CH 1 & 2

Question 1

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

1935

Answer 1

Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive without outlining strict standards
for how the executive is to exercise that power.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. (defendant) operated a slaughterhouse in Brooklyn, New York.
Schechter was charged with eighteen counts of violating the Live Poultry Code (LPC) regulations
passed by Congress, and with one count of conspiracy to violate the Code. Schechter’s violations
included issues relating to its employees’ hours and wages and the quality of its poultry products sold
to local New York retailers. Schechter appealed its convictions in the New York Circuit Court of
Appeals, alleging that Congress exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce by passing
regulations over Schechter’s in-state activities. Additionally, Schechter argued that the President
engaged in impermissible lawmaking by having full discretion to approve or disapprove the LPC
provisions. The circuit court sustained the convictions on sixteen counts but reversed the conspiracy
charge and two convictions pertaining to Schechter’s improper labor standards. The circuit court ruled
that such regulations were beyond Congress’s power to regulate and that the President engaged in
impermissible lawmaking functions. Schechter appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 2

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner
1967

Ripeness

Answer 2

(1) In determining whether a case or controversy is ripe for adjudication, a court must evaluate
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration. (2) Judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut
off unless Congress clearly intended to prevent such review.

In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require prescription drug
manufacturers to print the common or “established” name of their drugs in large letters along with the
“proprietary” or trade name of the drug on all packaging. Abbott Laboratories and thirty-seven other
prescription drug manufacturers (plaintiffs) brought suit against Gardner (defendant), the federal
Commissioner responsible for enforcing the new act, alleging that the Commissioner exceeded his
authority in making such a regulation. Abbott successfully sought injunctive and declaratory relief in
district court, but the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 3

Alden v. Maine
1999

Sovereign immunity

Answer 3

Congress may not authorize suits against state governments in state courts, even on federal
claims, without the state governments’ consent.

Alden (plaintiff), a probation officer, along with a group of other probation officers, filed suit against
their employer, the State of Maine (defendant) in district court. Alden alleged that Maine had violated
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and sought overtime pay and liquidated
damages. While the suit was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which held that Congress lacks power under Article I of the
Constitution to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suits in federal court. Based on this decision,
the district court dismissed Alden’s action, and the court of appeals affirmed. Alden then filed the same
action in state court in Maine. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds that states had
sovereign immunity from suit, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Alden submitted a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 4

Allen v. Wright
1984

Standing

Answer 4

To have standing to bring a lawsuit, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that they have personally
suffered a distinct injury, and the chain of causation linking that injury to the actions of a
defendant must not be attenuated.

The Wright family and other parents of African American public school children (plaintiffs), brought a
nationwide class action suit against Allen, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (defendants). The parents argued that the
failure of the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to racially-segregated private schools caused injury to their
children on two grounds. Firstly, the parents alleged that the IRS’s failure to comply with
desegregation laws caused them direct harm by creating a climate of stigma against their children.
Secondly, the parents alleged that their children’s ability to attend a desegregated school had been
directly impaired because the IRS’s failure to remove private schools’ tax-exempt status effectively
encouraged the continued segregation of schools. The parents sought declaratory injunctive relief for
their claims in federal district court. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
parents lacked standing to bring the suit. The court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.

Question 5

Baker v. Carr

Political question

Answer 5

A challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures brought under the Equal Protection Clause
is not a political question and is thus justiciable.

Baker (plaintiff) was a Republican living in Shelby County, Tennessee. The Tennessee Constitution
required that legislative districts be redrawn every ten years to adjust for changes in population. Baker
brought suit against Carr (defendant), Secretary of State in Tennessee, in his official capacity alleging
that because Tennessee had not actually redistricted since 1901, the urban Shelby County district had
ten times as many residents as did the more rural districts. As a result, Baker argued that rural votes
counted more than urban votes, and that he was thus denied equal protection of the laws. The State of
Tennessee argued that legislative districting issues were not judicial questions but political questions,
and were thus not capable of being decided by the courts based on the Constitution’s prohibition on the
Court’s deciding political questions.

Question 6

Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
1936

Commerce clause

Answer 6

Congress may not regulate a purely local act under its Commerce Clause powers.

Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (BCCA) to create a national commission of
coal miners, coal producers, and private citizens to help regulate the coal mining industry by
establishing standards for fair competition, production, wages, hours, and labor relations. The BCCA
delegated to the commission the power to fix the minimum and maximum prices of coal at every mine
in the United States. Additionally, the labor relations provisions of the BCCA gave coal mine
employees the right to organize and enter into collective bargaining agreements in all states. Although
compliance with the BCCA was purely voluntary, Congress encouraged compliance by rewarding
participating coal mines with a tax rebate for abiding by the BCCA’s provisions. Carter (plaintiff) sued
his own company, Carter Coal Co. (defendant) to enjoin it from paying the required tax for
noncompliance under the BCCA.

Question 7

Champion v. Ames
1903

Commerce clause

Answer 7

The trafficking of lottery tickets across state lines constitutes interstate commerce that may be
prohibited entirely by Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 (FLA) which prohibited the buying and selling of
lottery tickets across state lines. Charles Champion (defendant) was indicted by U.S. Marshall Ames
(plaintiff) for bringing Paraguayan lottery tickets into the United States and shipping them from Texas
to California in violation of the FLA. Champion challenged his indictment by alleging that Congress’s
Commerce Clause power does not include the power to completely prohibit a certain kind of
commerce; only to regulate it. Champion brought this challenge in a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which dismissed the case. Champion appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.

Question 8

City of Boerne v. Flores

1997

Answer 8

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress only with remedial powers, and when
upholding a constitutional right, Congress may only enforce legislation that utilizes means
proportional to achieving that legislative purpose.

In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an express attempt to
overturn the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, Oregon’s prohibition of the use of peyote in Native
American religious practice was upheld because the Oregon state law was one of general applicability.
The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion,
even if the burden is derived from a law of general applicability. A person’s free exercise of religion
can only be a substantial burden if the government can show that its actions were necessary to achieve
a compelling government interest and were the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. Archbishop Flores (plaintiff) brought suit against the City of Boerne (defendant)
under the RFRA after the City of Boerne denied his church’s application for a building permit to make
necessary expansions to its current building. The city denied the church’s permit pursuant to a city
ordinance that prevented expansions and alterations of structures designated as historic landmarks or
existing within historic districts. The church’s permit was denied because the City’s Historic Landmark
Commission determined the church was located in a historic district. Archbishop Flores sought relief
under the RFRA in the District Court for the Western District of Texas. The district court held that the
RFRA was unconstitutional, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The City of Boerne
submitted a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 9

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
2013

Standing

Answer 9

Threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact for purposes of
Article III standing.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) authorized the United States government to
conduct surveillance on non-U.S. citizens that were outside the U.S. Amnesty International USA, et al.
(plaintiffs) are lawyers, journalists, and human rights researchers, among other things, who do work
that often has them communicating with individuals abroad that the plaintiffs claimed are likely to be
subject to surveillance under FISA. The plaintiffs brought suit seeking a declaratory ruling that this
portion of FISA was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed that there was an “objectively reasonable
likelihood” that the plaintiffs’ communications would be recorded under FISA. Alternatively, the
plaintiffs claimed that given the risk of surveillance, they had to spend significant funds to ensure that
their communications were kept confidential. The court of appeals ruled that the plaintiffs had standing
to bring the suit. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 10

Cooper v. Aaron

1958

Answer 10

State officials and state legislatures are bound by orders of the United States Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the United States Constitution.

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that racial
segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and ordered the desegregation of public schools in the
southern United States. An Arkansas federal district court, relying on Brown, ordered the desegregation
of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Little Rock school board was unable to comply with that
decree after the Governor of Arkansas blocked African American students from attending a segregated
school by calling in the National Guard. The district court issued an injunction against the Governor,
and African American students were eventually permitted to attend desegregated schools with the
protection of federal troops. The Little Rock school board, represented by Cooper (plaintiff), brought
suit in federal district court seeking a postponement of the desegregation plan in the state due to the
uneasy circumstances present. The suit was challenged by Aaron (defendant), representing African
American children in Arkansas. The district court granted relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 11

Craig v. Boren

1976

Answer 11

A governmental regulation involving gender discrimination is constitutional if it is substantially
related to the achievement of an important government purpose.

An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2 percent alcoholic beer to males
under the age of twenty-one, but permitted the sale of such beer to females over the age of eighteen.
Craig (plaintiff), a liquor vendor in Oklahoma, brought suit against Boren (defendant), an Oklahoma
state official, in federal district court on the grounds that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the statute, holding that statistical evidence
regarding young men’s drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based
discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads. Craig
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 12

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow

2004

Answer 12

A non-custodial parent lacks standing to sue on behalf of his child in federal court because
federal courts may not interfere with state law in the area of domestic relations.

Michael Newdow’s (plaintiff) daughter attended a public school in the Elk Grove Unified School
District in California (defendant). Each day, teachers at the school led the students in a voluntary
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which included the words “under God.” Michael Newdow, an
atheist, brought suit in federal district court in California arguing that Elk Grove’s act of making the
students listen—even if they chose not to participate—to the words “under God” each day violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. The case was referred to a
Magistrate Judge, who concluded that “the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause.” The
district court adopted that recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Newdow appealed and
Sandra Banning, the mother of his daughter, filed a motion to have her daughter dismissed as a party to
the lawsuit on the grounds that (1) a state-court order granted her “exclusive legal custody” of her
daughter and (2) her daughter did not personally object to saying the Pledge of Allegiance. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered Newdow’s case in light of Banning’s motion and reversed,
holding that the grant of sole legal custody to Banning did not deprive Newdow of his standing to
challenge the school’s policy and that, under California law, Newdow had the right to expose his child
to his particular religious views, even if those views contradicted the mother’s. The court of appeals
also held that the school’s policy, as well as the Congressional Act in 1954 which first added the words
“under God” to the Constitution both violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the standing and First Amendment issues.

Question 13

Ex Parte McCardle

1868

Answer 13

Although the United States Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is derived from Article III of
the Constitution, it is conferred subject to whatever exceptions and regulations Congress chooses
to make.

William McCardle (defendant), a newspaper editor in Vicksburg, Mississippi, was arrested by federal
government officials after he wrote a series of newspaper articles that were highly critical of the post-
Civil War Reconstruction and resulting military rule of the South. The federal government justified
McCardle’s arrest on the ground that he violated several provisions of the Reconstruction Acts.
McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court in Mississippi, but was ultimately
unsuccessful in challenging his arrest. McCardle then sought appellate review of his habeas corpus
petition in the United States Supreme Court, relying on an 1867 congressional statute that permitted
the Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction over such matters. However, while the case was
pending in the Supreme Court, Congress passed a new law repealing the part of the 1867 statute that
permitted Supreme Court appellate review of writs of habeas corpus. President Andrew Johnson
vetoed this legislation, but Congress immediately overrode his veto and reinstated its repeal of the
1867 statute.

Question 14

Ex parte Young
1908

Sovereign immunity

Answer 14

Private actions may be brought in federal court against state officials, even though states have
sovereign immunity.

The State of Minnesota enacted legislation regulating railroad rates. If a railroad company charged
rates in excess of the approved amount, its officers and employees were subject to misdemeanor or
felony convictions, fines, and potentially lengthy jail sentences. The shareholders of multiple railroad
companies (plaintiffs) brought suit in federal circuit court, alleging that the law violated the due
process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs
sued the railroad companies to prevent them from complying with the legislation. The action also
sought an injunction against the attorney general of Minnesota, Edward Young (defendant), to prevent
him from enforcing the legislation. Young filed a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment
prohibition against private actions against states. The circuit court dismissed Young’s motion and
entered a preliminary injunction to prevent Young from enforcing the law. Young then filed a state
court action to enforce the legislation against the railroads. The circuit court held Young in contempt,
and he filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Question 15

Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority
2002

Sovereign immunity

Answer 15

The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity for states against actions by private citizens in
federal administrative proceedings.

South Carolina Maritime Services, Incorporated (Maritime Services) (plaintiff) requested permission
from South Carolina State Ports Authority (the Authority) (defendant) to berth a cruise ship at the Port
of Charleston, South Carolina on five occasions. The Authority denied the request each time based on
a policy of denying berths to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services then
filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), alleging that the Authority’s refusals
violated the Shipping Act of 1984. The Authority filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with the
administrative law judge assigned to the matter. The Authority asserted that the Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution provided immunity against actions by private citizens before the
FMC.

Question 16

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer

1976

Answer 16

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce legislation that
overrides states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereignty for the purpose of enforcing the substantive
rights of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to allow individuals to sue state
governments for money damages for discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Based on these amendments, Fitzpatrick and several other male state retirees (plaintiffs) sued
Bitzer, Chairman of the Connecticut State Retirement Commission, and the State of Connecticut
(defendants) for gender-based discrimination in Connecticut’s retirement policies. Fitzpatrick brought
suit in district court. The district court granted only injunctive relief on the grounds that granting
monetary relief under the Title VII Amendments violated state sovereignty as protected by the
Eleventh Amendment. The court of appeals affirmed, and Fitzpatrick filed a petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.

Question 17

Flast v. Cohen
1968

Taxing and spending

Answer 17

Federal taxpayers may have standing to challenge expenditures of Congress if they show that the
challenged expenditure forms part of a federal spending program and is not just incidental to the
program, and that the constitutional provision under which the taxpayer claims a violation exists
constitutes a “specific limitation” on Congress’s Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending powers.

Flast and six other federal taxpayers (plaintiffs) brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin Cohen and other federal officers tasked with administering
federal funds (defendants) from spending those funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965. The taxpayers brought suit solely based on their status as federal taxpayers, alleging that
Congress’s spending of federal funds on instruction and materials in religious schools violated the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution. The lower court held that the
taxpayers did not have standing as federal taxpayers. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Question 18

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc.
2000

Mootness

Answer 18

A controversy will be deemed moot on the grounds of voluntary cessation by the defendant if the
defendant proves there is no reasonable chance it could resume the offending behavior.

Friends of the Earth (FOTE) and several other environmental groups (plaintiffs) brought suit against
Laidlaw Environmental Services (defendant) alleging that the company was violating provisions of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) and its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit by
emitting mercury into the environment. Laidlaw claimed that the controversy was moot because it
complied with all environmental regulations associated with its NPDES permit. The district court
determined that, because Laidlaw was in compliance with its permit, it was inappropriate for FOTE to
sue under the CWA. After this decision, Laidlaw closed one of its main offending facilities. On appeal
by FOTE, the court of appeals held that the case was moot because Laidlaw’s compliance with the
statute and closure of its offending facility constituted a voluntary cessation of the offending behavior.
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine the law surrounding mootness.

Question 19

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority
1985

Commerce clause

Answer 19

Congress’s application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the employment actions of a state
municipal transit authority is a constitutional exercise of its Commerce Clause power.

Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938, but ruled in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), that the FLSA did not grant authority to Congress to regulate the wages,
overtime pay, and hours of state government employees. The San Antonio Metro Transit Authority
(SAMTA) (defendant) had previously paid its state employees according to the federal standards
established in the FLSA, but ceased doing so after the Supreme Court’s decision in National League of
Cities. In 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the United States Department of Labor ruled that
SAMTA could be regulated by the FLSA because its actions were not a “traditional government
function” reserved for the states under National League of Cities. SAMTA then filed suit against the
United States Department of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
seeking a declaratory judgment that its actions were not subject to congressional regulation. Garcia
(plaintiff) and other employees of SAMTA also filed suit at the same time against SAMTA claiming
overtime back-pay. The district court allowed Garcia to intervene as a defendant in SAMTA’s suit
against the United States Department of Labor. The district court ruled for SAMTA. Garcia and the
Department of Labor appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. The United States
Supreme Court remanded the case, and the district court again ruled for SAMTA. On appeal the second
time, the United States Supreme Court considered the case.

Question 20

Gibbons v. Ogden
1824

Commerce clause

Answer 20

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law
governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce.

Ogden (plaintiff) received a license under New York state law to operate commercial steamboats on
New York waters. Gibbons (defendant) was also given permission from the United States Congress to
operate steamboats in those same waters in an effort to help regulate coastal trade. Ogden filed suit in
the New York Court of Chancery to enjoin Gibbons from operating his boats in New York waters.
Gibbons argued that he was operating his boats pursuant to an order of Congress, and that Congress
has exclusive power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce. The
New York Court of Chancery found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons
from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to the Court of Errors of New York, which
affirmed the decision. Gibbons appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 21

Goldwater v. Carter
1979

Politics question

Answer 21

The constitutionality of a unilateral action by the United States president to rescind a treaty
without Senate involvement is a non-justiciable political question incapable of adjudication.

President Jimmy Carter (defendant) unilaterally rescinded a treaty formed with Taiwan, so that the
United States could instead form a treaty with the new People’s Republic of China. Senator Barry
Goldwater (plaintiff) filed a constitutional challenge against this action, arguing that the president
exceeded his bounds, because the Senate must be involved in rescinding a treaty, just as a two-thirds
vote by the Senate is required to make a treaty. The court of appeals determined this was a justiciable
question. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 22

Gonzales v. Raich
2005

Commerce clause

Answer 22

Congress may regulate the use and production of home-grown marijuana as this activity, taken
in the aggregate, could rationally be seen as having a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.

In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act to combat
illegal drug use in the United States. Shortly after, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) which categorized illegal drugs into different “schedules” and prevented their sale, purchase,
and possession in the United States. In 1996, California enacted the Compassionate Use Act that
allowed the use of medical marijuana within the state by persons needing it for legitimate medical
purposes. Angel Raich and Diane Monson (plaintiffs) were California residents who both legally used
marijuana to treat legitimate medical issues. Despite receiving approval from California state officials,
federal agents seized and destroyed Raich’s marijuana plants. Raich brought this suit against Alberto
Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (defendant), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
prohibiting the enforcement of the federal CSA. The court of appeals ruled that the CSA was an invalid
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and Gonzales appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.

Question 23

Hammer v. Dagenhart
1918

Commerce clause

Answer 23

Congress may not use its Commerce Clause power to regulate child labor in the states as this is a
purely local matter.

In 1916, in response to increasing concerns over child labor conditions in mills and factories, Congress
passed the Keating-Owen Act which prohibited goods made by children under a certain age from being
sold in interstate commerce. Dagenhart (plaintiff) brought suit on behalf of himself and his two sons,
who were minor children employed in a cotton mill in North Carolina, against Hammer (defendant), a
United States attorney, alleging that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce
Clause Power. The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held that Congress acted
unconstitutionally in attempting to regulate a purely local matter. Both Hammer and the United States
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 24

Hans v. Louisiana
1890

Sovereign immunity

Answer 24

A state may not be sued in federal court by one of its own citizens even if the cause of action
arises under federal law.

Hans (plaintiff) was a citizen of the state of Louisiana (defendant). He brought suit against the state in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana for interest accrued on
bonds issued by the state. The suit alleged that an amendment to the state constitution that barred the
state from paying the interest violated the United States Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, and Hans appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 25

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
1964

Commerce clause

Answer 25

Congress may enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies in hotel
accommodations because of the negative effects of those policies on interstate commerce.

In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination
by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
(plaintiff) in Atlanta, Georgia advertises to and hosts primarily out-of-state guests. The motel practices
a policy of refusing to rent rooms to African Americans and brought this suit against the United States
government (defendant) in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to challenge the CRA
as an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The district
court upheld the CRA as constitutional. The court of appeals affirmed. Heart of Atlanta appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.

Question 26

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation

2007

Answer 26

Taxpayers do not have standing to challenge expenditures made by the executive branch of the
federal government solely based on their status as taxpayers.

Members of the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) (plaintiffs) brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against Hein and other federal officials
(defendants) tasked with administering President George W. Bush’s Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives program. FFRF challenged the program, as taxpayers, on the grounds that the program
inappropriately used taxpayer money to support faith-based programs and that speeches made by
President Bush contained “religious imagery.” The district court granted FFRF’s motion to dismiss the
case for lack of standing, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the program constituted
an inappropriate use of federal money in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 27

Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v.
United States (The Shreveport Rate Cases)
1914

Commerce clause

Answer 27

Congress may regulate operations in all matters having a close and substantial relation to
interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions
under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms.

The Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. (the railway) (plaintiff) functioned to facilitate
commerce among Texas cities and between Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana. However, the railway
charged significantly higher rates for the transportation of goods from Shreveport to Texas cities than
from Dallas and Houston to those same Texas cities. The result of this was to severely impair
commerce from Shreveport. The Interstate Commerce Commission, established by Congress
(defendant), sought to regulate this situation by fixing the maximum price that could be charged by the
railway on its interstate routes to be comparable to its intrastate routes. The railway brought suit in the
Commerce Court, arguing that because the Interstate Commerce Commission was setting the price of
interstate commerce based on its determination of what was reasonable in intrastate commerce, it was
overstepping its Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Commerce Court
rejected this argument and held that the Interstate Commerce Commission acted constitutionally. The
railway appealed.

Question 28

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

1968

Answer 28

Congress may make whatever laws are necessary and proper for enforcing the Thirteenth
Amendment’s abolition of slavery and the negative effects of slavery.

Jones (plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court against Alfred H. Mayer Co. (Mayer) (defendant)
alleging that Mayer refused to sell a house to Jones simply because Jones is African American. Jones
relied on 42 U.S.C. §1982 which grants the right to all citizens of the United States to “inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The district court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that §1982 only applies to state action and does not reach private actors who
refuse to sell real estate. The court of appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Question 29

Katzenbach v. McClung
1964

Commerce clause

Answer 29

Congress may regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil
Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination
by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The McClungs (plaintiffs) owned
and operated Ollie’s Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama and refused to serve African American
customers. Approximately half of the food served by the restaurant moved in interstate commerce. The
McClungs sued Katzenbach (defendant), the United States government actor responsible for enforcing
the act, to enjoin the act’s enforcement against the McClungs. The action was brought in federal district
court. The district court issued an injunction preventing enforcement of the Act against the McClungs.
The United States government appealed. This case was decided by the United States Supreme Court
along with Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

Question 30

Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan

1966

Answer 30

Congress may pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law.

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 4(e) of the Act provided that no
person that successfully completed the sixth grade in a public or private school accredited by the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where the language of education was something other than English,
could be denied the right to vote in an election because of his inability to read or write English. The
election laws of the State of New York, however, required all voters to have the ability to read and
write English as a requisite to voting. Morgan & Morgan (plaintiffs) were registered voters in New
York City and brought suit against Katzenbach (defendant), the United States government official
tasked with enforcing §4(e). Morgan & Morgan challenged the constitutionality of §4(e) in federal
district court on the grounds that it prohibited enforcement of New York’s election laws requiring an
ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. The district court held that §4(e) was
unconstitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. Katzenbach appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.

Question 31

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
1992

Standing

Answer 31

Under Article III of the Constitution, a party does not have standing to litigate a generalized
grievance against the government in federal court if she suffered no personal injury other than
the harm suffered by all citizens.

Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), as amended 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.,
requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce before undertaking
actions that might jeopardize endangered or threatened species. The ESA provides that any person may
initiate a civil suit on her own behalf to enjoin anyone, including governmental entities, from violating
the ESA. In 1978, the Secretaries promulgated a joint regulation stating that the ESA consultation
requirement extended to federal actions taken in foreign nations. A new joint regulation limiting the
geographic scope to the United States and the high seas was proposed in 1983 and adopted in 1986.
Organizations dedicated to the protection of wildlife (plaintiffs) sued the Secretary of the Interior,
Lujan (Secretary) (defendant), seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation’s interpretation
was wrong and an injunction requiring the Secretary to restore the initial interpretation of the
geographic scope of the statute. The plaintiffs argued they were injured because a lack of consultation
for governmental activities abroad increases the rate of extinction of endangered species. The Secretary
moved to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, but the
court of appeals reversed and remanded. The district court then granted the plaintiffs’ summary
judgment motion and issued the injunction. The appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.

Question 32

McCulloch v. Maryland
1819

Taxing and spending

Answer 32

The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general
welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this
enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that
interfere with the federal government’s exercise of its constitutional powers.

In 1816, Congress passed an act that incorporated the Bank of the United States. In 1817, the Bank
opened up a branch in the state of Maryland (plaintiff). In 1818, the Maryland state legislature passed
an act to impose a tax on all out-of-state banks operating in the state of Maryland. Although the act
was general in nature, the Bank of the United States was the only such bank in Maryland at that time
and was thus the only establishment affected by the tax. James McCulloch (defendant), head of the
Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States (Bank), refused to pay the tax. This lawsuit ensued
and the case was appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The court of appeals upheld Maryland’s
argument that because the Constitution was specifically silent on the subject of whether the United
States government could charter a bank, the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. The case
was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 33

Marbury v. Madison

1803

Answer 33

The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to
determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution.

William Marbury (plaintiff) was appointed Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia by
President John Adams at the close of Adams’ presidency. When the new president, Thomas Jefferson,
assumed office, he refused to fully finalize Adams’ appointments of Marbury and several other
appointees. Relying on Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury then brought an action in the
United States Supreme Court against James Madison (defendant), Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of
State, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel him to finalize Marbury’s political appointment.

Question 34

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee

1816

Answer 34

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
authority to exercise appellate review of state court decisions.

In 1791, Martin (plaintiff) instituted a land dispute case against Hunter’s Lessee (Hunter) (defendant)
in Virginia state court. In 1810, the Virginia Court of Appeals held for Hunter. The United States
Supreme Court reversed in 1813, but the Virginia state courts did not respect this ruling. The Virginia
judges argued that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, a law which provided that the United States
Supreme Court had appellate review over state court decisions, was unconstitutional and thus
unbinding. The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the case.

Question 35

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency
200

Case and controversy

Answer 35

(1) The Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Protection Agency with the statutory
authority to regulate new motor vehicle emissions greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant.” (2) For
standing to be appropriate, an actual case or controversy must be present, which is characterized
by a truly adversarial relationship. (3) Although an agency’s refusal to initiate rulemaking is
subject to judicial review, such review is extremely limited and highly deferential.

After the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (defendant) declined several private petitions to
issue regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles, a group of states
(including Massachusetts) (plaintiffs) brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(defendant) seeking declaratory relief on the issue of whether the EPA had the statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; and if so, whether its stated reasons for
refusing to do so were consistent with the Clean Air Act. The state of Massachusetts alleged inter alia
that the EPA’s failure to regulate these emissions would ultimately result in loss of its coastal lands due
to increased global warming from the emissions. The EPA claimed that the Clean Air Act (CAA) did
not authorize the agency to issue regulations to address global climate change and, moreover, that
Congress had not yet finished investigating the scientific merits of climate change. The EPA further
argued that it was not wise to regulate such emissions at that time. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit agreed and held in favor of the EPA. Plaintiffs appealed. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Question 36

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
1937

Commerce clause

Answer 36

Congress may regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power because labor relations
have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is
essential to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.

In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which created the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant) to enforce federal fair labor practice standards, including the
right of employees to unionize. After Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) (plaintiff) fired ten
employees that attempted to unionize at one of its Pennsylvania plants, the NLRB sanctioned the
company for engaging in discriminatory employment practices in violation of federal standards. JLSC
brought suit alleging that the NLRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s interstate
commerce power, and the lower courts agreed. The NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 37

National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius
2012

Taxing and spending

Answer 37

(1) The individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
is a valid use of Congress’s power to tax; and (2) The Medicaid expansion provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress’s
spending powers.

The National Federation of Independent Business, 26 states, and a number of individuals and
businesses (plaintiffs) filed suit in several different federal district courts against Kathleen Sebelius,
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and others (defendants) challenging the
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the Act) enacted by
Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that two provisions of the Act, the individual mandate,
which required U.S. citizens to pay a penalty if they did not purchase a health insurance policy, and the
Medicaid expansion provision, which required the states to greatly expand the pool or risk losing their
existing federal funds, were unconstitutional. The several district courts reached different conclusions.
The U.S. District Court for Northern District of Florida held in favor of the plaintiffs and struck down
the Act in its entirety. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part, concluding that the individual mandate was unconstitutional but severable from the rest of the
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review and to resolve the split among the appellate
courts.

Question 38

National League of Cities v. Usery

1976

Answer 38

The Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state employers is unconstitutional as a violation of
the Tenth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), that Congress
may regulate the labor standards of private employers through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
In this case, the National League of Cities (NLC) (plaintiffs) sought to challenge several amendments
made in 1974 to the FLSA making it applicable to state government employers. NLC brought suit in
federal district court against Usery (defendant), the Secretary of Labor, alleging that enforcement of the
FLSA against states would violate the Tenth Amendment’s protection of states’ rights to conduct
functions essential to their separate and independent existence from the federal government. The
district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. NLC
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 39

Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs
2003

Sovereign immunity

Answer 39

Congress implemented a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity
when it established a private cause of action under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.

Hibbs (plaintiff) was an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources (defendant). Hibbs
was fired after refusing to return to work upon notice that the Department would not extend a 12-week
leave of absence to care for his wife’s medical needs. Hibbs filed suit in the federal district court
claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. The Department moved for
summary judgment on grounds that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hibbs from bringing suit against
the state and that Hibbs had no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court of appeals reversed
the order for summary judgment. The Department petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
review.

Question 40

New York v. United States

1992

Answer 40

Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.

In 1985, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (the Act) to help
address issues of low-level radioactive waste disposal among the states. The Act encouraged states to
adopt programs to dispose of their own waste by creating three incentives: a monetary incentive to
encourage states to open waste sites, an access incentive to allow states without sites to be denied
access to other states’ sites, and a take-title provision which required a state, upon request of a wastegenerator
within its borders, to take title to the waste and pay damages to the generator for any harm
caused by the state’s failure to take title. The State of New York (plaintiff) brought suit against the
United States government (defendant), alleging that the three provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and the
Guarantee Clause. The federal district court dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 41

Nixon v. United States
1993

Political question

Answer 41

The constitutionality of Senate impeachment proceedings is a non-justiciable political question
incapable of judicial adjudication.

Walter Nixon (plaintiff) was a former federal district court judge who was convicted of perjury and
sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his commission even after incarceration, and the United
States House of Representatives began impeachment proceedings against him. The matter was referred
to the United States Senate to vote on Nixon’s removal. The Senate appointed a special committee to
receive evidence and hear testimony in the case and then to report their findings to the full Senate.
Nixon instituted this suit arguing that the Senate’s creation of a special committee to hear the case
violated the Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 constitutional requirement that all impeached persons be
“tried by the Senate.” Nixon sought a declaratory judgment that his impeachment conviction was void
and that his judicial salary and privileges should be reinstated.

Question 42

Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen
2003

Commerce clause

Answer 42

Congress’s regulation of roads and highways are covered under its powers to regulate the
instrumentalities and channels of commerce.

Congress created the Hazard Elimination Program (HEP) to provide state governments with funding to
improve dangerous sections of their state roads. To be eligible for federal funding, a state had to make
a thorough evaluation of the quality of its roads and report those findings to the federal government.
These requirements caused concern to state governments because they would need to determine what
sections of roads were hazardous and publicly report information about that determination, exposing
themselves to increased liability for accidents occurring at sites determined to be hazardous before
improvements could be made. To address these concerns, Congress held that materials compiled or
collected for purposes of the HEP would not be discoverable or capable of admission in any federal
court proceeding. In 1996, Guillen’s (plaintiff) wife was killed at an intersection in Pierce County,
Washington (defendant) that had previously been determined by the Washington state government to
be hazardous. Washington’s first request for funding to fix the intersection was denied, but its second
request after the accident was granted. Guillen brought a wrongful death suit in federal district court
and sought to admit evidence that Washington failed to implement proper safety measures to improve
the intersection. Washington moved to exclude this evidence based on its participation in the HEP. The
Washington Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when
deciding that state hazard information is not discoverable. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Question 43

Poe v. Ullman
1961

Ripeness

Answer 43

For a lawsuit to be ripe for adjudication, the injury threatened must be relatively immediate and
certain to occur without court intervention.

This lawsuit against Ullman (defendant), attorney for the State of Connecticut, combined three separate
actions, each challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut state statutes which prevented the use of
contraceptive devices, even by married couples, and the giving of medical advice in the use of such
devices. The first suit was brought by Paul and Pauline Poe (plaintiffs), a married couple that had
experienced three previous pregnancies end in children born with severe birth defects and causing
severe physical and emotional trauma to the plaintiffs. The Poes consulted with Dr. Buxton who
suggested the use of contraceptive devices to prevent future pregnancies. The second suit was brought
by Jane Doe (plaintiff), a married woman whose previous pregnancy had caused her extreme physical
illness. She also consulted with Dr. Buxton who recommended she use contraceptive devices. The third
suit was brought by Dr. Buxton (plaintiff) who sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the
Connecticut statutes deprived him of his liberty and property. The Connecticut Court of Errors
dismissed the case, and plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court seeking declaratory
relief.

Question 44

Powell v. McCormack
1969

Political question

Answer 44

A challenge to restrictions on congressional membership set by the United States House of
Representatives is justiciable and not a political question.

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (plaintiff) was elected to serve the 18th District of New York in the United
States House of Representatives in the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House Resolution,
Powell was prevented from taking his seat. The resolution was passed in response to the results of an
investigation in the 89th Congress which determined that Powell as Chairman of the Committee on
Education and Labor deceived the Congress as to his travel expenses and authorized inappropriate
salary payments to his wife. When Powell was prevented from taking his seat, he and several of his
constituents filed suit in federal district court against McCormack (defendant) and five other members
of Congress, alleging that the House could only exclude Powell if he failed to meet the standing
requirements of age, citizenship, and residence claimed in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution
(requirements which the House found Powell met). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Question 45

Printz v. United States

1997

Answer 45

Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs.

Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) in 1993 as an amendment
to its Gun Control Act of 1968. The Brady Act was a federal gun-control provision that required the
United States attorney general to implement a nationwide handgun background check system. While
moving towards a national system, in the interim, state and local officials were required to conduct
background checks of prospective firearm purchasers. Under the Brady Act, sellers of firearms would
report sales to their county Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs). The CLEOs would then
conduct background checks and confirm the lawfulness of the sales. Printz and Mack (plaintiffs) were
CLEOs in Montana and Arizona, respectively. Printz brought suit in federal district court against the
United States government alleging that the Brady Act was an unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional power because it compelled state officers to participate in federal service. The district
court held that the provision of the Brady Act requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was
unconstitutional, but held that this provision could be separated from the rest of the act, leaving a
constitutional, voluntary background check system in place. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act’s interim provisions were constitutional. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.

Question 46

Reno v. Condon
2000

Commerce clause

Answer 46

Congress may regulate states’ activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the
regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or regulations and does not require state
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.

In 1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to regulate the disclosure of
personal information retained by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs). Congress passed this
legislation because states routinely obtained significant personal information from individuals in
connection with those individuals obtaining driver’s licenses and then sold that information to private
entities at a profit for the state. The private entities could also further resell this information. The DPPA
was designed to prohibit the selling or reselling of individuals’ personal information by DMVs or
private entities without obtaining the individual’s consent. South Carolina and its Attorney General,
Condon (plaintiff), brought suit against the United States government and its Attorney General, Reno
(defendant), in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the
DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. The district court granted
summary judgment for Condon, and the court of appeals affirmed. Reno appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.

Question 47

Runyon v. McCrary

1976

Answer 47

It is illegal under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 for a secular private school to exclude applicants on the
basis of race.

Runyon (defendant) operated a private school that observed a policy of denying admission to African-
American students. McCrary (plaintiff) was one of two African-American children who were denied
admission. McCrary participated in a class action suit against the school alleging that its admissions
policy violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. A second child filed a comparable suit against a different school
and the two cases were consolidated for trial. The federal district court found that both children were
denied admission on the basis of race and concluded that the admissions policies violated Section
1981. The court of appeals affirmed. The schools petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
review.

Question 48

Sabri v. United States

2004

Answer 48

Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare and may enact, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, any provision rationally related to carrying out its spending powers for the
promotion of the general welfare.

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) to provide federal criminal penalties for the giving and
receiving of bribes for the benefit of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at least
$10,000 in federal funds. Sabri (defendant), a real estate developer, bribed a Minneapolis city official
on three separate occasions in an effort to obtain permission to circumvent local licensing and zoning
laws. The city official headed a Minneapolis public community development organization, which
received approximately $23 million annually in federal funds. The United States government (plaintiff)
prosecuted Sabri in district court under 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) but Sabri moved to dismiss the
indictment. Sabri argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require proof of a
connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe in establishing criminal liability. The
district court held for Sabri and dismissed the indictment, but the court of appeals reversed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 49

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
1996

Sovereign immunity

Answer 49

Congress may not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment
unless through an exercise of power derived from §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) providing that Native American
tribes could only conduct certain gaming activities pursuant to a valid compact between the tribe and
the state in which the gaming activities were located. The IGRA imposes on states a duty to negotiate
with tribes in good faith for the purpose of forming a compact and authorizes tribes to bring suit in
federal court against states to compel performance of that duty. In 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida
(plaintiff) brought suit against the State of Florida and its Governor (defendants) in district court
alleging that Florida refused to enter into any negotiations with the tribe for the establishment of
gaming activities and therefore violated the IGRA. Florida moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the IGRA violated Florida’s sovereign immunity. The district court denied Florida’s
motion to dismiss, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Seminole Tribe of Florida
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 50

Shelby County v. Holder

2013

Answer 50

A federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by
current needs.

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. Prior to the enactment of this statute, several states
maintained test or devices, such as literacy and knowledge tests, good moral-character requirements,
and vouchers requirements for registered voters. In several states, white citizens were registered to vote
at a rate approximately 50 percent higher than African American citizens, as a percentage of total
eligible voters in each classification. Because of these conditions, Congress determined that racial
discrimination in voting restrictions was entrenched and pervasive. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
prohibited any standard, practice, or procedure imposed or applied to deny or limit the right to vote on
account of race or color. In the states with the most severe restrictions, Congress required any changes
in voting procedures be preapproved by either the Attorney General or a court of three judges in
Washington, D.C., under § 5 of the act. These states were determined through a formula set forth in §
4(b). Both § 4(b) and § 5 were temporary and were set to expire after five years. Congress reauthorized
these two sections in 1970 and updated the coverage formula in § 4. This happened again in 1975 and
1982. The 1982 reauthorization was effective for 25 years and did not change § 4(b)’s coverage
formula. In 2006, Congress again reauthorized § 5’s restrictions for another 25 years and did not
change § 4(b)’s coverage formula. However, by 2004, the voter-registration figures were nearly equal
between white citizens and African American citizens. Shelby County, Alabama (plaintiff) sued the
federal government (defendant), seeking a declaratory judgment that § 4(b) and § 5 were
unconstitutional. The district court found that the provisions were constitutional. Shelby County
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed.
Shelby County then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Question 51

Singleton v. Wulff
1976

Standing

Answer 51

A plaintiff has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a third party’s right when that right is
inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, and when it is unlikely that
the third party can or will sue on his or her own behalf.

Singleton (plaintiff) was a Missouri-licensed physician who, along with another Missouri physician,
challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that prohibited Medicaid funding of abortions that
were not “medically indicated.” Singleton brought suit against Wulff (defendant), the Missouri state
official responsible for determining the appropriateness of Medicaid benefits, on behalf of
impoverished female clients that depended on Medicaid benefits to fund their abortions. The district
court dismissed Singleton’s case for lack of standing to bring this claim. The court of appeals reversed,
finding that Singleton had standing and also ruled for Singleton on the merits. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standing issue.

Question 52

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
2001

Answer 52

The Migratory Bird Rule in the Clean Water Act does not grant permit jurisdiction to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers over isolated, non-navigable waters of the United States.

The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) (plaintiff), a consortium of 23
suburban Chicago cities and municipalities, purchased a 553-acre parcel of property (the site) for the
purposes of developing a fill disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste. The site, formerly a
sand and gravel mining pit, contained permanent and seasonal ponds of varying sizes. SWANCC
contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (defendant) to determine whether a fill permit
was required under § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Initially, the Corps determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to issue a permit because the ponds were not “navigable waters” as defined in the
CWA. However, after learning that the site contained several species of migratory birds, the Corps
reconsidered their position and asserted jurisdiction under § 404(a) which extended to waters used as a
habitat for migratory birds that cross state lines, known as the Migratory Bird Rule. The Corps refused
to issue a permit to SWANCC. SWANCC filed suit in federal court under the Administrative Procedure
Act challenging the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the site and the merits of the permit denial.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps. SWANCC appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Question 53

South Dakota v. Dole

1987

Answer 53

The receipt of federal funds may be conditional if the exercise of the spending power is for the
general welfare, the conditions are unambiguous, the conditions are related to a federal interest
in a particular national project or program, and the conditions do not violate any other
constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment.

A South Dakota law permitted persons age nineteen or older to buy beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol.
In 1984, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. §158, which directed the Secretary of Transportation, Dole
(defendant), to withhold up to five percent of federal highway funds otherwise available to states in
which state laws permitted persons under the age of twenty-one to purchase alcohol. South Dakota
(plaintiff) sued Dole and the United States government in federal district court seeking a declaratory
judgment that Section 158 violated constitutional limits on Congress’s spending power and the
Twenty-First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court ruled that Congress
acted constitutionally, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Question 54

Tennessee v. Lane

2004

Answer 54

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to circumstances affecting the right to
access the judicial system, represents a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.

George Lane (plaintiff) and Beverly Jones filed suit in federal district court against the state of
Tennessee (defendant) alleging that the state violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 by denying them access to state courthouses due to their disabilities. The state moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of Eleventh Amendment state immunity from non-consensual suit. The
district court denied the state’s motion and the state appealed. The court of appeals stayed review of the
case pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees of Alabama v. Garrett,
532 U.S. 356 (2001). The court of appeals interpreted Garrett to prohibit private suits based on equal
protection claims against states under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but to allow suits against
states based on due process violations. The court of appeals concluded that Lane’s claims were based
on due process violations and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the state’s motion for
dismissal. The state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Question 55

United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
1980

Mootness

Answer 55

A properly certified class action suit may continue even if the named plaintiff’s individual claims
are rendered moot.

Geraghty (plaintiff) was a federal prisoner who, after twice being denied parole from a federal prison,
brought suit challenging the validity of the United States Parole Commission’s Parole Release
Guidelines. Geraghty requested the district court to certify the suit as a class action on behalf of a class
of “all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole.” The district court
denied this request and granted summary judgment for the United States Parole Commission
(defendant). Geraghty appealed but was released from prison while his appeal was pending in the court
of appeals. The court of appeals ruled that his release did not make the case moot and reversed the
district court’s denial of the class certification. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the issue of mootness.

Question 56

United States v. Butler
1936

Taxing and spending

Answer 56

Congress may not use its taxing and spending powers to obtain an unconstitutional result, such
as invading the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment.

In 1933, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to allow the Secretary of
Agriculture to set limits on the production of certain crops and tax farmers that produced in excess of
those limits. The AAA also provided grants to farmers to control their production of crops and thus
regulate prices. Butler (plaintiff), a processor of crops, brought suit against the United States
government (defendant) in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the AAA. The
district court ruled that Butler was required to pay taxes under the AAA, but the court of appeals
reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 57

United States v. Darby
1941

Commerce clause

Answer 57

Congress may regulate the labor standards involved in the manufacture of goods for interstate
commerce and may exclude from interstate commerce any goods produced under substandard
labor conditions.

Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to prevent the introduction and shipment of
goods produced under labor conditions that failed to meet federal standards from entering the stream of
interstate commerce. The United States government (plaintiff) brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia against Darby Lumber Company (defendant) alleging that the company
engaged in labor practices that fell short of the FLSA’s standards with the intent of manufacturing
goods to be sold in interstate commerce. The district court quashed the indictment of Darby, and the
court of appeals affirmed. The United States government appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 58

United States v. E.C. Knight Co.
1895

Commerce clause

Answer 58

Congress may not use its general powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate manufacturing.

In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in an effort to prevent monopolies or restrictive
trade agreements that would severely reduce economic competition among businesses. In 1892, the
American Sugar Refining Company gained control of the E.C. Knight Company (defendant) and
several other sugar manufacturers through sales of stock. The result was to give the American Sugar
Refining Company a 98 percent monopoly over the American sugar refining industry. The United
States government (plaintiff) sued the E.C. Knight Company for violating the anti-monopoly
provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act in an effort to suppress the transaction.

Question 59

United States v. Klein

1871

Answer 59

Based on the principle of separation of powers in the United States Constitution, the legislative
branch may not impair or direct the exclusive powers of the judicial or executive branches.

In 1863, Congress adopted a statute providing that individuals whose property had been seized during
the Civil War could recover their property or just compensation for it if they proved they had not
assisted the Confederate army during the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln then issued a
proclamation offering a pardon to anyone who had fought for or supported the Confederate army,
provided that person take an oath of allegiance to the Union. Following Congress’s act and the
President’s proclamation, the United States Supreme Court held that a presidential pardon was
sufficient proof that an individual had not assisted the Confederate army and was enough to justify a
restoration of that person’s property rights. Based on the 1863 statute and the president’s proclamation,
V.F. Wilson took the oath of allegiance and was pardoned. After Wilson’s death in 1865, the
administrator of his estate, Klein (defendant), applied to the Court of Claims to recover compensation
for property seized from Wilson during the Civil War. While Klein’s case was pending, Congress
repealed its 1863 statute in 1867. The Court of Claims then decided in 1869 that Wilson’s estate was
entitled to compensation for seized property based on his oath and presidential pardon. However, in
1870, Congress passed a new law that prohibited the use of a presidential pardon as proof that an
individual was entitled to property rights or compensation. The law also said that acceptance of a
presidential pardon, without a specific disclaimer of guilt, was conclusive evidence that the person did
provide support to the Confederacy and thus made that person ineligible to recover property or
compensation. Congress stated that if a person was ultimately found to support the Confederacy, the
United States Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over an appeal of his or her denial of property rights
from the Court of Claims. Based on this new law, the United States government (plaintiff) brought suit
in the United States Supreme Court challenging the property rights given to Klein on the grounds that
since Wilson accepted a presidential pardon, his estate was not entitled to property or sale proceeds.

Question 60

United States v. Lopez
1995

Commerce clause

Answer 60

Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the
possession of a gun near a school.

In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), making it a federal offense “for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.” Lopez (defendant), a student who brought a gun to his high school,
was confronted by school authorities, arrested, and charged with violating the GFSZA. Lopez was tried
and convicted. In his appeal, he brought suit against the United States government (plaintiff),
challenging the constitutionality of the GFSZA as a regulation based on Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction. The
United States petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which granted the petition.

Question 61

United States v. Morrison
2000

Commerce clause

Answer 61

(1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against
women because it is not an economic activity.
(2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory
conduct of state officials, not private actors.

In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which contained a provision for
a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence, even when victims did not file criminal
charges. That same year, Christy Brzonkala, a female student at Virginia Tech University, was
allegedly assaulted and raped by Antonio Morrison (defendant) and James Crawford. Morrison was
temporarily suspended from school, but a state grand jury did not find enough evidence to indict him.
Brzonkala and the United States government (plaintiffs) brought suit against Morrison, Crawford, and
Virginia Tech under the VAWA in federal district court. Morrison challenged the VAWA as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. The district court held that
Congress lacked authority to enact the VAWA, but a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case and upheld the district court’s decision that
Congress lacked authority. Brzonkala and the United States appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.

Question 62

United States v. Richardson
1974

Taxing and spending

Answer 62

For a taxpayer to show sufficient personal, direct injury to justify his or her standing to
challenge a government action, he must challenge an enactment under the Taxing and Spending
Clause of the Constitution and must claim that the challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limits imposed on the taxing and spending power.

Richardson (plaintiff), a private citizen, brought suit against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of
the United States government (defendant) alleging that the CIA’s insufficient public reporting of its
expenditures under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 violated the Constitution of the United
States. Richardson brought suit in the district court, which dismissed his case for lack of standing. He
appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the standing issue.

Question 63

University of Alabama v. Garrett

2001

Answer 63

Federal laws enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be aimed at a pattern
of unconstitutional discrimination and must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.

Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability. Title I of the ADA applies to the states and permits employees to recover
money damages for violations of the statute. The legislative record considered by Congress in enacting
the ADA identified widespread discrimination against persons with disabilities. However, although
several instances of discrimination by local governments were identified, the legislative record only
contained a few examples of potential discrimination by states against persons with disabilities.

Question 64

Vieth v. Jubelirer
2004

Political question

Answer 64

The issue of political gerrymandering represents a nonjusticiable political question incapable of
adjudication by the courts.

Vieth (plaintiff), a Pennsylvania registered Democrat, brought suit against Jubelirer (defendant) in his
official capacity, alleging that the Pennsylvania General Assembly engaged in unconstitutional political
gerrymandering when it established the districts for the election of congressional representatives. The
complaint alleged that after the 2000 census, Pennsylvania was required to decrease its amount of
representatives by two. In redistricting to reflect this change, prominent members of the Republican
Party pressured the General Assembly into enacting a pro-Republican redistricting plan. This plan was
ultimately passed by the Pennsylvania governor as Act I. Vieth brought suit to enjoin the
implementation of Act I in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Question 65

Wickard v. Filburn
1942

Commerce clause

Answer 65

Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic-controlled
Congress passed many “New Deal” programs designed to improve the poor economic climate in the
United States. One such program was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the area
that farmers could devote to wheat production in an effort to stabilize the national price of wheat.
Filburn (plaintiff), a small farmer, was penalized pursuant to the Act for producing wheat in excess of
the Act’s quotas. Filburn filed suit against Secretary of Agriculture Wickard (defendant), seeking to
enjoin enforcement against himself of the penalties. Filburn argued that because the excess wheat was
produced for his own private consumption and never entered the stream of commerce, his activities
could not be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. The district court agreed with Filburn
that Congress’s regulations were unconstitutional, and the circuit court affirmed. Wickard appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.

Question 66

Zivotofsky v. Clinton

2012

Answer 66

The Constitution grants courts, not the political branches, the authority to determine the
constitutionality of statutes.

Congress enacted a law allowing Americans born in Jerusalem to list “Israel” as their birthplace on
their passports. The policy of the State Department, under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(defendant), was to remain neutral on the political status of Jerusalem. Thus, the department refused to
comply with the statute. Zivotofsky (plaintiff) sued in federal court. The court of appeals held that the
determination of whether the statute was constitutional was a political question. The U.S. Supreme
Court considered the question.