Actions under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards
Three main cases
- Rylands v Fletcher [1868]
- Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather [1994]
- Transco v Stockport MBC [2004]
Rylands v Fletcher [1868]
D was a mill owner who employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on his land to provide water for his mill. During construction the contractors found disused shafts from the old coal mine on D’s land, which they assumed were blocked up. However the shafts were not blocked up and they burst after the reservoir was built, flooding the claimant’s mine. C claimed on D for damages.
Blackburn J: “the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
The House of Lords upheld this, adding that D must engage in ‘non natural’ use of land.
Four requirements arising out of Rylands
- D brings on his land for his own purposes something likely to do mischief
- It escapes
- It is a non natural use of the land (added by Cairns L in the HL of Rylands)
- Causes foreseeable damage of the relevant type (added 100+ years later in Cambridge Waters)
Requirement one of Rylands claim
‘THE DEFENDANT BRINGS ON HIS LAND FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES SOMETHING LIKELY TO DO MISCHIEF…’
it requires voluntary action and is often something not likely to do damage in and of itself (flagpole in Shiffman v Order of st John [1936]).
Transco effect on requirement one
Bingham ruled that it must be reasonably foreseeable for the ‘thing’ to do damage if it escapes. This set a high threshold.
Transco turned the ‘likely to do mischief’ test into a foreeseeability test.
Requirement two of Rylands claim
It must escape.
Read v Lyons 1947: artillery shell exploded in factory and hit someone IN the factory. Rylands could not be used. The ‘thing’ must leave D’s land.
Requirement three of RYlands claim
‘… WHICH REPRESENTS A NON-NATURAL USE OF LAND…’
Trees, shrubs, etc cannot give rise to liability (Giles v Walker [1890]).
Non-natural has become non-ordinary. In Stannard v Gore [2012] stacking tyres on a piece of land was deemed a natural use. The use of land changes with time.
Cambridge water effect on requirement three
The storage of chemicals on D’s land which reached a water was found to be a non-natural use of land (the ‘epitome’ of non-natural use). This was a liberal interpretation to the requirement.
Requirement four of a Rylands claim
‘… WHICH CAUSES FORESEEABLE DAMAGE OF THE RELEVANT TYPE.’
Goff equated non-natural use with reasonable use of land, establishing Rylands as an application of nuisance to one off escapes. He introduced the Wagon Mound (No 1) remoteness principle (where the kind of damage is foreseeable not the extent, which is the question asked by the courts).
Transo effect on requirement four
Approved and expanded on Cambridge Waters. Hoffman stated that ‘a useful guide in deciding whether the risk has been created by a non natural user of land is to ask whether the damage which eventuated was something against which the occupier could reasonably be expected to have insured himself.’
Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] FACTS
D owned and operated a tannery and used PCE (a chemical) for many years until 1976. Large quantities of this substance had spilled onto the floor and seeped through the concrete into the soil below, where it travelled,entering the watercourse and polluted a well 1.3 miles away used by Cambridge Waters to extract drinking water. Upon discovering the chemical (thanks to an EC directive forcing them to test for these chemicals) they had to move their well away, costing them £1m.
Goff, in the leading judgment, found that the storage of large quantities of chemicals was the epitome of a non natural use of land, notwithstanding any community benefit or that in a tannery it might seen as an ‘ordinary’ use of land. Entering the watercourse was deemed to be an isolated escape too, despite the fact that it happened over a period of time. Despite these liberal interpretations, C couldn’t recover due to the damage being too remote.
Transco v Stockport MBC [2004]
This case approved and expanded on Cambridge Waters. They were dealing with a non natural use of land, the lords strangely found pumping water to a block of flats as a natural use of land.
Transco made the mischief test harder to satisfy as well as the non natural use of land. All the lords agreed that non natural should require an extraordinary or unusual use of land. Piping water to flats obviously does not fit this description therefore as it is quite normal. Hoffman considered the economic effects of this rule and stated that ‘a useful guide in deciding whether the risk has been created by a non natural user of land is to ask whether the damage which eventuated was something against which the occupier could reasonably be expected to have insured himself.’
Who can sue under this rule?
Hunter v Canary Wharf: need a proprietary interest confirmed in Transco.
Rylands: cannot be for personal injury.
Institute for Animal Health: cannot claim for pure economic loss
Defences
Fault of claimant or express/implied consent
Escape caused by unforeseeable act of stranger
Act of God
Statutory authority
contributory negligence
volenti
Fault of claimant/express or implied consent
Ponting v Noakes [1894]: C’s horse reached over into D’s garden, ate a poisonous leaf and died. This was due to the horse’s own intrusion.
