant) is a Yemeni national who was captured by the United States
government in 2001 and transported to Guantanamo Bay, a United States detention facility, in 2002.
After one year, Hamdan was deemed eligible for trial by a United States military commission. After
two years in custody, Hamdan was charged with one count of “conspiracy to commit offenses
connected with the attacks of September 11, 2001.” Hamdan petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the authority of the military commissions to try him. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In rendering its decision on the legality of Hamdan’s trial by military commission,
the Supreme Court considered whether the military commissions’ structure and procedures violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which the United States
is a party. Particularly, the Supreme Court focused on interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.

Question 14

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

2004

Answer 14

Due process guarantees that United States citizens held in the United States as enemy combatants
must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a
neutral decision-maker.

In 2001, in response to attacks against the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network on
September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
authorizing the President to use all appropriate and necessary force against persons suspected of
engaging in terrorist activity against the United States. The President shortly thereafter ordered United
States military forces into Afghanistan. This case arises out of the detention of Yaser Hamdi
(defendant), a U.S. citizen, who was seized in Afghanistan on suspicion that he was actively working
with the Taliban regime. He was turned over to the United States military. The United States
interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan before transferring him to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in
2002. After learning he was an American citizen, authorities transferred him to Norfolk, Virginia, and
then Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contended that because Hamdi was an “enemy
combatant” it could hold him indefinitely in the United States without formal charges or proceedings
until it determined that access to counsel or further process was warranted. Hamdi’s father filed a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that Hamdi’s detainment violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and demanding that Hamdi be appointed counsel and given a fair hearing. The government (plaintiff)
filed a motion to dismiss, which included an outline of the evidence against Hamdi, called the Mobbs
Report. The district court found that the Mobbs Report did not contain enough evidence to hold Hamdi
without trial. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the United States acted constitutionally in
detaining Hamdi, and Hamdi petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 15

Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha
1983

Answer 15

Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the executive branch does
not meet the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism.

Congress passed § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizing one house of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate an executive determination that allowed Chadha (plaintiff) to
remain in the United States. Chadha lawfully came to the United States on a student visa, but remained
after the visa expired. At a deportation hearing, a judge ruled that Chadha must file an application to be
deported. However, at a second hearing, another judge suspended his deportation because he met the
requirements of §244(a)(1) of the INA for lawfully remaining in the United States without a visa. The
Attorney General submitted a recommendation for suspension of Chadha’s deportation to Congress.
Section 244(c)(2) of the INA granted Congress the authority to override the Attorney General’s
suspension. The House of Representatives considered the case of Chadha and five other illegal
immigrants, and passed a resolution pursuant to §244(c)(2) to override the Attorney General’s
suspension of their deportation. Chadha appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals,
which dismissed his action. Chadha then appealed his case against the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) (defendant) to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals ruled in his favor
and held that Congress could not overturn the decision of the Attorney General. The INS petitioned to
the United States Supreme Court.

Question 16

Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute (The Benzene Case)
1980

Answer 16

In promulgating standards regarding exposure levels to carcinogens, the Secretary of Labor
must make appropriate findings that exposure presents a significant health risk in the workplace
at higher levels in order to set exposure levels at the lowest possible level.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) delegated authority to the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate standards to ensure safe and healthful working conditions. According to Section 3(8),
standards created by the secretary must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment.” Section 6(b)(5) of the statute sets the principle for
creating the safety regulations, directing the Secretary to “set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity…”. Pursuant to this Act, the Secretary
promulgated a standard to regulate exposure to benzene, a carcinogen. The Secretary took the position
that no safe exposure level can be determined and that § 6(b)(5) requires him to set an exposure limit at
the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated.
The American Petroleum Institute (plaintiff) took the issue to court, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held the regulation invalid. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 17

Mistretta v. United States

1989

Answer 17

Congress may delegate authority to set sentencing guidelines to a judicial commission, provided
that it gives an intelligible principle to guide the commission and does not aggrandize the judicial
branch at the expense of another branch.

Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act) to combat serious disparities in
sentencing for criminal punishment. The Act: (1) rejects rehabilitation and declares that punishment
should be “retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative”; (2) creates the United States
Sentencing Commission (Commission), which sets sentencing guidelines (Guidelines); (3) makes
sentences essentially final; (4) imposes the Guidelines on federal courts; and (5) authorizes limited
appellate review of sentences. The Commission is an independent body in the judicial branch
comprised of members appointed by the president. At least three members must be judges. The
Commission must set, review, and revise the Guidelines, report to Congress, set policies, and monitor
and train judicial actors. Here, John Mistretta (defendant) was indicted in federal court on drug
charges. Mistretta moved for a declaration that the Guidelines were unconstitutional on the grounds
that the Act violated the separation of powers and nondelegation doctrines. The district court
concluded that the Commission should be treated as an executive branch entity and the Guidelines as
agency rules. Though the court expressed reservations about the Act, it rejected Mistretta’s argument.
Mistretta pled guilty and was sentenced to prison, pursuant to the Guidelines. Mistretta filed notice of
appeal. Before the Eighth Circuit ruled, Mistretta and the government petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted on the basis of “imperative public importance.”

Question 18

Morrison v. Olson

1988

Answer 18

A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an
independent counsel) and prohibiting removal without cause does not violate separation of
powers principles.

Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the Act). Title VI of the Act permitted a court
called the Special Division to appoint an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute certain highranking
government officials for violations of federal criminal laws upon request by the Attorney
General. The independent counsel could terminate the position when the investigation and/or
prosecution was complete. Additionally, the Act gave the Attorney General sole removal power of an
independent counsel “for cause.” Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison (plaintiff) was appointed to
investigate possible obstruction of congressional investigations by Department of Justice officials
(defendants), including allegations of misconduct and providing false or misleading testimony to a
congressional subcommittee by Solicitor General Ted Olson (defendant). When Morrison requested
that the federal court issue subpoenas requiring production of withheld Environmental Protection
Agency documents, Olson moved to quash, claiming the Act’s independent counsel provision was
unconstitutional. Olson argued that the Act violated separation of powers principles by giving to the
judiciary the appointment and removal powers traditionally vested in the president. The district court
denied the motion to quash, declared the Act constitutional, and held Olson in contempt for not
complying with the subpoenas. A divided court of appeals reversed, holding that an independent
counsel is a principal officer, rather than inferior officer, and thus the Act violated the Appointments
Clause of Article II of the Constitution. Morrison appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 19

Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald

1982

Answer 19

he President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages based
on actions taken in his official capacity.

A. Ernest Fitzgerald (plaintiff) was a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. In
January 1970, he lost his job when it was eliminated through a departmental reorganization and
reduction in force. Previously, in November 1968, Fitzgerald testified before Congress about inflated
costs and technical difficulties surrounding the Air Force’s new aircraft. His testimony reflected
negatively on the Air Force and was met with a negative reaction by Fitzgerald’s supervisors, which he
alleged was the reason behind his dismissal. Following his dismissal, President Nixon (defendant)
publicly claimed personal responsibility for deciding to fire Fitzgerald, but the White House later
retracted this statement. Fitzgerald brought suit in district court against President Nixon on the grounds
that he was improperly dismissed because of his negative comments about the Air Force. Fitzgerald
sought civil damages and President Nixon argued that he was absolutely immune from suit for actions
taken in his official capacity. The district and circuit courts rejected the President’s claim of immunity,
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 20

National Labor Relations Board v. Noel
Canning
2014

Answer 20

The president of the United States may invoke the Recess Appointments Clause to fill a vacancy
that exists during any sufficiently long Senate recess.

In 2011, the president of the United States nominated three individuals to positions on the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant). However, all three nominees were still awaiting Senate
confirmation a year later. In January 2012, the Senate was taking a three-day break between pro forma
sessions. The Senate resolved to conduct no business during the pro forma sessions, but retained the
power to conduct business by passing a unanimous consent agreement. During the three-day break, the
president used the Recess Appointments Clause (Recess Clause), Art. II, § 2, cl. 3, to appoint all three
individuals to the NLRB without the advice and consent of the Senate. Subsequently, the NLRB
ordered a Pepsi-Cola distribution company, Noel Canning (Canning) (plaintiff), to enter into a
collective-bargaining agreement. Canning sought to have the NLRB’s order set aside by the federal
court of appeals. Canning challenged the NLRB’s authority to issue the order, arguing that the three
new NLRB members had not been validly appointed, because the Recess Clause did not apply to a
three-day break between pro forma sessions of the Senate. The court of appeals held that the NLRB’s
order was invalid. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 21

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan

1935

Answer 21

Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive branch without providing clear
standards for how the executive must exercise that power.

A provision of the National Recovery Act (NRA) authorized the President to prohibit interstate and
foreign transportation of petroleum produced in excess of limits set by states. In 1933, the President
issued Executive Order No. 6199 which acted on this authority and prohibited petroleum transportation
in accordance with the NRA. Panama Refining Co. (plaintiff) challenged the executive order by suing
Ryan (defendant), the Secretary of the Interior, on the grounds that the NRA represented an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President by Congress. The district court held
the executive order was unconstitutional, but the court of appeals reversed. Panama Refining Co.
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 22

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

1970

Answer 22

A state law that furthers a legitimate local public interest and only incidentally affects interstate
commerce will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.

Arizona passed the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act (AFVSA), which required all
cantaloupes grown and offered for sale in Arizona to be packed compactly in standard closed
containers. Bruce Church, Inc. (plaintiff) was a cantaloupe grower in Arizona that routinely shipped its
fruits to California in uncrated containers. Loren J. Pike (defendant) was the Arizona official tasked
with enforcing the AFVSA. In 1968, Pike prohibited Bruce Church, Inc. from shipping its cantaloupes
in violation of the AFVSA. Bruce Church brought suit in district court seeking to enjoin enforcement
of the AFVSA, arguing that it did not have the required facilities and equipment to pack cantaloupes in
compliance with the AFVSA. Additionally, it stated that the perishable nature of the fruit would not
allow for the acquisition of such facilities in time, resulting in a loss of $700,000 to the company. The
district court held that the AFVSA was unconstitutional, and Pike appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States.

Question 23

Rasul v. Bush

2004

Answer 23

Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by foreign nationals held at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress authorized the use of force against the terrorists. Rasul
and others (defendants) were captured abroad during the ensuing military campaign. The defendants
were held at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The base is in Cuban territory, but the
lease gives the United States jurisdiction. The defendants’ relatives challenged the detentions claiming
the defendants are innocent but have not been charged, allowed to talk to an attorney, or access courts.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia deemed the filings habeas corpus
petitions and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 24

Raymond Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Delaware
1981

Answer 24

A state law that substantially burdens interstate commerce without furthering a legitimate and
not illusory state safety interest violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

An Iowa statute restricted the length of most truck combinations to 55 feet or less, with some
exceptions provided for mobile homes, doubles, and livestock transportation vehicles. Additionally,
cities located on the Iowa state line abutting other states were permitted to adopt the truck length
regulations of either state. Finally, deliverers of trucks or oversized mobile homes were required to
obtain a permit before shipping their goods over state lines. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of
Delaware (plaintiff) was a transportation company engaged in interstate commerce through Iowa state
lines. It sued Raymond Kassel (defendant), the state official tasked with enforcing the Iowa state
regulations, in district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state law. Iowa defended its statute on
the grounds that 55 foot single trailers were demonstrably safer than 65 foot double trailers and other
large vehicles, and that the law served legitimate state safety objectives by diverting traffic outside the
state. The district court disagreed, finding that 65 foot trailers were no more dangerous than 55 foot
vehicles, and that Iowa gained very little local benefits from the law in comparison with the significant
burdens the law placed on interstate commerce. It invalidated the Iowa statute, but the court of appeals
reversed. Consolidated Freightways Corp. appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 25

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake

1980

Answer 25

Under the market participant exception to the Commerce Clause, when a state government acts
as a market participant rather than a market regulator, it may favor its own citizens in
commercial dealings.

The State of South Dakota built a cement plant to deal with cement shortages within the state. The
South Dakota Cement Commission (the Commission) concluded that all of the cement produced would
be needed inside the state. Nevertheless, the plant’s output exceeded South Dakota customers’ needs
for many years, and the plant was able to supply cement to both in-state and out-of-state contractors.
Later a boom in the construction industry coincided with internal difficulties at the plant. As a result,
the plant was unable to fill all of its cement orders. To combat this problem, the Commission
reaffirmed that the plant should preferentially supply cement to South Dakota contractors first before
filling orders with out-of-state contractors. Reeves, Inc. (Reeves) (plaintiff) was an out-of-state
contractor who suffered serious financial harm when the plant stopped filling its orders. Reeves sued
the Commission and its chairman, William Stake (collectively, defendants), in district court,
challenging the state’s cement sales policy. Reeves argued that the policy unconstitutionally
discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The district court
agreed and enjoined the Commission from continuing its preferential treatment of in-state buyers, but
the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 26

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc.
1938

Answer 26

When Congress has not acted, if a state regulation does not discriminate against interstate
commerce and the state legislature has a rational basis for adopting the regulation based on
safety or economic interests, the Court must defer to the judgment of the state legislature in
holding the regulation constitutional.

In 1933, South Carolina passed a regulation prohibiting the operation on its state highways of certain
motor trucks and “semi-trailer” motor trucks which exceeded width and weight limitations. For
purposes of the weight limit, the statute considered semi-trailer motor trucks, which were composed of
two pieces, as one single unit. Barnwell Bros., Inc. (plaintiff), an out-of-state trucking company,
brought suit in district court against the South Carolina Highway Dept. (defendant), challenging the
South Carolina weight restrictions as an impermissible restriction on interstate commerce. The district
court upheld the South Carolina regulations on the grounds that Congress had not acted to regulate this
area of interstate commerce, thus leaving all regulation up to the individual states. The court of appeals
reversed. The South Carolina Highway Dept. appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 27

South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, Commissioner, Dept. of Natural
Resources of Alaska
1984

Answer 27

A state may impose burdens on commercial transactions within the market in which it is a
participant, but may not go further and impose conditions that have a substantial regulatory
effect outside of that particular market.

In September 1980, the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources of Alaska (defendant)
announced that the department would sell approximately forty-nine million board-feet of timber in Icy
Cape, Alaska in October, 1980. However, the contract for sale required that all timber sold must be
processed within the State of Alaska before being shipped outside the state. South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. (plaintiff) was an Alaska-based timber retailer that did not operate an Alaska mill
and sold primarily unprocessed timber to exclusively out-of-state clients. South-Central brought suit in
district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the in-state processing requirement on the grounds that
it violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court agreed and granted the injunction, but the
court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 28

State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.

1981

Answer 28

A state law that has the practical effect of discriminating against interstate commerce will not be
struck down unless the burden it places on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits it confers.

In 1977, Minnesota passed a statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers, but permitted sales in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as
paperboard milk cartons. The legislature argued that the statute was passed to address solid waste and
other environmental concerns in the state. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. and other Minnesota and non-
Minnesota plastic producers and dairies (plaintiffs) brought suit against the State of Minnesota
(defendant) in district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute. Clover Leaf alleged that the
actual purpose of the Minnesota legislature was to promote the interests of certain segments of the
local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of the economic interests of other segments of the
dairy industry and plastics industry. The district court agreed with this argument and struck down the
statute, and the state supreme court affirmed after an extensive hearing. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.

Question 29

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn
A. Piper
1985

Answer 29

States may discriminate against rights of out-of-state residents as long as there is a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment, and the discrimination practiced against nonresidents
bears a substantial relationship to the state’s objective.

The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (defendant) limit bar admission to state residents.
Kathryn Piper (plaintiff) took and passed the February 1980 New Hampshire bar exam. She passed all
requirements to be admitted to the New Hampshire bar and filed an application for admission along
with a form illustrating her intent to become a New Hampshire resident. She was denied admission to
the bar on the grounds that she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire prior to
being sworn in. Piper filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the restrictions
on her bar admission, and the district court agreed and granted the injunction. The court of appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 30

Toomer v. Witsell

1948

Answer 30

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution prevents states from discriminating
against citizens of other states unless valid independent reasons exist for the discrimination, and
the degree of discrimination bears a close relationship to those reasons.

A South Carolina statute designated certain maritime waters off the coast of that state as “a common
for the people of the state for the taking of fish.” However, the statute also required payment of a
license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat in the area owned by a South Carolina resident, and $2,500 for
each boat owned by a non-resident. Toomer (plaintiff) was an individual fisherman from Georgia, who
instituted this action along with four other Georgia fishermen in district court against Witsell
(defendant), the South Carolina official responsible for enforcing the statute and fees. Toomer sought
to enjoin enforcement of the South Carolina statute on the grounds that it violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court denied the injunction and dismissed the
case, and Toomer appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 31

United Building & Construction Trades Council
of Camden County v. Mayor & Council of the
City of Camden
1984

Answer 31

A state may not discriminate against out-of-state interests if those interests are sufficiently
fundamental to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to fall within the purview of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, unless the state has a substantial reason for treating out-ofstate
citizens differently, and the discriminatory means it imposes are closely related to
accomplishing that reason.

A municipal ordinance of the city of Camden, New Jersey required that at least forty percent of the
employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden
residents. United Building & Construction Trades Council of Camden County (plaintiff) brought suit
against the Mayor & Council of the City of Camden (defendants), challenging the ordinance on the
grounds that it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause did not apply to invalidate the ordinance
because the city of Camden was acting as a market participant. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
did not apply because the discrimination was based on municipal, not state residency. United Building
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 32

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

1936

Answer 32

An otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless
be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict.

Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to countries involved in
the Chaco border dispute. That same day, President Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting
munitions sales to warring countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. In 1936, an indictment was
issued alleging that Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (defendant) illegally sold arms to Bolivia, a country
engaged in the Chaco border dispute. The transaction was in violation of the congressional resolution
and the President’s executive order. The district court issuing the indictment held for Curtiss-Wright,
ruling that the indictment was not supported by sufficient information to charge Curtiss-Wright. The
United States government (plaintiff) appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 33

United States v. Nixon

1974

Answer 33

A presidential claim of privilege asserting only a generalized interest in confidentiality is not
sufficient to overcome the judicial interest in producing all relevant evidence in a criminal case.

President Nixon (defendant) was named as a co-conspirator in various charges including conspiracy to
defraud the United States. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia subpoenaed
various tapes and documents relating to specific meetings in which Nixon was a participant. Nixon
filed a formal claim of privilege and a motion to quash the subpoenas. The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia denied the motion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 34

United States v. Pink

1942

Answer 34

The President’s actions have supremacy over state law with respect to foreign relations.

In 1907, the New York branch of the First Russian Insurance Co. (FRIC) was organized under the
former Russian government. In 1919, the newly created Russian government nationalized Russian
insurance companies, including FRIC, and canceled all company debts and shareholder rights. FRIC
continued to do business in New York until 1925, when the Supreme Court of New York ordered that
Pink (defendant), the New York Superintendent of Insurance, take control of FRIC’s assets. After Pink
paid FRIC’s U.S. creditors, there remained a balance of more than $1,000,000. In 1931, the New York
Court of Appeals ordered Pink to use the balance to first pay FRIC’s foreign creditors who had
previously filed attachments, then pay any surplus to FRIC’s board of directors. This action was
stayed, however, due to a claim on FRIC’s assets by the United States (plaintiff). In 1933, the United
States recognized the new Russian government and accepted Russia’s Litvinov Assignment regarding
certain claims. The United States, in honoring the Litvinov Assignment, sued Pink to recover the
remaining assets under Pink’s control.

Question 35

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy

1994

Answer 35

A regulation violates the Commerce Clause if the combination of a tax and subsidy discriminates
against interstate commerce, even if each component would be constitutional if separated.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Massachusetts dairy farms began to lose their share of the overall dairy
market due to lower prices of their competitor producers in other states. In response to the downsizing
of the Massachusetts dairy market, the state created a Special Commission to investigate solutions to
this problem. Healy (defendant), head of the Special Commission, recommended that Massachusetts
impose a tax on all fluid milk sold to Massachusetts retailers by dealers. The tax would then be used to
subsidize the efforts of Massachusetts’s dairy farmers to help them compete in the national milk
market. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. (plaintiff), an out-of-state milk dealer, was taxed. West Lynn
Creamery challenged the Massachusetts statute in superior court on the grounds that it impermissibly
discriminated against interstate commerce. The court denied relief, and the state supreme court
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 36

White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc.
1983

Answer 36

When a state government enters the market as a participant, it is not subject to the restraints of
the Commerce Clause.

Mayor White (defendant) issued an executive order requiring that construction projects funded by
Boston city funds be completed by construction companies who have Boston residents comprising at
least half of their employees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the
executive order was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution in that it imposed a significant burden on interstate commerce by prohibiting the hiring of
construction companies with a majority of out-of-city workers. Mayor White appealed.

Question 37

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
Inc.
2001

Answer 37

(1) When Congress confers decision making authority to agencies, it must set forth in a legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform;
and (2) Under § 109 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator may not consider
implementation costs in setting national ambient air quality standards.

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) (defendant) to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
certain air pollutants. Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA directs the EPA to set ambient air quality
standards, the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator are necessary
to protect the public health. In July 1997, the Administrator revised the NAAQS for particulate matter
and ozone. The American Trucking Associations, Inc. and others (plaintiffs) challenged the new
standard in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that § 109(b)
(1) of the CAA delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of Article I, § 1 of the
United States Constitution because the EPA had interpreted the CAA to provide no “intelligible
principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of authority. The appellate court further held that Whitman is
prohibited from considering the costs of implementation in setting NAAQS under the CAA. The
appellate court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The case then came before the United States
Supreme Court.

Question 38

Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company
1829

Answer 38

Under the Commerce Clause, states may pass laws that affect commerce, so long as they are not
repugnant to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company (the Company) (plaintiff) was authorized by a Delaware law to
construct a dam across a creek that fed into the Delaware River through a deep-level marsh. The creek
was navigable, and the tide ebbed and flowed through it. Constructing the dam likely enhanced the
value of property on the banks of the marsh. The health of the inhabitants of these properties was also
probably improved by the construction of the dam. However, the dam also stops a previously navigable
creek and, therefore, impacts the rights of those who had been using the creek. The owners of a boat
(defendants) broke the dam. The defendants were sued by the Company for trespass. The defendants
challenged the authority of the state to authorize the construction of the dam.

Question 39

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

1952

Answer 39

The President of the United States may not engage in lawmaking activity absent an express
authorization from Congress or the text of the Constitution.

In late 1951, steel mill owners and their employees had disagreements over the terms of collective
bargaining agreements. Unable to reach an agreement, the steel mill employees’ representative gave
notice of intent to strike after the expiration of their current agreement. The federal government
unsuccessfully entered the negotiations, and on April 4, 1952, the steel mill employees’ union gave
notice of its intent to strike on April 9, 1952. The importance of steel as a component in weapons and
war materials led President Truman to believe that a reduction in steel production from a nationwide
strike would jeopardize the nation’s security. The President issued Executive Order 10340 directing
Sawyer (defendant), the Secretary of Commerce, to take control of and continue operating most of the
nation’s steel mills. Sawyer carried out the order, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff), along
with other steel mill operators, brought suit in district court alleging that the President’s order
amounted to an exercise of lawmaking, a legislative function reserved expressly for Congress.
Therefore, the President’s exercise of lawmaking was unconstitutional. The district court granted an
injunction in favor of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., on the grounds that the President acted
unconstitutionally, but the court of appeals stayed the injunction. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.

Question 40

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry
(Zivotofsky II)
2015

Answer 40

Article II of the Constitution grants the U.S. president the exclusive authority to formally
recognize a foreign sovereign through executive power that Congress may not contradict via
statute.

Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky (plaintiff) was born to United States citizens living in Jerusalem.
Zivotofsky’s mother requested a passport and report of birth abroad for her son, listing his place of
birth as Jerusalem, Israel. The request was denied pursuant to a State Department policy put forth by
the U.S. president, which provided that a passport could only list Jerusalem as the place of birth.
Zivotofsky filed suit in federal district court against Secretary of State John Kerry (defendant),
claiming that § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Act), 116 Stat.
1350, permitted citizens born in Jerusalem to list their place of birth as Israel. The district court
dismissed the action, reasoning that the action presented a nonjusticiable political question and that
Zivotofsky lacked standing. Zivotofsky appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the political-question
determination, but reversed on the standing issue. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review, vacated the judgment, and remanded the matter to the court of appeals to determine whether
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of § 214(d) was correct and whether the statute was constitutional, rather
than whether Jerusalem was in fact part of Israel. On remand, the court of appeals held that the statute
was unconstitutional, concluding that the president exclusively held the power to recognize a foreign
sovereign and that § 214(d) directly contradicted this constitutional authority. The Court again granted
certiorari.