Causation and remoteness Flashcards

1
Q

What does causation do?

A

Provide a link between D’s action and C’s loss, seeing if D should be liable for the loss in question.

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2
Q

Factual causation (‘but for’)

A

Would C’s damage have occurred but for D’s action?

The answer of yes or no is based on the balance of probabilities (as opposed to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in criminal law).

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3
Q

Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington [1969]

A

This case established the balance of probabilities and the but for test.
C’s husband taken ill at work, hospital negligently sent him home to get some rest. C died as a result of acute arsenic poisoning.
Held: C’s husband would have died but for doctor intervention, thus D’s negligence did not cause C’s loss.

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4
Q

Multiple potential causes

A

When it is factually impossible to establish a single cause of damage and there are various likely causes. This is an exception to the but for rule as one single defendant might not be 50% likely to have caused the damage.

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5
Q

Wilsher v Essex HA [1987]

A

Facts: A baby was placed in an incubator and negligently received too much oxygen. The baby developed an incurable eye condition.
Judgment: This was one of 5 potential causes however, so on the balance of probabilities it could not be proven to be the fault of the doctor.
A non-natural cause (i.e. negligence) must be the DOMINANT factor in causing the damage.

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6
Q

Material contribution to the harm

A

Where it can be found that a defendant materially contributed to the harm, then liability can be established.

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7
Q

Bailey v MoD [2008]

A

D materially contributed to the harm in the cause of a serious illness. Because the hospital’s negligence materially contributed to the harm (the illness had two competing causes, one natural and one negligent), the hospital was found liable.

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8
Q

Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956]

A

A factory allowed a negligent build up of dust to occur, an employee developed pneumoconiosis but it the but for test could not be established. The Lords bypassed the but for test by establishing that the employer contributed to the risk of contracting the disease and therefore ignored it.

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9
Q

Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) [2000]

A

Established in this case that compensation could only be claimed proportionate to the negligence of the defendant, based on the extent of exposure (time plus intensity).

Thus, following from Bonnington, where a diseased is contracted due to cumulative exposure, the negligent part need only contribute to the harm and not necessarily make it likely.

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10
Q

Material increase in risk

A

Where a defendant materially contributes to the risk of contracting a disease (i.e. one with a single exposure as the cause), they can be found liable, providing another exception to the but for test.

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11
Q

McGhee v National Coal Board [1973]

A

It could not be established if innocent or guilty exposure to brick dust was the cause of the claimant’s skin condition. The dust was innocent at work but guilty after work. The company was negligent in not providing showers at the work but since dermatitis was not a cumulative condition, the Lords found that the guilty dust increased the risk of disease thus making the employer liable.
This case shows that there still is a but for test involved - but for the defendant’s negligence, the risk would not have increased.

The idea that the material increase in risk was the same as a material increase in harm was rejected in Barker v Corus [2006].

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12
Q

The Mesothelioma Exception

A

This is an exception for this disease where the but for test can be established, but not for a single person. It was established in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002].

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13
Q

Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002]

A

Facts: C developed mesthelioma from asbestos exposure - it was out of negligence for one employer but it could not be establsihed which.
Judgment: it could not be established on the balance of probabilities that one defendant caused it, therefore they used McGhee as all employers materially increased the risk. Thus factual causation was established, but it could not be established for whom.
This was stressed as an EXCEPTION to the rule.

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14
Q

MoD v AB and Others [2012]

A

Limited Fairchild to mesothelioma as it would not be extended to various cancers caused by nuclear testings in the Pacific.

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15
Q

Barker v Corus [2006]

A

This case revisited Fairchild. It refined the principle that several employers would only be proportionately liable to the amount that they contributed to risk of mesothelioma (i.e. the amount of time spent with them).

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16
Q

Compensation Act 2006

A

This reversed the decision in Barker, stating that if conditions of Fairchild were met, then all negligent employers would be jointly and severally liable.

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17
Q

Sienkiewicz v Grief [2011]

A

This case questioned the Compensation Act and the Lords decided that one employer could be liable under the Fairchild principles. They believed that the but for test was unnecessary.
In this case, an individual was nelgigently exposed to asbestos in the work place but where they lived had an 18% increased risk of asbestos related diseases. Thus Fairchild was applied to a single employer.
Lord Barker stated that it would only apply to mesothelioma and the but for test will not be bypassed in other cases.

18
Q

Failure to inform

A

In Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985 a surgeon failed to disclose a tiny risk of paralysis in a back surgery. When the damage materialised the claimant claimed but was denied and the dr had no liability.

This changed in Chester v Afshar [2005] in which C developed a serious spinal condition following an operation, in which there was a tiny risk of it happening. The Lords found that it does not matter if she would have known of the risk and thus moved the operation to a later date, there was not sufficient causation of the doctor’s failure to disclose. Nonetheless it was found to be a breach of the doctors duty.

19
Q

Indeterminate causes

A

Where it cannot be determined which of the two defendant’s are liable, both will be found jointly liable.

20
Q

Cook v Lewis [1951]

A

Two hunters fired identical bullets and hit the claimant - it could not be established which hit the claimant thus they were jointly liable (even though it was clearly only one of them).

21
Q

Fitzgerland v Lane [1987]

A

Two successive car crashes caused the claimant to become tetraplegic. It could not be established which so both were found liable.

22
Q

Loss of chance

A

Where a chance is lost by the claimant as a result of another’s negligence, the chance must have been above 50% prior to the defendant’s negligence.

23
Q

Hotson v East Berks HA [1987]

A

C fell out of a tree, injured his hip and was negligently misdiagnosed in hospital.
His chance of developing the hip disease that following from the negligent misdiagnosis was still 75% despite the actiosn of the doctor, therefore it could not be established on the balance of probabilities that the negligence caused the disease to occur. Only a 25% chance of not developing the disease occurred.

24
Q

Gregg v Scott [2005]

A

A cancerous lump was misdiagnosed as not being cancerous. His chance of survival decreased from 42% to 25%, therefore he was still MORE LIKELY THAN NOT to have died.
The House of Lords held that a lost chance could not form the basis of a medical claim.

25
Q

Multiple sufficient causes

A

Where more than one tortfeasor passes the but for test but

  • one action is later than the other
  • the later action is non-tortious but still capable of giving rise to harm
26
Q

Baker v Willoughby [1970]

A

C’s leg was injured in a car accident as a result of D’s negligence. Later, a group of robbers shot the leg of C, making it have to be amputated.
It was held that D was only liable for the injury up to the point of the shooting, as the shooting obliterated the effect of the injury caused to him in the original incident.

27
Q

Jobling v Association Dairies [1982]

A

C injured his back from negligence of D. An unrelated back injury arose, completely debilitating him. It was held that C can claim up to the point of the natural disease; after that, the original damage is obliterated.

28
Q

Murrell v Healy [2001]

A

C was hit by a car and awarded £58,000.
A year later C was hit by another car and the court held that the later car need only compensate for the further damage caused by him.

29
Q

Legal causation

A

This aspect is broken into two questions:

  • Remoteness
  • Intervening acts (novus actus intervenius): has something broken the link between D’s negligent act and C’s loss?
30
Q

Remoteness

A

The basic test is that of reasonable foreseeability - was it foreseeable that D’s action would case C’s loss? (Wagon Mound No 1). The kind of damage must be foreseeable and it overruled the Re Polemis [1921] test in which D was liable for all consequences of their negligence.

Only the type of damage need by foreseeable, not the extent.

31
Q

Conarken Group v Network Rail Infrastructure [2011]

A

Confirmed that only the type of damage need be foreseeable, not the extent. This was not always so straightforward.
In Doughty v Turner Manufacturing [1964] a lid was knocked into a hot tub of liquid. While the chemical reaction that ensued was not foreseeable, the type of damage (burns) was foreseeable from the splashing from the lid. The extent and means of the damages does not manner as long as the damage is foreseeable.

32
Q

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963]

A

A manhole was let open by street workers with a sign and paraffin lights. A child walked up and fell in with a lamp. While an explosion by itself was not foreseeable, falling in the manhole with lamp and causing an explosion was. The boy could claim for burns.

33
Q

Tremain v Pike [1969]

A

A farmer allowed his farm to be infested with rats due to negligence. A worker developed a disease from rat urine; the rat urine disease was not foreseeable but damage from the rats was. Nonetheless the courts did not find for the claimant.

34
Q

Vacwell Engineering v BDH Chemicals [1971]

A

A small explosion was found to be foreseeable, therefore a large one was too.

35
Q

Egg shell skull rule (remoteness)

A

Displayed in Smith v Leech Brain [1962] a galvaniser was required to lift articles into a tank of molten metal; a bit spit out and burned him on the lip, creating a promoting agent of cancer from which he died. Because the physical damage (type) was foreseeable, the cancer (extent) was too and the employer was liable.

36
Q

Intervening acts

A

They must be sufficient to break the chain of causation.

37
Q

What kind of act is intervening?

A

Deliberately wrongful acts are sufficient (Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920]).
The latter act must not be foreseeable - if an act is foreseeable then it will unlikely break the chain of causation (Home Office v Dorset Yacht [1970]).

38
Q

Need it be negligent?

A

No, but it must be really foreseeable if it is not to break the chain of causation (Home Office v Dorset Yacht [1970]).

39
Q

Negligent acts breaking the chain of causastion

A

Rouse v Squires [1973]: lorry driver negligently caused his lorry to jackknife, two lorries stopped to help, a fourth lorry negligently crashed into the third lorry killing the driver. The chain of causation had not been broken and both drivers were liable.
Knightly v Johns [1982]: a nelgigent car accident occurred in a tunnel, and a police officer negligently ordered two subordinates to drive up the tunnel to stop traffic. When one officer was injured, he could not claim on the initial negligent driver, only his police boss.
Wright v Lodge [1993]: a car broke down and they negligently did not move onto the hard shoulder. A lorry driver negligently crashed into it, injuring a passenger and injuring people on the other side of the road. The lorry driver was found 100% liable for injuries to people on the other side of the road but 90% liable for damage to the passenger of the initially negligent car.

40
Q

Acts of the claimant

A

You can break your own chain of causation as inMcKew v Holland and Hannen [1969] where McKew suffered a leg injury at work due to his employer’s negligence. Later he was showing people around a house and fell down the stairs, launching himself to avoid hitting his head. This negligence broke the chain of causation and the employer was liable only to the point of the initial damage.
In Corr v IBC Vehicles [2008] a man was clinically depressed after a negligent work accident and his emlpoyer was found liable for his subsequent suicide as the suicide was not a free choice of the depressed man.

41
Q

What breaks the chain of causation?

A

An act by a third party if it was freely chosen or unreasonable. This breaks the chain (McKew).
Medical negligence typically won’t break the chain (Reaney v University Hospital of North Staffordshire [2014]).
Despite this, there is the exception that an unreasonable act won’t break the chain where D owed C a duty of care anyway (Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2000]).