CH 1 & 2 Flashcards

Question

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 1964 Commerce clause

Answer 1

Congress may enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies in hotel accommodations because of the negative effects of those policies on interstate commerce. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. (plaintiff) in Atlanta, Georgia advertises to and hosts primarily out-of-state guests. The motel practices a policy of refusing to rent rooms to African Americans and brought this suit against the United States government (defendant) in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to challenge the CRA as an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The district court upheld the CRA as constitutional. The court of appeals affirmed. Heart of Atlanta appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 2

Taxpayers do not have standing to challenge expenditures made by the executive branch of the federal government solely based on their status as taxpayers. Members of the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) (plaintiffs) brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against Hein and other federal officials (defendants) tasked with administering President George W. Bush’s Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program. FFRF challenged the program, as taxpayers, on the grounds that the program inappropriately used taxpayer money to support faith-based programs and that speeches made by President Bush contained “religious imagery.” The district court granted FFRF’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of standing, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the program constituted an inappropriate use of federal money in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 3

Congress may regulate operations in all matters having a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms. The Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. (the railway) (plaintiff) functioned to facilitate commerce among Texas cities and between Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana. However, the railway charged significantly higher rates for the transportation of goods from Shreveport to Texas cities than from Dallas and Houston to those same Texas cities. The result of this was to severely impair commerce from Shreveport. The Interstate Commerce Commission, established by Congress (defendant), sought to regulate this situation by fixing the maximum price that could be charged by the railway on its interstate routes to be comparable to its intrastate routes. The railway brought suit in the Commerce Court, arguing that because the Interstate Commerce Commission was setting the price of interstate commerce based on its determination of what was reasonable in intrastate commerce, it was overstepping its Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Commerce Court rejected this argument and held that the Interstate Commerce Commission acted constitutionally. The railway appealed.

Answer 4

Congress may make whatever laws are necessary and proper for enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery and the negative effects of slavery. Jones (plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court against Alfred H. Mayer Co. (Mayer) (defendant) alleging that Mayer refused to sell a house to Jones simply because Jones is African American. Jones relied on 42 U.S.C. §1982 which grants the right to all citizens of the United States to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that §1982 only applies to state action and does not reach private actors who refuse to sell real estate. The court of appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 5

Congress may regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Title II of the CRA forbids racial discrimination by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. The McClungs (plaintiffs) owned and operated Ollie’s Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama and refused to serve African American customers. Approximately half of the food served by the restaurant moved in interstate commerce. The McClungs sued Katzenbach (defendant), the United States government actor responsible for enforcing the act, to enjoin the act's enforcement against the McClungs. The action was brought in federal district court. The district court issued an injunction preventing enforcement of the Act against the McClungs. The United States government appealed. This case was decided by the United States Supreme Court along with Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

Answer 6

Congress may pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 4(e) of the Act provided that no person that successfully completed the sixth grade in a public or private school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where the language of education was something other than English, could be denied the right to vote in an election because of his inability to read or write English. The election laws of the State of New York, however, required all voters to have the ability to read and write English as a requisite to voting. Morgan & Morgan (plaintiffs) were registered voters in New York City and brought suit against Katzenbach (defendant), the United States government official tasked with enforcing §4(e). Morgan & Morgan challenged the constitutionality of §4(e) in federal district court on the grounds that it prohibited enforcement of New York’s election laws requiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. The district court held that §4(e) was unconstitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. Katzenbach appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 7

Under Article III of the Constitution, a party does not have standing to litigate a generalized grievance against the government in federal court if she suffered no personal injury other than the harm suffered by all citizens. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), as amended 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce before undertaking actions that might jeopardize endangered or threatened species. The ESA provides that any person may initiate a civil suit on her own behalf to enjoin anyone, including governmental entities, from violating the ESA. In 1978, the Secretaries promulgated a joint regulation stating that the ESA consultation requirement extended to federal actions taken in foreign nations. A new joint regulation limiting the geographic scope to the United States and the high seas was proposed in 1983 and adopted in 1986. Organizations dedicated to the protection of wildlife (plaintiffs) sued the Secretary of the Interior, Lujan (Secretary) (defendant), seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation’s interpretation was wrong and an injunction requiring the Secretary to restore the initial interpretation of the geographic scope of the statute. The plaintiffs argued they were injured because a lack of consultation for governmental activities abroad increases the rate of extinction of endangered species. The Secretary moved to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The district court then granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and issued the injunction. The appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 8

The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this enumerated power. Additionally, federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government’s exercise of its constitutional powers. In 1816, Congress passed an act that incorporated the Bank of the United States. In 1817, the Bank opened up a branch in the state of Maryland (plaintiff). In 1818, the Maryland state legislature passed an act to impose a tax on all out-of-state banks operating in the state of Maryland. Although the act was general in nature, the Bank of the United States was the only such bank in Maryland at that time and was thus the only establishment affected by the tax. James McCulloch (defendant), head of the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States (Bank), refused to pay the tax. This lawsuit ensued and the case was appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The court of appeals upheld Maryland’s argument that because the Constitution was specifically silent on the subject of whether the United States government could charter a bank, the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 9

The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution. ``` William Marbury (plaintiff) was appointed Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia by President John Adams at the close of Adams’ presidency. When the new president, Thomas Jefferson, assumed office, he refused to fully finalize Adams’ appointments of Marbury and several other appointees. Relying on Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury then brought an action in the United States Supreme Court against James Madison (defendant), Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of State, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel him to finalize Marbury’s political appointment. ```

Answer 10

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has authority to exercise appellate review of state court decisions. In 1791, Martin (plaintiff) instituted a land dispute case against Hunter’s Lessee (Hunter) (defendant) in Virginia state court. In 1810, the Virginia Court of Appeals held for Hunter. The United States Supreme Court reversed in 1813, but the Virginia state courts did not respect this ruling. The Virginia judges argued that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, a law which provided that the United States Supreme Court had appellate review over state court decisions, was unconstitutional and thus unbinding. The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the case.

Answer 11

(1) The Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Protection Agency with the statutory authority to regulate new motor vehicle emissions greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant.” (2) For standing to be appropriate, an actual case or controversy must be present, which is characterized by a truly adversarial relationship. (3) Although an agency’s refusal to initiate rulemaking is subject to judicial review, such review is extremely limited and highly deferential. After the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (defendant) declined several private petitions to issue regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles, a group of states (including Massachusetts) (plaintiffs) brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (defendant) seeking declaratory relief on the issue of whether the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; and if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so were consistent with the Clean Air Act. The state of Massachusetts alleged inter alia that the EPA’s failure to regulate these emissions would ultimately result in loss of its coastal lands due to increased global warming from the emissions. The EPA claimed that the Clean Air Act (CAA) did not authorize the agency to issue regulations to address global climate change and, moreover, that Congress had not yet finished investigating the scientific merits of climate change. The EPA further argued that it was not wise to regulate such emissions at that time. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed and held in favor of the EPA. Plaintiffs appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Answer 12

Congress may regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power because labor relations have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions. In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant) to enforce federal fair labor practice standards, including the right of employees to unionize. After Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) (plaintiff) fired ten employees that attempted to unionize at one of its Pennsylvania plants, the NLRB sanctioned the company for engaging in discriminatory employment practices in violation of federal standards. JLSC brought suit alleging that the NLRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s interstate commerce power, and the lower courts agreed. The NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court.

Answer 13

(1) The individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a valid use of Congress’s power to tax; and (2) The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending powers. The National Federation of Independent Business, 26 states, and a number of individuals and businesses (plaintiffs) filed suit in several different federal district courts against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and others (defendants) challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the Act) enacted by Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that two provisions of the Act, the individual mandate, which required U.S. citizens to pay a penalty if they did not purchase a health insurance policy, and the Medicaid expansion provision, which required the states to greatly expand the pool or risk losing their existing federal funds, were unconstitutional. The several district courts reached different conclusions. The U.S. District Court for Northern District of Florida held in favor of the plaintiffs and struck down the Act in its entirety. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the individual mandate was unconstitutional but severable from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review and to resolve the split among the appellate courts.

Answer 14

The Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state employers is unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), that Congress may regulate the labor standards of private employers through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, the National League of Cities (NLC) (plaintiffs) sought to challenge several amendments made in 1974 to the FLSA making it applicable to state government employers. NLC brought suit in federal district court against Usery (defendant), the Secretary of Labor, alleging that enforcement of the FLSA against states would violate the Tenth Amendment’s protection of states’ rights to conduct functions essential to their separate and independent existence from the federal government. The district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. NLC appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 15

Congress implemented a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity when it established a private cause of action under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Hibbs (plaintiff) was an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources (defendant). Hibbs was fired after refusing to return to work upon notice that the Department would not extend a 12-week leave of absence to care for his wife’s medical needs. Hibbs filed suit in the federal district court claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. The Department moved for summary judgment on grounds that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hibbs from bringing suit against the state and that Hibbs had no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court of appeals reversed the order for summary judgment. The Department petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Answer 16

Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. In 1985, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (the Act) to help address issues of low-level radioactive waste disposal among the states. The Act encouraged states to adopt programs to dispose of their own waste by creating three incentives: a monetary incentive to encourage states to open waste sites, an access incentive to allow states without sites to be denied access to other states’ sites, and a take-title provision which required a state, upon request of a wastegenerator within its borders, to take title to the waste and pay damages to the generator for any harm caused by the state’s failure to take title. The State of New York (plaintiff) brought suit against the United States government (defendant), alleging that the three provisions of the Act were unconstitutional under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and the Guarantee Clause. The federal district court dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 17

The constitutionality of Senate impeachment proceedings is a non-justiciable political question incapable of judicial adjudication. Walter Nixon (plaintiff) was a former federal district court judge who was convicted of perjury and sentenced to prison. He refused to resign his commission even after incarceration, and the United States House of Representatives began impeachment proceedings against him. The matter was referred to the United States Senate to vote on Nixon’s removal. The Senate appointed a special committee to receive evidence and hear testimony in the case and then to report their findings to the full Senate. Nixon instituted this suit arguing that the Senate’s creation of a special committee to hear the case violated the Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 constitutional requirement that all impeached persons be “tried by the Senate.” Nixon sought a declaratory judgment that his impeachment conviction was void and that his judicial salary and privileges should be reinstated.

Answer 18

Congress’s regulation of roads and highways are covered under its powers to regulate the instrumentalities and channels of commerce. Congress created the Hazard Elimination Program (HEP) to provide state governments with funding to improve dangerous sections of their state roads. To be eligible for federal funding, a state had to make a thorough evaluation of the quality of its roads and report those findings to the federal government. These requirements caused concern to state governments because they would need to determine what sections of roads were hazardous and publicly report information about that determination, exposing themselves to increased liability for accidents occurring at sites determined to be hazardous before improvements could be made. To address these concerns, Congress held that materials compiled or collected for purposes of the HEP would not be discoverable or capable of admission in any federal court proceeding. In 1996, Guillen’s (plaintiff) wife was killed at an intersection in Pierce County, Washington (defendant) that had previously been determined by the Washington state government to be hazardous. Washington’s first request for funding to fix the intersection was denied, but its second request after the accident was granted. Guillen brought a wrongful death suit in federal district court and sought to admit evidence that Washington failed to implement proper safety measures to improve the intersection. Washington moved to exclude this evidence based on its participation in the HEP. The Washington Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when deciding that state hazard information is not discoverable. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 19

For a lawsuit to be ripe for adjudication, the injury threatened must be relatively immediate and certain to occur without court intervention. This lawsuit against Ullman (defendant), attorney for the State of Connecticut, combined three separate actions, each challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut state statutes which prevented the use of contraceptive devices, even by married couples, and the giving of medical advice in the use of such devices. The first suit was brought by Paul and Pauline Poe (plaintiffs), a married couple that had experienced three previous pregnancies end in children born with severe birth defects and causing severe physical and emotional trauma to the plaintiffs. The Poes consulted with Dr. Buxton who suggested the use of contraceptive devices to prevent future pregnancies. The second suit was brought by Jane Doe (plaintiff), a married woman whose previous pregnancy had caused her extreme physical illness. She also consulted with Dr. Buxton who recommended she use contraceptive devices. The third suit was brought by Dr. Buxton (plaintiff) who sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the Connecticut statutes deprived him of his liberty and property. The Connecticut Court of Errors dismissed the case, and plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court seeking declaratory relief.

Answer 20

A challenge to restrictions on congressional membership set by the United States House of Representatives is justiciable and not a political question. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (plaintiff) was elected to serve the 18th District of New York in the United States House of Representatives in the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House Resolution, Powell was prevented from taking his seat. The resolution was passed in response to the results of an investigation in the 89th Congress which determined that Powell as Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor deceived the Congress as to his travel expenses and authorized inappropriate salary payments to his wife. When Powell was prevented from taking his seat, he and several of his constituents filed suit in federal district court against McCormack (defendant) and five other members of Congress, alleging that the House could only exclude Powell if he failed to meet the standing requirements of age, citizenship, and residence claimed in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution (requirements which the House found Powell met). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 21

Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs. Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) in 1993 as an amendment to its Gun Control Act of 1968. The Brady Act was a federal gun-control provision that required the United States attorney general to implement a nationwide handgun background check system. While moving towards a national system, in the interim, state and local officials were required to conduct background checks of prospective firearm purchasers. Under the Brady Act, sellers of firearms would report sales to their county Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs). The CLEOs would then conduct background checks and confirm the lawfulness of the sales. Printz and Mack (plaintiffs) were CLEOs in Montana and Arizona, respectively. Printz brought suit in federal district court against the United States government alleging that the Brady Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power because it compelled state officers to participate in federal service. The district court held that the provision of the Brady Act requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was unconstitutional, but held that this provision could be separated from the rest of the act, leaving a constitutional, voluntary background check system in place. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act’s interim provisions were constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 22

Congress may regulate states’ activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or regulations and does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. In 1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to regulate the disclosure of personal information retained by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs). Congress passed this legislation because states routinely obtained significant personal information from individuals in connection with those individuals obtaining driver’s licenses and then sold that information to private entities at a profit for the state. The private entities could also further resell this information. The DPPA was designed to prohibit the selling or reselling of individuals’ personal information by DMVs or private entities without obtaining the individual’s consent. South Carolina and its Attorney General, Condon (plaintiff), brought suit against the United States government and its Attorney General, Reno (defendant), in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for Condon, and the court of appeals affirmed. Reno appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 23

It is illegal under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 for a secular private school to exclude applicants on the basis of race. Runyon (defendant) operated a private school that observed a policy of denying admission to African- American students. McCrary (plaintiff) was one of two African-American children who were denied admission. McCrary participated in a class action suit against the school alleging that its admissions policy violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. A second child filed a comparable suit against a different school and the two cases were consolidated for trial. The federal district court found that both children were denied admission on the basis of race and concluded that the admissions policies violated Section 1981. The court of appeals affirmed. The schools petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Answer 24

Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare and may enact, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, any provision rationally related to carrying out its spending powers for the promotion of the general welfare. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) to provide federal criminal penalties for the giving and receiving of bribes for the benefit of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds. Sabri (defendant), a real estate developer, bribed a Minneapolis city official on three separate occasions in an effort to obtain permission to circumvent local licensing and zoning laws. The city official headed a Minneapolis public community development organization, which received approximately $23 million annually in federal funds. The United States government (plaintiff) prosecuted Sabri in district court under 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(2) but Sabri moved to dismiss the indictment. Sabri argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require proof of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe in establishing criminal liability. The district court held for Sabri and dismissed the indictment, but the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 25

Congress may not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment unless through an exercise of power derived from §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) providing that Native American tribes could only conduct certain gaming activities pursuant to a valid compact between the tribe and the state in which the gaming activities were located. The IGRA imposes on states a duty to negotiate with tribes in good faith for the purpose of forming a compact and authorizes tribes to bring suit in federal court against states to compel performance of that duty. In 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida (plaintiff) brought suit against the State of Florida and its Governor (defendants) in district court alleging that Florida refused to enter into any negotiations with the tribe for the establishment of gaming activities and therefore violated the IGRA. Florida moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the IGRA violated Florida’s sovereign immunity. The district court denied Florida’s motion to dismiss, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Seminole Tribe of Florida appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 26

A federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by current needs. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. Prior to the enactment of this statute, several states maintained test or devices, such as literacy and knowledge tests, good moral-character requirements, and vouchers requirements for registered voters. In several states, white citizens were registered to vote at a rate approximately 50 percent higher than African American citizens, as a percentage of total eligible voters in each classification. Because of these conditions, Congress determined that racial discrimination in voting restrictions was entrenched and pervasive. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibited any standard, practice, or procedure imposed or applied to deny or limit the right to vote on account of race or color. In the states with the most severe restrictions, Congress required any changes in voting procedures be preapproved by either the Attorney General or a court of three judges in Washington, D.C., under § 5 of the act. These states were determined through a formula set forth in § 4(b). Both § 4(b) and § 5 were temporary and were set to expire after five years. Congress reauthorized these two sections in 1970 and updated the coverage formula in § 4. This happened again in 1975 and 1982. The 1982 reauthorization was effective for 25 years and did not change § 4(b)’s coverage formula. In 2006, Congress again reauthorized § 5’s restrictions for another 25 years and did not change § 4(b)’s coverage formula. However, by 2004, the voter-registration figures were nearly equal between white citizens and African American citizens. Shelby County, Alabama (plaintiff) sued the federal government (defendant), seeking a declaratory judgment that § 4(b) and § 5 were unconstitutional. The district court found that the provisions were constitutional. Shelby County appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed. Shelby County then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Answer 27

A plaintiff has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a third party’s right when that right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, and when it is unlikely that the third party can or will sue on his or her own behalf. Singleton (plaintiff) was a Missouri-licensed physician who, along with another Missouri physician, challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that prohibited Medicaid funding of abortions that were not “medically indicated.” Singleton brought suit against Wulff (defendant), the Missouri state official responsible for determining the appropriateness of Medicaid benefits, on behalf of impoverished female clients that depended on Medicaid benefits to fund their abortions. The district court dismissed Singleton’s case for lack of standing to bring this claim. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Singleton had standing and also ruled for Singleton on the merits. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standing issue.

Answer 28

The Migratory Bird Rule in the Clean Water Act does not grant permit jurisdiction to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers over isolated, non-navigable waters of the United States. The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) (plaintiff), a consortium of 23 suburban Chicago cities and municipalities, purchased a 553-acre parcel of property (the site) for the purposes of developing a fill disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste. The site, formerly a sand and gravel mining pit, contained permanent and seasonal ponds of varying sizes. SWANCC contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (defendant) to determine whether a fill permit was required under § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Initially, the Corps determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a permit because the ponds were not “navigable waters” as defined in the CWA. However, after learning that the site contained several species of migratory birds, the Corps reconsidered their position and asserted jurisdiction under § 404(a) which extended to waters used as a habitat for migratory birds that cross state lines, known as the Migratory Bird Rule. The Corps refused to issue a permit to SWANCC. SWANCC filed suit in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act challenging the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the site and the merits of the permit denial. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps. SWANCC appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Answer 29

The receipt of federal funds may be conditional if the exercise of the spending power is for the general welfare, the conditions are unambiguous, the conditions are related to a federal interest in a particular national project or program, and the conditions do not violate any other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment. A South Dakota law permitted persons age nineteen or older to buy beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol. In 1984, Congress passed 23 U.S.C. §158, which directed the Secretary of Transportation, Dole (defendant), to withhold up to five percent of federal highway funds otherwise available to states in which state laws permitted persons under the age of twenty-one to purchase alcohol. South Dakota (plaintiff) sued Dole and the United States government in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 158 violated constitutional limits on Congress’s spending power and the Twenty-First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court ruled that Congress acted constitutionally, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 30

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to circumstances affecting the right to access the judicial system, represents a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. George Lane (plaintiff) and Beverly Jones filed suit in federal district court against the state of Tennessee (defendant) alleging that the state violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 by denying them access to state courthouses due to their disabilities. The state moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of Eleventh Amendment state immunity from non-consensual suit. The district court denied the state’s motion and the state appealed. The court of appeals stayed review of the case pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees of Alabama v. Garrett, 532 U.S. 356 (2001). The court of appeals interpreted Garrett to prohibit private suits based on equal protection claims against states under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but to allow suits against states based on due process violations. The court of appeals concluded that Lane’s claims were based on due process violations and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the state’s motion for dismissal. The state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Answer 31

``` A properly certified class action suit may continue even if the named plaintiff’s individual claims are rendered moot. ``` Geraghty (plaintiff) was a federal prisoner who, after twice being denied parole from a federal prison, brought suit challenging the validity of the United States Parole Commission’s Parole Release Guidelines. Geraghty requested the district court to certify the suit as a class action on behalf of a class of “all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole.” The district court denied this request and granted summary judgment for the United States Parole Commission (defendant). Geraghty appealed but was released from prison while his appeal was pending in the court of appeals. The court of appeals ruled that his release did not make the case moot and reversed the district court’s denial of the class certification. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of mootness.

Answer 32

Congress may not use its taxing and spending powers to obtain an unconstitutional result, such as invading the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment. In 1933, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to set limits on the production of certain crops and tax farmers that produced in excess of those limits. The AAA also provided grants to farmers to control their production of crops and thus regulate prices. Butler (plaintiff), a processor of crops, brought suit against the United States government (defendant) in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the AAA. The district court ruled that Butler was required to pay taxes under the AAA, but the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Answer 33

Congress may regulate the labor standards involved in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce and may exclude from interstate commerce any goods produced under substandard labor conditions. Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to prevent the introduction and shipment of goods produced under labor conditions that failed to meet federal standards from entering the stream of interstate commerce. The United States government (plaintiff) brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against Darby Lumber Company (defendant) alleging that the company engaged in labor practices that fell short of the FLSA’s standards with the intent of manufacturing goods to be sold in interstate commerce. The district court quashed the indictment of Darby, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States government appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 34

Congress may not use its general powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate manufacturing. In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in an effort to prevent monopolies or restrictive trade agreements that would severely reduce economic competition among businesses. In 1892, the American Sugar Refining Company gained control of the E.C. Knight Company (defendant) and several other sugar manufacturers through sales of stock. The result was to give the American Sugar Refining Company a 98 percent monopoly over the American sugar refining industry. The United States government (plaintiff) sued the E.C. Knight Company for violating the anti-monopoly provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act in an effort to suppress the transaction.

Answer 35

Based on the principle of separation of powers in the United States Constitution, the legislative branch may not impair or direct the exclusive powers of the judicial or executive branches. In 1863, Congress adopted a statute providing that individuals whose property had been seized during the Civil War could recover their property or just compensation for it if they proved they had not assisted the Confederate army during the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln then issued a proclamation offering a pardon to anyone who had fought for or supported the Confederate army, provided that person take an oath of allegiance to the Union. Following Congress’s act and the President’s proclamation, the United States Supreme Court held that a presidential pardon was sufficient proof that an individual had not assisted the Confederate army and was enough to justify a restoration of that person’s property rights. Based on the 1863 statute and the president’s proclamation, V.F. Wilson took the oath of allegiance and was pardoned. After Wilson’s death in 1865, the administrator of his estate, Klein (defendant), applied to the Court of Claims to recover compensation for property seized from Wilson during the Civil War. While Klein’s case was pending, Congress repealed its 1863 statute in 1867. The Court of Claims then decided in 1869 that Wilson’s estate was entitled to compensation for seized property based on his oath and presidential pardon. However, in 1870, Congress passed a new law that prohibited the use of a presidential pardon as proof that an individual was entitled to property rights or compensation. The law also said that acceptance of a presidential pardon, without a specific disclaimer of guilt, was conclusive evidence that the person did provide support to the Confederacy and thus made that person ineligible to recover property or compensation. Congress stated that if a person was ultimately found to support the Confederacy, the United States Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over an appeal of his or her denial of property rights from the Court of Claims. Based on this new law, the United States government (plaintiff) brought suit in the United States Supreme Court challenging the property rights given to Klein on the grounds that since Wilson accepted a presidential pardon, his estate was not entitled to property or sale proceeds.

Answer 36

Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school. In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), making it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Lopez (defendant), a student who brought a gun to his high school, was confronted by school authorities, arrested, and charged with violating the GFSZA. Lopez was tried and convicted. In his appeal, he brought suit against the United States government (plaintiff), challenging the constitutionality of the GFSZA as a regulation based on Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction. The United States petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which granted the petition.

Answer 37

(1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity. (2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory conduct of state officials, not private actors. In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which contained a provision for a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence, even when victims did not file criminal charges. That same year, Christy Brzonkala, a female student at Virginia Tech University, was allegedly assaulted and raped by Antonio Morrison (defendant) and James Crawford. Morrison was temporarily suspended from school, but a state grand jury did not find enough evidence to indict him. Brzonkala and the United States government (plaintiffs) brought suit against Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech under the VAWA in federal district court. Morrison challenged the VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. The district court held that Congress lacked authority to enact the VAWA, but a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case and upheld the district court’s decision that Congress lacked authority. Brzonkala and the United States appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 38

For a taxpayer to show sufficient personal, direct injury to justify his or her standing to challenge a government action, he must challenge an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution and must claim that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limits imposed on the taxing and spending power. Richardson (plaintiff), a private citizen, brought suit against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States government (defendant) alleging that the CIA’s insufficient public reporting of its expenditures under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 violated the Constitution of the United States. Richardson brought suit in the district court, which dismissed his case for lack of standing. He appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standing issue.

Answer 39

Federal laws enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be aimed at a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination and must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. Title I of the ADA applies to the states and permits employees to recover money damages for violations of the statute. The legislative record considered by Congress in enacting the ADA identified widespread discrimination against persons with disabilities. However, although several instances of discrimination by local governments were identified, the legislative record only contained a few examples of potential discrimination by states against persons with disabilities.

Answer 40

The issue of political gerrymandering represents a nonjusticiable political question incapable of adjudication by the courts. Vieth (plaintiff), a Pennsylvania registered Democrat, brought suit against Jubelirer (defendant) in his official capacity, alleging that the Pennsylvania General Assembly engaged in unconstitutional political gerrymandering when it established the districts for the election of congressional representatives. The complaint alleged that after the 2000 census, Pennsylvania was required to decrease its amount of representatives by two. In redistricting to reflect this change, prominent members of the Republican Party pressured the General Assembly into enacting a pro-Republican redistricting plan. This plan was ultimately passed by the Pennsylvania governor as Act I. Vieth brought suit to enjoin the implementation of Act I in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Answer 41

Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic-controlled Congress passed many “New Deal” programs designed to improve the poor economic climate in the United States. One such program was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the area that farmers could devote to wheat production in an effort to stabilize the national price of wheat. Filburn (plaintiff), a small farmer, was penalized pursuant to the Act for producing wheat in excess of the Act's quotas. Filburn filed suit against Secretary of Agriculture Wickard (defendant), seeking to enjoin enforcement against himself of the penalties. Filburn argued that because the excess wheat was produced for his own private consumption and never entered the stream of commerce, his activities could not be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. The district court agreed with Filburn that Congress’s regulations were unconstitutional, and the circuit court affirmed. Wickard appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Answer 42

The Constitution grants courts, not the political branches, the authority to determine the constitutionality of statutes. Congress enacted a law allowing Americans born in Jerusalem to list “Israel” as their birthplace on their passports. The policy of the State Department, under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (defendant), was to remain neutral on the political status of Jerusalem. Thus, the department refused to comply with the statute. Zivotofsky (plaintiff) sued in federal court. The court of appeals held that the determination of whether the statute was constitutional was a political question. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question.

CH 1 & 2 Flashcards

(66 cards)